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the vortex of creation is the vortex of destruction 
the vortex of artistic creation is the vortex of self-destruction 
the vortex of political creation is the vortex of flesh destruction 
 flesh is in the fire, it curls and terribly warps 
fat is in the fire, it drips and sizzling sings 
bones are in the fire 
  the crack tellingly in 
  subtle hieroglyphs of oracle  
 charcoal singed 
the smell of your burning hair 
for every revolutionary must at last will his own desteruction  
rooted as he is in the past he sets out to destroy 
 




What good is a book that does not even carry us beyond all books?  
 
 –Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science  
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Introduction: The Impossibility of Foucaultian Commentary, The 
Exhaustion of Neoliberalism, and Critique  
 
The student has no interests. The student’s 
interests must be identified, declared, pursued, 
assessed, counseled, and credited. Debt 
produces interests. The student will be indebted. 
The student will be interested. Interest the 
students! The student can be calculated by her 
debts, can calculate her debts with her interests. 
She is in sight of credit, in sight of graduation, 
in sight of being a creditor, of being invested in 




0.0 Arriving at the Point of Departure 
 To write critically is to take up a position that one is always already in the act of leaving. 
The gesture of critique is not only a certain refusal of the given, but flight, abandonment, or 
desertion. As Foucault once said, “My problem, or the only theoretical work that I feel is 
possible for me, is leaving the trace, in the most intelligible outline possible, of the movements 
by which I am no longer at the place where I was earlier.” (GL, 76) 
But in truth, this dissertation is an attempt to arrive at something that has for some time 
now already been evident. The anonymous insurrectionary collective Tiqqun put it forward in 
2004. Situated between September 11, 2001 and the global financial crisis of 2007 – 2008, they 
asserted an ethical-political starting point when they wrote:  
The “we” that speaks here is not a delimitable, isolated we, the we of a group. It is the we 
of a position. In these times, this position is asserted as a double secession: secession first 
with the process of capitalist valorization; then secession with all the sterility entailed by 
a mere opposition to empire, extra-parliamentary or otherwise; thus a secession with the 
left. (Tiqqun 2016, 10)  
Tiqqun’s call sought to both break from and organize against the reduction of life and non-life to 
governability, whether that governability was ushered by capitalism or so-called resistance 
against it. There is another anonymous insurrectionary text that was published in late 1990s Italy 
called, At Daggers Drawn which emphatically exclaims that, “The secret is to really begin,” that 
is, to initiate the movement by which insurrection becomes possible.2  
However, philosophy has always had a problem with beginning and firstness. Both in that 
it has always had trouble thinking with respect to the conditions of time, but also in that it has 
tended to defer action and thinking about action until it has satisfied itself with thinking about 
thinking. As Reiner Schürmann argues, in such (metaphysical) thought about thought, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Moten, Fred and Stefano Harney. The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study. Brooklyn: Minor 
Compositions, 2013.  
2 At Daggers Drawn is an Italian insurrectionary anarchist text by the anonymous publishing project “NN” that 
sought to assess anarchist modes of thinking and acting in 1998. NN. At Daggers Drawn. Trans., Weir, Jean, John 
Moore, and Leigh Stracross. Santa Cruz: Quiver Distro, 2006.  
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dominant tendency has been to seek the first principles of thought and its proper objects. 
Philosophy turns to praxis and life only after it has grounded them in thought so as to 
subordinate them to its order. (Schürmann 1987, 3-4) Thus philosophy has it that true action only 
begins in (or must at least be verified by) principled thought. Yet such thought rarely thinks of 
itself as a practice in the sense of having already made a practical decision about life. This is a 
decision that philosophy could not possibly have grounded in advance; and it is one that 
philosophy can only rationalize after the fact, often by neglecting (or trying to overcome the fact) 
that thought, too, had to begin without arriving at its beginning.  
Is it any different with philosophy in the academy? There, thought qua philosophy 
assumes its jurisdiction on the condition that it abstracts itself from academic practice in order to 
treat the latter as a non-philosophical problem. Academic philosophy rarely acknowledges that 
its contingency—that it is practiced this way—has already been made to appear as necessary. 
That is, it thinks in the forgetfulness of decisions it has already made; it thinks within forms of 
action and life to which it cannot remember having already philosophically committed itself. 
However far it may go in questioning, such philosophy largely finds its limit in practical 
conditions that appear to it as a given reality. Thus, either philosophy never problematizes its 
practice or if it does, it finds itself in the cynicism that Peter Sloterdijk described as “enlightened 
false consciousness”: the impotence of critique when it endlessly undoes its own representations 
without being able to challenge the grip that such representations have on practical life. 
(Sloterdijk 1987, 5)  
One could just as well follow this line of inquiry from the perspective of those who 
would begin to do academic philosophy as from the perspective of those of us who have been 
more or less programmed by it. What does it take—what operations intervene—to turn an 
encounter that produces a desire to think into a research interest? Or, what must be so 
overwhelmingly given in order for the desire to think to eventually become the desire to sell 
oneself on the market in an array of expert research products? As Fred Moten and Stefano 
Harney say, such an interest these days is not innocent, but guilty, that is to say, indebted to 
creditors who are experts at turning debt into credit and academic citizenship.  
The impulse behind this dissertation comes from the notion that philosophy is a critical 
departure from the givens of our practical lives. That is why the starting point for me in writing 
this dissertation is our situation in the academy, which increasingly models itself on the market 
and induces its subjects to live their lives and relate to others in economic terms. And it is part of 
the reason why, as an academic dissertation in philosophy, it is about Foucault. The choice of a 
figure-oriented project here is partly institutional: how else to justify the proposal to think along 
this line and with this target other than by appealing to the legitimacy of writing on one of the 
most cited philosophers in the humanities?  
Yet, the gesture of refusal and taking leave (or of abandonment, displacement, and flight) 
that characterizes Foucault’s work is practically and theoretically useful. To start philosophizing, 
as he did, with madness, death, delinquency, the unlivable, the ungovernable, the scandalous—
whatever instance one prefers—is not to concern oneself with a pure beginning. It is to expressly 
start with a singular limit of discourse. These limit-experiences of discourse provided his 
philosophy with its critical edge because they allowed him to describe how discourse constituted 
itself through an attempt to capture them. In this way, his writing illuminated the contingent 
origins of the concepts and practices we have inherited and spurred readers to think and act 
otherwise. The practice of critique, then, is the consistent repetition of a gesture of leaving and 
becoming different. It is what Foucault called desubjection in relation to the subjects we are as 
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effects of discourse and power.  
As with any writing on Foucault, this puts a dissertation on his work into a tricky 
situation. The definition of critique above makes philosophical commentary into an oxymoron 
and condemns every attempt to philosophically comment on his work to be either an exercise in 
irony or an outright failure. This is due to what Foucault called the principle of exteriority: never 
seek to interpret, comment, or explain; don’t try to articulate the non-said of one or several 
texts—seek instead to describe the historical occurrence of discourse in power relations. As he 
states, “I have tried to get rid of textuality by situating myself in the dimension of history, that is 
to say locating discursive events that take place, not within the text or several texts, but through 
the fact of the function or role given to different discourses within a society.” (WK, 198)   
 When Foucault does provide readings of philosophers, it is always because their writing 
somehow figured as a disruption in the order of discourse that is still to some extent present for 
us, as in the case of Nietzsche’s break with anthropology. That is, philosophically reading other 
philosophers does not involve commentary, but finding things in them that one can affirm and 
use because they still allow us a point of attack in our historical situation. To block this 
movement and fix the vocabulary by way of commentary is anti-philosophical.  
As for this dissertation and its abundance of commentary, it is admittedly uncritical to the 
extent that it is assumes the value of commentary and communication. One way of reading what 
I have written here is to see it as a commentary on Foucault that uses him to critique 
neoliberalism. In that sense, it is an “argument” for struggling against neoliberalism, grounded in 
a Foucaultian conception of critique. However, as I’ll discuss, struggle—including the struggle 
that is critique itself—does not need reasons. Struggle against or within a mode of power need 
not delegitimate its target on the basis of a better-founded legitimacy, just as the target of a mode 
of power does not automatically gives us the ground on which to struggle (say, the demos contra 
the market, the proletariat contra the bourgeoisie, or humanity contra domination in general). 
Instead, as I’ll discuss in a moment, struggle is a practice of ungrounding, or, following 
Foucault’s reading of the Cynics, it is the practice of the destitution of grounds.  
I said a moment ago that this dissertation began as an attempt to critically evaluate the 
conditions of its production in the academic marketplace, however, it’s real starting point is a 
sensibility shared by many of us, myself included, that the neoliberal future we live within 
ourselves is exhausted in the sense of being a dead-end and exhausting in the sense that there is 
something cruel and even intolerable about our practices of self-investment in what increasingly 
resembles a desert. But the difference between a breakdown and a breakaway hinges on finding 
something propitious at the limits of one’s ability to repeat and go on performing the gestures of 
normative existence. And it’s necessary to affirm something other than the traps offered by either 
the hope for some soteriological event or the cynicism that compensates itself for its impotence 
with the pleasure of knowing the extent of its excuses. To the extent that this dissertation 
succeeds as a critique, it is only as an attempt to gain some orientation and tool-up in a 
desubjection that is already underway.  
that sense, this dissertation was written in search of an exit. The theme here is not that 
cliché of self-loss on the way to self-discovery. Instead, it is about finding something unexpected 
at the limits of one’s ability to repeat and go on performing the gestures of normative existence. 
That something else appears at the end of the dissertation, namely, insurrectionary communism. 
This isn’t the only way out of neoliberalism, but it is one that attempts to face up to the full 
extent of its subjections while carrying out its critique, that is, while overcoming the limits it 
imposes on the present.  
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This dissertation unfolds through seven chapters, including the conclusion. The first four 
of these chapters are concerned with defining Foucault’s concept of critique in relation to its 
object and the conditions that make this critique possible. The first chapter situates Foucault 
during his archaeological period in relation to the critique of anthropology as a set of rules for 
the production of the concepts, objects, subjects, and strategies of knowledge. My reading of 
Foucault begins here because his notion of critique as a practice of desubjection is to a large part 
owing to its anthropological object. And in later chapters I will argue that Foucault’s political 
critiques of apparatuses of power are also critiques of their epistemological forms, as modern 
apparatuses are defined by anthropological discursive strategies. As a mode of producing 
knowledge, anthropological knowledge grounds itself on a mark of finitude found within the 
objective contents of human experience. Moreover, it posits itself in a fundamental relation to the 
alterity contained within experience and thereby narrates the relation between knowledge and 
experience as the history of overcoming or grappling with this relation. Neoliberalism, for 
instance, founds its anthropology on the scarcity of time available to human economic subjects, 
which is rather an effect of market competition as a model for power relations. It understands 
itself politically as the overcoming of economic irrationality (whose most evil form is 
totalitarianism) through the progressive liberalization of capitalist societies.  
In the second chapter I will move to look at how Foucault understood the basis of his 
archeological critique of anthropology, which he identified as the being of language. His mode of 
“access” to the being of language is itself archaeological in that it is found in the cracks that have 
formed in the historical strata of anthropological discourse. For Foucault, Mallarmé and 
Nietzsche stand as two divergent ruptures with “man.” Their writing attests to the fundamentally 
unmasterable character of language and the impossibility of reducing it to subjective conditions 
of knowledge. Whether one understands the being of language as an anonymous and impersonal 
speech without signification (Mallarmé) or as the eternal return that ungrounds all relations of 
power (Nietzsche), language is essentially an event without any metaphysical or historical 
ground. However, the undecidable alternative posed by these two writers presents decisive stakes 
for critique, which Foucault was forced to confront toward the end of the 1960s. A declining 
literary avant-garde and the problematization of literature by the student uprisings in Tunisia and 
France in 1968 pushed him toward Nietzsche and a re-evaluation of his thought in relation to the 
upsurge of Marxism at this time. 
 Chapters Three and Four together seek to articulate Foucaultian critique after the 
genealogical turn as the politics of truth. The politics of truth bases itself on the open, 
ungrounding character of power relations by rooting itself in struggles of desubjection. These 
seek to break away from forms of power that crystalize their fluidity through processes of 
subjection. This involves historically tracing the relation between discourse and power in order 
to strengthen and multiply such struggles. As the politics of truth, then, philosophy is a partisan 
enterprise. Yet it is more than its partisanship with what escapes subjection—it is also itself a 
practice of desubjection that seeks to consistently practice the gesture of suspending universals 
and undoing the effects of power in the self—particularly those that result from being codified as 
an anthropological subject. Critique involves forming a subjectivity whose substance is 
exclusively ethical and political because it is formed out of its relation to struggle. As I will go 
on to discuss in Chapter Four, in the context of Foucault’s studies of governmentality, critique is 
an art of becoming ungovernable that connects the gesture of critique to all the rest that make up 
a life. Specifically, it is an askēsis, or consistent test of oneself in terms of desubjection. As such, 
it is an ethical and political style of existence.  
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 The remaining three chapters of this dissertation analyze Foucault’s reading of 
neoliberalism as a test of his understanding of critique, as neoliberalism models power relations 
on the fluid and constantly shifting market, which produces subjectivities that must constantly 
change and adapt to their conditions. From a Foucaultian perspective, neoliberalism is a 
paradoxical discourse of governmentality for two reasons.  
First, neoliberalism does not epistemologically ground the market in human nature, 
which is to say that it does not naturalize the market at the level of its premises. Depending on 
who one reads, neoliberals posit the market either as an institution based on the 
phenomenological suspension of the natural attitude toward the economy, as the historical 
product of spontaneous social organization, or as a “non-false” hypothesis on human behavior. 
And yet, neoliberal theorists pursue economic policies that function to model all power relations 
on the market, including those which traditional liberal discourse deems to be either social or 
political. The proliferation and generalization of the market functions to adapt subjects to 
economic rationality (the allocation of scarce resources to competing ends) to the point where the 
entirety of one’s worldly relations are framed in market terms. Thus, while neoliberals do not 
begin from the premise that the market is a necessary form of human life, they naturalize it in 
their consequences nonetheless by governing all other modes of life into nonexistence. 
Furthermore, they not only seek to format all human life in economic terms, but they seek to 
abolish all other forms of existence that would limit neoliberal expansion as potentially 
totalitarian.  
Second, neoliberalism paradoxically models economic subjection in terms of economic 
freedom. By bracketing the exercise of power to the contractual categories of coercion and 
deception, neoliberals envision all economic activity as an exercise of freedom. This is amplified 
by the way they generally understand economic subjectivity as an enterprise, which is taken to its 
furthest extreme in Gary Becker’s concept of human capital. Human capital hypothesizes that all 
subjective powers of action function under market conditions as capital according to economic 
rationality. Under market competition and its price mechanism, which signals value in terms of 
supply and demand, subjects must constantly invest in themselves so as to maximize (or at least 
minimally enhance) their human capital according to the needs of the market. The neoliberal 
image of life is thus fluid as it requires indefinite self-transformation so as to be in step with the 
market. The neoliberal form of subjection therefore paradoxically establishes itself on the 
freedom of subjects to choose their own lives amongst competing possibilities under the pressure 
to reinvent themselves for the market.  
Together, Chapters Five and Six offer the elements of a Foucaultian critique of the 
neoliberalism as a form of governmentality. They include neoliberalism’s narrow delimitation of 
power relations and possibilities of existence that seeks to fix them to an economic form; the 
neoliberal attack on all other forms of life based on what Foucault calls a “paranoiac,” 
“inflationary critique” of the totalitarianism lurking within them; and the production of 
subjectivities that are “eminently governable” by acting on the market conditions in which they 
are ineluctably captured or produced. (BB, 131; 269; 188; 209; 207) 
Finally, starting from Foucault’s concept of critique and his analysis of neoliberalism, I 
present two ways for thinking about how to critically resist neoliberalism. As I said at the outset 
of this introduction, this dissertation is in part simply an effort to arrive where others have 
already begun. If the task of critique is to increase grow capacities of resistance and intensify 
struggles of desubjection, then one form of struggle that has emerged since the rise of 
neoliberalism is insurrectionary communism. Whether one traces it back to the Italian Autonomia 
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movement of the 70s or the “left-communist” writings began in the latter half of that decade, 
insurrectionary communism understands itself not as a mode of production but as a form of 
struggle. Moreover, it views communism itself—or communization—as a means of struggle. 
This involves thinking communism as a specifically non-economic, political form of rationality 
whose question concerns the reciprocal growth of powers of existence and political relations of 
friendship and camaraderie. Secondly, after a brief reading of Foucault’s concept of parrhesia, 
particularly as it pertains to the Cynics, I argue that an ethical existence today must “change the 
value of the currency” of neoliberal life. (CT, 240) One must destitute neoliberal codes of 
conduct and divest from the modes of accumulating human capital. This involves practices of 
incivility, hostility, and scandalousness as it makes living a different life the condition of living 
well. Finally, it involves living this different life as risky proposal to others to desert unfreedom 
together.  	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Chapter 1: The Problem of Archaeology: Anthropology 
 
Anthropology constitutes perhaps the 
fundamental arrangement that has governed 
and controlled the path of philosophical 
thought from Kant until our own day. This 
arrangement is essential, since it forms part 
of our history; but it is disintegrating before 
our eyes, since we are beginning to 
recognize and denounce in it, in a critical 
mode, both a forgetfulness of the opening 
that made it possible and a stubborn 
obstacle standing obstinately in the way of 




By the end of his life, Foucault’s philosophy expressed a unity of two seemingly separate 
lines of inquiry and concern. Regardless of whether he called his thinking archaeology, 
genealogy, or an “ascesis,” he sought to undertake a history of the present and to abolish “man” 
and subjectivity as both a condition of knowledge and an effect of power. This destruction is 
what he calls “desubjection” (désassujettissement in French): undoing not only the contents of 
the self (one’s practices, thoughts, and qualities), but the very form of one’s selfhood, including 
the discursive, political, and ethical conditions of its existence and intelligibility.3 To the extent 
that it is possible to define modernity for Foucault, it revolves around a determinate form of 
selfhood, namely, “man.” A backward glance at Foucault’s work sees him develop strategies for 
diagnosing and transforming the historical present through the undoing of the subject and, vice 
versa, the practice of undoing the subject that one is by historically questioning the limits of 
what is possible in the present.4   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is necessary to immediately add two comments on this word. First, just as there are different ways to translate 
assujettissement, there is an even greater variety of ways to translate désassujettissement. In order to distinguish 
assujettissement (the production of subjectivity by relations of power) from subjectivation (the ethico-aesthetic 
practice of self-fashioning and self-formation) in Foucault, I use the simple word “subjection” to translate and refer 
to assujettissement. That makes it easy to “translate” subjectivation simply as subjectivation. As for 
désassujettissement, in translations of Foucault one finds a plethora: “desubjugation,” “desubjectivation,” 
“desubjectification,” and “desubjection.” To make things straightforward, I have chosen to go with “desubjection.” 
There is one instance (in his 1978 interview with Duccio Trombadori) where he uses the word “dé-subjectivation,” 
however, from the context it is clear that he is using it synonymously with désassujettissement. Secondly, to my 
knowledge, the first instance of désassujettissement occurs in 1971, where Foucault identifies it with struggle amidst 
power relations, in particular, with class struggle prior to his break with the Maoists and the ultra-left after the Bruay 
en Artois affair in 1972. However, the most suggestive use of the word comes later, in 1978, when Foucault reflects 
back upon his interest in Nietzsche, Bataille, and Blanchot, and finds in all of them a thought arranged around a 
limit-experience which forms “a project of desubjectivation [une entreprise de dé-subjectivation].” (EF3, 241). 
4 Tracing the unity of these two lines in Foucault’s work is difficult. Up until the end of the 1960s, his work is Janus-
faced, divided between “positive studies” that describe the discursive formations leading up to the present on the one 
hand and, on the other, so-called works of “passion” that speak of transgressing the epistemic limits of discourse: 
“For a long while, there has been in me a space of poorly resolved conflict between the passion for Bataille and 
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Critique names the unity of these two lines in Foucault’s work and constitutes his central 
philosophical task. As other scholars have pointed out, he always understood his works in 
different ways as attempts to think the historical emergence and undoing of limits: the limits of 
forms of discourse, the limits of apparatuses and modes of exercising power, and the limits by 
which an ethical practice forges a self.5 And he put forward a critical philosophy that sought to 
undo the limits that make us what we are by questioning not only what philosophy is, but also 
what makes it possible in our own time as the thinking of historical limits.6 Hence, the unity of 
the history of the present and desubjection is the critical philosophy of discourse, power, and the 
subject. 
This chapter has two main objectives. After setting down some of his archaeological 
vocabulary, the first is begin to show the unity of the history of the present and desubjection in 
Foucault’s thought by drawing upon textual evidence from his 1960s archaeological period (I 
will continue to argue for it in later periods of his work in the following chapters). To this end I 
will start by looking at his remarks on the problem of the beginning of philosophy, in which he 
claims that philosophical critique has two external conditions: non-philosophical discourse on 
the one hand and, on the other, what Foucault calls the being of language, is both the ground and 
abyss of discourse as such.  
Second, I would like to present anthropology as the historical problem of critique, that is, 
as both the primary subject matter of the history of the present and the target of desubjection. 
Though Foucault initially develops his concept of anthropology in his Introduction to Kant’s 
Anthropology, I will focus on its mature formulation in The Order of Things, which defines the 
target of much of Foucault’s philosophy, namely, the conceptual image of man as a set of rules 
governing discourse. This will take my reading up to the brink of the second condition of 
philosophy, by showing how Foucault’s concern with the being of language emerges within the 
critique of anthropology, or, more precisely, at the limits of anthropological discourse. For now, 
in order to explain Foucault’s idiosyncratic definition of critique, it is necessary to start at the 
beginning, as it were, and see how the history of the present and desubjection find their unity in 
what makes critique possible.  
 
1.1 The Beginning of Philosophy 
Ever since Kant, critique has had to satisfy two conditions owing to the subject-object 
distinction from which it begins. First, every critique must question its own activity of thought 
and, secondly, it must do so by interrogating its relation to its subject matter. However, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Blanchot on the one hand and, on the other, the interest that I nourished for certain positive studies, like those of 
Dumézil and Levi-Strauss for example. But, at bottom, these two orientations, of which the unique common 
denominator was perhaps constituted by the religious problem, equally contributed to lead me to the problem of the 
disappearance of the subject.” (DE1, 642) 
5 Included among those who insist on the critical nature of Foucault’s work, I refer to Rudi Visker’s Michel 
Foucault: Genealogy as Critique, Judith Butler’s “What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” Béatrice 
Han’s Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical, and, more recently, Colin 
Koopman’s Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity.  
6 In Badiou’s Metapolitics, one reads, “As for [Foucault], who could fail to recognise that Foucault “twisted” 
philosophy towards an archival history of epistemic singularities, that he was more of a historian than any of us, to 
the extent that nowadays his followers are much more active in the profession of the “human sciences” than in “pure” 
philosophy? Besides, everybody knows that Foucault’s real philosophical referent was Nietzsche and that, despite 
the latter’s silent latency in Foucault’s published work, Foucault is the Prince of contemporary anti-philosophy.” 
(Badiou 2005, 52) 
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Foucault said to an interviewer in 1975, “Only a Kantian could attribute a general meaning to the 
word ‘critique.’”7 (DE1, 1683) Whereas Kant could begin to philosophize on the basis of 
experience in general, Foucault does not permit himself to assume the generality of experience 
and thus he denies the universality of its formal conditions. In order to determine the 
philosophical character of Foucaultian critique, we must see how it responds to one of 
philosophy’s perennial questions, “where does philosophy begin?”  
Foucault poses this question in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1970 
(The Discourse on Language). Though he does not answer it directly, one can gather a response 
both from the lecture and the whole of his work: for Foucault, a pure philosophical beginning is 
impossible because the subject matter of philosophy necessarily escapes it, refusing its 
incorporation and mastery within the limits of knowledge, thus consigning philosophy to history. 
What follows in this section is a brief elaboration of two clues that point in this direction. The 
first is the claim that philosophy does not begin with the interiority of its own discourse, but with 
the critique of historical discourses, the chief object of Foucault’s work being anthropology (at 
least until his turn to ethics). The second is that the historical character of discourse is in turn due 
to the fact that language fundamentally resists totalization by philosophical discourse. Now, 
neither of these claims can be examined in abstraction from Foucault’s own critique of 
anthropology; they will thus have to wait to until the beginning of the next chapter to be borne 
out. Nonetheless, I would like to take a moment here to point out Foucault’s own explicit 
comments on this question of the beginning of philosophical critique.   
The Discourse on Language begins and ends on the theme of beginning. Foucault begins 
the lecture thus: “I would really like to have slipped imperceptibly into this lecture…I would 
have preferred to be enveloped in words, borne way beyond all possible beginnings.” (AK, 215) 
These words point to the institutional site that is the Collège de France, which requires that an 
author-function be attached to the speech that takes place within it. To speak from a chair 
position at the Collège requires authorization on the basis of a high degree of mastery over one’s 
speech and what it designates. Speaking from such a position means that one is, in a way, the 
origin of one’s speech, because one has been recognized not only as having something original to 
say, but as a universal representative of human knowledge. To indicate a desire to be enveloped 
by speech and disappear within it is to point to the tension between the stratified character of the 
Collège and what Foucault considers to be the fundamental character of language, namely, its 
unmasterability, or the fact that the speaking subject cannot control the conditions and the effects 
of its speech. This unmasterability marks the impossibility of beginning, which accounts for the 
historical character of philosophical critique.  
The Discourse on Language ends by treating the question of beginning in homage to his 
late mentor, Jean Hyppolite. As he recounts the lessons he learned from Hyppolite’s philosophy, 
many of Foucault’s remarks could be applied to himself. His apprenticeship was over twenty 
years old when Hyppolite died in 1968 and it was Hyppolite who formerly occupied the empty 
chair at the Collège that Foucault was to receive.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Foucault: “Throughout my research, I try, conversely, to avoid all reference to this transcendental, which would be 
a condition of possibility for all knowledge. When I say that I try to avoid it, I do not affirm that I am sure of 
achieving this. My way of proceeding at this moment is of a regressive type, I would say; I tried to take on an 
increasingly large detachment in order to define the historical conditions and transformations of our knowledge. I 
tried to historicize to the maximum in order to leave as little place as possible for the transcendental. I cannot 
eliminate the possibility of finding myself, one day, faced with a non-negligible residue that would be the 
transcendental.” (DE1, 1241)  
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The transformative power of Hyppolite’s work on Hegel, Foucault says, lay in how he 
conceived of philosophy as “an endless task, against the background of an infinite horizon…a 
task in the process of continuous recommencement...as the thought of the inaccessible totality.”8 
This endless repetition of the gesture of beginning is due to the insurmountable character of 
history. In Hyppolite, it was Marx who first insisted on this point, which posed the greatest 
difficulty for Hegel: “if philosophy really must begin as absolute discourse, then what of history, 
and what is this beginning which starts out with a singular individual, within a society and a 
social class, and in the midst of struggle?”9 (AK, 236) Caught between the aspirations for 
absolute knowledge and a singularly contingent starting point, Hyppolite turned to non-
philosophical discourses:10 
In order not to reduce them, but to think them, thus philosophy was to examine the 
singularity of history, the regional rationalities of science…thus arose the notion of a 
philosophy that was…uncertain, mobile all along its line of contact with non-
philosophy…But, if it is in repeated contact with non-philosophy, where then lies the 
beginning of philosophy? Is it already there, secretly present in that which is not 
philosophy?...But perhaps, from that point on, philosophy has no raison d’être… (Ibid., 
236) 
Philosophy, for Hyppolite begins with the already-said of discourse in order to undo the self-
evidence of the concepts handed down to us. Every attempt at a pure beginning will hence be 
ineluctably mediated by what has been said and philosophy will never be able to overcome this 
condition because it is what makes it possible in the first place.11 It is also why all philosophical 
ventures are “doomed historically to history” and thus subject to critically recoiling back on 
themselves. (BC, xvi) The task, then, is not to reveal the universal in the history of discourse, but 
to show the contingent historicality of discourse in all so-called universal concepts. Eight years 
later, in his course titled Security, Territory, Population, Foucault criticizes the inadequacy of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Hyppolite on the totality as present only in its absence: “The totality is always immanent…the Whole is there 
insofar as it is excluded, sublated; it is there because it is lacking; it is there as negation in the position and as 
internal negativity. The whole that we would like to put outside is in fact inside, like the exterior which is only an 
interior.” (Hyppolite 1997, 162)  
9 Hyppolite on the impasse in Hegel’s alternative to Marx’s idea that history is the realization of humanity: “Being-
for-itself must consent to mediation, to the history which thinks itself as common work, the work of all and each. 
This work thinks itself by making itself; this work is the history of finite, objective spirit, and there is a philosophy 
of history because it is impossible to conceive history, at least retrospectively, without determining it as sense. It is 
here that Hegelianism presents almost insurmountable difficulties. What is the relation between absolute knowledge, 
the Logos, and this philosophy of history? For Hegel, is the common work Humanity? We can respond to the second 
question quite clearly. Humanity as such is not the supreme end for Hegel. When man is reduced to himself, he is 
lost…” (Hyppolite 1997, 186). 
10 Hyppolite’s position on the relation between philosophy and non-philosophy is rooted in the notion that non-
philosophical discourses are themselves the unfolding of the logic of sense and thus reveal the Absolute under a 
certain aspect: “I think that there is a strict relation between philosophy and the non-philosophical, between 
philosophy and its conditions, between philosophy and the conditions of its time; the philosopher thinks her time, 
she was raised in thought and she depends on non-philosophy to the degree that…to the degree that it is not a pure 
form and to the degree that there are non-philosophical sources of philosophy.” (Badiou and Hyppolite 2013, 7) 
11 This echoes the eulogy Foucault wrote for his mentor the year before: “[Hyppolite] had taught us, finally, that 
philosophical thought is an incessant practice; that it is a certain way of putting non-philosophy to work, while 
always remaining as close to it as possible, where it is tied to existence.” (DE1, 813)  
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historicism on this very point when he says that it “starts from the universal and, as it were, puts 
it through the grinder of history.”12 (BB, 3)  
Nevertheless, Foucault made Hyppolite’s lesson his own and, as I will continue to show 
in what follows, he goes further than Hyppolite by committing himself to the position that non-
philosophical discourses are neither particular moments of philosophical consciousness, nor are 
they pregnant with the universal concepts of scientific self-consciousness.13 If philosophy’s 
encounter with historical discourse and its relentless self-criticism of false universals is not 
owing to the restlessness of alienated self-consciousness pursuing its true, absolute form, then 
what compels philosophy toward critique in the first place?  
The very historicality of discourse, the fact that it has always already begun, is rooted in 
its unmasterability, or the fact that no subject will ever be able to finally and fully account for 
itself and thereby master all language. This limit of speech pertains to what Foucault calls the 
being of language, which I will address in the next chapter after showing how it emerges in his 
critique of anthropology. The unmasterability of language that accounts for the historicality of 
discourse and the impossibility of purely beginning is however also what makes critique possible 
by undoing subjectivity in advance. The unmasterability of language, then, is both what 
determines critical philosophy as a history of the present and what allows it to be a practice of 
desubjection, even as it withdraws philosophy’s reason for being. Therefore, as a history of the 
present that inclines toward the undoing of the subject, philosophy is thrown outside of itself in 
two respects. One, philosophy relies on discourse outside of itself, which serves as its object and 
determines it in its historicity. And two, philosophy is conditioned by the limit of discourse, or 
language itself in its unmasterability, which destines philosophy to become other than itself.  
As I have argued for here, philosophy’s relation to itself and its object on the basis of the 
being of language cannot be fully accounted for without examining Foucault’s critique of his 
object, namely, anthropological discourse. For it is only within this critique that he discovers the 
being of language at the limits of anthropology. My next major move will be to present 
Foucault’s critique of anthropology, but only after taking a moment to lay down some of 
Foucault’s elementary concepts of the archaeology of discourse.   
  
1.2 The Vocabulary of Archaeology: Discourse, The Historical A Priori, and the 
Archive  
 The Archaeology of Knowledge fixes the vocabulary of Foucault’s first major 
methodological period. Relying on The Archaeology—or any of his texts for that matter—to 
explain Foucault’s project is risky for the reason that, in its time, it was only the latest in a series 
of erasures and revisions that he exacted upon his own work. And it would soon find itself 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Also, Foucault states in The Archaeology of Knowledge, “[O]ne describes the conceptual network [of a discursive 
formation] on the basis of the intrinsic regularities of discourse; one does not subject the multiplicity of statements 
to the coherence of concepts, and this coherence to the silent recollection of a meta-historical ideality.” (AK, 62) 
13 This is not to mention the problems concerning history and contradiction that Deleuze raises in his review of 
Logic and Existence. Arguably Deleuze’s review begins an intellectual relation between himself and Foucault that 
will see the two of them tacitly write for and respond to one another up until their spilt in the winter of 1977-78. 
Deleuze’s review highlights Hyppolite’s difficulty with accounting for history without falling back into the 
philosophical anthropology from which Hyppolite had tried so hard to extricate himself. Not only will this be the 
very challenge that Foucault sets for himself and which comes to a head in The Order of Things, but Deleuze sets 
himself the task of fulfilling Hyppolite’s philosophy of a logic of sense without reducing difference to contradiction 
in Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense. Difference and Repetition is in many ways a rejoinder to The Order 
of Things and constitutes an encounter with the twofold outside of philosophy as well.  
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revised in the turn to genealogy.14 Nonetheless, it is useful to begin with the results of this period 
in which Foucault formulated his critique of anthropology and arrived at a set of hypotheses on 
the basic features of language and discourse.  
I will restrict myself in this section to the following terms from The Archaeology of 
Knowledge in order to specify the archaeological level of analysis: the statement, discursive 
formation (or episteme in The Order of Things), the historical a priori, and knowledge (qua 
savoir as distinct from connaissance). In short, what I would like to clarify here is that the 
archaeology situates its analysis at the level of knowledge, which consists of statements and their 
groupings into discursive formations according to historical rules. It is helpful to distinguish 
statements from sentences and propositions by the character of their rules, by their positivity, and 
by the relations that statements have with sentences and propositions.  
Let’s start with the rules of these different modes of language. It can be said that the finite 
set of historically contingent grammatical rules makes possible an infinite number of sentences, 
just as the same can be said for propositions on the basis of a finite set of universally valid 
logical principles. However, while the rules governing statements are finite in number in any 
given instance, they do not enable an infinite number of statements. Rather what the historical a 
priori makes exist is a finite set of statements that make up a discursive formation. That is, the 
rules governing statements are finite not only in their number, but also in the duration of their 
hold on discourse. And the statements they govern are likewise not merely finite in number but 
also in that they belong to what has been said more than being actualizations of what is formally 
possible to say. They belong to history, not empirical or logical possibility. In other words, 
statements are finite because the rules by which they come to pass are themselves historically 
finite.  
Secondly, the positivity of statements may be distinguished from the negativity of 
sentences and propositions. Sentences and propositions introduce negativity into language 
because they are determined in relationship to something outside of them, which they lack in 
themselves. Sentences always point beyond themselves toward their meaning, while propositions 
are measured by their truthfulness in relation to what they denote. Foucault repeatedly distanced 
himself from two of his French contemporaries: Jacques Lacan’s structuralist analysis of the 
signifier as the absent term structuring the symbolic unconscious and Jacques Derrida’s 
deconstruction of binary oppositions that suppress the unsayable in order to establish textual 
meaning, à la différance. And he refused to view language from the perspective of the concept 
and its movement in objective spirit, as Hegel did. 
Foucault calls discursive formations of statements positivities because one arrives at them 
simply by describing what has been said, yet at the level where it can be apprehended not merely 
as an empirical phenomenon. At this level, one describes the emergent historical rules in the 
contingent unfolding of speech, which give it the status of an historical event: “In the 
examination of language, one must suspend, not only the point of view of the ‘signified’…but 
also that of the ‘signifier,’ and so reveal the fact that…there is language [il y a du langage].” (AK, 
111) This level of analysis is composed of emergent rules that take shape as language is spoken 
in a certain way, with respect to certain objects, using certain concepts, from certain subjective 
positions of enunciation, among other factors as I will discuss momentarily. In other words, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “Erasure” and “revision is to be taken somewhat literally here, as he suppressed the publication of both the 
original and re-written versions of Madness: The Invention of an Idea, as well as the original preface of History of 
Madness. 
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eventfulness of discourse is due to the historical a priori that emerges through its factical 
appearance.  
The multiplicity of rules that, for a time, immanently govern the production of statements 
are what Foucault calls the historical a priori of a discursive formation. One can identify the 
groupings of discursive formations into larger historical aggregates as well. The “general system 
of the formation and transformation of statements,” that is, the rules defining what has been 
said—or what will have been effectively sayable—in the multiplicity of discursive formations, is 
what Foucault calls the archive. The archive is, then, the general subject matter of the 
archaeological history of the present. 
Foucault claims, “The statement is neither visible nor hidden.” (Ibid., 109) Rather, “it 
requires a change of viewpoint and attitude to be recognized and examined in itself.” (Ibid., 110-
1) What rules might emerge with a change of perspective on language? The main domain of 
rules of a historical a priori consists of rules that govern the formation of objects, concepts, 
subjects of enunciation, and the field of possible themes.15 There are rules that govern the 
appearance of objects and the discontinuities in their appearance over time as they are 
transformed. For instance (to take political economy as an extended example), there are breaks 
between labor as a unit common to all wealth in the 18th century analyses of wealth, labor as the 
source of all wealth in 19th century political economy, and labor as the activity of human capital 
in 20th century neoliberal economics16.  
Second, there are “preconceptual” rules that govern the succession and distribution of 
concepts, such as political economy’s concept of homo oeconomicus as a “man of exchange,” 
who involves himself in market relations determined by equivalent values, and neoliberalism’s 
“entrepreneurial man,” whose first relation is to himself in practices of self-investment. 
Third, there are rules that govern the dispersion of subjects of enunciation. Who is 
qualified to speak, in what sites, and according to what powers of action? Becoming an 
economist today requires institutional training according to pedagogical norms that subject the 
individual to criteria of competence. Normalized subjects are afforded access to a variety of 
positions in academic, governmental, and private sectors, each with their own set of 
characteristic practices.  
And finally, there are rules that govern the disjunctions between possible themes and 
theories within a discursive formation. Each disjunction offers different “strategic choices” of 
possible lines of affiliation for would-be subjects of enunciation. In 19th century political 
economy for instance, within the concept of labor as the activity of overcoming need, it is 
possible to oppose Ricardo to Marx according to a choice between different themes of History. 
The former offers a theme of pessimistic History, which ends in the static economy limited by 
scarcity where the quantities of profit, rent, wage, and population are all reciprocally adjusted to 
one another. The latter offers a revolutionary theme of History, as the falling rate of profit 
correlates inversely with the impoverishment of the working class until it overturns the material 
conditions of this contradiction and thus overcomes scarcity and need. The choice of theme is 
strategic because it is here that one can see a discursive formation not as a deterministic regime 
of signs, but as a series of struggles whose stakes are primarily the appropriation, operation, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Statements are also always related to a second, associative domain, which consists of other statements. A 
statement’s relation to this field is governed by rules as well: a statement occurs in a series of other statements, may 
refer to other statements, allows others to follow, and coexists with other statements of its kind. 
16 Labor, life, language, sexuality, madness, and criminality are the major discursive objects of Foucault’s 
archaeological and genealogical works.  
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retention of the ability to speak in discourse. (Ibid., 120) This use of strategies and positions of 
enunciation to conceive of discourse as an object of struggle is how Foucault, already in 1969, 
integrates the concept of power into his work, albeit a negative one.17 Here the games of power 
around strategic choices in discourse is based on the claim that any given discursive formation is 
both the subject and object of discursive practice, or the iterative use of the rules pertaining to 
objects, concepts, and possible choices by a subject occupying a position of enunciation. 
One obvious question arises here, namely, if both statements and their rules are historical, 
what sense does it make to speak of them in a priori terms? Foucault’s concept of the historical a 
priori arrived at the same point that Deleuze made with respect to Nietzsche’s concept of the will 
to power, namely, that the conditions of real existence are not “larger” than what they condition. 
(Deleuze 1983, 50) In keeping with the positivity of discourse, discursive rules extend only as far 
as historically existing language as it appears in “things actually said;” and these rules are 
nothing other than the description of relations between statements and their conditions. (AK, 127) 
Discursive formations are entirely governed by their variable conditions and yet one does not 
discover their rules on a higher, transcendental level. The historical a priori is categorically 
distinct from the Kantian a priori, as the former extends only as far as the historical existence of 
statements—it is completely immanent to them—while the latter delineates the truth conditions 
for possible judgments. (Ibid., 127) In other words, historical a prioris are not universal. And if 
they are not universal conditions, then what they condition cannot extend as far as “possibility” 
in general. The rules of the historical a priori are entirely immanent to statements, they are 
“caught up in the very things that they connect” and are transformed with them and their 
repetitions in turn. (Ibid., 127) As the conditioned shifts from the experiential limits of possible 
judgments to the historical reality of existing statements, “a priori” no longer means necessary 
and universal, but contingent and singular (the a priori is not given through its possibility alone). 
One can speak of possibility and necessity only within a discursive formation—and in the 
temporal dimension of the future-anterior at that: the historical a priori of a discursive formation 
will have made possible certain statements, certain discourses, and so on.18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 That Foucault was already thinking about the power is evident in a handful of different places in The Archaeology, 
particularly where he states that “a fuller analysis of theoretical choices must be left until a later study” and where he 
links this potential study to politics. (AK, 65, 194) 
18 Foucault is actually ambiguous on this point and I am intentionally reading him in a Deleuzian direction. Foucault 
sometimes writes as if the historical a priori consists of rules that make possible the formation of a particular 
discourse or set of discourses. This seems either to lend to them a generality that exceeds the discourses they 
condition or to suggest that they completely precede the statements that they condition. Foucault’s earliest explicit 
categorical articulation of the historical a priori is in The Order of Things, where he writes, “The history of 
knowledge can be written only…in terms of conditions and a prioris established in time. It is in this sense that 
archaeology can give an account of the existence of [discourses].” (OT, 208) However, Foucault’s clearest statement 
on the historical a priori stresses the quality and modality of the conditioned: “Juxtaposed these two words produce 
a rather startling effect; what I mean by the term is an a priori that is not a condition of validity for judgments, but a 
condition of reality for statements. It is not a question of rediscovering what might legitimize an assertion, but of 
freeing the conditions of emergence of statements, the law of their coexistence with others, the specific form of their 
mode of being, the principles according to which they survive, become transformed, and disappear…the a priori of 
a history that is given, since it is that of things actually said.” (AK, 127) So, anthropological discourse is possible in 
an abstract sense, but it need not have come into being. Once it does, however, anthropological statements define the 
rules of their enunciation and, as they accumulate, the regularity of any given statement becomes tied to the other 
statements in its formation and their regularity. One can say that “It will have been necessary for Marx to have 
conceived of history as the disalienation of the proletariat,” but only after the possibilities immanent to the historical 
a priori have begun to exhaust themselves. Furthermore, if conditions are historical, this means that they arise on the 
basis of singular, disjunctive, and problematic events. These conditions do not arise complete on the scene of history 
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Secondly, whereas “possible experience” implies a universal subject judgment, 
“historically existing statements” implies that the subject is not the ground that underlies 
experience, but is rather subject to discourse as its prior condition. Archaeology thus detaches 
knowledge from judgment and thereby subjects the former to the conditions of discourse, not the 
other way around. The subject is first spoken before speaking.  
This gives rise to the distinction within knowledge between savoir and connaissance. 
When knowledge refers to the judgments of a subject-object relation made in accordance with 
historical rules of intelligibility, Foucault uses the word connaissance. However, when 
knowledge refers to those rules themselves which involve producing, using, and repeating 
statements—everything that determines the entire domain of what will have been able to be said 
and appear—he uses the word savoir. In other words, savoir refers to the historically existing 
rules of the sayable, whereas connaissance refers to the existing sciences and regions of 
knowledge such rules make possible. Archaeology thus distinguishes itself from the history of 
ideas by departing from the subject-object relation as its sole point of departure and inevitable 
return in the analysis of knowledge.  
There is one final word on the archaeology of historical a prioris. According to the 
Foucault of The Archaeology of Knowledge, it is not possible to describe the a priori that 
governs us in the present because we speak from within its rules, which define both the 
appearance and disappearance of our archive. Here, the history of the present is the history of 
“discourses that have just ceased to be ours.” (Ibid.,130) Archaeology attests, then, to the 
otherness of the present by describing the a priori from which it is breaking.19  
For Foucault, the historical a priori from which we are breaking is man, the figure of 
those rules that make up the discourse of anthropology. The task of The Archaeology is to 
summarize almost a decade of work critiquing anthropology and to show how one can 
historically analyze discourse without presupposing categories that derive from man and his 
constitutive subjectivity. These include, for example, the author, the book, and tradition among 
others—all those categories that ensure that history is tied to the continuity of man’s 
consciousness. However, the most comprehensive account of man and anthropology is to be 
found in The Order of Things, to which I will turn after a brief overview of the central place of 
anthropology in Foucault’s archeological period.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
all at once and then make possible the experience of a historical period—only to mysteriously just go away in the 
give and take of being. Nor are they “finite eternal structures” that, once arisen, exist in transcendental memory. 
This is because historical a prioris are not themselves unconditioned—they are conditioned in two ways. First, 
following the Nietzschean turn in the early 1970s, they are conditioned by the encounter of forces that they 
problematize—the void that they try to objectify, conceptualize, enunciate and make speak in multiple ways. Second, 
they are conditioned by these very practices of objectification, conceptualization, and enunciation, which the 
historical a priori conditions. Inasmuch as discursive formations give rise to a historical form of experience, one 
could say that experience also conditions its conditions, although it would be more accurate to say that experience is 
a scene of discursive strategies and these strategies in turn condition the rules of the discursive formation to which 
they pertain. 
19 This characterization of the relation between the historical a priori and archaeological critique will undergo a 
significant revision in the turn to genealogy. For one, Foucault will trouble the capacity to so easily separate the past 
from the present as he turns to considering the role of discourse in programming the relations of power. And second, 
the position from which one will be able to delineate the otherness of the present will no longer be the archive of the 
past, but conflicts raging within the present itself. 
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1.3 Anthropology as The Historical Problem of Archaeological Critique  
As works of critique, each of Foucault’s 1960s projects shows how the move to ground 
experience in its own finitude turns out to be dogmatic. As he said to an interviewer in 1975: “I 
would say [critical work] is an attempt to disclose as much as possible, that is to say, most 
profoundly and generally, all the effects of dogmatism tied to knowledge, and all of the effects of 
knowledge tied to dogmatism.”20 (DE1, 1683) Foucault’s most consistent claim against 
anthropology is that while it asserts a necessary and universal link between the subject of 
knowledge and its and object, this link is ungrounded. This allows him to claim that 
archaeology’s historical present is a critical juncture in the history of discourse, as anthropology 
is ungrounded and yet continues to regulate what we say, do, and think.  
In the Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault concerns himself with identifying 
the moment in Kant in which anthropology becomes possible as a mode of intelligibility, but 
which Kant had already determined to be insufficiently critical. Anthropology emerges after 
Kant when “anthropological illusion” comes to govern discourse in Euro-American societies; it 
is the central problem of Foucault’s archaeological period.21 The Introduction to Kant’s 
Anthropology uses it in direct relation to Kant’s problem of transcendental illusion. In Kant, 
transcendental illusion results from reason’s tendency to use the pure categories of the 
understanding beyond the limits of experience, which results in reason positing the 
unconditioned as a possible object of knowledge.22 Foucault accounts for the Kantian subject 
thus: “[Kant] uncovers a transcendental field in which the subject, which is never given to 
experience (since it is not empirical), but which is finite (since there is no intellectual intuition), 
determines its relation to an object = x all the formal conditions of experience in general.” (OT, 
243)  
Anthropological discourse instead views man as a determinate object in an empirical field, 
whose objective syntheses both delimit the knowledge man can have of himself (since they lack 
the spontaneous character of transcendental subjectivity) and serve as transcendental conditions 
of knowledge, which converts the initial empirical status of the objective field. Whereas reason’s 
search for the unconditioned gives rise, among other things, to an actual infinity in the realm of 
possible knowledge (the theological idea of God), anthropological illusion occurs as a sort of 
reversal of transcendental illusion. It emerges when the limits of experience are found in the 
contents of experience itself and are made to serve as its fundamental ground in general. That is, 
the illusion of “man” takes shape when he encounters his own empirical limit in himself and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 My translation. 
21 I also here omit Foucault’s first published book, subject as it is to the anthropological constraints he would 
critique just a couple years later. Regarding the relation of his archaeological works to anthropology, he writes in 
The Archaeology, “[they] were attempts that were carried out, to some extent, in the dark: but they gradually became 
clear, not only because little by little their method became more precise, but also because they discovered—in this 
debate on humanism and anthropology—the point of its historical possibility.” (AK, 16)  
22 Regarding the discursive status of the human sciences in the modern period, Foucault discounts the value of the 
concept of illusion, stating, “But to say that they are part of the epistemological field means simply that their 
positivity is rooted in it, that that is where they find their condition of existence, that they are therefore not merely 
illusions, pseudo-scientific fantasies motivated at the level of opinions, interests, or beliefs, that they are not what 
others call by the bizarre name of ‘ideology’.” And, regarding the concept of savoir in his archaeological texts, “The 
notion of knowledge had the function, precisely, of casting the opposition between the scientific and the non-
scientific, the question of illusion and reality, the question of the true and the false out of the field of inquiry.” (GV, 
13, my translation) 
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takes it to be the ground of a necessary synthesis of the objective and subjective conditions of 
knowledge.23  
It should be said that “illusion” is a word that drops out of Foucault’s vocabulary by 
entirely the mid-1970s, however, its use to describe the problem of anthropology already ends by 
The Order of Things. This is on account of two reasons: the first is that its Kantian legacy is itself 
complicit in the rise of anthropology and the second is that it assumes truth as a normative value. 
Kant held that transcendental illusion resulted in contradictory propositions in the sphere of 
reason, which meant that critique must become a “critique of dialectical illusion” whose task was 
to reveal the illusory premises of metaphysical reasoning and the falsity of its conclusions. (Kant 
1998, 199) By way of Hegel and Marx, the dominant legacy of the “critique of dialectical 
illusion” in our own time (and certainly in Foucault’s) is the critique of ideology. “Ideology 
critique” shows how the dominant ideas of class-based societies tend to present themselves as 
universal and necessary when they are in fact the particular and contingent expressions of a 
historical society. Foucault is not interested in unveiling the contingent particularity of historical 
social conditions. To be sure, Foucault agrees that knowledge is always historically contingent, 
however, unlike ideology critique, he denies that knowledge can ever be adequate to its 
conditions (communism will not produce truly universal ideas). This is because, as I discuss in 
the following section and at the beginning of the next chapter, for Foucault, the condition of 
discursive knowledge—at least as it appears to us today—is language itself; and language is 
devoid of any necessary or universal criteria of judgment.  
This is why The Order of Things does not speak of “anthropological illusion,” but merely 
describes the rules of anthropology and shows how they are coming undone by language itself.24 
As its French title Les mots et les choses (“Words and Things”) hints, its subject matter is the 
emergence of historical orders out the interminglings of an invisible language and a silent 
expanse of things. The task of The Order of Things is to show the rules that emerged in the 
mutual envelopment of the sayable and the visible to form the historical a priori “man” within 
the modern episteme.25 To do so, it looks at looks at the discourses that emerged around three of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 What distinguishes these empirical limits from the limit-experiences valued by Foucault is that the former are 
empirical while the latter are at the limits of constituted experience.  
24 One also sees anthropology at the center of History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic. The former shows 
how modern psychiatry emerges by “liberating” madness from the confused, hidden, and silenced multiplicity of 
“unreason” that was rounded up by the Great Confinement in the 17th century. Freed from a grouping that included 
criminals, paupers, vagabonds, and the infirm, madness was made to appear and speak in the asylum, where science 
was able to establish the self-certainty of its non-madness. Modern madness was formed as an object in which 
scientific man—from Jean-Étienne Esquirol to Freud—could know himself as the disalienated truth of an alien other. 
This is what History of Madness calls the anthropological circle of madness, but which The Order of Things 
addresses at the relation between “the cogito and the unthought.” The Birth of the Clinic shows the role of 
fundamental finitude in the birth of etiology. Near the turn of the 18th century, Marie François Xavier Bichat’s 
statement, “Open up a few corpses,” reverses the relations of visibility and invisibility in medical practice and 
indicates a break in the medical discourse on life. In the Classical period of medicine, disease was a sign of death 
that appeared on the body; it was opposed to life, which was known externally through its own essence. With Bichat 
and modern medical science, one explains how bodies die after the fact by opening up their insides, such that death 
becomes the principle of the medical gaze in understanding of life. (BC, 146, 197)  
25 It is important to note that “the visible,” as a perceptual field in a given discursive formation, is an object of self-
criticism in The Archaeology of Knowledge and in interviews he gave around the time of its publication. For History 
of Madness and, especially, The Birth of the Clinic both refer the visible and the invisible to the gaze of a scientist. 
Thus Foucault risked inadvertently basing his account in a phenomenological subject. The Order of Things “brackets” 
this gaze and refers the visibility of objects to the formation of concepts. Foucault will refer it to power as well 
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man’s fundamental objective contents in the classical and modern periods: life, labor, and 
language. In what amounts to an expansion and refinement of the anthropological illusion first 
developed in Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault identifies four rules that make up 
the historical a priori of anthropology. Taken together, he calls them the “anthropological 
quadrilateral,” which presides over modernity’s “sleep of anthropology.” 26 (Ibid., 341)  
It is important to point out that for Foucault, “man” does not refer to human nature 
(which is nothing new), but to the exclusive object and subject of anthropological discourse, 
which is why Foucault can say that “man…is probably no more than a kind of rift in the order of 
things, or, in any case, a configuration whose outlines are determined by the new position he has 
so recently taken up in the field of knowledge.” (Ibid., xxiii) The anthropological quadrilateral is 
made of up of the following four rules (1) Finitude: man is the form of finitude that one may 
derive from his objective contents in order to ground them. (2) The empirico-transcendental 
doublet: man is a transcendental doublet as his empirical contents may serve as transcendental 
conditions of their knowledge. (3) The thought of the unthought: man’s thought of man is the 
thought of the unthought in man, or man’s objective contents necessarily elude his thought, 
which compels man to reconcile himself by pursuing them. (4) Originary historicity: man 
possesses originary historicity, or his objective contents in the present point to a lost origin that 
awaits repetition.  
As the historical a priori “man,” these rules constitute the problem of archaeology. For in 
describing them, archaeology apprehends the limits of man, or the groundlessness of 
anthropological thought. Therefore, on the one hand, archaeology attests to the beginning of 
man’s decline and, on the other, these rules continue to exert their hold on discourse. Much like 
Nietzsche’s proclamation of the “death of God,” Foucault’s archeology proclaims the death of 
man as an event that takes time: “This tremendous event is still on its way, still 
wandering…Lightning and thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time…” 
(Nietzsche 1974, 182) The archaeology of man finds itself in a historical present that is splitting 
apart that is the primary concern of critique as the unity of the history of the present and 
desubjection. Hence, to call “man” the problem of archaeology is to say that this historical a 
priori is the target of its critique and the metric by which archaeology endless critiques its own 
concepts and methods as it seeks to invent a new form philosophical inquiry. At this point, I’d 
like to turn directly to The Order of Things, where Foucault not only critiques the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
beginning with Discipline and Punish, as can be seen in the opening Part on changes in the distribution of the visible 
and the invisible amongst the spaces of judicial decision and punishment throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.  
26 I have here omitted the text on Roussel, Death and the Labyrinth. This is because—along with his essays on 
Manet, Blanchot, and Bataille—it largely falls on the other side of the aforementioned division between “positive 
studies” and “works of “passion.” Hence Foucault himself believed that the book on Roussel didn’t have a proper 
place in the sequence of his works: “it is by far the book I wrote most easily, with the greatest pleasure, and most 
rapidly”…“My relationship to my book on Roussel…is something very personal.” (DL, 187) While it concerns itself 
with the extent to which modern discursive conditions necessitate a writer like Roussel, its main focus is on how the 
language of Roussel’s books not only uses but also reveals the being of language, the (tropological, imaginary) site 
where words and things intersect and make discourse possible. (DL, 150) While I do not turn to this text at length 
below, I will treat the being of language insofar as it relates to transgression and the thought of the outside, which 
prefigure desubjection. Finally, it is easy to misread Foucault’s own distinction between positive and passionate 
works, but this should not be taken to mean that Foucault’s positive studies are entirely dispassionate and hence 
exterior to the practice of self-transformation. They may sometimes appear devoid of passion in the sense of 
affective intensity, but that does not mean they are not involved in an undergoing and that they do not constitute a 
step in the undoing of the subject who undertakes the investigation by traversing discourse toward its limit. 
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anthropological a priori, but also accounts for what gives rise to it, namely, the fundamentally 
unmasterable character of language. 
  
1.4. “Man” as a Historical A Priori 
The Order of Things shows how the anthropological quadrilateral quickly began to 
govern three primary discourses at the turn of the 19th century: biology, philology, and political 
economy. They cover the whole field of modernity’s episteme and they developed with the 
formation of three discursive objects: respectively, life qua organic structure, language qua 
grammatical system, and labor qua economic structure. Since Foucault claims that the historical 
a priori is nothing other than a description of the differential rules of a discursive formation, in 
order to keep things relatively concrete, I will present the quadrilateral with reference to his 
analysis of modern political economy in The Order of Things. This will also serve to anticipate 
my argument in Chapter Six that neoliberal economics largely continues to operate according to 
the quadrilateral, which unites it with a governmental mode of power. Moreover, again later on, 
it will show how anthropology still informs the horizon of the critique of neoliberalism. Having 
enumerated the rules above I would like to now go through them one by one to see how each 
side of the quadrilateral builds upon and complicates the ones preceding it, starting with finitude.  
Foucault writes, “[A]t the archaeological level, which reveals the general, historical a 
priori of each of [the] branches of knowledge, modern man—that man assignable in his 
corporeal, laboring, and speaking existence—is possible only as a figure of finitude.”27 (OT, 318) 
In Kant, anthropological finitude is an empirical double of the transcendental syntheses that 
make experience possible. From within the experiential domain of existence, the syntheses of the 
transcendental “I” appear as always already there, dispersed in time. Kant’s finite, empirical man 
is a double of the transcendental subject, which eventually grounds itself in God and the world. 
Post-Kantian anthropology makes it the other way around. Here, the fact of finitude’s existence 
serves as its own ground. Each anthropological discourse takes man as an empirical object and 
discovers in his contents some element of facticity that marks his irreducible finitude (as I’ll 
discuss later, the existential phenomenological language here is not accidental). For the three 
primary discourses respectively, finitude is found in the death of the organism, the excess of 
language’s historical meaning beyond the intent of a speaker, and human need. Accordingly, 
man assumes a doubly ambiguous form as both the object and subject of knowledge. As an 
object of knowledge, his contents precede and outstrip his existence as an individual. 
Nonetheless, his contents refer to him as a subject that activates them and comes to know itself 
through them. Therefore, in order for man to know himself in his objectivity, anthropology 
extracts a subjective ground from within it.  
Man’s empirical determinations are given to experience on the basis of “a fundamental 
finitude which rests on nothing but its own existence as a fact, and opens upon the positivity of 
all concrete limitation.” (Ibid., 315) The two principal thinkers of modern political economy, 
Ricardo and Marx, both isolate need as the fundamental sign of man’s finitude, which gives rise 
to a labor theory of value and a history of economic forms.28 Ricardo bases human labor on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Translation amended, my emphasis. 
28 In The Order of Things, Foucault explicitly differs from his friend and mentor Althusser. Althusser famously 
argues for an epistemological break in Marx’s work that separates into an early, humanist period and a late, “anti-
humanist” period characterized by theorizing the economic, structural determinations that are external to individual 
human beings. By focusing on the discursive level of reality and its historical a prioris, Foucault excludes the type 
of reading that would identify an epistemological break within the work of a single thinker, since such a reading 
	   24	  
fact of human desire, which appears as need under conditions of scarcity, or death when scarcity 
is absolute. Thus labor is the sign of death just as it is the activity of warding it off. And it is this 
same desire, which, put to work, confers value upon all things relative to itself. Political 
economy epistemologically constitutes man as an object of knowledge on the basis of his needs, 
whose satisfaction requires him to become a laboring subject.  
In Ricardo, the value of every commodity is derived from the subjective activity of 
human labor, such that the quantity of labor (measured in time) required for manufacture 
determines the value of the commodity. The amount of labor time is determined in turn by the 
form of production, its degree of the division of labor, the kinds of tools available, the mass of 
capital available, and so on. These in turn are results of human labor. Man’s concrete 
determinations consequently open out onto a whole history of developments in the act of 
laboring and exchanging that precedes him and makes him possible. For Marx, man too produces 
use values under the condition of need. However, the social form of labor as wage labor is but 
the historical result of a series of revolutions in the relations and forces of production. And the 
need that compels him is itself produced by social conditions that are produced in turn by 
alienated labor. For, beset by the contradiction between the relations of production and the forces 
of production, laboring man is daily robbed of his products. Moreover, these same conditions 
periodically precipitate crises of overproduction in which property relations prevent the available 
supply of commodities from being distributed to meet the human needs of workers. However, the 
proletariat’s experience of bare life on the basis of its alienation from the products of labor 
enables it to recognize the historical character of its condition and to apprehend its truth in its 
revolutionary future, namely, communism. It’s no surprise that Marx defines communism in 
terms of need in his Critique of the Gotha Program in the famous statement, “From each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs.” (Marx 1994, 320)  
Man in his needs and laboring activity is hence “the principle and means of all 
production.” (OT, 313) The form of finitude by which man is both a knowing subject and an 
object of knowledge is such that finitude is always double. Finitude grounds both the act of 
laboring today and, consequently, the socio-historical form that outstrips it and determines it 
from without. The objective contents of man are derived from his needs, which point to man as a 
subject, but only by first referring man outside of himself to an objective process that is already 
there, which limits and determines him. Thus man’s finitude is marked by his passivity with 
respect to the sign of his finitude and the temporal precedence of the contents it generates as they 
envelop him from without and compel him to participate in their history. Finitude is both the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
would have to start from the premise of an authorial subjectivity. Nevertheless, one could reconcile Althusser and 
Foucault on Foucaultian terms by saying that if there is an epistemological break in Marx, it is in no way unique to 
Marx, but rather one instance of a break taking place within the archive as one discursive formation gives way to 
another. A Foucaultian account of the break Althusser finds in Marx would see it as the eclipse of labor in Marx in 
favor something closer to language. This is because it was by means of language that Sade was the first to detach 
desire from utility and need and “[place] it in a void where it establishes its sovereignty…In this sense, the 
appearance of sexuality as a fundamental problem marks the slippage of a philosophy of man as worker to a 
philosophy based on a being who speaks.” (EF2, 85) Foucault on displacing the epistemological break: “[T]here 
does remain an obvious difference between Althusser and me: he employs the phrase “epistemological break” in 
connection with Marx, and I assert to the contrary that Marx does not represent an epistemological break…What I 
said about Marx concerns the specific domain of political economy. Whatever the importance of Marx’s 
modifications of Ricardo’s analyses, I don’t think his economic analyses escape form the epistemological space that 
Ricardo established. On the other hand, we can assume that Marx inserted a radical break in people’s historical and 
political consciousness, and that the Marxist theory of society did inaugurate an entirely new epistemological field.” 
(EF2, 281-282) 
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content to which he is passive and the spontaneous ground of that content; need is both the 
factual limit of man extracted from his empirical contents and the ground that repeats itself in 
every concrete determination of those contents in history. The desire and need that thrusts men 
into labor for Ricardo is the same as that on the basis of which everything is desirable; the desire 
and need that grows from the alienation of the working class for Marx is the same as that which 
will allow the proletariat to coincide with its objective conditions and truly produce itself. “From 
one end of experience to the other, finitude answers itself; it is the identity and the difference of 
the positivities and of their foundation, within the figure of the Same.” (Ibid., 315) Within the 
space of this repetition, knowledge finds itself historically limited by its contents and the forms 
they prescribe. However, these forms simultaneously ground and make knowledge possible. 
Finitude, as the repetition of the positive in the fundamental, thus constitutes a discursive fold, a 
site, in which the other sides of the quadrilateral emerge. Let’s move then to the second rule, that 
of the transcendental doublet. 
Foucault writes, “Man, in the analytic of finitude, is a strange empirico-transcendental 
doublet, since he is a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all 
knowledge possible.”29 (Ibid., 318) The transcendental doublet is the form of finitude when 
viewed along the transcendental-empirical divide. Whereas the form of finitude closes in on 
itself because its objective contents serve as their own foundation, man functions as a 
transcendental doublet to the extent that the empirical contents of man serve as their own 
transcendental condition. Here another difference emerges with respect to the place of finitude in 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy: whereas pure reflection first had to determine the conditions 
of the possibility of experience before the Anthropology could take them up in the empirical 
domain of existence, for post-Kantian anthropology the conditions of the possibility of 
experience first emerge in its object. From this point of view, “Labor, life, and language appear 
as so many ‘transcendentals’ which make possible the objective life of living beings, of the laws 
of production, and of the forms of language.” (Ibid., 244)  
There are two kinds of analysis in modernity that make the contents of experience 
function as their own conditions. Foucault distinguishes them in a Kantian fashion according to 
whether they appeal to sensibility or whether they appeal to judgment and understanding. The 
first is a “quasi-transcendental aesthetic” which derives the forms of knowing from sensation and 
the human body as these forms themselves make up part of the body’s functioning.30 The second 
is a “quasi-transcendental dialectic” which derives the conditions of knowledge from the 
historical succession of man’s truths and illusions.31 Elements of both kinds of analysis can be 
found within a single discourse or even within a single author, however some discourses are 
more identifiable with one or the other.  
Ricardo and Marx obtain the doublet through a “quasi-transcendental aesthetic” when 
they relate the science of man to the body’s needs and desires. Above, I stated that Ricardo 
yields a new principle for economics when its primary object is no longer money, but labor, 
which in turn is an activity of desire and need under the condition of scarcity. That is, economics 
becomes anthropological when it is related to “the biological properties of the human species.” 
(Ibid., 257) With Ricardo, need itself is not implicated in the history that develops on its basis. 
However, the same cannot be said for Marx, who understands need within a historical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 My emphasis 
30 Recall that for Kant, the transcendental aesthetic deals with the a priori principles of sensibility. (OT, 319-20) 
31 Recall that Kant calls the transcendental dialectic a logic of illusion. (Kant 1998, 384)  
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progression that mediates and eventually surpasses it in full communism, understood as a society 
without need.32 As a sign of finitude, need initiates a history that ends by surpassing it. 
The German Ideology tells us “The first historical act is the production of the means to 
satisfy…needs…the satisfaction of the first need…leads to new needs; and this production of 
new needs is the first historical act.” (Marx 1978a, 156) The history of humanity, its knowledge, 
and its productive forces must be understood on the basis of the consciousness of physical need, 
since the prospect of increasing society’s capacity to satisfy human needs motivates science to 
understand nature. Yet as human history is one of alienated labor wherein one class controls the 
ability of another to meet their needs and thereby deprive them of the ability to determine them 
for themselves, human needs have historically only been able to appear in the false light of an 
alien class which imposes a social condition of scarcity. This makes the communist abolition of 
need the historical basis of true natural science. Marx writes: 
The nature which comes to be in human history…is true anthropological nature. Sense-
perception…must be the basis of all science. Only when it proceeds from sense-
perception in the twofold form both of sensuous consciousness and of sensuous need…is 
it true science. All history is the preparation for "man" to become the object of sensuous 
consciousness, and for the needs of “man as man” to become [natural, sensuous] needs. 
(Marx 1978a, 90)  
True human needs (those of “man as man”) refers to “species being,” humanity’s ability to 
become conscious of itself as it produces itself in the course of producing its own material 
conditions. Such needs appear only in communism when all can not only meet their needs, but 
determine the conditions under which they do so. Need in this case would extend beyond the 
bare necessities of life to include “a totality of human life-activities,” that is, both intellectual and 
physical activity. (Ibid.) For Marx, the sign of this under capitalist alienation is artistic beauty—
the ability to produce free from physical need. (Ibid., 76) The quasi-transcendental aesthetic 
dimension of Marx consists of man’s empirical need qua the criterion of historical intelligibility.  
Yet, the historicity of human need also lends itself to a “quasi-transcendental dialectic,” 
the second way of forming an empirico-transcendental doublet. This dialectic involves deriving 
the conditions of knowledge from the historical succession of man’s truths and illusions. Here 
one sees how Foucault’s critique of the transcendental doublet informs his long battle against the 
critique of ideological illusion. As is well known, according to Marx’s concept of ideology, 
man’s truths are but a long chain of illusions bound to the historical dialectic of class 
contradictions that engender them.33 In order for true knowledge to come about, it must critique 
ruling class ideology from the perspective of the exploited class that is excluded from knowledge 
production. In the capitalist mode of production, true knowledge is produced by critiquing 
bourgeois ideology from the perspective of the proletariat, which is deprived of its needs in order 
for the capitalist system to function.34  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Behaviorism and, following it, the neoliberal theory of human capital and economic rationality also deploy a 
quasi-transcendental aesthetic. In Grimm and Bopp, language is first treated by an analysis of the totality of its 
sounds. Curvier analyzed life as a fundamental force that maintains the conditions of its existence by developing 
functional structures by which it relates to death as the limit to which it is incessantly born off. 
33 And as far as critique itself is concerned, one might recall the Postface to the Second Edition of Capital Volume I, 
where Marx states, “In so far as such a critique represents a class, it can only represent the class whose historical 
task is the overthrow of the capitalist mode of production and the final abolition of all classes—the proletariat.” 
(Marx 1990, 98)  
34 One could certainly question Foucault here with regard to whether, according to Marx, social conditions are 
empirically given or their empirical appearance is completely ideological and requires critical mediation in order to 
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Depending on how one derives the transcendental doublet, one ends up either in 
positivism or eschatology. As one can derive the quasi-transcendental conditions of man’s 
intelligibility from either sensibility or thought, one obtains the criteria of truth either directly in 
the object of sensation (the human body), which results in positivism, or in the form of discourse 
on man’s empirical beings, which results in eschatology. It is a question of whether discourse 
must measure up to the truth located directly in man’s empirical contents or whether criteria 
must be found in how these contents appear differently across historical time. Eschatology 
emerges in the latter case by taking over these criteria and using them to anticipate and prophesy 
the true form of its historical object. Foucault remarks, however, that the alternative between the 
aesthetic and the dialectic, positivism and eschatology, is not strictly exclusive: “In fact, it is a 
question not so much of an alternative as of an oscillation inherent in every analysis that wants to 
assert the empirical at the level of the transcendental.”35 (OT, 320) That is, eschatology and 
positivism are indissociable in the anthropological discursive formation and anthropological 
discourses may sometimes deploy both to differing degrees.  
Marx bears this out once again. Need points to the (social) conditions of the object 
(man’s labor), which measure the truth of thought (whether or not it is ideological). 
Simultaneously, by apprehending the measure of truth negatively in man as the truth of his 
illusions, Marx prophesies the true disalienated man who finally arrives at self-consciousness. 
The true form of need is the one that surpasses itself and the condition of scarcity created by the 
alienation of labor and, likewise, the true form of labor is the one that expresses man’s true need, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be truly appropriated by knowledge. Althusser obviously stands as a representative of the latter possibility for 
reading Marx. It is crucial that Althusser, in his symptomalogical reading of Marx in Reading Capital, stresses the 
primacy of ideology critique over political economy and sociology. If labor only appears empirically on the 
condition of a critique of political economy, then man’s empirical contents do not suffice to generate their own 
conditions of intelligibility. On Althusser’s reading, critique first makes labor visible as an absence in the visible. 
Regarding his difference with Althusser, in an interview Foucault states: “However, there does remain an obvious 
difference between Althusser and me: he employs the phrase “epistemological break” in connection with Marx, and 
I assert to the contrary that Marx does not represent an epistemological break…What I said about Marx concerns the 
specific domain of political economy. Whatever the importance of Marx’s modifications of Ricardo’s analyses, I 
don’t think his economic analyses escape form the epistemological space that Ricardo established. On the other hand, 
we can assume that Marx inserted a radical break in people’s historical and political consciousness, and that the 
Marxist theory of society did inaugurate an entirely new epistemological field.” (EF2, 281-282) Foucault’s 
insistence on a distinction between the economic and the social in Marx is telling. It is as if he wants to recognize 
Marx’s efficacy for intervening in society’s power struggles while stating that the theoretical form of this 
intervention is dogmatic. Finally, even if one grants Althusser his anti-humanist symptomalogical reading, the 
problem of ideology is reproduced on another level in the dogmatic assertion of the distinction between Marxist 
science and ideology. Foucault already deals with this in The Order of Things and returns to it in Society Must Be 
Defended. “But if fact the search for a…history of knowledge, in the movement by which the dimension proper to a 
critique is fitted over the contents of empirical knowledge, already presupposes the use of a certain critique—a 
critique that is not the exercise of pure reflection, but the result of a series of more or less obscure divisions. And, in 
the first place, these divisions are relatively clearly elucidated, even though they are arbitrary:…the division that 
distinguishes illusion from truth, the ideological fantasy from scientific theory…but there is a more obscure and 
more fundamental division: that of truth itself; there must, in fact, exist a truth that is of the same order as the 
object…the truth that appears as illusions are dissipated…there must also exist a truth that is of the order of 
discourse—a truth that makes it possible to employ…a language that will be true.” (OT, 320) 
35 Translation amended. 
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the totality of life activity from which it has been alienated hitherto.36 In all of this, however, the 
empirical is made to stand for the transcendental: “Pre-critical naïveté holds sway”.37 (Ibid., 320)  
Finitude and the location of the syntheses of thought in man’s objectivity lead to the third 
side of the quadrilateral, the rule of the unthought, which has it that thought is grounded in its 
other, its unthought: 
Man is a mode of being which accommodates that dimension…which extends from a part 
of himself not reflected in a cogito to the act of thought by which he apprehends that part 
and which, in the inverse direction, extends from that pure apprehension to the empirical 
clutter… (Ibid., 323) 
Whether it is death, need, or the antecedence of the language one speaks—finitude means that 
man’s objective contents historically come precede him; he encounters them as always already-
there. Anthropological man must pursue self-knowledge in his empirical objectivity, which “is 
not thought,” deprived as he is of any transcendental status that would allow him to derive the 
criteria of his judgment from his own spontaneous activity.38 (Ibid., 324) As the conditions of 
thought belong to its object before they belong to thought itself, man’s objective contents exceed 
the forms of thought they make possible and knowledge can no longer represent itself in the 
certainty of the cogito.39 That is, while finitude’s existence is initially grounded nothing but its 
own existence asserted as a fact, man’s condition is initially and permanently a lack of 
knowledge with respect to the objective contents that precede him. It follows that anthropological 
thought is not located in the element of self-understanding, but that of self-misunderstanding, 
that is, thought’s alienation from itself. And on this basis, the task of thought, man’s futural 
orientation, is to pursue self-knowledge by thinking the unthought dimension of himself. 
The question is whether man can identify himself with objective determinations that 
present him as other than himself. “Can I say that I am this labor I perform with my hands, yet 
which eludes me not only when I have finished it, but even before I have begun it?” (Ibid., 324) 
Anthropology is a thoroughly practical discourse as it sets out to overcome the unthought alterity 
in man: “[A]ny imperative is lodged within thought and its movement towards the apprehension 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This is why, much later in his career, Foucault states, “What attracts me to Marx are his historical works, like his 
essays on the coup d’état of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, on the class struggles in France, or on the 
Commune…However, these analyses, in the historical works, always end with prophetic speeches.” (DE2, 612) 
37 Looking ahead, I will show that neoliberalism fits within the grid outlined by the transcendental doublet, as a 
quasi-transcendental aesthetic positivism. For neoliberalism relates a site of veridiction in the market and its price 
mechanism (price as a metric of the truth of liberal practices) to the body as the site of capital and governability 
(human capital as a uniquely inalienable form of value). 
38 According to the rule of the unthought, both the phenomenology of the unthought in Heidegger and the 
psychoanalysis of the unconscious in Freud share the same epistemological rules of formation. Foucault almost goes 
so far as to say that Heidegger simply ontologized man as the historical a priori of modern discursive formations as 
Dasein’s having to-be appears against the horizon of Being, which is always unthought yet always-already 
understood pre-ontologically. Moreover, constitutes an empirico-transcendental doublet through both a quasi-
transcendental aesthetic of the body and a quasi-transcendental dialectic of history, with its attendant themes of 
positivism and eschatology. For in lived experience or the there-is of phenomena, phenomenology finds a third 
element in which the experience of history and the body are held together. Nevertheless, archaeology provides an 
account of what can be heard and what can be seen, but their unity in the phenomenon is never given through itself 
in its self-showing, but through discursive rules. These rules in turn never refer to the perception of a practitioner of 
discourse (see Foucault’s corrective to History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic below), nor to a being whose 
essence ultimately lies in the simple self-sufficiency of its finitude, but to a more profound multiplicity: the relations 
of power.  
39 Of course, this certainty was already most decisively challenged by Kant when he denied that the transcendental 
“I” refers to a substance that thinks.  
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of the unthought.” (Ibid., 328) This is why Foucault daringly claims that modern thought has 
never been able to produce a morality that was not coextensive with thought’s movement toward 
the unthought, for its thought is a mode of action: “modern thought is advancing toward that 
region where man’s Other must become the Same as himself.” (Ibid., 328) This movement 
always has the significance of a historical event for anthropology. 
Originary repetition is the fourth and final rule of the quadrilateral. It refers to man as the 
principle of historical time as his destiny is to ground his finitude, the conditions of his 
knowledge, and his inner alterity by an act of originary repetition. Man’s historicity does not first 
proceed from an originary past, but from the antecedence of his contents, which impels him to 
overcome his alienation as his historic task. Foucault states, “the origin is that which is returning, 
the repetition towards which thought is moving, the return of that which has always already 
begun.” (Ibid., 332) I have already indicated the originary and historic character of man’s 
finitude in Marx: need is not only the sign of man’s finitude, but the originary source of his 
concrete essence as a laboring being. And by seeking to overcome need under the capitalist 
conditions, man will not only transfigure the very meaning of need, but his will overcome its 
empirical origins, proving themselves to be truly universal, at which point he will finally know 
himself in his species being. Thus, it is only with the repetition of finitude, regarded as an 
historical origin, that it finally becomes possible to ground the temporality of finitude in itself. 
Communism is hence the return and transcendence of the origin.  
Finitude is the fourfold of anthropology. It founds, conditions, delimits, and temporalizes 
the truth of man. “And so we find philosophy falling asleep once more in the hollow of this Fold: 
this time not the sleep of dogmatism, but that of Anthropology.” (Ibid., 341) The pre-critical 
knowledge of man’s empirical being serves to enable “everything that can, in general, be 
presented to man’s experience.” (Ibid., 341) Yet, what follows in the wake of the critique of 
anthropology? This question returns us to the question of the beginning of philosophy, namely, 
what makes Foucault’s own critique possible? Given what I discussed in Section 1.2, this 
question requires some modification. For if Foucault’s understanding of the a priori abandons 
any pretense to universal necessity in the subject and opts instead for a discursively historical a 
priori that makes the conditioned exist, then one must ask, what is Foucault’s understanding of 
language as it accounts for his own critique of anthropology? 
In his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault indicates that the critique of 
anthropology (and critique generally as a history of the present) has historical conditions, which 
are to be found in ruptures with the modern a priori that have already taken place. Critique is 
consigned to this austerity because it suspends universals in order to analyze the history of their 
emergence. This includes the concept of “experience,” which leads either to a transcendental 
subjectivity or an anthropological subjectivity, depending on whether it is dogmatically assumed 
as the proper jurisdiction for transcendental reason or the location of a fundamental finitude. In 
his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault cites Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal return and 
the death of God as one such rupture that allows Foucault to pronounce the death of man. (IKA, 
124) However, The Order of Things gives no less weight to Mallarmé’s understanding of poetic 
language as an asignifying, a-subjective event. (OT, 306) In radically different ways, these two 
figures orient Foucaultian critique toward language as its abyssal ground of critique. In order to 
understand the groundless character of the history of the present and its role in critique as a 
practice of desubjection, in the following chapter I will examine the alternative between 
Nietzsche and Mallarmé regarding the being of language.  	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Chapter 2: From the Being of Language to the Politics of Truth  
 
If the discovery of the [eternal] Return is indeed 
the end of philosophy, then the end of man, for 
its part, is the return of the beginning of 
philosophy. It is no longer possible to think in 
our day other than in the void left by man’s 
disappearance. For this void…is nothing more, 
and nothing less, that the unfolding of a space in 
which it is once more possible to think. (OT, 
342)  
 
Instead of analyzing this knowledge [savoir]…in 
the direction of the episteme that it can give rise 
to…analyze it in the direction of behavior, 
struggles, conflicts, decisions, and tactics. Not a 
political knowledge that is a theorizing about 





2.0. Introduction  
Man’s withdrawal from the scene of history leaves “more than” a void: what Foucault 
diagnosed in his present as it slowly tore away from the modern historical a priori was the being 
of language, which I referred to in the previous chapter as its “unmasterability.” The being of 
language is what accounts for the existence of critique at the end of modernity—it is the problem 
of the beginning of philosophy for Foucault. As I also mentioned at the conclusion of the 
previous chapter, the critique of anthropology bases itself on two prior ruptures with man, which 
indicate the possibilities for thinking at the end of modernity, namely, Mallarmé and Nietzsche. 
These two indicate the problematic character of the being of language, that is, the fact that it 
presents an exclusive disjunction—and thus a decision—for critical philosophy. The question at 
the heart of this disjunction is, if it is not man who speaks in discourse, then who? Or what? One 
choice goes by way of Mallarmé, for whom language itself is an anonymous, asignifying 
murmur. Who speaks language? No one—only language itself.40  The other goes by way of 
Nietzsche and points in the direction of the polemic and multiple character of the will to power. 
Who speaks language? Behind all consciousness and its metaphysical fictions about itself, there 
is only the multiplicity of different “wills” struggling against each other in the grand economy of 
the eternal return, which grants the final say in history to no one.  
Again, the stake here is not just the critique of anthropology and its production of truth by 
means of the doublet, but the very conditions of critique. For the problematic being of language 
not only accounts for the existence of discourse, but critique in its historical existence as well. 
The choice between Mallarmé and Nietzsche is a choice about how to think the abyss, or the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Foucault’s reading of Mallarmé in The Order of Things largely follows Blanchot’s in The Space of Literature. 
(Blanchot 1982)  
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groundlessness of all discourse. As Foucault’s entire archaeological period is effectively the 
staging of this alternative and a tarrying with it, in this chapter I will attempt to reconstruct 
Foucault’s historical understanding of the being of language and the decision he ultimately made 
to pursue a Nietzschean path over the one represented by Mallarmé. 
 
2.1. The Being of Language as a Void in Discourse  
In this section, I will begin dealing with the being of language by considering Foucault’s 
take on the “void,” or groundlessness, as it is what makes it possible to “think again” in his 
historical juncture. Depending on whether one considers the being of language from within 
discourse or in its own right as the condition of thought, it may be characterized either positively 
as the pure “there is” of language, its taking place “without why” in the diffuse production of 
statements, or negatively.41 Negatively, it designates that which discourse excludes from itself in 
order to ground itself, as with modern psychiatry and madness. In this sense, the void is the 
“Other” of discourse, its “constitutive outside,” or the term of its “inclusive exclusion.”  
The void makes it the conceptual placeholder of the absence of history, or what has a 
history only in that one can track its exclusion from the history of discourse. In this respect, the 
void is the abyssal ground of the historical a priori, which can be negatively outlined by 
exposing the discursive practices of its exclusion.42 The void marks what thought can apprehend 
only symptomatically as the ground of history that bestows discontinuity, singularity, and 
contingency upon historical discourse.43  
The void also marks what Foucault, following Bataille, calls limit-experiences, where the 
subjective conditions of intelligible experience break apart. History of Madness quite explicitly 
states that the very basis of a history of the present is just such limit-experiences, as an account 
of how they became enveloped within discursive practices that capture them within a regime of 
representation and exclude them as its outside, as its limit of intelligibility. Foucault writes, “We 
could write a history of limits…To interrogate a culture about its limit-experiences is to question 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Later, when Foucault turns to the genealogy of power, the void names the “nonplace” of emergence (Entstehung 
in Nietzsche) of power relations, that is, the fact that relations between forces take on a determinate form only on the 
basis of a lack of any prior representational relation to each other. Then, power relations will be thought of as being 
of its own order, or of a different order than the relations of discourse. 
42 Clearly, the critique of anthropology leveled in the preceding section doesn’t point to anthropology’s historical 
lacunae. Instead, it opts to critique finitude by pointing out the “illegitimate” use of man’s empirical existence. This 
is because, while The Order of Things is to a large extent the result of Foucault’s preceding works, it is more akin to 
the positive understanding of discourse espoused in The Archaeology of Knowledge, which resists reducing 
discourse to a function of negativity by making “the said” a function of “the unsaid,” of absence, exclusion, 
repression, silencing, and so on. Ultimately, the problem of negativity in discourse is a problem of subjectivity. For 
if discourse is a negation of its Other, then one risks reintroducing a repressed subject that speaks in all discourse. 
Critiquing his work in History of Madness, Foucault writes that it “accorded far too great a place, and a very 
enigmatic one too, to what I called an “experience,” thus showing to what extent one was still close to admitting an 
anonymous and general subject of history.” (AK, 16)  
43 I use the term “symptomatic” here somewhat recklessly, perhaps. Unlike Althusser, for whom the symptom is the 
effect of a cause of a different conceptual order, I use the term here to apply not to a set of conceptual conditions, 
but primarily to the ungrounding of order. However, one could see in Foucault’s archaeological project of 
identifying the historical a prioris of discourse something akin to the Althusserian procedure by which a practice of 
critical reading distinguishes and divulges a second text as an undivulged event within the lapses of the first. 
However, there is one major difference. Namely, while Althusser allows the proper name to refer to a developing 
totality (the oeuvre), Foucault does not admit anthropological unities of discourse such as the author and the oeuvre, 
but rather applies his “reading” to discourse itself, which cuts across oeuvres and fragments them by virtue of the 
rules that operate within them. (Althusser and Balibar 2006, 28) 
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it at the confines of history about a tear that is something like the very birth of history.” (HM, 
xxix) In this sense, the void marks the double limit of a discourse: it marks the excluded outside 
of a discourse and it points to the inaccessible experience that exists at an unlivable limit.44 
These dimensions of the void tend to be found in literature, where the being of language 
appears for itself. The principal example here is madness, since it is both a term of exclusion that 
disqualifies certain people from discursive speech and a limit-experience that cannot be 
accounted for within the structures of experience prescribed by the historical a priori.45 In rare 
instances, literary language brings the speaking subject to this zone of exclusion marked, as 
attested to by writers such as Hölderlin, Nietzsche, Bataille, Roussel, and Artaud.46 Perhaps the 
most significant instance here is Nietzsche, for whom madness was a real consequence of his 
thought as it weighed all speech with the eternal return, only to one day become incapable of 
speaking.47 (Ibid., 537) In madness, whether arrived at by way of literature or not, rational 
discourse only hears a “murmur,” and includes it within itself so as to ground itself, but only by 
simultaneously excluding it as its Other. (Ibid., xxxi)  
As I stated above, there is a radical divergence in the breakaway from anthropology as 
thought makes contact with the being of language.48 According to Foucault, the question of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Foucault also calls this inclusively excluded space of the limit-experience a “blank space” with respect to 
discourse. 
45 The void is not just an issue of madness, but of other limit experiences as well. In fact, Foucault forms much of 
his itinerary around the different kinds of “inner experience” explored by Bataille. However, whereas Bataille 
directly treats madness, death, sex, and criminality as limit experiences, Foucault analyzes how these have become 
objectified by discourse. In History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic, he respectively treats madness and death 
not only as discursive objects, that is, as objectified by discourses like medicine and clinical psychology, but as 
methodological principles of investigation. 
46 Foucault provides a symptomatic reading of Nietzsche’s text in the penultimate paragraph of History of Madness. 
He writes: “It matters little exactly what day in the autumn of 1888 Nietzsche went definitively mad, and from 
which point his texts were suddenly more the concern of psychiatry than of philosophy; all those texts, including the 
postcard to Strindberg, belong to Nietzsche, and all are connected in a common parentage to The Birth of Tragedy. 
But that continuity should not be thought of as being on the level of a system, or a thematics or even an existence: 
Nietzsche’s madness, i.e. the collapse of his thought, is the way in which that thought opens onto the modern world.” 
(HM, 537) 
47 The being of language connects to the Nietzsche’s madness the recoil of the will to truth and the singularization of 
the philosopher under the sign of the eternal return: “Today, one cannot understand this curious experience that is 
writing without confronting the risk of madness…with Nietzsche, we finally arrive at the moment where the 
philosopher says, ‘perhaps I am mad.’” (DE1, 981) It is not by coincidence that Nietzsche has a madman be the first 
to hear the thunderous event of the death of God. (Nietzsche 1974, 182) 
48 By what right does Foucault lay claim to the being of language? He argues for a distinction between traditional 
philosophy’s “I think,” by which subjectivity folds itself up in the interiority of its thought, and literature’s “I speak,” 
which effaces the speaking subject and opens the play of language from its being. His argument is something of a 
literary reduction, which, in three steps, reduces the speaking subject as the sovereign of its speech to the being of 
language. Formally speaking, the “I speak,” taken on its own, appears as a true statement [énoncé]; it simply 
coincides with itself as its own object. Yet, the “I speak” cannot constitute its own beginning for itself, as it 
necessarily requires a supporting discourse to supply it with an object other than itself about which it can speak. The 
“I speak” can only speak “I speak” without a. Unlike the Cartesian cogito, which served as the ontological basis for 
other true statements, the sovereignty of the “I speak” stops where the rest of language begins. The reduction of the 
object of the “I speak” to a discourse outside of itself makes up the first step of the reduction. In a second step, 
Foucault shows that the “I speak” is only possible within a void, beyond which it finds itself lost in a language that 
precedes it. This is because a language wholly reducible to the discourse that precedes the speaking subject would 
only ever amount to the duplication of things. Thus the “I speak” is reducible nether to a sovereign subject nor to an 
objective, representational discourse based exclusively on its own contents. The “I speak,” therefore, is contingent 
upon the void that separates it from discourse. This void that makes possible both the “I speak” and its insertion into 
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being of language concerns how the incompatibility of the unity of man and language will 
unfold:  
For Nietzsche, it was not a matter of knowing what good and evil were in themselves, 
but…who was speaking…For it is there…in the possessor of the word [parole], that 
language is gathered together in its entirety. To the Nietzschean question ‘Who is 
speaking?’, Mallarmé replies…by saying that what is speaking is, in its solitude…the 
word itself…[its] being…The whole curiosity of our thought now resides in the question: 
what is language, how can we find a way round it in order to make it appear in itself, in 
all its plenitude? (OT, 305-6)  
Foucault himself and all the “heterogeneous” 20th century writers he cites—everyone from 
Roussel to Blanchot—operate within this divergence.  
In response to the question of the being of language, Mallarmé’s poetizing presents 
language in its simple autonomy, as that which speaks in all speech—but never qua language. 
Language speaks in all speech, but typically through an author-function. When language speaks 
by presenting itself as language, language, or “the word” [parole], speaks only to itself. The 
poem is the fold in which language manifests the “there-is” [il y a] of its own being. Mallarmé 
thus states: “…double condition of the word, crude or immediate on the one hand, essential on 
the other.” (Blanchot 1982, 37-38) But paradoxically, in presenting the being of language, poetic 
language itself becomes silent writing and even, as the blank spaces in poems like Un coup de 
dès illustrate, disappears. Mallarmé occasions a literature that “has no other law than that of 
affirming…its own precipitous existence…as if its discourse could have no other content that the 
expression of its own form.” (OT, 300) Language speaks in the poem only on the condition that 
“beings are quiet,” and that Mallarmé qua authorial subject is absent from the language of the 
poem. “His” poetry purifies itself of him. This is why Foucault insists on the Blanchotian “blank” 
or “neutral” space of literature when speaking of language in the Mallarméan mode. Language is 
neutral and indifferent with respect to who claims to be speaking because it is irreducibile to any 
subject of discourse. And the language that emerges in the poem tends to withdraw from things 
as well, as poetic language untethers itself from the functions of signification and referentiality. 
It is a pure language in as much as it is nothing other than language’s own self-presentation, 
which precedes its degradation and subordination to subjects and objects. As I said in the 
previous chapter, one fundamental negative characteristic of language is its unmasterability. In 
Mallarmé, the autonomy of language in the poem means that no one can definitively master or 
appropriate it. This is also what Foucault means when he says that language in Mallarmé is 
characterized by an “impotent power:” when language purely presents itself it is useless. (Ibid., 
300) 
Mallarmé’s legacy of poetic speech continues in what Foucault, citing Blanchot, calls the 
thought of the outside. For Blanchot, literature transgresses the rules of discursivity and 
representation and thus “escapes the mode of being of discourse—in other words, the dynasty of 
representation.” (EF2, 148-9) Blanchot’s fiction, like Mallarmé’s poems, issue from language’s 
being prior to any schematization according to subject and object. As Blanchot writes: 
Before all distinctions between form and content, between signifier and signified, even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
discourse is itself nothing other than the “there is”—the being—of language, which is irreducible to the individual 
who assumes the “I speak,” the others to whom it may be addressed, the things designated in speech, and the 
meaning it supposes. The being of language negatively correlates with the being of man to the extent that the former 
is the unfolding of an exteriority in speech, not the game of catch-up by which a subject attempts to coincide with 
the meaning of what it says in its interiority.  
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before the division between utterance and the uttered, there is the unqualifiable Saying, 
the glory of a ‘narrative voice’ that speaks clearly, without ever being obscured by the 
opacity or the enigma or the terrible horror of what it communicates. (Blanchot 1999, 
494) 
Prior to the aforementioned binaries, such “saying” is “neutral” in that it is indifferent and 
irreducible to any subject position within discourse—and thus is unmasterable by any one of 
them. This neutrality is the blank space that The Archaeology of Knowledge indicates as the site 
of its speech. It is, as it were, the heterotopia that is language itself:49 “[Archaeology] is an 
attempt to define a singular site by the exteriority of its vicinity…this blank space from which I 
speak, and which is slowly taking shape in a discourse that I still feel to be so precarious and so 
unsure.”50 (AK, 17) 
As for the other way of treating the being of language, Foucault identifies in Nietzsche 
not only a unique way of erasing oneself by thinking one’s conditions (this time through self-
overcoming in accordance with the eternal return) but also a precursor to the history of the 
present. The latter involves Nietzsche’s new theory of signs, which suspends the value of truth 
and replaces it with the will to power. These two dimensions coincide at the point where the 
interpretation of signs in terms of their strength leads Nietzsche to hypothesize a measure of 
force in the eternal return—the very abyss that undoes the subject. At this point, interpretation 
risks everything—God, man, and Nietzsche himself.  
Since Nietzsche will prove to be the decisive thinker for the politics of truth, I would like 
to give comparably more room to the Nietzschean interpretation of the being of language, 
starting with how Foucault reads his understanding of “the beginning of philosophy,” or the 
conditions of critique. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault writes: 
For Kant, the possibility and necessity of critique were linked, through certain scientific 
contents, to the fact that there is such a thing as knowledge. In our time—and Nietzsche 
the philologist testifies to this—they are linked to the fact that language exists and that, in 
the innumerable words spoken by men…a meaning has taken shape that hangs over us, 
leading us forward in our blindness, but awaiting in the darkness for us to attain 
awareness before emerging into the light of day and speaking. We are doomed 
historically to history. (BC, xv-i) 
The link between “the possibility and necessity of critique” and the historicity of language here 
should give one pause: is this not the same as the structure of finitude described by The Order of 
Things? Prior to 20th century linguistics, the reigning science of language was philology. The 
crux of its anthropology was that, while every language has its own grammar that determines the 
connection of “sounds, syllables, and words,” each one is rooted in an “active subject” that 
establishes the ostensive function of language by expressing what the subject does or undergoes. 
(OT, 283, 289-90) That is, while the form and content of language precedes man and determines 
in advance what he can say, how he may represent his will to himself, and the possible mutations 
that language will undergo in the future, on the other hand, the future of a language is ultimately 
bound up with the freedom and will of those who speak it. Philology thus evinces the 
anthropological features of finitude, historicity, and the unthought.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Foucault uses the term “heterotopia” to designate a space that “suspend[s], neutralize[s], or reverse[s] the set of 
relations that are designated, reflected, or represented by them” and involve “temporal discontinuities” that interrupt 
the time of what passes through them. (EF1, 178, 182) 
50 Translation amended. 
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This structure is still present in Nietzsche’s apprehension of the being of language as will 
to power and eternal return, yet only as the object of a destructively ironic twist. For him too, 
man’s language and its history precede him, its grammar informs his thought in ways that he 
does not understand and yet must, and the prejudices it contains determine his future (possibly 
even dooming him to nihilism). And yet, man’s language has a pre-history in the power relations 
that have shaped his instincts, that is, in the pre-moral forms of will to power that have produced 
what we know as “man.” Nietzsche’s “philology” breaks from anthropology by referring not to 
the will of man, but to the will to power.  
Returning to “the possibility and necessity of critique” in the fact of language, Nietzsche 
is Foucault’s primary predecessor when it comes to the history of the present. Foucault is explicit 
about this as early as 1966: “For [Nietzsche], the philosopher is the one who diagnoses the state 
of thought…who plays in some way the role of an archaeologist, who studies the space in which 
thought displays itself, and hence studies the conditions of thought, its mode of constitution.”51 
(DE1, 581) This diagnostic practice is what calls either physiology.52 It entails not just 
determining who speaks, but diagnosing the will that speaks in a given discourse, determining 
the value of its values, and seeing how it triumphs over rival instincts and forces. The question of 
Nietzschean genealogy is, which “will” is it that struggles, dominates, exploits, and subordinates 
the others to itself in order to control discourse?  
Depending on whether they are active or reactive, affirmative or negative, strong or weak, 
different instincts give rise to different grammars. And conversely, language becomes a 
battlefield as certain grammatical elements (such the subject or reflexive pronouns and verbs) are 
captured and exploited by certain instincts in their struggle (such as the reactive instinct whose 
coup de grâce in the pre-history of man is bad conscience). Due to the rise of reactive values, 
grammar became the medium for the transmission of moral prejudices: “I am afraid that we have 
not got rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.” (Nietzsche 2005, 170) In Nietzsche, 
one may say “there is language,” but there is nothing neutral about this fact. Instead, as Foucault 
says of the Nietzschean position, “all of Western metaphysics is tied not only to its 
grammar…but to those who, in holding discourse, have a hold over the right to speak." (EF2, 
151) In the mid-1960s, Foucault largely defines the will to power negatively in terms of the 
capture and exclusion of the right to speak, but here one can see that it is also a question of how a 
will affirms itself in struggle. 
Yet one only encounters the will to power through signs that require interpretation. 
Foucault lays out his reading of Nietzschean interpretation in his 1967 essay “Nietzsche, Freud, 
Marx.” His central claim here is that every sign and word to be interpreted points not to a 
constitutive subject, but to a twofold hermeneutic reality. On the one hand, because every sign is 
the product of a will in struggle with a multiplicity of other wills, every word and sign is an 
interpretation of other signs, which are in turn yet more interpretations. Thus, there exists an 
infinite series of interpretations: “For Nietzsche, there is no original signified. Words 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Elsewhere, Foucault links the archaeological motif to Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols as well: “[O]ne has to 
delve into the mass of accumulated discourse under our own feet…[A]s soon as we are obliged to question the 
words that still resonate in our ears, that are mingled with those we are trying to speak, then archaeology, like 
Nietzschean philosophy, is forced to work with hammer blows.” (EF2, 293) 
52 On the Genealogy of Morals shows a preference for the physiological. “Indeed, every table of values, every ‘thou 
shalt’ known to history or the study of ethnology, needs first and foremost a physiological elucidation and 
interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and all of them await critical study from medical science. The 
question: what is this or that table of values and ‘morals’ worth? needs to be asked from different angles; in 
particular, the question ‘value for what?’ cannot be examined too finely.” (Nietzsche 1967, 55) 
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themselves…interpret before being signs…they do not denote a signified, they impose an 
interpretation.”53 (EF2, 276) The determination of the being of language as will to power means 
that there is an identity of force and interpretation: every sign is an interpretation that is only as 
successful as the strength of its commanding force. Consequently—and this is an insight that 
Foucault makes his own—the being of language is strategic: language is not fundamentally 
about signification, but strategy. This means that it is also about dissimulation, for to the extent 
that a discourse is invested in truth as a transcendent measure of force, its signs and words 
conceal themselves as interpretations.  
On Foucault’s reading, what makes it possible to question man’s existence and conceive 
language anew on the basis of the will to power is the critical suspension of the value of truth. 
Critique is the recoil of the will to truth back upon itself that establishes an active relation to the 
discourse. As the first section of Beyond Good and Evil attests: “Who is it really that puts 
questions to us here? What in us really wants ‘truth’?...Suppose we want truth: why not rather 
untruth?” (Nietzsche 1966, 9) Instead of focusing on the line between truth and falsity, Foucault 
says of Nietzsche, “the interpreter must, when he examines signs in order to denounce them, 
descend along the vertical line and show that this depth of interiority is in reality something other 
than what it says.”54 (EF2, 273) Nietzsche does not conduct an immanent critique discourse in 
the pursuit on an absolute measure of truth because the institution of the difference between truth 
and falsity is neither true nor false and thus necessarily exceeds its own criteria. This is why 
immanent critique (or any dialectical critique of illusions) is of only limited value: it does not 
question the value of truth. The critical suspension of truth enables the critical study of discourse 
by opening a different level of reality for analysis, namely, the practices of exclusion, command, 
and evaluation.  
This leads Foucault to the other dimension of critique—desubjection—as it stands in 
Nietzsche. As Foucault says in a 1978 interview, “[I]n Nietzsche…experience has the function 
of…seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself….This is a project of desubjection [C’est une 
entreprise de dé-subjectivation].”55 (EF3, 241) In one of the most paradoxical of Nietzsche’s 
gestures, his critique requires the interpreter to pose the “Who?” to themselves and put 
themselves at stake in their critique. Critical interpretation must constantly re-interpret and 
diagnose itself to determine whether or how much the interpreter functions within the discourses 
it studies. One must ask, “What type of will speaks through me? To what extent do I unwittingly 
reproduce and circulate its signs and commands?” Yet since consciousness is inherently reactive 
for Nietzsche—our “weakest and most fallible organ!”—interpretation is an infinite task, without 
beginning, and forever incomplete. (Nietzsche 1967, 84)  
As critique throws the interpreter from history back upon themselves and yet again into 
history, it leads to a prospect that threatens the entire critical venture: “the farther one goes in 
interpretation, the closer one comes at the same time to an absolutely dangerous region where 
interpretation not only will find its point of return but where it will disappear as interpretation, 
perhaps involving the disappearance of the interpreter himself.”56 (EF2, 274) This point of return 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 My emphasis. 
54 Nietzsche’s Preface to Daybreak begins, “In this book you will discover a ‘subterranean man’ at work, one who 
tunnels and mines and undermines.” (Nietzsche 1997, 48) 
55 “[E]xpérience” in French can mean “experiment” as well as “experience.” 
56 My emphasis. By submitting the self to the test of the eternal return for diagnosis, Nietzsche singularizes it. By 
posing the question “Who?” to himself in relation to the being of language, he opens “a caesura in the history of 
Western thought.” Foucault writes: “The mode of philosophical discourse changed with him. Previously, this 
discourse was an anonymous I. Thus, the metaphysical Meditations have a subjective character. However, the reader 
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refers to the eternal return, which is both the very limit or measure of critical interpretation and 
the essence of the will to power. 
The eternal return is the measure of the value of values; it tests the strength of every will. 
The eternal return is the differential essence of the being of language qua will to power. 
Nietzsche calls it “[t]he greatest weight:” it grants passage only to the most affirmative wills, that 
is, those that can wholly affirm themselves as a future. (Nietzsche 1974, 273) For to think that 
what returns is what one has been, that is, to think that the eternal return is grounded in the past, 
is to fail the test. It selects out those who hear in it only the return of the same because they only 
encounter reactive instincts in themselves that tie them to their identity as a necessity and weight 
(ressentiment: literally “to feel again”).57 As Foucault remarks in his 1978 interview with Duccio 
Trombadori, “Might there not be experiences in which the subject might be able to dissociate 
from itself, sever the relation with itself, lose its identity? Isn’t that the essence of Nietzsche’s 
experience of eternal recurrence?” (EF3, 248) The eternal return is the differential essence of the 
will to power because it measures the strength of the will in terms of its power to differentiate 
itself—hence Nietzsche’s ideal of the Übermensch.58  
In The Order of Things, Foucault relates the eternal return as a force of ungrounding to 
the deaths of God and man, the Übermensch, and the possibility of philosophizing today:  
Nietzsche rediscovered the point at which man and God belong to one another, at which 
the death of the second is synonymous with the disappearance of the first, and at which 
the promise of the superman signifies first and foremost the imminence of the death of 
man. In this, Nietzsche, offering this future to us as both promise and task, marks the 
threshold beyond which contemporary philosophy can begin thinking again; and he will 
no doubt continue for a long while to dominate its advance. If the discovery of the Return 
is indeed the end of philosophy, then the end of man, for its part, is the return of the 
beginning of philosophy. It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
can substitute in ‘Descartes.’ It is impossible to say ‘I’ in the place of Nietzsche. Because of this fact, he looms over 
all of contemporary Western thought.” (DE1, 580) Nietzsche’s “I” is neither Descartes’ anonymous “I,” which is the 
completely exchangeable subject of a universalist discourse, nor is it compatible with the neutrality of the 
Mallarméan being of language, which speaks prior to the subject-object distinction. The Nietzschean “I” is by 
contrast completely singular and unexchangeable.56 Later, Foucault appropriates this Nietzsche’s paradoxical sense 
of individuation when he says, “My way of being no longer the same is, by definition, the most singular part of what 
I am.”56 (EF3, 444)  
57 Deleuze’s Nietzsche book is once again helpful here: by converting the last man’s passive nothingness of will 
(wanting to die), which resides in the element of negativity, into wanting to be overcome as a bridge to the 
Übermensch, Nietzsche sought to arrive at the thought of the active self-destruction of the transvaluation of values, 
which requires the element of affirmation. (Deleuze 1983, 171 – 186).  
58 The idea of the Übermensch that emerges here is an ironic sovereignty. For strength qua affirmation is not the 
power to remain the same in the face of external adversity (which is reactive), rather, the only thing that one can 
eternally affirm in oneself is one’s power to become different. While the eternal return as Foucault deploys it in The 
Introduction and The Order of Things is compatible with Deleuze’s use of it in Nietzsche and Philosophy and 
Difference and Repetition, Foucault does not go as far as Deleuze in connecting it to intensity and the domain of 
force relations it depends on. In Nietzsche & Philosophy, Deleuze carefully shows how Nietzsche requires that force 
relations be plural because force only has other forces as its object. (Nietzsche 1966, 48) Forces are primarily 
determined by their quantitative differences, and are qualitatively determined insofar as qualitative differences are 
themselves unequalizable aspects of quantity. In Difference & Repetition, intensity plays a central role as it names 
the being of the sensible, which is roughly the domain of the will to power or of force as such. (Deleuze 1994, 144-5, 
236) I return to Deleuze’s advance in this regard in the excursus, where I argue that Deleuze offers a theoretical 
explanation of desubjection by thinking a new type of synthesis, namely, inclusive disjunction. (Deleuze 1983, 7-8; 
42-44).  
	   38	  
left by man's disappearance. (OT, 342) 
In Foucault’s reading of the death of God, man is God’s murderer because he has been born 
along by the will to truth to overturn God and establish knowledge on his own basis.59 (Ibid., 
385) Yet whereas anthropological man is bound to a historical temporality in which his future is 
nothing other than the totalizing recuperation of his unthought dimension, the eternal return 
promises the death and overcoming of man in the ideal of the Übermensch. Hence, The Order of 
Things articulates the eternal return as an evental “Promise-Threat” in which the death of man 
unfolds alongside that of God:  
…man would soon be no more—but would be replaced by the superman; in a philosophy 
of the Return, this meant that man had long since disappeared and would continue to 
disappear, and that our modern thought about man, our concern for him, our humanism, 
were all sleeping serenely over the threatening rumble of his non-existence.60 (Ibid., 322) 
Foucault says that the eternal return promises the Übermensch, but is it an empty promise? As 
the Übermensch is grounded in the abyss of the eternal return, it is an exclusively futural form of 
overcoming history (even to the point of forgetting it). Therefore, its principal effect lies in 
opening up a non-anthropological space of thought, which is to say, in the perpetual 
recommencement of the critical gesture of suspending the value of truth and questioning the 
interpretations in which we are imposed and the forces at play within them. In other words, the 
reality of the Übermensch lies in the existence of post-anthropological critique as a historical 
practice of desubjection.61  
 As it stands in Mallarmé and Nietzsche, the being of language is the abyssal ground of 
discourse, which manifests its existence in the desubjection of the subject. Foucault continues to 
maintain this groundlessness in his turn to Nietzschean genealogy, in which he describes 
discourse in the context of the inherently evental, formless, and ungrounded relations of power. 
Ungrounding accounts for the existence of critique and its normative status, according to 
Foucault. Regardless of which path one takes to interpret the being of language, its 
groundlessness selects out any claimants to mastery over language, which is to say that it dooms 
discursive knowledge to erasure. The questions “Why desubject?” or “Why practice critique?” 
find their answer here. A simple answer would be that the question is poorly posed inasmuch as 
it arises from the point of view of reason or ground. However, the full answer is that critique 
heeds and attests to the groundlessness of language by way of the history of the present, that is, 
by describing the historical limits of discourse. Later, after the Nietzschean turn, this will include 
the history of those of apparatuses that seek to stabilize power relations. At that point, the very 
existence of critique will be based upon intolerable limit-experiences of power as they produce 
breakaways from apparatuses.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 This is the epistemological interpretation of the death of God. The moral interpretation holds that man kill God 
out of ressentiment because he cannot bear God’s pity.  
60 Emphasis added. 
61 This foreshadows what I will discuss below as the true sense of the history of the present and what we are today. 
This history does not simply seek to recapitulate the historical conditions of the present in the temporal mode of the 
past, but rather its relation to the past is first one of forgetting on the basis of the future. In what sense is the history 
of the present a forgetting? It is a forgetting in the sense that its determinations of the historical conditions of the 
present take place within the mode of fiction (which Foucault calls, at different points in his career, literature, poetry, 
and theater). As a fictionalizing of historical conditions, Foucault is careful to distinguish between the conditions of 
the present as they are determined by and for thought on the basis of desubjection and something like the true 
conditions of the present, which would require a constitutive subject as a transcendent instance.  
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2.2. Foucault’s Decision on the Being of Language 
Foucault’s indecision on the alternative between Mallarmé and Nietzsche lasts up until 
the very end of the 1960s. Of course, his eventual siding with the latter famously leads him to the 
genealogical study of power, however, I have spent time considering the terms of this decision so 
as to underscore its stakes. Here I would first like to provide an overview of what these 
alternatives fundamentally share regarding critique’s relation to the being of language before 
focusing on the crux of their divergence, namely, whether or not critique speaks in a sovereign 
discourse that is indifferent to multiplicity of discourses that surround it or whether the being of 
language puts critique in touch with a partiality of a politically partisan character. At that point, I 
would like to recount how Foucault finally decides on this undecidable problem against 
Mallarmé following the French and Tunisian students revolts of 1968. 
I first introduced the being of language in my reading of Foucault by negatively 
characterizing it as “unmasterable,” which is to say that it fundamentally refuses subjectivity, 
whether transcendental or anthropological. What both interpretations share is an apprehension of 
language that rejects the subject-object distinction, which is also to say that they both abandon 
truth as an affair of judgment. The writings of Mallarmé and Nietzsche may both be 
characterized as fictional or literary in the fundamental sense that they speak beyond truth and 
falsity. And finally, both point to an experience of language that undoes subjectivity.  
Foucault adopts these lessons as his own. In the previous chapter, I noted how Foucault’s 
critique of anthropology led to him overturning the Kantian a priori as its categorical articulation 
shifted from one of universality and necessity to singularity and contingency. This leads to a 
second reversal, namely, that the a priori is not fixed by the limits that reason sets for itself 
through its reflection on experience; instead, critique discovers the limits given by the historical 
a priori only by transgressing them so as to think their abyssal ground. The significance of this 
reversal is immense for the status of Foucault’s work as literature or fiction. The a priori no 
longer secures the conditions of truth as the correspondence of the object to the rules of judgment, 
as it did for Kant. Nor do the conditions of truth emerge from man’s objective conditions, as they 
did for anthropology. Truth is neither the correspondence of the object with the form of 
knowledge within the limits of reason, nor the historical grounding of man in the disalienation of 
his objective contents. On the contrary, because the being of language that grounds discourse is 
not in itself true, the critique of discourse must necessarily be fictional.62 Consequently, this also 
means that the historical a priori itself is a real fiction. The only truth produced by Foucaultian 
critique is relative to the truth claims of any discourse that fails to account for its ontological 
ground. In 1967, Foucault positions himself more in-line with Mallarmé and Blanchot when he 
states,  
My book is a pure and simple fiction: it is a novel, but it is not I who invented it, it is the 
relationship of our age and its epistemological configuration with that whole mass of 
statements. So the subject is, in fact, present in the whole book, but it is the anonymous 
“one” who speaks today in everything that is said.63 (EF2, 286) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Foucault observes that modern discourse assumes without question that there is a difference between the true and 
the false. (OT, 320) 
63 It would obviously be a mistake to align Mallarmé with a poetic or literary determination of the being of language 
and Nietzsche with an exclusively political one, as Thus Spoke Zarathustra should attest. This is why Foucault 
maintains the literary character of his writing throughout the genealogical turn, as evidenced by calling his critical 
method “a liberatory poetry machine” in 1973. (DE1, 1511)  
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What fundamentally separates these figures, however, is not just whether the being of 
language is one or multiple, but whether it is neutral or perspectival, that is, whether the “outside” 
of discourse is a blank space that is indifferent to discourse or whether it rather involves taking 
up a position within it. Perhaps the very fact that Foucault sustained his archaeological period 
without making a decision on this alternative shows that he in fact preferred anonymous 
neutrality of a Mallarméan idea of language. Nevertheless, there is still enough ambiguity to 
question whether there was not some pull towards thinking power relations in his archaeological 
works. For while his frequent references to the “one” that speaks in all discourse, the 
performance of self-erasure required of him, and the blank space of his writing all indicate that 
he sided with Mallarmé throughout this period, the very fact that his archaeologies seek to 
diagnose the present through a historical analysis of regimes of signs indicates that he was just as partial to 
Nietzsche. This continues right up to the end of the 1960s, as The Archaeology of Knowledge and 
“What is an Author?” illustrate (both published in 1969).  
Foucault does not discover some common ground that enables him to resolve the 
problematic being of language. Instead, there are two sets of reasons that help elucidate (if not 
explain) Foucault’s decision and, in their own way, both of them underscore the need to return to 
the problem of ideology. First, there are historical reasons, such as the political events of his time 
(notably, the student rebellions of 1968) and the decline of Europe’s literary avant-garde. 
However, there are also philosophical reasons, as Foucault’s attentiveness to these realities can 
only be explained on the basis of his increasingly Nietzschean concerns with the concept of 
power as a struggle over discourse. In other words, his concern with ideology already evinces a 
prior decision to critically pursue the concept of power behind the distribution of subject 
positions and the production of discourse. Let’s start with the historical reasons.  
The first has to do with the decline of the literary avant-garde in France and its cooptation 
by bourgeois culture. Just around the time that Foucault presented his first lecture at the Collège 
de France in December of 1970, he gave an interview where he declares that the problem of 
ideology is insurmountable for literature: “But, today, it seems to me that literature recuperates 
its normal social function by a sort of debasement or by the force of assimilation that is 
possessed by the bourgeoisie…the bourgeoisie is a system that has an enormous capacity of 
adaptation. The bourgeoisie has come to vanquish literature.” (DE1, 987) Foucault bases his 
diagnosis on a performance of Jean Genet’s Haute Surveillance by the Renaud-Barrault Theater 
Company, which, he says, 
[reduces] a really subversive act…to the level of a striptease by a beautiful boy…[This] 
does not imply a weakness inherent in the work of Genet, but rather it indicates the 
enormity of the force of recuperation by the bourgeoisie. In short, it signifies the force of 
the enemy that we must combat and the weakness of the weapon that is literature.” (Ibid., 
987-8)  
What is at stake here is not just an instance of commodification, but an exemplary force relation. 
It is a matter of the power of bourgeois ideology to neutralize the transgressive power of 
literature. Eroticism in literature, which once redoubled the transgressive and scandalous 
character of sex—from Sade to Genet—has become banal and acceptable. The space of literature 
is no longer the exceptional space that it once was:  
The transgressive acts that were tolerated as individual acts were no longer so once they 
took place in literature. Playing out sexual transgressions on the stage of literature made 
them more intolerable. But, on the contrary, today, literature as scene of sexual 
transgression has watered down the very act of transgression, and when it takes place on 
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the stage of literature, it becomes, by far, more tolerable. (Ibid., 990-1)  
By the late 1960s, literature’s complacency vis-à-vis bourgeois ideology was only compounded 
by its literary solipsism and exceptionalism. The idea of literature as an autonomous space of 
language (even as an impersonal language speaking only to itself) made it appear as the space of 
subversion regarding all discursive codes (a pure heterotopia): 
…it has been very important to establish the great principle that literature is concerned 
only with itself…But it seems to me that this was still only a stage…The political 
implications were not absent from this exaltation. Thanks to it, one succeeded in saying 
that literature in itself at this point was freed from all determinations, that the fact of 
writing in itself was subversive, that the writer possesses, in the very gesture of writing, 
an imperceptible right to subversion! (FL, 151-2) 
In other words, the relative weakness of avant-garde literature in relation to bourgeois ideology 
reduced it to mere posturing and empty gestures, as its transgressions failed to achieve any 
meaningful effects at broader discursive and political levels. Foucault continues, pointing to the 
institutionalization and even the canonization of literary transgression at the hands of the 
academy:  
If I have spoken of the fading away of writing qua transgression, it is because many 
European writers believed themselves to be protected from this [social] situation by 
writing…there certainly exist some neutral places of writing, at least they existed until 
recently, but I am no longer sure today that these places of writing still preserve their 
neutral character. Because of their historico-social position, I no longer know if they still 
have this exteriority.64 (DE1, 995) 
The bourgeois exhaustion of literature ultimately amounts to literature’s incorporation 
within the reproduction of class relations and closure of the space it opened for the manifestation 
of language. Literature is no longer exceptional: it is one more discourse amongst others, subject 
to Nietzschean questions about its positionality. The task of contesting the power of ideology 
hence falls to politics: “[T]he global situation of language, and of its different modalities…can 
only be reformed by a social revolution.” (Ibid., 989) 
When Foucault says that the disappearance of the space of literature was recent, what 
events is he referring to? What led to the problematization of pure literature? Earlier in the 
interview, Foucault indicates that the exhaustion of literature was made clear by the problem of 
ideology posed by the student revolts of May ’68.65 In particular, these revolts revealed the 
academy as an ideological state apparatus involved in the reproduction of bourgeois society 
through the transmission and reproduction of its knowledge. And they showed how the state 
would deploy its repressive apparatuses to protect this functioning, as students waged pitched 
battles against the cops in the streets and campuses. In other words, they showed that the 
question “Who speaks?” is a matter of a relation of forces.  
This is why it’s worth mentioning the politicizing effect of May ’68 on the thinkers of 
Foucault’s generation, despite the fact that it has become a cliché. While Foucault was in Tunis 
when Paris was exploding with student and worker revolts, they almost immediately affected his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 My emphasis. 
65 Foucault credits Blanchot with being the last writer of literature in this same interview: “If, today, we have 
discovered that we must leave literature, that we must not consider its ‘inside’ as the rather agreeable place where 
we communicate and recognize each other, or again that we must put ourselves outside of literature in abandoning it 
to its meager historical destiny, a destiny that remains defined by the modern bourgeois society to which literature 
belongs, then it is Blanchot who has pointed the way for us…it is he who, in constantly evading literature, has 
shown us that it was certainly necessary to place ourselves outside of literature.” (DE1, 993-4) 
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thought. His interviews during that May show him earnestly attempting to elaborate the political 
implications of his thought as interviewers began questioning him about his position on the 
unfolding insurgency.66 After returning to Paris and obtaining tenure at the Centre Expérimentale 
de Vincennes, he found himself in a mostly Marxist-Leninist intellectual scene that demanded 
accountability to social and political questions—and he was eager to oblige. His contact with 
Marxism included his relations with Louis Althusser, the Marxist-Leninist faculty and students at 
Vincennes and, later, the French Maoists with whom he collaborated on several political 
campaigns. Hence, Foucault took his first steps towards a political reformulation of critique by 
placing himself in the unfamiliar territory of class struggle: “I call politics all that concerns class 
struggle and ‘social’ all that derives from it as a consequence of human relations and institutions” 
(Ibid., 1247). Though he would quickly abandon this position, it was crucial for forcing him 
think politically.  
Still, it is hard to make a straightforward argument for the claim that May ’68 alone can 
account for the shift in his thinking. For one, it must be admitted that Nietzsche is not an obvious 
choice when it comes to theorizing social and political struggles, particularly amongst the left. 
And, even more obviously, Foucault’s growing engagement with Nietzsche preceded May ’68 
and intensified during his time at Vincennes. (Eribon 1991, 207) The turn to Nietzsche was not 
just an off-beat attempt to be relevant to the changing political scene in France. Instead, it is 
there are two reasons that hit closer to Foucault’s own philosophical concerns: the limits of his 
concept of power at the time and the fact that “man” requires a deeper understanding of what 
holds him in existence.  
First, Foucault’s definition of power throughout the 1960s is mostly negative in that it is 
defined as the practice of appropriating discursive speech by excluding other groups and 
individuals. The first significant challenges to this negative concept of power begin in earnest 
later, in 1973 with his lecture course titled The Punitive Society. (PS, 2-3) The same may be said 
of his use of the concept of ideology to critique the university system. In another interview from 
1970, Foucault appears to be wrestling with this problem when he points to the tension between 
the positivity of discourse and the negative character of the conceptual tools at his disposal 
(“ideology” and “exclusion”) for critiquing the academy:  
“[T]he communication of knowledge is always positive. Yet, as the events of May 
showed convincingly, [knowledge] functions as a double repression: in terms of those it 
excludes from the process and in terms of the model and the standard (the bars) it 
imposes on those receiving this knowledge.” (LCP, 219) 
Regardless of whether he was already intent on questioning the limits of “exclusion” in 1970, at 
the time it was a basic category for thinking his social and political conditions. And given his 
commitment to the critical gesture of suspending universals, the critique of the negative concept 
of power was almost inevitable—not only in its own right but as a continuation of the critique of 
anthropological subjectivity.  
For this negative concept risks understanding power as the property of a subject, which 
can be seen in the problem of expressionism that Foucault poses both to the concept of ideology 
and to the concept of power as exclusion. One year later, Foucault criticizes History of Madness 
on this very point: 
In the History of Madness, for example, there were still a certain number of 
“expressionist” themes. I let myself be seduced by the idea that the manner of conceiving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See “Réponse à une question.” (DE1, 721) I quote this text at length below where I return to discussing the 
politics of truth.  
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madness immediately expressed a type of social repulsion with regard to madness. I often 
employed the word “perception”: one perceived madness. This perception was for me the 
link between a real practice, which was this social reaction, and the manner in which 
medical and scientific theory elaborated on madness. Today, I no longer believe in this 
type of continuity. (DE1, 1031) 
How is it possible to account for the relation between power and knowledge without relying on a 
subject that mediates them? Moreover, how does one avoid the pitfall of thinking that discourse 
is simply the expression of power relations, that is, how does one avoid an empirico-
transcendental doublet by deriving the conditions (power) from the conditioned (discourse)? For 
Marxist ideology critique, this is of course the problem of the base-superstructure relation in 
which material conditions and ideology are linked through an isomorphic causal relation.   
Second, as for the anthropological a priori “man,” Foucault reconsiders the notion that 
man is can be reduced to a set of limits in the murmuring play of discourse. In an interview from 
1975, an interviewer repeats the same critical question that appears at the end of the Order of 
Things: “Does man exist?” This time Foucault’s answer is more complicated: “Of course he 
exists. What one must destroy is the ensemble of qualifications, of specifications, and 
sedimentations by which some human essences have been defined since the 18th century. My 
error has not been to say that man does not exist, but to imagine that he would be so easy to 
demolish.” (Ibid., 1685) This demolition cannot be left to literature. It requires taking on the 
force relations that produce and reproduce man within our conduct and the way we interpret 
ourselves. That is, critique must act at the level of these very power relations themselves since it 
is already implicated within them. Therefore, the archaeology of the limits of the sayable must 
become the genealogy of power in the politics of truth. Foucault’s continued grappling with 
ideology critique, the politicization of the critique of anthropology, and Foucault’s understanding 
of the politics of truth will make up the concerns of the following chapter.  	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Chapter 3: The Politicization of the Critique of Anthropology and the 
Politics of Truth 
 
The essential political problem for the 
intellectual is…to know if it is possible to 
constitute a new politics of truth. The problem is 
not of changing the consciousness of the people 
or what they have in their heads, but of 
changing the political, economic, and 
institutional production of truth. (DE2, 159-60) 
 
I will say that critique is the movement by which 
the subject gives himself the right to question 
truth on its effects of power and question power 
on its discourses of truth…Critique would 
essentially insure the desubjugation 
[désassujettissement] of the subject in the 
context of what we could call, in a word, the 
politics of truth. (EFS, 266) 
 
The displacement and transformation of 
frameworks of thinking, the changing of 
received values and all the work that has been 
done to think otherwise, to do something else, to 
become other than what one is—that, too, is 




There is a phrase that occurs seldom, yet decisively, in Foucault’s 1970s work that serves 
to bookend what was his most famous period of writing. That phrase is the politics of truth. By 
this Foucault signifies two things. First, it names a level of reality that philosophy must study: 
the historical relation of the historical a priori (or knowledge, savoir) to struggles in the social 
field. And second, it names the practice of using this study within those struggles which define 
our present because they break away from it. My decision to focus on this phrase that, admittedly, 
appears only a handful of times in Foucault’s work is because I maintain that, in pushing the 
Nietzschean idea of interpretation to its limit, the politics of truth most succinctly captures what 
it is to do critical philosophy (even more so than the term genealogy). Thus, it also connects 
Foucault’s own interpretation of language to his practices as a philosopher, and these in turn to 
critical practices outside of philosophy—both those already existing and those to come. With this, 
Foucault’s understanding of philosophy, the practice of desubjection that proceeds by way of a 
history of the present, undergoes an intensification and a reorientation. When philosophy is 
forced to engage with the forces that confront it, the historical practice of desubjection must 
involve combat and struggle. In their conjunction, both politics and truth undergo a profound 
transformation: while truth becomes totally immanent to politics, politics, severed from any 
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transcendent truth, comes to name the field of force relations constitutive of society and the 
strategic practice of becoming other within it.  
It is with the politics of truth that Foucault both appropriates and surpasses Nietzsche’s 
proclamation, “It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics.” (Nietzsche 1967, 
327) If Nietzsche’s declaration followed upon his prophesy of a “war of spirits” that brings 
destruction to “all power structures of the old society,” Foucault’s appropriation does not begin 
without asking how this might actually come about. (Ibid.) It’s a fair question to ask how 
Nietzschean premises on the being of language led Foucault to end up allying himself with 
everything from women’s and gay liberation movements, to French Maoism, the riotous 
outbursts of Lumpens, and Iranian revolutionaries. If philosophy is to enter a war of spirits in 
which the stakes of its practice are the power structures of society, then it must take leave of the 
solitary life that Nietzsche embodied in order to connect with political forces beyond itself—
which is what Foucault sought to do with the politics of truth.  
What Foucault discovered in the process of turning toward the politics of truth was a 
change in the relation between intellectuals and the discourse of those active in political struggles. 
The intellectual was now a marginal and local figure, no longer either a universal consciousness 
at the forefront of the Zeitgeist or a beneficiary of the division of political labor between those on 
the streets and those behind their pens. Whether it was in his engagements with the French ultra-
left in the early 1970s, the Groupe d’information sur les prisons, in his communiqués on sexual 
politics, or in his journalistic misadventure in Iran, Foucault understood the necessity that his 
work establish a real connection with political practices outside of the domain of philosophy, 
traditionally conceived, and outside of the traditional form of the proletariat. And, of course, as 
his own philosophical developments led him to reestablish this connection in new ways with new 
political phenomena, there was always the risk of error, as his time in Iran attests. Regardless of 
where he found himself at the close of the 1970s, what Foucault leaves us with from this period 
is an effort to live a political life and a philosophical life simultaneously. Philosophy, understood 
as the politics of truth, combats the effects of power in the self not by withdrawing from the 
game of forces in which the self is at stake, and not by setting limits to power that bear the seal 
of truth, but by “intensifying the struggles that unfold around power” and its truth effects. (DE2, 
540) 
In this chapter, I will analyze the theme of the politics of truth in Foucault’s 1970s 
writings. In doing so, my aim is to amplify the concept of critical philosophy as a pursuit of 
desubjection by way of the history of the present. To begin exploring the politics of truth, it will 
be necessary to first consider how Foucault advances the critique of anthropology in a political 
direction in relation to one of his main theoretical opponents, ideology critique. Second, I will 
discuss how the politicization of the critique of anthropology leads Foucault to study how power 
relations produce subjectivity through various modes of subjection (assujettisement in French) to 
discourses of truth. This leads him to define the politics of truth both as a field of inquiry and as 
what characterizes critical-philosophical practice. Third, I will show the effects of this shift on 
Foucault’s formulation of the “the beginning of philosophy,” which shows grounding the politics 
of truth in contemporary struggles against subjection and in the critical gesture of suspending 
universals. As a fourth step, I will focus in particular on how Foucault’s concept of politics is not 
based on structural social categories, but on struggles that erupt around the affect of intolerance 
in relations of power. And finally, in Section 5, I will look at Foucault’s understanding of 
critical-philosophical writing as a technology of desubjection that simultaneously aims to create 
critical subjectivities, or critical subjectivations (subjectivation in French).  
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3.1 Politicizing the Anthropological Problematic: From Ideology to the Politics of 
Truth 
In the previous chapter, I attempted to reconstruct Foucault’s abandonment of an 
interpretation of the being of language as an anonymous, neutral event outside of all discursive 
rules of intelligibility. I showed how his Nietzschean turn to deepen his understanding of 
discourse on the basis of power relations led him to pose two problems. (1) What is the relation 
between discourse and its conditions? And (2) if The Order of Things has it that man’s reality “is 
probably no more than a kind of rift in the order of things,” then how does one account for the 
difficulty of abolishing man as a historical a priori? (OT, xxiii) I also showed how, at the same 
time as Foucault was engaged in a self-critique of archaeology, he was also affirmatively 
exploring ideology critique as a powerful tool for explaining the social production knowledge. 
However, the farther Foucault goes in his turn toward Nietzschean genealogy and the politics of 
truth, the more one sees him wrenching away ideology critique and social theory. Here, then, I’d 
like to show how Foucault came to affirm a political critique of discourse over and against a 
social critique of ideology. 
Foucault’s turn toward genealogical critique to account for the historical reality of man 
faced a one major obstacle, or better, a major rival in the anti-humanism of Althusser’s particular 
version of ideology critique.67 Althusser was closest to Foucault as far as Marxist intellectuals 
are concerned. Not only was Foucault one of Althusser’s students, but both sought to critique the 
premises of humanism and viewed subjectivity as a product of historical practices. In other 
words, the crux of Foucault’s challenge to ideology critique is about accounting for the historical 
production of subjectivity, or subjection (assujettissement). The question is whether this 
production is socio-economic or political, that is, whether it is determined by the general 
contradiction of society between labor and capital or whether this production is primarily 
determined by local strategies of power operating outside of any functionalist framework. For 
Foucault, the stake of this difference is whether critique leads to true knowledge (Marxist 
“science” for Althusser) or whether critique is a practice of desubjection. That is to say that the 
stake of their difference is political: is critique an endless way of inhabiting power relations or 
does it end in scientific authority, which takes a commanding role in class struggle and 
legitimates the authoritarian subjections of party politics.  
Interestingly enough, however, Foucault first uses the term “desubjection” 
(désassujettissement) to define the meaning of class struggle on the basis of the will to power in 
the brief period when he took over the concept of ideology for himself—and in a critique of 
humanism no less:68 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Althusser’s essay “Marxism and Humanism” was first published in 1964 and thus predates The Order of Things, 
while his famous essay, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” first appeared in 1970.  
68 One must emphasize that Foucault’s critique of humanism is not the same as his critique of anthropology. 
Humanism exists over a broader historical period and is based on discourses outside of the trio examined by The 
Order of Things. Foucault’s concern for the political problem of humanism is evidenced as early as 1966: “Our task 
is to definitely free ourselves from humanism and it is in this sense that our work is political work, to the extent that 
all of the regimes of the East or of the West must peddle all of their bad merchandise under the pavilion of 
humanism.” (DE1, 544) And, in 1969, it appears that Foucault entirely replaces the problem of man with that of the 
subject: “The death of man is nothing to get particularly excited about. It’s one of the visible forms of a much more 
general disease, if you like. I don’t mean by it the death of god, but the death of the Subject, the Subject in capital 
letters, of the subject as origin and foundation of Knowledge (savoir), of Freedom, of Language and History.” (FL, 
67) Foucault’s analysis here is certainly indebted, in part, to Althusser’s critique of humanist political ideology in 
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I understand by humanism the ensemble of discourses by which one has said to Western 
man…“the more you renounce the exercise of power and the more you submit to what is 
imposed on you, the more you will be sovereign.” Humanism, is what invented these 
subjected sovereignties [souverainetés assujetties] that are, in turn, the soul (sovereign of 
the body, subjected to God), consciousness (sovereign in the order of judgment; 
submitted to the order of truth), the individual (titular sovereign of rights, subjected to the 
laws of nature or to the rules of society), fundamental freedom (internally sovereign, 
externally consenting and given to its destiny). In brief, humanism is all of that by which 
in the West one has barred desire from power…In the heart of humanism, there is the 
theory of the subject (in the double sense of the word). This is why the West rejects with 
such relentlessness everything that can blast open this barrier. And this barrier can be 
attacked in two ways. Either by a desubjectivation [désassujettissement] of the will to 
power (that is to say, by political struggle understood as class struggle), or by an 
enterprise of the destruction of the subject as a pseudo-sovereign (that is to say by 
cultural attack: suppression of taboos, of limitations, and sexual divisions; the practice of 
communitarian existence; lack of inhibition with regard to drugs; rupture with all the 
prohibitions and all the closures by which normative individuality reconstitutes and 
renews itself). I think there of all the experiences that our civilization has rejected or 
which it has only admitted in the element of literature. (DE1, 1094-5) 
Three comments are in order here. First, it is notable that desubjection concerns the conflict 
between the will to power (not the proletariat per se) and humanism as a bourgeois ideology. 
Second, humanism is instituted through a “subjected sovereignty” based on a conception of 
power as a property of the subject (“the desire for power”). And third, the “subjected sovereignty” 
of humanism elaborates upon the structure of the anthropological doublet. Recall that “man” is 
an empirico-transcendental doublet in that the subjective conditions of his knowledge are derived 
from his objective contents. Later, Discipline and Punish will implicitly use this structure to 
show how panopticism functions by first constituting disciplinary man as an object of knowledge 
that becomes a subject by subjecting itself to its constituted objectifications. Now, how does the 
“desubjection of the will to power” lead to the politics of truth instead of the critique of ideology 
and Marxist science?  
 Along with the politics of truth, and as its corollary, one of the most consistent themes of 
Foucault’s 1970s work is the critique of ideology. Foucault maintains his basic position from The 
Order of Things, namely, that the concept of ideology dogmatically assumes the value of truth. 
While his renewed attack on ideology begins in earnest in his 1973 lecture course The Punitive 
Society, all of his criticisms of the concept of ideology are presented together at the beginning of 
his 1980 lecture course, On the Government of the Living:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Marxism and Humanism,” where Althusser claims that “Marx’s materialism excludes the empiricism of the subject 
(and its inverse: the transcendental subject) and the idealism of the concept (and its inverse: the empiricism of the 
concept).” (Althusser 2006, 228) This would effectively mean that Marx had transcended the empirico-
transcendental doublet. However, against Althusser’s thesis that there is an epistemological break in Marx between 
his earlier humanist period and his later, anti-humanist period, Foucault insists that this is not his concern. That is, 
the object of Foucault’s research is not the author and its corpus, but the episteme and its rules of formation: 
“Someone said: the concrete essence of man is labor. To speak truthfully, several people enunciated this thesis. We 
find it in Hegel, in the post-Hegelians, and also in Marx, the Marx of a certain period, as Althusser would say. As I 
am not interested in authors but in the functioning of statements, it matters little who said it or when it was said.” 
(DE1, 1490)  
	   48	  
If I tried to set the notion of knowledge-power against the notion of dominant ideology it 
is because I think three objections could be made to the latter. First, it postulated a badly 
constructed theory, or a theory not constructed at all, of representation. Second, this 
notion of dominant ideology was pegged, implicitly at least, and moreover without being 
able to rid itself of it in a clear way, to an opposition of true and false, reality and illusion, 
scientific and unscientific, rational and irrational. Finally, third, under the word 
“dominant,” the notion of dominant ide- ology chose to overlook all the real mechanisms 
of subjection [assujettissement] and as it were discarded the card, passing it on to another 
hand, saying: after all, it’s for historians to find out how and why some dominate others 
in a society. In opposition to this I tried therefore to establish the notions of knowledge 
and power. (GL, 11-2) 
I would like to take the second claim first. In the previous chapter I discussed how The Order of 
Things critiques the dogmatic distinction between truth and falsity in the context of the analysis 
of the empirico-transcendental doublet. Foucault states that, beyond merely drawing the 
conditions for anthropological knowledge from empirical man, the doublet arises from the 
assumption of the existence of truth. In the resulting dialectic of man’s truths and illusions, it is 
held that “there must also exist a truth that is of the order of discourse” that allows one to 
“[distinguish] illusion from truth, ideological fantasy from the scientific theory.” (OT, 319-20) 
With Foucault’s turn to power, however, the question becomes political. As Society Must Be 
Defended puts it, “What types of knowledge are you trying to disqualify when you say that you 
are a science?...[W]hat subject of experience and knowledge are you trying to minorize…?” 
(SMD, 10) The problem is that the dogmatic division between truth and falsity, here rendered in 
terms of science and ideology, is used to assume the right to discourse to the exclusion of certain 
other perspectives. And here Foucault does not have in mind the capitalist targets of ideology 
critique, but proletarians, lumpen proletarians, the “masses,” the “people,” and other groups on 
whose behalf Marxist science claims to speak—in other words, all of those whose existence is at 
stake in the phrase “the desubjectivation of the will to power.” The division between science and 
ideology, then, becomes a tactic for controlling and policing the will to power. I will return to the 
link between Marxist critique as an exercise of power in Chapter Five, when I discuss why 
Foucault does not draw upon Marx in his assessment of neoliberalism.  
Now let us look at the inadequate theory of representation assumed by the division 
between science and ideology. The concept of ideology posits that signs function in society to 
reproduce material economic relations of production necessary for capitalist accumulation. By 
the time Foucault renewed his attack on ideology critique in 1972, the most advanced concept of 
ideology was to be found in Althusser’s famous 1970 essay “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses.” There, Althusser famously argues that the mechanism of the ideological 
reproduction of the relations of production is the interpellation of individuals as subjects. The 
over-all function of ideology is to ensure that individual subjects act according to the norms and 
rules that enable the production of surplus-value. Althusser’s advancement over previous 
theories of ideology consists of grounding ideology in material practices of “hailing” or 
“interpellating.” Ideology primarily functions not as a set of representations that express the 
spirit of the ruling class and dupe the masses. Instead, ideology’s primary mode of existence (and 
the condition of its “duping” function) lays in its social circulation between subjects according to 
the distribution of capitalist social positions. A police officer subjects an individual as a suspect 
by calling out to them; a teacher interpellates a student by their gaze and calling on them, and so 
on.  
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Althusser assumes, however, that ideology (signs and subjects) resembles the class 
relations of capitalist production, or that ideology represents capital. As I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Foucault takes aim at a similar link in his own work between discourse and its 
conditions when he calls out The History of Madness for assuming a relation of resemblance 
between the discursive concept of madness and the non-discursive practice of socially excluding 
the mad. (DE1, 1031) Foucault particularly critiqued the subjectivity implied by the using 
“medical perception” to explain this link. In Althusser’s example, the link between ideology and 
a capital is secured by the perception of the cop tasked with producing normative subjects for 
capital.  
While Althusser revises the concept of ideology to include overdetermining social 
contradictions (e.g., race and gender) beyond the general contradiction between labor and capital, 
he famously argues that the general contradiction is the “determination in the last instance.” 
(Althusser 2001, 135) In other words, despite the relative autonomy of every other social 
contradiction, each one is determined to function for the sake of the accumulation of surplus 
value as the structural cause of the entire social field. One might ask, why is it not the reverse, 
namely, why is it not the case that capital and its social relations are the effects of a multiplicity 
of heterogeneous socio-political conflicts? If ideology is in any way autonomous from the 
contradiction at the heart of capitalist social relations, then there is no guarantee that it will 
resemble them.69   
Foucault’s third problem, the deadlock on “the real mechanisms of subjection,” amounts 
to two major restrictions that ideology critique implicitly places on the concept of power, which 
prevent it from going beyond the problems associated with the concept of interpellation. The first 
restriction is the notion that the relations of production are fixed through a dominant ideology 
that is seated in the state. In other words, it ideology critique tethers all power relations and 
effects of subjection to the state, or the idea that all ideological power relations interpellate 
subjects as a function of state apparatuses. Not only are there a number of power relations that 
neither originate in nor are destined to being appropriated by the state, but the concept of the 
ideological state apparatus in which ideology has its material reality is a one of those so-called 
universals that it is necessary to critique by way of history. As Foucault will argue in The Birth 
of Biopolitics, the state is not a universal of history; it “is nothing else but the effect, the profile, 
the mobile shape of a perpetual statification (étatisation) or statifications, in the sense [that the] 
state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities.” (BB, 77) In 
other words, not only are power and discourse not essentially statist, but the state is but one of 
the many overall effects of power and discourse in their strategic relation to one another.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 It is on this point that the turn to Nietzsche makes an advance over his 1965 essay, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” 
which put forth an expressive relation in which signs express the point of view of the force that speaks them. In The 
Will to Know, however, Foucault explicitly cautions against repeating this mistake (which is the same mistake made 
by the concept of ideology): “All in all, try to show truth as an effect of…struggle at the level of discursive 
practices…Not to look for a link of expression and/or reflection between these struggles and their effect in 
discourse.” (WK, 195) Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche in the 1970s, signs go beyond simply imposing an 
interpretation of their object and interpreting other signs; signs combine an epistemic function of identifying the 
object of knowledge (by means of the identity of the concept) and a pragmatic function of singling the object out of 
the sensible in order to use and dominate it. Thus, prior to any use that is made of an object or any violence that is 
done to it, there is the necessary epistemological violence of erasing or overwriting its individual differences. In 
short, the relation between a force and the signs it produces is not principally a relation of expression, but a strategic 
relation that intensifies domination. Signs intensify the will to power: they function as relays in the circuit that the 
will establishes with itself to enhance itself. This is again why it is not a matter of hypothesizing a universal and 
anonymous will behind discourse, but a multiplicity of forces in constant struggle with one another.  
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Directly related to this, then, is the second “deadlock” for ideology critique is the binary 
opposition between the violence of repression and the discourse of ideology. In other words, 
what ideology critique misses is the subjection that happens without the involvement of either 
violence or ideology:  
there is no opposition between what is done and what is said, between the silence of force 
and the prattle of ideology. It is necessary to show how knowledge and power are 
effectively bound up with each other, not in the mode of identity—knowledge is power, 
or the other way round—but in an absolutely specific fashion and according to a complex 
interplay. (PS, 233)  
As Foucault will argue with regard to panopticism, “subjection is not only obtained by the 
instruments of violence or ideology; it can also be direct, physical, pitting force against force, 
bearing on material elements, and yet without involving violence.” (DP, 26) Foucault thus 
proposes an analysis of the strategies of power without restricting the techniques of power in 
advance to the opposition between repression and violence internal to the apparatuses of the 
state: “No, [the subject is] absolutely not [formed] by ideology…it is not an analysis of ideology, 
but a strategic analysis; it is a matter…of a sort of analysis of discourse as strategy…in a more 
real historical context.”70 (DE1, 1498)  
 For a brief time, Foucault was influenced by ideology critique in his move away from 
literature in 1970s and in his analysis of the student rebellions of May ’68, only to renounce this 
influence by the time of his conversation with Deleuze published under the title of “Intellectuals 
and Power” in March of 1972. (DE1, 995; LCP, 207-8) For Foucault, the passage from ideology 
critique to the politics of truth was made possible by a series of studies he undertook on 
Nietzsche. At this point, I’d like to show how these studies enabled him to develop the notion of 
philosophy as the politics of truth, which studies the production of subjectivities in strategic 
relations of power.  
 
3.2 The Politicization of Truth  
In 1973, toward the end of Foucault’s studies on Nietzsche, he states, “I chose…to show 
that there are in Nietzsche a certain number of elements that afford us a model for a historical 
analysis of what I would call the politics of truth.” (EF3, 13) And later, he continues with a jab 
against ideology critique, “What I intend to show…is how, in actual fact, the political and 
economic conditions of existence are not a veil or an obstacle for the subject of knowledge but 
the means by which subjects of knowledge are formed, and hence are truth relations.” (Ibid.) 
What does Foucault mean by “truth” in “the politics of truth?” In this section, I’d like to show 
how Foucault uses Nietzsche to politicize his understanding of truth, which means understanding 
its role within processes of subjection in power relations. 
Let us recall that, as a history of the anthropological a priori, one of the fundamental 
problems in The Order of Things is truth—both with the anthropological doublet and the being 
of language. With the doublet, Foucault showed that man’s finite, empirical objectivity (whether 
it is life, labor, or language) is illegitimately made to provide transcendental criteria of truth. On 
the other hand, The Order of Things shows how the collapse of the subject-object distinction in 
the being of language makes truth impossible as a lasting measure of adequacy between 
statements and objects. In moving closer to Nietzsche, Foucault deepens his understanding of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 This critique of the state as a universal historical concept in Marxism can be seen as early as 1972 in his 
commentary on Balibar’s reading of The Communist Manifesto from that year. (DE1, 1274-5) 
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non-identity or gap between the truth-claim of a statement and its real function as an expression 
and of power by complicating his understanding of the struggles that make up power relations.  
At the end of the last chapter, I mentioned Foucault’s suspicion that his earlier 
interpretation of Nietzsche still risked making the will to power into the constitutive subjectivity 
of all discourse.71 Foucault notes this at the beginning of his first lecture course at the Collège, 
Lectures on the Will to Know:  
if it is a matter of discovering a sort of great assertive (albeit anonymous) will behind the 
historical phenomena of knowledge, will this not return us to a sort of autonomous and 
ideal history in which the will to know itself determines the phenomena in which it 
manifests itself? How would this differ from a history of thought, consciousness, or 
culture? To what extent is it possible to articulate this will to know on the real processes 
of struggle and domination which develop in the history of societies? (WK, 3-4) 
This leads Foucault to rethink truth as a historical event that is produced by strategic relations of 
power and knowledge—that is, in terms of what he calls politics.72  
Foucault arrives at politics by way three principal texts, which comprise his interpretation 
of Nietzsche in the early 1970s: the opening Lectures on the Will to Know (1970-71), “How to 
Think the History of Truth with Nietzsche without Relying on Truth” (1971), the famous 
“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971), and “Truth and Juridical Forms” (1973). In order to 
conceptualize the relation between power and knowledge, Foucault extracts four principles from 
Nietzsche: they are the principles of exteriority (power is outside of knowledge), the event 
(knowledge emerges through novel encounters between forces), and the dispersion of the subject 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 It must be stressed that Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power is not metaphysical because it is a hypothesis that 
results from the critique of morality. Two particularly stand-out instances include his critique of the 
representationalist dogmatism of subjectivity and that of metaphysics as an essentially moral enterprise and the 
subsequent critique of morality as a negative and reactive mode of thought and existence. By showing that every 
metaphysical system is an attempt to justify its moral prejudices and that morality is in turn based on negation (or at 
least every morality that would concern itself with metaphysics), Nietzsche is led to understand morality by positing 
the affirmative element they negate. Thus he arrives at the will to power, which he lays down as a quasi-ontological 
hypothesis. The critique of truth begins as early as 1973 in his famous essay, “Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral 
Sense.” There it is argued that the syntheses in the subject necessary for bringing forth an object of knowledge each 
produce effects that are different in kind. In other words, it cannot be assumed that the faculties of the subject stand 
in a relation of concordant harmony, as Deleuze would put it. Instead, Nietzsche points out that there are 
unresolvable differences between the sensory encounter with an object, the synthesis of sensations into a 
representation, and the synthesis of that representation in turn with a word. As such, each step or representation in 
the process of knowledge involves a moment of creation and production that is not just different than what it 
represents, but also obscures and distorts it. He takes this to mean that the basic element of human knowledge is not 
the concept, but the metaphor, since each synthesis transfers the singular content of what it represents to a new, 
more foreign level. (Nietzsche 2009, 253-64) Nietzsche ventures the hypothetical formulation of the will to power 
due to the requirements of causality: “The question is in the end whether we really recognize the will as efficient, 
whether we believe in the causality of the will: if we do—and at bottom our faith in this is nothing less than our faith 
in causality itself—then we have to make the experiment of positing the causality of the will hypothetically as the 
only one. ‘Will,’ of course, can affect only ‘will’—and not ‘matter’ (not ‘nerves’ for example). In short, one has to 
risk the hypothesis whether will does not affect will wherever ‘effects’ are recognized—and whether all mechanical 
occurrences are not, insofar as a force is active in them, will force, effects of will… The world viewed from inside, 
the world defined and determined according to its ‘intelligible character’—it would be ‘will to power’ and nothing 
else.” (Nietzsche 1966, 48)  
72 The Archaeology of Knowledge already conceives of statements and discursive formations as events, however, 
that text does not yet account for the strategic dimension of discourse as the being of language. 
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(the subject is a product of events of knowledge and power).73 While Foucault’s use of these 
principles varies throughout his studies of power, he nonetheless never abandons them as 
methodological principles.  
The will to power is the being of language as the abyssal ground of discourse. Hence, the 
first principle of the Nietzschean model pertains to the primacy of power over knowledge. It is 
what he calls “The principle of exteriority: that behind knowledge (savoir) there is something 
altogether different from knowledge.”74 (Ibid., 198) Or again, Foucault states, 
“Nietzsche…refuses…pure consciousness, in which the object is given in the form of the subject 
and the subject may be the object of itself.” (Ibid., 212) In other words, the object, insofar as it is 
known, and the subject, in its self-knowledge vis-à-vis the object, in no way resemble the real 
genesis of knowledge: “neither man, nor things, nor the world are made for knowledge.” (Ibid., 
207) How is it possible to think force outside of the form of knowledge and truth without 
abandoning force to pure indeterminacy? Forces are unknowable in themselves, yet they may be 
known through their effects: if knowledge is not to be understood according to truth, but as an 
effect of the encounter between forces, then power relations can only be understood 
diagnostically. What power consists in is a question for the history of the present, not 
metaphysics: “I repeat, once again, that power can in no way be considered either as a principle 
in itself, or as having explanatory value which functions from the outset. The term itself, power, 
does no more than designate a [domain] of relations which are entirely still to be analyzed.” (BB, 
186) This returns us to the problem of the representational link between discourse and its 
conditions that plagued History of Madness. For if power is exterior to knowledge itself, then 
one can never know whether knowledge faithfully represents or expresses its cause, or power. 
Hence the second principle, the principle of the event: knowledge is always an historical 
invention, or event, because it is grounded in historically contingent power relations. Foucault 
focuses on three decisive words in Nietzsche to describe the evental character of knowledge: 
Erfindung, meaning invention, Entstehung, meaning emergence, and Herkunft, meaning descent. 
Nietzsche thinks them together as the emergence of power relations that invent knowledge, 
which sometimes endure historically to form lines of descent. Foucault redeploys the theme of 
the void to characterize the being of language in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” when he 
asserts that the encounter between forces happens in a “‘nonplace,’ a pure distance…the 
adversaries do not belong to a common space.” (EF2, 377) Here the void not only refers to the 
groundlessness of the will to power, as it did in his earlier writings, but also its heterogeneity, 
which accounts for the open, strategic character of force relations. That is, novel force relations 
are open precisely in the sense that their terms do not share a common ground in which they can 
be reconciled. Hence they relate to one another polemically through strategies: “Relations of 
power are strategic…Every time one side does something, the other one responds by deploying a 
conduct, a behavior that counter-invests it, tries to escape it, diverts it, turns the attack against 
itself, etc. Thus nothing is ever stable…” (FL, 144)  
Erfindung refers to the inventedness of knowledge within the strategic context of power 
relations, that is, it refers to the fact that strategies of power are involved both in the way that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Here I omit the principle of fiction, which Foucault includes in this list, since it doesn’t significantly depart from 
his interpretation of Nietzsche in The Order of Things, which I discussed in the previous chapter.  
74 In his commentary on force and the outside of knowledge in Foucault, he insightfully points out that whereas for 
Hegel, in the chapter of The Science of Logic titled “The Essence of Reason,” the concept of force is thought as a 
cause of externalization, which mediates the relation between the inside and the outside. The critique that Foucault 
and Deleuze offer of this model, vis-à-vis Nietzsche, is that this exteriorization is false insofar as force lacks a 
interiority to begin with because it is always already related to the outside of knowledge. (Balibar, 2013)  
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knowledge is produced (e.g., the game of the confession, or surveillance), and in the use of 
knowledge to reinforce power relations (e.g., psychiatric knowledge as a systematic record of 
confessional speech or the examination of panoptic effects in disciplined individuals).  
The principles of exteriority and the event establish the historicality of critical knowledge, 
which, on Foucault’s reading, Nietzsche refers to as Herkunft, meaning “stock” or “descent.” 
Herkunft is the object of genealogy. It doesn’t mean “race” or “lineage” in the common-sense 
meanings of these terms, but to the values and wills that have been transmitted and cultivated 
over history. The lineage behind “modern man” can be traced back to the formation of his 
memory in practices of punishment that marked and destroyed bodies, his will to truth in the 
intolerability of his pointless suffering or his ancestral debt, and so on. For Foucault, one can 
trace modern governmentality ands its governance back across a series of historical 
discontinuities to the Christian-pastoral and its conduct of souls. In both cases, genealogy traces 
the relations of power by following their Herkunft, or the signs of their lines of descent.75  
Since the groundlessness of critique requires it to endlessly question its own categories, 
genealogy can only offer models of power that serve as hypothetical devices for testing our 
contemporary limits of speech, thought, and action.76 Psychiatric power, disciplinary power, 
biopower, and governmentality do not name the external, historical appearances of the inner 
essence of power. The same goes for knowledge: the false question “What is knowledge?” must 
not be answered in the manner of traditional philosophers, who seek to found their authority on 
truth itself, but by looking to the expressly strategic use of knowledge:  
In reality, knowledge is an event…[K]nowledge is always the historical and 
circumstantial result of conditions outside the domain of knowledge…One can speak of 
the perspectival character of knowledge because there is a battle and knowledge is the 
result of this battle. (EF3, 12-4) 
The principles of exteriority and the event relate to an analytical procedure in the politics of truth, 
which Foucault calls eventalization, which he defines most directly in 1978:  
[E]ventalization means rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, 
plays of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what 
subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary…I would like in short 
to resituate the production of true and false at the heart of historical analysis and political 
critique.” (Ibid., 226-30) 
A historical a priori is a self-sufficient principle that totalizes a period, but refers to a problem 
that it ends up codifying in the field of power relations, the most famous in Foucault’s work 
being madness, sexuality, and criminality.  Each problem arises through of a multiplicity of 
struggles and in turn gives rise to a division between the true and the false.  
The final principle that Foucault extracts from his early-1970s studies on Nietzsche is the 
principle of dispersion. It states, “the subject is not the bearer of truth, but truth passes through 
the multiplicity of events that constitute it.” (WK, 198) The subject is an effect of subjection 
(assujettissement) in a relation of power. At the end of the previous section, I stated that the 
politics of truth goes beyond ideology critique by accounting for “the real mechanisms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Once again, this is why Foucault hits upon the question of the Enlightenment through Nietzsche before he 
considers it through Kant: “But it is, once again, Nietzsche who was the first, I think, to define philosophy as being 
the activity that serves to know what’s happening and what is happening now. In other words, we are traversed by 
processes, movements, forces; these processes and these forces, we do not know them, and the role of the 
philosopher, it is, without a doubt, to be the diagnostician of these forces, to diagnose the present [l’actualité].” 
(DE2, 573) 
76 See note 11 regarding Beyond Good and Evil, which argues for this necessary limit in the study of power. 
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subjection.” For Foucault, truth is not a product of critique, instead, following The Genealogy of 
Morals, it is a constitutive element of subjection. For as the historical a priori that emerges 
through power relations includes the practical norms of conduct through the production of 
knowledge. In 1976, Foucault states:  
The essential political problem for the intellectual is not to critique the ideological 
contents that would be tied to science…it is to know if it is possible to constitute a new 
politics of truth. The problem is not of changing the consciousness of the people or what 
they have in their heads, but of changing the political, economic, and institutional 
production of truth…The political question, in sum, is not that of error, illusion, alienated 
consciousness, or ideology; it is that of truth itself. Hence the importance of Nietzsche. 
(DE2, 159-60) 
Power concerns subjectivity not only in the distribution of subject positions that provide 
exclusive access to discourse, but in the objectification of individuals and populations as objects 
of knowledge and targets of the exercise of power. In 1978 he writes:  
These programings of behavior, these regimes of jurisdiction and veridiction…are 
fragments of reality which induce such particular effects in the real as the distinction 
between true and false implicit in the ways men “direct,” “govern” and “conduct” 
themselves and others. To grasp these effects as historical events—with what this implies 
for the question of truth (which is the question of philosophy itself)—this is more or less 
my theme. (EF3, 233)  
The politics of truth is about tracing norms of subjection back to the evental encounters between 
heterogeneous forces and their effects, whose dispersed existence accounts for the historical a 
priori of a mode of power and the subjections it involves.  
Finally, on the basis of these principles outlined above, it is easy to see how Foucault 
defines the “politics” in the politics of truth.77 In a 1977 interview, he states, “If it is true that all 
power relations in a given society constitute the domain of the political…each power relation can 
be referred to the political sphere of which it is a part, both as its effect and as its condition of 
possibility. To say that ‘everything is political’ is to acknowledge this omnipresence of relations 
of force and their immanence to the political field…” (FL, 211) Foucault’s concept of “the 
political” is neither an essence, nor a set of formal criteria, nor a restricted domain of spirit—it 
extends beyond any codified domain of human activity. It is coextensive with all force relations 
in that it is both the site that they carve out and, once constituted, a historically contingent, yet 
determining set of conditions for the forces therein. Foucault’s definition of politics implies an 
immanent causal relation between power and its effects, including knowledge, whereby the 
effects of power are no less causal in their relation to the political. This is how the principles of 
exteriority and of the event establish the politics of truth.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 In 1978 Foucault shows how Nietzsche makes possible a truly political conception of the will, which is irreducible 
to the moral and natural versions of the concept that philosophy had thought previously: “It must now be asked 
under what form one can think the problem of the will. I have said to you just now that the West, in order to address 
the relations between human actions and the will, possessed up until now only two methods. In sum, in other terms, 
from a methodological point of view as well as a conceptual point of view, the problem was posed only under 
traditional forms: nature-force or the law that distinguishes between good and evil. But curiously, in order to think 
the will, we didn’t borrow the method from military strategy. It seems to me that the question of the will can be 
posed as in a struggle, that is, from a strategic point of view so as to analyze a conflict where diverse antagonisms 
develop themselves.” (DE2, 605) 
	   55	  
Despite the polemic character of power, it is irreducible to the negative concepts of 
exclusion and prohibition, which offer themselves as general forms of power.78 And since power 
is not a negation, it is not dialectical inasmuch as it is not subject to the fate of being negated in 
turn: “The master-slave dialectic, according to Hegel, is the mechanism by which the power of 
the master empties itself by the very fact of its exercise. What I want to show is the opposite: that 
power is reinforced by its own exercise.” (DE1, 1685) Consequently, power is also irreducible to 
oppression: “Power does not oppress, for two reasons: first, because it procures a pleasure…We 
have a whole…erotics of power…In the second place, power can create [knowledge].” (Ibid., 
1510). A theory of power qua oppression states that power is a property of a subject—the 
oppressor—that is used to negate its object, the oppressed. However, power is neither a socio-
politically ascribed property nor a faculty of a subject, whether individual or collective. Instead, 
power’s positivity is revealed both in the pleasure that it gives (the self-affirming character of its 
exercise) and in the knowledge that it creates. 
In tracing the emergence of anthropological man, then, one must not only describe the 
historical rules of his discourse of truth; one must also trace these rules back to the relations 
between forces that constituted the historical field of knowledge and that made man exist as an 
object of knowledge and a subject of norms. Arguably, this was Foucault’s entire project during 
the 1970s. As Foucault concludes in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (and here one should think 
of Marx), “[the] critique of the injustices of the past by a truth held by men in the present 
becomes the destruction of the man who maintains knowledge [connaissance] by the injustice 
proper to the will to knowledge.” (EF2, 389).  
Foucault’s passage through ideology critique leads him to the politics of truth, which 
accounts for subjection by analyzing the strategic relation between discourse and power. Its 
historical problem is anthropological subjection. That is, critique questions the power relations 
that produce the anthropological a priori and the way that this form of truth programs the 
production of subjectivities. The problem of man is not only epistemological, but it is also 
political in that it is a form of organizing capacities, actions, and subjects within an open 
strategic field of practices.  
Though the language of anthropology and the historical a priori drops out of Foucault’s 
genealogical work, the statement by Foucault that appears at the end of my previous chapter 
confirms that man is still his guiding problem well into his political period. To repeat:  
Of course [man] exists. What one must destroy is the ensemble of qualifications…that 
have defined some human essences since the 18th century. My error has not been to say 
that man does not exist, but to imagine that he would be so easy to demolish. (DE1, 1685)  
Foucault clearly links his archaeologies of man to his genealogies of power in a 1978 interview 
titled “On Power:” “[G]enerally speaking, the fact that…human behavior became…a problem to 
be analyzed and resolved, all that is bound up, I believe, with mechanisms of power…So the 
birth of the human sciences goes hand in hand with the installation of new mechanisms of power.” 
(PPC, 106) The mechanisms of power that deploy the knowledge of man constitute the political 
conditions that bring man into being and hold him there; they make up the conditions that 
critique must challenge by describing their history and revealing their contingency. In 1976, 
Foucault states:  
The essential political problem for the intellectual is not to critique the ideological 
contents that would be tied to science…it is to know if it is possible to constitute a new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Whereas Foucault’s studies of madness in the asylum suggested the opposite, it is the study of delinquency and 
prisons that show that power possesses a positive, strategic dimension. (FL, 209) 
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politics of truth. The problem is not of changing the consciousness of the people or what 
they have in their heads, but of changing the political, economic, and institutional 
production of truth…The political question, in sum, is not that of error, illusion, alienated 
consciousness, or ideology; it is that of truth itself. Hence the importance of Nietzsche. 
(DE2, 159-60) 
If anthropological subjection is the synthesis of essentialized predicates in concrete 
subjects, then critique, as the politics of truth, must attack the forms of power that tie us to our 
predicates. At the archaeological level, the predicates that make up the human essence are, of 
course, life, labor, and language. Examples of the continuation of anthropology in Foucault’s 70s 
period include his studies on man as a subject of life through his sexuality and as a subject of 
language through the force relations that make him speak and through the normalization more 
generally. And, with respect to labor, in 1973 Foucault states:  
What I would like to show is that in fact labor is absolutely not the concrete essence of 
man…In order for men to be effectively…tied to labor, there must be an operation…by 
which men effectively find themselves…synthetically…tied to the apparatus of 
production for which they work. There must be…a synthesis operated by a political 
power in order for the essence of man to be able to appear as labor. (DE1, 1489-90) 
This statement appears in “Truth and Juridical Forms,” which followed upon The Punitive 
Society, where he provides a genealogy of the punitive measures that made the European 
proletariat identify itself with the activity of labor as “the working class.” The syntheses that 
Foucault refers to are performed by what he will call apparatuses (dispositifs) according to a 
strategy within a relation of power. After the turn deeper into Nietzsche, the apparatus is what 
accounts for what archaeology formerly analyzed as discursive formations. (PP, 13) 
The term apparatus first appears in Foucault’s lecture course The Punitive Society to 
describe how the popular illegalisms of the European underclasses were politically neutralized 
through a network made up of the rise of modern policing and criminology, the profiling of work 
history, the individualization of risk with the invention of savings banks, and a set of social-
moral reforms targeting laziness, gambling, disorderliness, and excessive spending. This 
disciplinary apparatus sought to induce the practice of providing a detailed account of one’s daily 
existence to a number of authorities who used this knowledge to split the underclasses into a 
docile “working class” on the one hand and a “criminal population” on the other. (PS, 194, 239)  
Later, Discipline and Punish provides the most far-reaching definition of this concept: an 
apparatus is “a way of making power relations function in a function, and of making a function 
function through these power relations.” (DP, 206-7) An apparatus is a form that emerges out of 
the strategically fluid relations of power that tends toward both spatio-temporal organization and 
regularity in the production of signs and subjects:  
[T]he apparatus [dispositif] is…a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, 
either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them, utilizing 
them, etc…but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue 
from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: 
strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by types of knowledge. (PK, 
196) 
The most famous instance of this is of course the panopticon, where “A real subjection 
[assujettissement réel] is born mechanically from a fictitious relation,” since the imagined and 
uncertain possibility of being seen forces one to “[become] the principle of one’s own subjection” 
by internalizing the norms of the apparatus. (DP, 202-3)  
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Foucault adds that apparatuses tend to emerge at points of urgent crisis in history where 
power relations are most fluid. Thus, one can trace such norms back to the problems that they 
“solve,” such as the problem of making multiplicities of human beings useful by enhancing their 
powers of action without risking that they become politically empowered thereby. Such was the 
problem posed during the initial period of primitive accumulation in modern capitalism, which 
saw a steady increase of sundry population flows being dumped into burgeoning industrial 
centers. This period not only staged encounters between the heterogeneous forces of labor and 
capital, but also vagrants and municipal authorities, prisoners and systems of justice, police and 
delinquents, students and educators, soldiers and generals. 
 If the archaeology of man was made possible by literary ruptures that broke away from 
anthropological discourse, what accounts for the genealogical critique of power relations? This is, 
of course, a repetition of the question of the beginning of philosophy, but it is more than that. On 
the one hand, there is no question that Foucault took Nietzsche in a drastically more political 
direction than the latter’s solitary life—and so one should ask how this came to be. On the other, 
there is the question of what orients the critique of subjection, that is, how does it know which 
field of power relations to study? 
 
3.3 The Possibility of the Politics of Truth 
Ever since Rorty’s critique of Foucaultian pessimism, it has sometimes been claimed that 
Foucaultian critique is an intellectual exercise without any practical dimension, or simply leads 
to the stance that resistance is futile. As the argument goes, the critique of “humanity” and its 
attendant ideal of freedom is too destructive and undermines politics altogether—especially 
those practiced by the oppressed and exploited. (Rorty 1982, 206-8) Perhaps more significantly, 
this points to an epistemological concern for the possibility of the politics of truth: what critical 
position is there when there is nothing outside of power?79 If the exteriority of the being of 
language qua literature formerly offered Foucault a critical position from which to speak (as a 
neutral, anonymous “one”), what position is there now that such exteriority with respect to power 
is absent? How is critique possible when it is necessarily immanent to power relations? For 
Nietzsche, this was answered by the hypothesis of the eternal return as the abyssal ground of the 
will to power. For the eternal return allowed him to say that only those wills that express the 
groundlessness of the eternal return succeed in passing its test. While Foucault decidedly does 
not follow Nietzsche on this point, the question is the same: if power is essentially without 
reason, then what within power relations expresses this groundlessness in a way that offers a 
foothold to critique? Of course, this is another way of returning to the question that was explored 
last chapter, “what is the beginning of philosophy?”  
Foucault returns to the problem of beginning on two separate occasions toward the end of 
his writings on power—both from 1978. Foucault’s “What is Enlightenment?” reiterates his 
eulogistic remarks about Hyppolite in his first lecture at the Collège: 
It is true that we have to give up hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give 
us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical 
limits…the theoretical and practical experience that we have of our limits and of the 
possibility of moving beyond them is always limited and determined; thus we are always 
in the position of beginning again. (EFS, 54) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Charles Taylor poses a similar concern to Foucault’s Nietzscheanism as it rejects liberation as a goal of freedom 
from instrumental rationality and its “oppression of nature.” (Taylor 1984, 160) 
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With the politics of truth, the limits that make up the historical a priori now include the modes of 
normalization deployed by apparatuses of power in processes of subjection, which dissimulate 
their own historical contingency. The immanence of critique with respect to power relations 
means that it is constantly limited by them, which gives philosophy the circular form of 
recommencement. Foucault describes this form in his first lecture of Security, Territory, 
Population:  
…what I am doing concerns philosophy, that is to say, the politics of truth, for I do not 
see many other definitions of the word “philosophy” apart from this…I see its role as that 
of showing the knowledge effects produced by the struggles, confrontations, and battles 
that take place within our society, and by the tactics of power that are the elements of this 
struggle…I would like the [imperative] underpinning the theoretical analysis we are 
attempting to be quite simply a conditional imperative of the kind: if you want to struggle, 
here are some key points, here are some lines of force, here are some constructions and 
blockages80…I would like these imperatives to be no more than tactical pointers. Of 
course, it’s up to me, and those who are working in the same direction, to know on what 
fields of real forces we need to get our bearings in order to make a tactically effective 
analysis. But this is, after all, the circle of struggle and truth, that is to say, precisely, of 
philosophical practice. (STP, 3) 
Foucault articulates the history of the present carried out by critical research as a cartography of 
power and knowledge in the pursuit of struggle and desubjection. Studying the knowledge 
effects and tactics that have coalesced as strategies of power in the historical field makes it 
possible to provide tactical imperatives for those struggling for their own desubjection in the 
present. Note that these tactical imperatives are “hypothetical” owing to the fact that they are as 
conditioned by the historical limits they seek to contest and, more importantly, by the presence of 
the desire to struggle. The desire to struggle is not a necessary given. However, Foucault argues 
that the point of the politics of truth is not to paint a picture of the machinations that result in “the 
wrong life,” as Adorno puts it; that is, its point is not to sadden while offering the conciliatory 
pleasure of being able to know just how and to what extent one is dominated, but to increase the 
possibility of struggle: “No formation of domination has ever been as fecund, and consequently, 
as dangerous, as profoundly rooted, as [the bourgeoisie’s]. It does not suffice to cry out over the 
villainy…this justifies a certain sadness. One must then bring to the combat as much gaiety, 
lucidity, and tenacity as possible. The only thing that is truly sad is not struggling.” (DE1, 1593) 
Therefore, the basis from which critique is possible within the field of power relations is the will 
to struggle, or more exactly, the will to desubjection; for the will to desubjection expresses the 
groundless and open-ended character of power itself.  
Philosophy’s role in the relations of power is thus not juridical, that is, it is not that of a 
judge or a legislator who sets limits to the exercise of power. If philosophy has historically 
played the negative role of a judge and a legislator by setting limits to the exercise of power, this 
is because the philosophical interpretation of power has largely viewed it as unjust or illegitimate 
in itself. Philosophy hence gave itself considerable authority to judge power: “If, after all, 
[philosophy] says to power, ‘stop there’, is this not to take precisely, virtually, and secretly, the 
place of power, to make itself the law of the law, and consequently, to realize itself as law?” 
(DE2, 540)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 This formulation of the hypothetical condition of the politics of truth also appears in Society Must Be Defended: 
“[I]f we are to struggle against disciplines, or rather against disciplinary power…we should be looking for a new 
right that is both antidisciplinary and emancipated from the principle of sovereignty.” (SMD, 39-40) 
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If philosophy for Foucault is not transcendent (and hence not juridical) with respect to 
power relations, that does not free philosophy from having to evaluate the field of force relations, 
since it is always a question of asking which forces express a will to desubjection. By 
overturning the power-law schema, philosophy must ally itself with what he calls “counter-
powers” in various forms of political struggle:  
Perhaps one could still conceive that it would be possible for philosophy to play a role in 
relation to power that wouldn’t be a role of foundation or of agreement with power. 
Perhaps philosophy could still play a role on the side of counter-power on the condition 
that this role no longer consist of wanting to make itself, in the face of power, the very 
law of philosophy, on the condition that philosophy cease to think of itself as prophecy, 
as legislation, and that it charges itself with the task of analyzing, elucidating, rendering 
visible, and thus of intensifying the struggles that unfold around power, the strategies of 
the adversaries from within the relations of power, the tactics utilized, the openings of 
resistance, on the condition, in sum, that philosophy cease to pose the question of power 
in terms of good or bad, but in terms of existence…One could imagine, one should 
imagine something like an analytico-political philosophy.81 (Ibid., 540-1) 
If power is not the property of a subject and if it is not to be understood in terms of legitimacy, 
then the difference between being a “counter-power” and a limit to power is crucial, since the 
task of philosophy is not to regulate power but intensify it. 
This provides a clue to a basic question about the grounds of critique, namely, how does 
one determine which history of the present to undertake? How does one know which events of 
struggle and which discourses in the historical field need to be analyzed? The answer: by paying 
attention to the problems encountered and posed by those struggles of desubjection that reveal 
the character of our present in the course of breaking away from it.  
Yet one must have a historical analysis in order to theorize the struggles in the present, 
know which existing struggles are important, and know how to frame them.82 For instance, why 
not simply champion the class struggle as a will to break free of capitalism? This returns us to 
the circle formed by the history of the present and desubjection in the politics of truth: on the one 
hand, philosophy cannot determine the historical archive without first being determined to do so 
by contemporary struggles; on the other hand, philosophy cannot conceptualize existing 
struggles and partake in them without reference to the history of power-knowledge. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 My italics. 
82 For instance, one of the most common dangers on the left is the organization of resistance on the basis of 
humanism and anthropological “man,” which is itself a product of normalizing practices to be resisted. In an 
interview titled “Michel Foucault: Responses from the Philosopher,” Foucault argues that political struggles must 
not situate themselves on an anthropological terrain, but that they must fight against normalization in the name of 
anthropological man. This is Foucault’s response when his interviewer asks if acting and writing in solidarity with 
minoritarian struggles is the same thing as humanism and whether humanism should be conserved: “If these 
struggles are led in the name of an essence determined by man, such that they are constituted in the thought of the 
18th century, then I would say that these struggles are already lost. Because they will be carried out in the name of 
abstract man, in the name of normal man, in the name of good health—they are the precipitate of a series of powers. 
If we would like to critique these powers, we must not carry it out in the name of an idea of man that was 
constructed by these powers. When the vulgar Marxist speaks of total man, of man reconciled with himself, what is 
at stake here? It’s normal man, balanced man. How was this image of man formed? By using a psychiatric, medical 
knowledge and power, by starting from a power that normalizes. To make a political critique in the name of 
humanism means reintroducing into one’s arsenal the very thing against which we must struggle.” (DE1, 1685) 
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One way to solve this dilemma is to prioritize the struggles of the present, which finds 
plenty of support in Foucault’s oeuvre.83 Philosophical critique does not have a monopoly on 
desubjection—far from it. Foucault’s experiences with patient-doctor relations at the Hôpital 
Saint-Anne helped give rise to his archaeology of madness;84 the prison revolts of the early 1970s 
gave rise to the Groupe de l’Information sur les Prisons, which in turn made possible Discipline 
and Punish; the first volume of The History of Sexuality was preceded by Foucault’s trip to 
California in 1975 that exposed to him to the heterotopias of gay counter-culture and LSD; 
Foucault’s concepts of conduct, counter-conduct, and ‘political spirituality,’ retroactively appear 
to be just a half step behind the Iranian Revolution; and, finally, Marcelo Hoffman has 
convincingly argued that Foucault’s concept of parrhēsia owes a great deal to his experiences 
supporting the Solidarity movement in Poland. (Macey 1993, 338-40; Hoffman 2014, 129-43) 
But, above all, the most straightforward evidence for the claim that critique presupposes struggle 
comes from “What is Critique?” which articulates a will to not be governed. Towards the 
beginning of this lecture, he states: 
[C]ritique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth 
on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth…critique will be the 
art of voluntary insubordination [inservitude], that of reflected intractability [indocilité]. 
Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation [désassujettissement] of the subject in 
the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth.85 (EFS, 266) 
He ends this same essay stating, “And if it is necessary to ask the question about knowledge in 
its relationship to domination, it would be, first and foremost, from a certain decision-making 
will not to be governed [volonté décisoire de n’être pas gouverné]...” (Ibid., 278) Likewise, one 
must remember the hypothetical character of the imperative that opens the circle of the politics 
of truth: “…if you want to struggle…” Where would such a will come from? What conditions 
the will to struggle?  
Harkening back to the notion of philosophy as a counter-power, Foucault answers: 
“[T]here is…always something, in the social body, in classes, in groups, in individuals 
themselves that…escapes the relations of power…it is not so much the exterior of power 
relations as it is their limit, their inverse, their counter-blow…[which] motivates every 
new development of the networks of power…[T]he point of view of the pleb…is hence 
indispensable for the analysis of apparatuses [dispositifs]; starting from there, it is 
possible to comprehend their functioning and their developments.” (DE2, 421-2) 
“The pleb,” as Foucault states it here, is not a sociological category, but instead refers to the self-
differentiating essence of power relations, that is, the tendency of power relations to break down 
as forces within power relations escape them. The pleb is the virtual limit of power in that it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 In a hyperbolic passage, Foucault suggests that one walk away from “the canon” altogether if one desires to 
ground philosophical discourse through its auto-critique: “Leave aside the ‘great books’, avoid setting straight out 
for the unconsciousness of the system, seek the surface of discourse, the explicit: it is neither in Hegel nor in August 
Comte that the bourgeoisie speaks directly…On the side of the sacralized texts, an absolutely conscious, reflected 
strategy can be clearly read in a mass of unknown documents that constitute the effective discourse of a political 
action. A logic of strategy must replace the logic of the unconscious. For the privilege accorded to the signifier and 
its chains one must substitute tactics with their apparatuses.” (DE1, 1587) 
84 Foucault would go on to say that power was the unnamed problem in his early work on madness: “I would say 
that it’s through the asylum that I first became aware of a problem that still haunts me, I mean the problem of power.” 
(FL, 138) 
85 My emphasis.  
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escapes the subjection of apparatuses and thus defines what is novel in power relations.86 The 
pleb is not a particular force or instinct, but it could be said that there are forces that are “of the 
pleb” in that they are irreconcilable with subjection and provide clues that can lead to 
apprehending the limits of our current order of power-knowledge. When a force traverses the 
limit of the pleb, it poses a problem to the existing order of dominations because it puts the 
strategies of apparatuses to the test and forces them to change in response. Beyond the basic 
relational character of power, the pleb is what allows Foucault to say, “Power comes from below” 
and that resistance is a matter of “mobile and transitory points” as opposed to “massive binary 
divisions.” (HS1, 94, 96) While the pleb is not “the permanent ground of history, the final 
objective of all subjections,” it is a principle of historical intelligibility, because it illuminates the 
strategic domain of power from the point of view of its limit—a possibility of existence that is 
incommensurable with the possibilities afforded by the existing strategies of forces. (DE2, 421)  
The will not to be governed, then, is the guiding will for a form of life that is lived from 
the point of view of the pleb. Critique must think from this perspective because, in illuminating 
power apparatuses, it is the point of view that, in escaping the present, defines it. Therefore, the 
history of the present is the history of what is becoming other in the present, that is, of what in 
the present is moving toward desubjection. That is, contemporary struggles of desubjection pose 
problems to the present’s historically unique forms of power-knowledge and thereby made 
possible their genealogy. Thus it would seem that the politics of truth begins from resistance, or 
practices of desubjection that are already unfolding.87  
The other way of solving this dilemma, of course, is to give priority to philosophy since it 
has the critical theoretical tools that enable it to diagnose the present and identify historical 
novelty. This would be to claim that what enabled Foucault to ally with prison revolts was the 
extant critique of anthropology and the vigilance of philosophy over the death of man. Politically, 
it is a matter of inventing and identifying new types of struggles that no longer advance 
themselves on anthropological premises, such as laboring man as the subject of history. More 
directly, it is a matter of struggling—and identifying struggles—against anthropological 
normalization.  
However, as with basing critique on contemporary struggles, according to this second 
alternative, critique is grounded in something that precedes it, namely, the history of limit-
discourses on the being of language. More exactly, the critique of truth and subjection in power 
relations is historically based on the literary problematization of language. Foucault’s claim that 
man emerged around discursive attempts to capture and normalize singularities like sexuality, 
criminality, and mental illness was made possible not only by literary breaks with the 
anthropological a priori, but even more directly by the fact that such singularities were often the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 This is what makes it possible for Deleuze to say that resistance is analytically and politically primary in power 
relations: “[T]he final word on power is that resistance comes first to the extent that power relations operate 
completely within the diagram [such as panopticism], while resistances necessarily operate in a direct relation with 
the outside from which the diagrams emerge.” (Deleuze 1988, 89)  
87 In his reconstruction of the Foucaultian figure of the plebs, Martin Breaugh follows Alain Brossat, who argues 
that the pleb is not a substantial, continuous historical subject, but that its sole characteristic is formal: the act of 
rising up and making a cut in history. On this basis, Brossat lumps the likes of Osama Bin Laden into the category of 
the pleb, which leads Breaugh to argue that the concept of the pleb is unhelpfully broad. (Breaugh 2013, 88-90) It is 
true that Foucault’s definition is sufficiently broad to cut across classes, groups, and individuals—that it is present in 
an “irreducibly diverse extension of forms and energies.” (DE2, 421) However, the pleb is not the terminal point of 
the analysis of power, which one would then use as the ultimate perspective upon it. For while a terrorist might 
function as a pleb perspective on the apparatus that they attack, nothing necessitates that there is only one plebian 
perspective and nothing prohibits an analysis of the pleb within a terrorist organization as an apparatus of power.   
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subject matter of literature speaking outside of the discursive rules of intelligibility. That is to say 
that Foucault not only saw literature as key to thinking the being of language as power relations, 
but also saw it as a site in which the problems in power relations symptomatically appeared.  
As Foucault’s philosophical works partially based their political problematizations in 
literature, he belongs to a line of post-Heideggerian thinkers who saw in literature a political 
subject to come. As he states of historical experiences:  
The problems that experiences like these pose to politics have to be elaborated. But…the 
problem is, precisely, to decide…if it is not, rather, necessary to make the future 
formation of a “we” possible by elaborating the question. Because it seems to me that the 
“we” must not be previous to the question; it can only be the result—and the necessarily 
temporary result—of the question as it is posed in the new terms in which one formulates 
it.” (EF1, 114-5) 
Like Heidegger, Derrida, or Deleuze, Foucault’s work relays an aesthetic experience or event 
such as the literature of madness or crime to a collectivity that can only be glimpsed because its 
arrival would violate the current order of the possible. Though it is by now a worn infinitive, 
each of Foucault’s histories of the present is a call to a collectivity, or a “we,” to come: a pleb 
that forms a collective subject of non-anthropological enunciation. 
This “we to come” would supersede the works of critique by testing their limits in a game 
of domination. In a 1975 interview, Foucault states: “The uses of a written book are not defined 
by the one who wrote it. The more new, unforeseen, possible uses there are, the more I will be 
content.” (DE1, 1588). Or again, when he characterizes his writings as short-lived weapons: “I 
would like to write book-bombs, that is to say, books that are useful precisely at the moment 
when someone writes them or reads them. Then, they disappear…” (DE2, 477)  In another 
interview from this period, Foucault echoes the anonymity and self-erasure of his archaeological 
works by speaking of the pleasure of being transcended: “I feel almost a physical pleasure in 
thinking that the things I’m involved in go beyond me, that there are a thousand people and a 
thousand books being written…a thousand things being done, that go in exactly the same 
direction I am and that ultimately surpass me.” (FL, 145) This pleasure is not straightforward. 
While he only once speaks of writing as a pleasurable activity (DE1, 1513), in 1975 he 
disparages writing in yet another moment in which he distances himself from the neutrality of 
literature: 
At bottom, I do not like writing…Writing interests me only to the extent that it is 
incorporated in the reality of a combat, as an instrument, a tactic, an illumination. I would 
like my books to be a sort of scalpel, a Molotov cocktail, or a minefield. I would like 
them to self-destruct after use, like fireworks…The utilization of a book is closely tied to 
the pleasure that it can give, but I do not all see what I make as an oeuvre…I am a seller 
of instruments, a maker of recipes, an indicator of objectives, a cartographer, a drawer of 
plans, an armorer. (Ibid., 1593) 
Foucault saw one such instance happen in France after the publication of Discipline and Punish:  
What I am trying to do is provoke interference between our reality and the knowledge of 
our past history. If I succeed, this will have real effects in our present history. My hope is 
my books become true after they have been written—not before…But two years ago 
there was turmoil in several prisons in France, prisoners revolting. In two prisons, the 
prisoners in their cells read my book. They shouted the text to other prisoners. I know it’s 
pretentious to say, but that’s a proof of a truth—a political and actual truth—which 
	   63	  
started after the book was written. I hope that the truth of my books is in the future. (FL, 
301) 
What is at play in these statements is a sort of jouissance in allying struggles to come that will 
undo the present in which one’s writings are relevant. By way of a connection to future struggles, 
Foucault repeats the gesture of writing-to-forget that he first admired in Blanchot, which I will 
pick up again later when I discuss how he conceived of each of his books as an “experience 
book.” 
In sum, there are two answers to the question of what makes critique possible as the 
politics of truth. Yet, neither the contemporary will to desubjection nor the history of the being of 
language in literature has priority over the other. Yet this is not an impasse for philosophy but the 
source of the perpetual recommencement of the politics of truth. One can see how Foucault roots 
the politics of truth in the contemporary will to desubjection in his remarks on May ’68 and on 
prisoner revolts. And one can see how he roots critique in the problem of the being of language 
wherever he reflects on power and the critique of ideology. And one can see the how critique is 
rooted in both struggles and the history of the problem of language whenever Foucault asserts 
that his works are tools to be surpassed by those who use them.  
The general aim of the politics of truth in Foucault’s early to mid-1970s work is 
desubjection, or the refusal of “what we are.” Another way of putting this, as I mentioned 
already, is that the goal is the intensification of struggle in power relations. Foucault writes, 
“[Critique’s] use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn't 
have to lay down the law for the law…It is a challenge directed to what is.” (EF3, 235-6) 
Critique’s aim is not simply negative, however. The positive goal of critique is the increase of 
capacity for those in struggles of desubjection. As Foucault asks in “What is Enlightenment?”: 
“how can the growth of capabilities [capacities] be disconnected from the intensification of 
power relations?”88 (EFS, 55) By “intensification of power relations” Foucault means the 
intensification of subjection. The politics of truth, then, aims at the intensification of the forces of 
desubjection in relation to the forces of subjection, which critique aims to weaken. The politics 
of critique lies in its partisanship to whatever is “pleb” in a situation, that is, whatever pursues a 
line of desubjection. This is directly connected to an ethos, namely, an attitude of refusal. The 
question of the critic in any situation is, how can thought refuse the “ontology” that defines its 
historical present while empowering forces in ways that do not reinforce the apparatuses of 
power that control what we do, say, and think?89 As I have developed it to the point, this 
question leads to the task of the demolition of “man” by producing critical tools for 
understanding the power relations involved in subjection and its relation to anthropological 
knowledge. Now, I would like to analyze the politics of truth in greater detail with particular 
focus on the task of the critic as an individual.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 As Deleuze would put it, it is a matter of (re-) connecting bodies to what they can do. This is Deleuze’s formula 
for reactive forces, where reaction becomes perceptible when it ceases to be acted, giving rise to fantasy and 
ressentiment. (Deleuze 1983, 114)  
89 This is the problem put forth by Discipline and Punish, where docility is the effect of disciplinary power that 
simultaneously makes bodies more useful as individualized subjects of disciplinary apparatuses and thoroughly 
depoliticizes them by attenuating their power of resistance so as to increase their productive forces: “Let us say that 
discipline is the unitary technique by which the body is reduced as a 'political' force at the least cost and maximized 
as a useful force.” (DP, 221)  
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3.4 The Task of the Philosopher in the Politics of Truth90 
How does the philosopher practice the politics of truth, given their position within 
discourse? Foucault’s interviews and essays abound with commentary on how intellectuals can 
take up a political position in discourse that allies itself with struggles of desubjection. Foucault 
denounces the figure of the “general intellectual” who declares the universal truths of man as an 
anthropological archaism. (LCP, 207-8) In its stead, he affirms the emergence of the “specific 
intellectual,” who takes up a position in local struggles. The specific intellectual refers to any 
intellectual with professional expertise in a certain domain of knowledge and practice, as when 
Foucault states: 
One of the essential sociological features of the recent evolution of our societies is the 
development of what might variously be called technology, white-collar workers, the 
service-sector, etc. Within these different forms of activity, I believe that it is quite 
possible, on the one hand, to get to know how it works and to work within it, that is to 
say, to do one’s job as a psychiatrist, lawyer, engineer, or technician, and, on the other 
hand, to carry out in that specific area of work that may properly be called intellectual, an 
essentially critical work…of examination that consists of suspending as far as possible 
the system of values to which one refers when testing and assessing it. In other words: 
“what am I doing at the moment I’m doing it?” (PPC, 107) 
An exemplary case of the specific intellectual, understood along these lines, would be someone 
like Chelsea Manning, who asked that very question of herself as a military intelligence analyst, 
and risked the most extreme consequences in the struggle against the neoliberal security state. 
Yet what about philosophers? Do they retain a degree of privilege from the times when they 
desired to be kings or the embodiment of absolute knowledge? Hardly. The philosopher who 
studies the history of thought from a universal standpoint is largely irrelevant qua philosopher 
when it comes to struggle. This is why Foucault, in identifying himself as a philosopher, and in 
identifying philosophy with the politics of truth in Security, Territory, Population, insists on the 
value of critical philosophy to consist in tracing the history of the knowledge effects of power, 
which is to say, to trace the historical relation of knowledge to its own groundlessness. This is 
what allows him to offer “hypothetical imperatives” in the form of “tactical pointers” in his 
opening remarks to that lecture course.91 (STP, 3) 
 In the remainder of this chapter, then, I will focus on the task of the specific intellectual 
qua philosopher, which is to say that I will focus on how Foucault conceived of his own 
philosophical practice. In a 1976 interview, Foucault identifies three conditions of the role of the 
intellectual in the politics of truth: 
[T]he intellectual…occupies a specific position…that is tied to the general functions of 
the apparatus [dispositif] of truth in a society…[T]he intellectual bears a triple specificity: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In “The Masked Philosopher” interview from 1980, Foucault views the “intellectual” label as suspect, since it 
tends to both mark out an object of judgment, which creates a paranoid cultural atmosphere, and because it leads to a 
fetishistic and uncritical relationship to the authorial name. (EF1, 322) However, I use this term in the sense of a 
“local intellectual,” who operates within a local domain of knowledge and whose political agency is restricted to that 
domain, as opposed to the “global intellectual,” who tries to speak universally.  (LCM, 205-208) 
91 Foucault also places himself in the category of the specific intellectual in a remark from 1977 where he states, “I 
dream of the intellectual destroyer of evidence and universalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the 
present, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of power, who incessantly displaces himself, 
doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he’ll think tomorrow because he is too attentive to the present.” 
(FL, 225) 
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the specificity of their class position…the specificity of their…intellectual condition 
(their domain of research…the economic or political requirements to which they submit 
themselves or against which they revolt in the university, in the hospital, etc.); and finally, 
the specificity of the politics of truth in our society. And this is where their position can 
take on a general significance, that the local or specific combat that they lead carries 
with it its effects…[T]hey struggle at the general level of this regime of truth…[around] 
the ensemble of rules according to which we untangle the true from the false and attach to 
the true some specific effects of power. (DE2, 159)   
More decisive than the philosopher’s class position and their “work conditions” is their 
engagement with their archaeological and genealogical conditions, that is, the apparatus that 
grants them a subject position in discourse and the capacities to use it.92  
Throughout all of Foucault’s comments on intellectuals and the politics of truth, there are 
two elements that mark out the critical task of the intellectual vis-à-vis the apparatus. They are: 
(1) connecting to the desubjection of subjected knowledges in which those excluded from a 
discursive regime force themselves into it and thereby alter its rules; and (2) “political aesthetics,” 
or the mutation of sensibilities and thresholds of tolerability regarding forms of exercising power. 
There is a third element to add here, and that is the practice of philosophical writing and its 
connection to the aesthetics of existence—or the askēsis—that characterizes the philosophical 
life for Foucault.93  
Starting with the intellectual’s connection to subjected knowledges, his most concise 
formulation comes in Society Must Be Defended:  
[S]ubjugated [assujettis] knowledges…[refer] to…knowledges that have been 
disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges…[I]t is the reappearance of what people know 
at a local level, of these disqualified knowledges, that made the critique possible… 
Compared to the attempt to inscribe knowledges in the power-hierarchy typical of science, 
genealogy is, then, a sort of attempt to desubjugate [désassujettir] historical 
knowledges…94 (SMD, 7-10) 
Subjected knowledges primarily refers, of course, to the strategic knowledge of those who 
struggled in the hunger strikes and prison revolts that sprung up across France between 1970 and 
1972, along with Foucault’s activity with Le Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 One of the first definitions of “strategy” in Foucault is archaeological. The Archaeology of Knowledge defines a 
strategy as a theme or theory made up relations between conceptual orders, series of statements, and groupings of 
objects. A discursive formation is characterized to a large extent by the different theories or themes that it make it up 
and whose divergences or exclusivity from one another exist as strategic choices. Consequently, one’s intellectual 
condition includes the specialization of knowledge, the kinds of problems and struggles one can engage, and the 
types of conceptual resources it can generate for struggle. 
93 I will also examine parrhēsia in the following chapter in the context of neoliberalism, since parrhēsia is, de facto, 
Foucault’s last development of the politics of truth.  
94 Subjugation and desubjugation here translate what I have been discussing as subjection and desubjection 
respectively (assujettir and désassujettir). While Foucault here refers to the Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons, 
concrete examples of the desubjection of subjected knowledges on Foucault’s radar also include the anti-psychiatry 
movement and Iranian Revolution. Foucault discussed his reporting and his refusal to condemn the Iranian 
Revolution in terms that draw upon the desubjection of subjected knowledges in one of his reports for Le Nouvel 
Observateur, where he declares, “One must assist in the birth of these ideas and in the explosion of their force…it is 
not in books that they announce these ideas, rather it is in events that they manifest their force…”94 (DE2, 706). The 
event of desubjection need not be spectacular or headline making. 
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mobilized around those resistances and lasted into the beginning of 1973.95 His attachment to 
these knowledges grew alongside his engagement with the French Maoist “Truth and Justice 
Committees,” which soon became a source of his disenchantment with ultra-leftism. One could 
also add his role in founding the newspaper Libération as an instance of the desubjection of 
subjected knowledge as well.96  
Yet the GIP was the most inventive of this trio. Its goal was to make public the hidden—
and often only imagined—material conditions of prison-life, in large part by making a space for 
prisoners to address the public. In Foucault’s words, the GIP responded to “the necessity to keep 
public opinion informed about what goes on in the prisons.” (Eribon 1991, 231) This took the 
form of questionnaires, interviews, and relaying secret messages and demands from prisoners, 
which then appeared in various GIP publications, press releases, and pamphlets. The GIP also 
organized support networks consisting of prisoners’ families and allies in addition to staging 
demonstrations outside of prisons where revolts or hunger strikes were taking place. 
Desubjecting subjected knowledges is a strategy for intervening in the enunciative 
modalities of discourse by opening up subject positions to those excluded from knowledgeable 
speech. One contests the rules for producing truth by challenging who has the right to speak and 
establishing material and discursive connections with those whose exclusion is necessary 
according to the current regime of knowledge. Because the politics of truth plays out at the level 
of force-relations that determine the assemblage of bodies and the granting of subject positions to 
some while denying them to others, acting on discursive conditions is not a matter of disabusing 
a class of people of their ideological illusions. Instead, desubjection starts when the excluded 
themselves corporeally contest the material order of their existence. For the historian of the 
present, it is a matter of forming concrete alliances with those whose exclusion is necessitated by 
apparatuses of power so as to increase their power to act and speak without subjecting them to an 
apparatus that captures and recuperates their activity.  
Consequently, the main task for the intellectual, according to Foucault’s early 70s work, 
is to de-individualize their subject position by sharing it with the excluded.97 As he states in a 
1975 interview, “I do not want to speak any more in the name of others and pretend to say better 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Foucault was particularly involved in committees that sprung up in response to the racist murder of a young 
Algerian (the Djallili Committee), the Bruay en Artois affair, which involved the murder of a 16-year-old working 
class girl by a corporate lawyer and his wife, and a fire at a dance club that claimed the lives of 150 people. See 
Didier Eribon’s chapter “Popular Justice and the Worker’s Memory” in Michel Foucault. (Eribon, 1991, 238-262)  
96 For the fledgling paper, Foucault proposed a column on “workers’ memory” that would feature stories from rank 
and file workers. It would prioritize stories of experiences of revolt omitted by the official histories of the unions, 
left parties, and the press. In the Libération that dealt with this topic, Foucault pointed out how many of the great 
workers’ struggles derived their energy and momentum from going beyond the dictates of union leaders, which 
sought to coopt them in turn. (DE1, 1267-8) In a later Libération interview, Foucault explains this by stating that the 
most radical forces in the working class tend to be “illegalist” (whereas unions seek compatibility with the existing 
order), since “the law has always been made against [them].” (Ibid., 1290) As for the intellectual’s role in relation to 
working class experience, then, Foucault states that it is “not to form the consciousness of the worker, since that 
already exists, but to allow this consciousness, this worker knowledge [savoir], to enter into the system of 
information, to broadcast and help it, and consequently get it to other workers or other people who are not aware of 
what is happening.” (Ibid., 1290)  
97 It almost goes without saying that the capacity of the intellectual to be a force in discourse depends on their status 
and the cultural value attributed to the type of intellectual that they are. This is assuming that the effect of allying 
with prisoners is in part measured by public opinion. Philosophers, especially those aligned with the left, enjoy a 
visibility in France that they do not in many other countries. Nevertheless, to the extent that the intellectual has 
access to a capacity for knowledge that is attached to their institutional affiliation, specialization, and training, the 
politics of truth suggests that forces can be increased by making connections that break the barriers of the university.  
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what they have said. My critique has, as its objective, permitting others to speak without putting 
limits on their right to speak.”98 (DE1, 1683) The form of desubjection here is rooted in how 
Foucault understood the Nietzschean mode of questioning discourse à la “Nietzsche, Freud, 
Marx” and The Order of Things, which asks “Who speaks?” in order to determine who or what 
forces have appropriated the right to speak. The GIP’s rallying cry was “prendre la parole,” 
which literally means “take speech,” but is idiomatically used to mean “speak up” or “take the 
floor;” the phrase thus plays on the act of appropriation necessary for making a public discourse 
from a position of marginality.99  
The Groupe d’information sur les prisons operated on the basis of a tactical reversal of 
the disciplinary power of the prison. The latter consists, in part, of removing prisoners and their 
conditions of life from the common order of visibility, along with the cellularized space of the 
prison that individualizes them and regulates their capacity to communicate about the conditions 
of their existence. As Michael Welch argues, if discipline finds its paradigm in panoptic 
surveillance, the GIP consisted of a counter strategy of “counterveillance.” (Welch 2011, 301) 
The GIP’s success consisted of creating a heterotopic space that traversed the boundaries of the 
prison, one where the prison’s rules for the assembling of bodies and the production of 
statements was effectively suspended so that a new subject of enunciation could emerge:  
[W]hen the prisoners began to speak, they possessed an individual theory of prisons, the 
penal system, and justice….[a] counter-discourse of prisoners and those we call 
delinquents…[T]o force the institutionalized networks of information to listen, to 
produce names, to point the finger of accusation, to find targets, is the first step in the 
reversal of power and the initiation of new struggles against existing forms of power. If 
the discourse of inmates or prison doctors constitutes a form of struggle, it is because 
they confiscate, at least temporarily, the power to speak on prison conditions—at present, 
the exclusive property of prison administrators and their cronies in reform groups. (LCP, 
209, 213-4)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The rest of this quote from this interview refers the act of speaking for other to the legacy of exoticism and French 
colonialism: “Since the epoch of colonization, there existed an imperialist discourse that spoke about others with a 
great meticulousness and transformed them into exotics, people incapable of discoursing on themselves. To the 
question of revolutionary universalism one could add this problem. For Europeans, and perhaps more still for the 
French than for others, revolution is a universal process. The French Revolution of the end of the 18th century 
thought to bring the revolution to the entire world, and up to today, they have not been released form this myth. 
Proletarian internationalism has replayed this myth in another register. However, in the second half of the 20th 
century, there has been no other revolutionary process outside of the frame of nationalism. Whence the malaise in 
certain theoreticians and militants of universal revolution; so they adopt a certain exoticism.” (DE1, 1683-1684) In 
1978, perhaps with an ear to Iran, Foucault reiterates himself, but this time with respect to the boundaries of 
philosophy: “It will be necessary to destroy the idea that philosophy is the only normative thought. It is necessary 
that the voices of an incalculable number of speaking subjects resonate and it is necessary to make an unnamable 
experience. It is not necessary that the speaking subject always be the same. It is not necessary that only the 
normative words of philosophy be allowed to speak. It’s necessary to have all sorts of experiences speak, to lend an 
ear to the aphasics, to the excluded, to the moribund. Because we find ourselves on the outside while it is they who 
effectively face the somber and solitary aspect of struggles. I believe that the task of a practitioner of philosophy 
living in the West must lend an ear to all of these voices.” (DE2, 615-6) 
99 Cecile Brich has argued that it is inaccurate to claim that the GIP’s work was about making it possible for 
prisoners to speak for themselves and that the discourse of prisoners in the GIP was the product of a dialogical 
relation with “the intellectuals’ investigative methods and editorial decisions.” This casts doubt on Foucault’s intent 
to not limits on the prisoners’ rights to speak, or at least requires that that statement function as a heuristic goal. 
(Brich 2008)  
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The pragmatism of the politics of truth does not consist of advancing principled policies, but by 
the creation of schemas of politicization. Schemas of politicization—such as “tactical reversal”—
are ways of empowering subjected groups, polarizing them against their own subjection, and 
weakening the apparatuses of power in which they exist. (FL, 211) Such schemas are composed 
of strategies (such as making visible society’s invisible spaces of domination) and tactics (like 
aiding in the self-organization of subjugated groups). What this looks like concretely depends on 
the apparatus of subjection in question and its strategies for making the power to act come at the 
cost of subjection and the reinforcement of the apparatus that captures the powers of bodies.100 
The local aim of a schema of politicization is to establish an irreconcilable and 
heterogeneous force vis-à-vis the prevailing modes of normalization and knowledge 
production—and to thereby point out their contingency and vulnerability. This is measured 
neither by public consciousness, nor by the political-economic consciousness of the proletariat. 
The intellectual is not in the business of “conscience, consciousness, and eloquence” (à la Sartre), 
as Foucault once said. (LCP, 207) Instead, it consists of making the attitude of non-acceptance 
and indocility “a political fact.” (DE2, 1405) It is only on this local basis that a schema of 
politicization can spread and achieve a general significance of changing the rules of discourse. 
The creation of an attitude of refusal as a political fact is tied to the second feature of the 
intellectual’s role in the politics of truth, namely, the political aesthetic. The desubjection of 
subjected knowledges implies a political aesthetic because the attitude of refusal and indocility is 
based on a perception that connects sensibility and sociability. For Foucault’s understanding of 
the GIP, this attitude is the subjective correlate of what is (and is to be) refused: “the intolerable.” 
In a statement preceding their first inquiry in March of 1971, the GIP wrote, “Last January’s 
hunger strike forced the press to speak. Let us profit from this chink in the armor: the intolerable, 
imposed by force and silence, must no longer be accepted…Let us become intolerant of prisons, 
of justice, of the hospital system, of psychiatric practice, of military service, etc.” (Ibid., 176)  
That same statement ends by declaring that the GIP’s first act would be to conduct 
“intolerance inquiries” that ask prisoners about what they found to be intolerable about their 
situation. It could be said that, by asking prisoners to identify the intolerable for themselves, the 
GIP sought to “conduct” prisoners toward an encounter with what lay at the constitutive limits of 
their experience. The intolerable names that point in the apparatus where the exercise of power 
proves too much, takes one beyond the limit of one’s endurance and, simultaneously, allows one 
to glimpse the limit of power in the possibility of refusal. It is the affective or intensive threshold 
of desubjection and resistance. 
 The intolerable is not an objective threshold of politicization (“once things get that 
bad…”), nor is there a universal moral value lurking behind “feeling” (“basic human dignity,” 
for instance). The intolerability of subjection is not based on reasons outside of the affect of 
intolerance itself. For while intolerance always refers to certain objective conditions 
(overcrowding, indefinite solitary confinement, arbitrary abuse, torture, and so on), its most 
paradigmatic cases refer to the very fact of subjection. As Foucault observes toward the 
beginning of Discipline and Punish, the prison revolts of the 1970s were not simply opposed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 The strategy of desubjecting subjected knowledges has its limit, however. It is true that the productive 
characteristics of desubjection’s positivity stems from the knowledge production of those without a proper place in 
discourse and of the historian who retrieves knowledges that have been suppressed by the archive. However, these 
aspects are secondary to the assumption of a still negative concept of power as exclusionary with respect to 
discourse. By 1973, Foucault had made a self-critique of his concept of power, arguing that the concept of exclusion 
(as well as that of transgression) reinscribes the law in the concept of power and representation in that of knowledge, 
when power and knowledge are about much more than law and representation.  
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“bad” prison conditions—there were “revolts against model prisons” too. (DP, 30) This is why 
the GIP aligned itself with those who rejected the prison simply “because it is part of a general 
system of punishment that cannot be accepted.” (DE2, 88) Intolerance is the subjective basis of 
the attitude of refusal and the task of the political intellectual is to help intensify this affect so 
that it can become a political force through schemas of politicization.  
The political aesthetic of intolerance can help us better understand what Foucault means 
by his notion of the pleb and show how the intolerable names a fundamental limit-experience of 
power relations. For while the intolerable, strictly speaking, does not refer to anything objective, 
neither does it arise from a pre-constituted subject. Let us recall that the pleb is what “escapes the 
relations of power…their limit, their inverse, their counter-blow…[which] motivates every new 
development of the networks of power” (Ibid., 421) And the affect of intolerance arises in an 
encounter with forces that takes one to the limits of what one can live. Two limits are in play 
here: (1) the limit of tolerability, to which one is forced and which forces one to resist and (2) the 
limit of the exercise of power in its current mode and apparatus, which is delimited by that 
resistance. Connecting it to Foucault’s turn to Nietzsche, intolerant refusal attests to the “non-
place of emergence,” or the ungrounded character of power relations, which allows for historical 
novelty and the splitting apart of the present. 101 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 I am implicitly drawing here on two Deleuze texts, as perhaps, is Foucault. The first is Difference and Repetition. 
I am thankful to Kieran Aarons for pointing out this book’s connection to the intolerable in Foucault. For in 
Difference and Repetition, Deleuze provides an account of thought that inverts the Kantian hierarchy of the faculties 
and severs each of them from any possible unity in a transcendental subject. Each faculty is both distinguished and 
born into existence by virtue of its transcendent object that it—and it alone—can grasp. Each faculty is measured in 
its power by its proper object, as the latter takes the faculty to the limit of its power: “Each faculty must be borne to 
the extreme point of its dissolution, at which it falls prey to a triple violence: the violence which forces it to be 
exercised, of that which it is forced to grasp and which it alone is able to grass, yet also that of the ungraspable.” 
(Deleuze 1994, 143) For sensibility, it is the sentiendum, or that which can only be sensed and which is, from the 
point of view of sensibility under the form of common sense (its merely “empirical” exercise), is imperceptible or 
insensible (namely, intensity, the being of the sensible). (Ibid., 140) Aside from memory, imagination, and thought 
(which thinks the limits of thought, the unthinkable), Deleuze ventures the possibility of a faculty of sociability, 
whose transcendent object and exercise would be anarchy or revolution: an apprehension of the irresolvable 
conflicts and singularities in a social structure that breaks the fetishistic empirical exercise of the faculty. (Ibid., 143, 
208) With the intolerable, Foucault links a limit-experience of the sensible with an apprehension of the limit of a 
structure of power and an encounter with the unthinkable—or at least with the unthought dimension of the apparatus 
(as evidenced in the desubjection of subjected knowledges). The second text from which I draw here (as does 
Foucault, perhaps) is Anti-Oedipus. “[W]hat escapes” appears to be semantically related to the concept of that 
book’s concept of the “line of escape” (“line of flight” in A Thousand Plateaus): “In the unconscious it is not the 
lines of pressure that matter, but on the contrary the lines of escape.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 338) Moreover, the line 
of flight is a concept they draw, in part, from Blanchot’s Friendship. (Ibid., 341) In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and 
Guattari construct a concept of desire in which the subject is a variable effect of the consumption of a series of 
intensities produced by relations between organs and their inscription on the intensive plane of the body. On this 
model, as it consumes intensive magnitudes, the subject tends to conjoin itself to the process of desire by 
retroactively positing itself as the cause of its experience of desire. However, human bodies exist and are inscribed 
within social bodies, which generate the intensive thresholds that define the parameters of a subject’s affective life. 
Along this line of thought, then, the intolerable is a social affect of the intensive constitution of the social body and, 
as such, inherently forms a potential rallying point for collective resistance. Finally, Foucault does at one point seem 
to speak disparagingly of the line of flight: “One need not imagine any longer that one can escape the relations of 
power globally, massively, and all at once by a sort of radical rupture or by a flight without return.” (DE2, 541-2) 
However, a line of flight in the way I have used it here does not imply a definitive escape from power relations, but 
that something has managed to become unaccounted for by the forces that try to dominate it, which implies further 
that these latter forces can go on the counter-attack. And moreover, Deleuze and Guattari state that the line of flight 
by no means guarantees an escape, as the schizophrenic—the figure of desire as a line of flight par excellence—
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3.5 Philosophical Writing as a Relay between the Politics of Refusal and Critical 
Subjectivation  
The most profound sense of the aesthetic in the politics of truth, however, coincides with 
the ethical dimension of his work, namely, the critic’s own desubjection through the practice of 
writing. Although philosophical critique does not have a monopoly on desubjection, what is 
characteristic of philosophy on Foucault’s account is that it is an art, namely, the “art 
of…indocility,” or the art of desubjection. (EFS, 266) Even before “the subjective turn,” the 
ultimate aesthetic dimension of Foucault’s work is its “aestheticism” in the sense that he would 
later give that word: the practice of using knowledge to change oneself. Foucault writes:  
For me, intellectual work is related to what you could call “aestheticism,” meaning 
transforming yourself… [K]nowledge can transform us…This transformation of one’s 
self by one’s own knowledge is, I think, something rather close to the aesthetic 
experience. (EF1, 130-1)  
Earlier I discussed how the practice of archaeological writing was about the writer’s loss of self 
in language as it distributes itself into—and ultimately erases—all subject positions. The politics 
of truth takes over this theme by recasting writing as a technology of desubjection. As he tells it 
in a 1978 interview with Duccio Trombadori: 
What I think is never quite the same, because for me my books are experiences, in a 
sense, that…[an] experience is something that one comes out of transformed…This is a 
project of desubjectivation [un entreprise de dé-subjectivation]. The idea of a limit-
experience that wrenches the subject from itself is what…explains the fact that…however 
erudite my books may be, I've always conceived of them as direct experiences aimed at 
pulling myself free of myself, at preventing me from being the same…this experience is 
neither true nor false. (EF3, 239-43)  
Foucault plays here on the polysemy of the French noun éxperience, which can mean either 
experience or experiment. This comes up again in the introduction to the second volume of The 
History of Sexuality, where he says that he doesn’t so much follow a method as “play” with the 
rules for producing truth: “The ‘essay’—which should be understood as the…test by which, in 
the game of truth, one undergoes changes…is the living substance of philosophy.” (HS2, 9) 
Foucault invokes the Old French sense of essai as a trial or test. What is the tested, experienced, 
or experimented with here? As with the politics of the intolerable, in the interview with 
Trombadori, Foucault states that critical thought must move within the element of the 
“unlivable”: “What is required is the maximum of intensity and the maximum of impossibility at 
the same time…a limit-experience that wrenches the subject from itself.”102 (EF3, 241) What 
does Foucault mean by the “unlivable” or the “maximum of impossibility” in this instance? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
provokes all of the powers of subjection in capitalism: its police, asylums, doctors, straight-jackets, and handbooks. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 245) 
102 One can find this idea in Foucault as early as History of Madness, which thematized how Nietzsche’s thought 
moved in the element of the unlivable because its inner logic of power and the eternal return drew him into madness. 
Foucault never thematized his own work in terms of madness, though he suffered from depression. Such depression, 
which occurred after Foucault returned for the last time from Iran, is perhaps responsible for one of his outbursts of 
pessimism in a late 1978 interview: “You are not only a critic, you are also a rebel as well.” “But not an active rebel. 
I have never marched with the students and the workers as Sartre has done. I think that the best form of protest is 
silence, total abstention. For a long time, I haven’t come to support the airs that certain French intellectuals gave and 
that floated above their heads like the halos on certain paintings by Raphael. This is why I have abandoned France…” 
(DE2, 669) 
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My reading here—and I admit that it is a loose one—is that critical writing makes an art 
out of dwelling in the unlivable through the critical gesture of suspending the self-evidence of 
historical a prioris. Within this gesture, which produces the history of the present, the 
apparatuses that subject us to our predicates appear as uncanny in their contingency; one 
experiences both the “underdeterminacy” of the historical a priori and the fact that one is still 
gripped by them. This “unlivable” suspension is the splitting of the subject from itself, or the 
unlivability of the present itself as held by the repetition of the past. Raising the Nietzchean 
theme of life in connection to experience books, Jan Masschelein says, “a limit-experience is 
precisely an experience that…makes something in us to die.”103 (Masschelein 2006, 571)  
Earlier, I discussed how contemporary struggle enables critique while critique contributes 
to future struggles by creating tools, mapping lines of power, and offering “tactical pointers.” 
The notion of the experience book deepens the circle of struggle and truth. For, on the one hand 
every act of writing is tied back to a desubjection that produces knowledge about the present by 
testing its limits. And, on the other, it is necessary to question one’s assumptions about the 
present by writing its history and thus creating tools for contesting the present anew.104 Thus the 
experience book embodies the definition of the theory-practice relation offered by Deleuze in his 
conversation with Foucault: “Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and 
theory is a relay from one practice to another.”105 (LCP, 206) 
Experiment books have a function of desubjection for the reader as well. As Masschelein 
states, by Foucault’s definition above, experience books may be contrasted with truth books, or 
books that purport to teach a lesson and assume the right to govern the reader.106 The author of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Nietzsche: “What is Life?— Life—that is: continually shedding something that wants to die.” (Nietzsche 1974, 
100) 
104 On gaming and thought, Foucault writes in 1978, ““Anglo-Saxon philosophy tried to say that language never 
deceives any more than it reveals. Language is what plays. Hence the importance of the notion of the game 
[jeu]…One need not imagine any longer that one can escape the relations of power globally, massively, and all at 
once by a sort of radical rupture or by a flight without return. The relations of power, equally, they play, they are 
games of power that one must study in terms of tactics and strategies, in terms of rules and chance, in terms of 
stakes and objectives.” (DE2, 541-2)  
105 If there is a dialectic in Foucault’s work, one would be tempted to locate it here. In his 2009 book, Valences of 
the Dialectic, Fredric Jameson sweepingly critiques Foucault’s work with the following characterization: “The 
problem…is not that it is non- or anti-dialectical, but rather that it is too dialectical…For what is left out in the 
characteristic Foucauldian narrative here is the passage from positive to negative which very precisely characterizes 
the dialectic as such, or, in other words, the unity of opposites.” Jameson might be right that Foucault’s thought is 
too dialectical, but only regarding the circular relation of struggle and critique, by which problems are apprehended 
at the limit of the social assemblage in struggle, which makes them visible for critique and in the way that critique’s 
activity of problematization maps out the problems we practically face in the present on the basis of the historical 
problematics that currently ensnare us. In this sense, Foucault’s thought walks in stride with Deleuze’s on thought’s 
relation to problems: dialectics is “the art of problems and questions.” (Jameson 2009, 52) According to Deleuze, 
one major characteristic of the dogmatic image of thought is that it traces problems from propositional solutions and 
that it determines problems to be either true or false depending on whether they are solvable. Critical thought, on the 
other hand, apprehends the genetic and differential character of problems as selective tests by means of their 
singular points. The dialectic of problems in Foucault concerns the relation between acts that break open the 
possible in the heart of the impossible and, when such acts confront their limits, acts of writing that problematize the 
present in order to provide tactical pointers to further struggle. (Deleuze 1994, 158-64) In conclusion, then, one 
could set things in this order: the history of the present, as an analytic of regimes of power-knowledge, is made 
possible within a dialectic between historically existing struggles and the effects of the analytic as an experience 
book in the service of desubjection. 
106 Related to the idea of the experiment book, there are three reasons why the aesthetic is at the root of the politics 
of truth—including the desubjection of subjected knowledges. First, the refusal to dogmatically appeal to the 
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truth book does not seek desubjection and its masked “no-oneness,” but the subject position of a 
teacher. They write for “a regime and a tribunal and [address] a reader who…is supposed to 
subject herself to the same regime and the same tribunal. It is this subjection…under a tribunal 
that allows the writer and the reader to be ‘somebody’…where they obtain or take the position of 
learner or of teacher.” (Masschelein 2006, 567)  
One can see the conflict between these two types of books in the critiques of Discipline 
and Punish from those who read it as a truth book. In a 1978 interview, Foucault discusses how 
certain readers (especially social workers in prisons) disliked its “totalizing” concept of panoptic 
power and its “anaesthetic” or “paralytic” effect on those who would otherwise take action to 
improve the situation of prisoners. Worse yet, the book failed to offer any guidance in the form 
of directives for action. That’s why Foucault’s response was tinged with disappointment when he 
said, “[M]y project is precisely to bring it about that [those who work in the institutional setting 
of the prison] ‘no longer know what to do’, so that the acts, gestures, and discourses which up 
until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous.”107 (EF3, 
235-6) Instead of a utopian vision, Foucault proposes a politicized version of the motto of 
Kierkegaard’s Johannes Climacus: the point is to make things more difficult, not easier—for 
what wills subjection.108 The use of thought interrupts certain subjects and so makes it possible 
for them to think: “To do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy…as soon 
as people begin to have trouble thinking things the way they have been thought, transformation 
becomes at the same time very urgent, very difficult, and entirely possible.” (Ibid., 456-458) 
Political writing aims at building forces of resistance by shifting sensibilities about power, 
throwing wrenches in the smooth functioning of subjection, and building affinities with those 
already resisting.109 This what Foucault meant when he called for a critical style of philosophical 
writing that does not set limits to power as such, but intensifies the struggles within it. 
Problematizing, making things more difficult, showing their dangerousness (their role in the 
intolerable): these all point to the role of writing in critique. But the question remains, how do 
they do this?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
distinction between truth and falsity (the principle of fiction) commits Foucault to explaining truth by using 
something that is indeterminable in terms of truth and falsity in itself, namely, power. Second, the task of critique is 
to demonstrate the historical contingency—and thus the fictiveness—of what counts as truth today (the principle of 
dispersion). The first two reasons result in a third: Foucault’s own discourse cannot be anything other than fictional. 
As Foucault says, the will to know deploys itself in a fictional space, which is why he repeatedly affirmed that his 
works were fictions. (WK, 197-8; FL, 213; EF3, 243; FL, 301)  However, the politics of truth deploys a counter-
fiction within discourses of truth in order to “make fiction work in truth” and “induce effects of truth with a 
discourse of fiction.”106 (FL, 213)  
107 The complete quotation here reads, “And, seeing what has been happening in and around the prisons, I don’t 
think the effect of paralysis is very evident there either. As far as the people in prison are concerned, things aren’t 
doing too badly…And then I have some news for you: for me the problem of the prisons isn’t one for the ‘social 
workers’ but one for the prisoners. And on that side, I’m not so sure what’s been said over the last fifteen years has 
been quite so—how shall I put it?—demobilizing.” (EF3, 235) 
108 Kierkegaard pseudonymously writes, “…wherever you look in literature or in life, you see the…many 
benefactors of the age who know how to benefit mankind by making life easier and easier…and what are you 
doing?...[Y]ou must, with the same humanitarian enthusiasm as the others have, take it upon yourself to make 
something more difficult.” (Kierkegaard 1992, 186) 
109 Foucault makes a similar point about action is not the result of representations in consciousness (which leads to 
the problem of ideological false consciousness), but that consciousness is determined by the practico-strategic 
conditions that give rise to it.  
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As opposed to truth books that subject the author and, consequently, the reader to a 
regime of truth, experience books make possible a shift in sensibility and a space of thought on 
the self by detaching the author and the reader from themselves:  
Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what 
allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an 
object of thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. 
Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches from 
it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem.” (EF1, 117) 
Contrary to the ancient theme of self-knowledge or the modern theme of reflection that 
appears to be at work in these lines, what is at stake here is art. As Foucault says, “the target 
nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are.” (EF3, 336) Experience 
books offer an aesthetic experience of the self that opens the possibility of an aesthetics of the 
self. They carry out a theatrical function by assuming the task of staging and gaining a 
perspective on ourselves.110 The author is the operator, the spectator, and the object of the 
book.111  
Foucault repeatedly used the image of the stage to elaborate non-place of the being of 
language in the Nietzschean mode, just as he used the image of “masks” to talk about the 
appearance of forces in history.112 As experiments in the history of the present, experience books 
continue Nietzsche’s notion of art as a will to deception. For Nietzsche, “art as the good will to 
appearance…furnishes us eyes and hands and above all the good conscience to be able to turn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Foucault’s works never directly study present-day phenomena, but instead tell the history of that from which the 
present is becoming different. Nevertheless, the present in Foucault is not a homogenous dimension of time. It is 
instead bifurcated into a past that continues to reactivate itself within the present and a future that truly defines the 
present by virtue of what is untimely within it. Moreover, this bifurcation is multiplied by the power relations within 
the present across different spaces, such that one can speak of a multiply fragmented present that is bifurcated at 
each of its breaking points. For instance, the hyper-industrialization and exploitation of labor in developing countries 
over the past 45 years is not simply a phenomenon of certain countries belatedly joining capitalism and going 
through their period of industrial capitalism. Instead, the seemingly “archaic” form of material labor that takes place 
in these countries is in fact completely novel because of the way it is enforced by entities like the IMF and the 
World Bank, the relation to foreign capital investment and consumption, and the structural separation between 
production and consumption that makes certain socio-economic norms (like Fordism) impossible. 
111 This triple determination is taken from Foucault’s characterization of the truth act in On the Government of the 
Living.  
112 Walter Privatera points out, arguably, this theme could be traced back to Foucault’s (pre-archaeological) 
foreword to Binswanger’s Le rêve et l’existence, which conceives of dream as a space prior to the distinctions 
between subject and object and truth and falsity. (Privatera 1995, 31-5) In Foucault’s post-anthropological works, 
The Order of Things describes how language replaces man as our historical a priori and how “masks” appear in the 
void left by his absence: “[W]hat Nietzsche’s thought heralds is the end of [God’s] murderer; it is the explosion of 
man’s face in laughter, and the return of masks.” (OT, 385) In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” the void is the stage 
of the will to power: “Emergence is thus the entry of forces; it is their eruption, the leap from the wings to center 
stage, each in its youthful strength.” (EF2, 379) And, eight years later, when Foucault emphasis the history of truth 
in genealogy, he rearticulates the principle of fiction and describes how the theater allows one to gain a perspective 
on truth by staging it in a way that neutralizes its priority over falsity: “The theater is against the distinction between 
truth and falsity: to accept the non-difference between the true and the false, between the real and the illusory, is the 
condition of the functioning of the theater” (DE2, 571). And in the same interview, he re-emphasizes the theater’s 
evental character: “To respond to the question: who are we? And what is it that has happened?...Philosophy of the 
present, philosophy of the event…it is a question…of using philosophy to reenter what theater has occupied, for the 
theater has always occupied the event, the paradox of the theater being precisely that this event repeats itself, repeats 
itself every evening, since one plays it, and repeats oneself in eternity or in any case in an indefinite time, since there 
is always the reference to a certain repeatable, anterior event. The theater grasps and stages the event.” (Ibid., 573-4) 
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ourselves into such a phenomenon.” This is because art gives us the power of “an artistic 
distance” from ourselves and a certain “freedom above things.” (Nietzsche 1974, 164) Like any 
art that has not been subjected to a moral function, experience books put the difference between 
truth and falsity out of play. But they are distinguished by their ability to show how we have 
been constituted by events in which truth was separated from falsity and willed over it. The 
experience book is what Foucault has in mind when he states, “I have never written anything but 
fictions…It seems to me the possibility exists…to induce effects of truth with a discourse of 
fiction…One ‘fictionalizes’ a political outlook that does not yet exist…” (FL, 213) Truth-effects 
are usually effects of power that reproduce subjection; they are signs that use the quality of truth 
to impose an interpretation of other forces and their signs. With experience books, the idea is to 
use the interpretive force of signs to questions these interpretations and “fictionalize” a new 
political perspective on ourselves and our role in power.  
Yet the desubjection that occurs by way of experience books is positive not only in its 
creation of signs, but more importantly, in the use of those signs to constitute an ethical self-
relation—or what Foucault calls subjectivation. This is because what allows for the critical book 
to function as experiment and experience is that it constitutes a new form of sensibility. Just as 
there is no independent faculty of intellect in Nietzsche, neither is there one in Foucault—the 
intellect is only “the very form” in which we become conscious of the passions. (Nietzsche 1974, 
261) Experiment books, then, are prostheses of the form in which we become aware of our 
capacity to be affected by other forces, that is, our sensibility. But here sensibility is forced to be 
affected by itself as the practice of reading produces a sense of the unacceptability of the 
historical a priori in its contingency. As a prosthesis, the subject book is successful to the extent 
that it forcibly cleaves or wrenches the subject away from itself and therefore constitutes a 
subject of desubjection. Philosophical writing seeks to instigate a division between the “me” as a 
subject effect of power on the stage and the “I” that, affected by what it perceives, is put to flight 
and made to go elsewhere. (Deleuze 1988, 98; 1994, 90) Deleuze says that Foucaultian 
subjectivity is created as an “an inside” that doubles the outside of force relations: “The most 
general formula of the relation to oneself is the affect of self by self, or folded force.” (Deleuze 
1988, 104) Experiment books, as prosthetic technologies of the self, fold the forces that 
constitute the subject onto itself.113 Or, looking ahead, one could say that the relation that the 
experiment book establishes with the reader is what Foucault calls a counter-conduct, or a 
relation of acting upon the action of another (or oneself) so as to pervert or challenge the regime 
of power knowledge in which one lives. I will turn to the concept of counter-conduct 
momentarily.114   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 This will be important to bear in mind when considering Foucault’s thought in relation to neoliberalism and its 
form of subjectivity. There, Foucault also uses the Deleuzean-Guattarian language of the machinic, as he calls homo 
oeconomicus a “machine understood in the positive sense, since it is a machine that produces an earnings stream.” 
(BB, 224) 
114 Critics have raised the question of how self-constitution is possible if Foucault thinks that “resistance is never in 
a position of exteriority in relation to power”—most notably Zizek. (HS1, 95) The answer lies in political aesthetics: 
first with the intolerable that forces one to “become-pleb,” and, beyond that, in the critical effects of experience 
books, which stage the contingency of what we are as subjects of power so that we might become different. I follow 
Aurelia Armstrong here, who uses Deleuze to contend with Zizek’s critique of Foucault. Zizek maintains that he 
cannot account for how resistance is possible at any point in his career without relying on a transcendent moment of 
exteriority. For Zizek, while the early Foucault conceives of resistance as emerging from an excluded, exterior site 
to the structure of power relations (e.g., madness à la History of Madness), this implies a juridical and thus narrow 
conception of power as “external to its field of application.” (Armstrong 2008, 19) Thus, as Foucault goes on to 
show that juridical power is but one type of power, his understanding of resistance changes to an immanent 
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As a technology of political aestheticism, experience books therefore embody the unity of 
critique qua the politics of truth: the desubjection of the subject-effects of power in the author 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conception of power and a conception of resistance as emerging from within a strategic field of force relations. 
However, this shift prevents Foucault from explaining what makes resistance possible. For if power is as capillary 
and ubiquitous as Foucault makes it out to be, “there is no way—within the terms of Foucault’s theoretical 
framework—to explain the emergence of the capacities for autonomy, reflexivity and critique which are 
presupposed in the account of the self-constituting subject.” (Armstrong 2008, 25) On Zizek’s reading, this is why 
Foucault tacitly sneaks back to a conception of resistance as emerging externally to the field of power in his 
conception of subjectivation, or self-formation as a practice of freedom, which posits the subject as “exterior” to 
power. Zizek goes on to claim that the missing solution to Foucault’s difficulties is a dialectical concept of the 
subject of resistance in which the subject of “resistance [is] an effect which can outgrow its cause and overturn it.” 
(Ibid., 20) Armstrong responds to Zizek’s critique with two maneuvers. First, she makes a distinction between an 
analytic and a political concept of resistance. The former simply refers to a component of the concept of power. It 
refers to how a power relation, as a relation between two forces, is not a relation between one side that is simply 
active and another that is simply passive, but that every action on behalf of one force is met with an active response 
by the other. (Ibid., 21) In this regard, Foucault states, “[I]f there was no resistance, there would be no power 
relations. Because it would simply be a matter of obedience…So resistance comes first, and resistance remains 
superior to the forces of the process; power relations are obliged to change with the resistance. So I think that 
resistance is the main word, the key word, in this dynamic.” (EF1, 167) Second, she shows how the political concept 
of resistance bridges the immanent conception of power and the concept of subjectivation that characterizes 
practices of freedom. This notion of resistance relies on Deleuze’s Foucault book to articulate how resistance, as a 
practice of self, entails (1) that subjection is never total insasmuch as it is constitutive, not determinative (à la 
Butler) and therefore allows for the practice of problematizing reflection to take the subject as an object of 
reflection; (2) doubling of the subject through problematization allows the subject to open a space of freedom 
between thought and itself as a problematized object; and (3) that the space of thought opened up “forms an ‘outside’ 
to the existing social order…[that]…enables the subject to extract itself from immediate immersion in 
its…conditions of formation and action.” (27) Daniel Smith also makes these latter two points, but by underscoring 
how subjectification occurs when a force folds over on itself and affects itself, which makes the subject irreducible 
to the forces that affect it: “Of those forces which act on the self, some of them come from the self itself, and it is 
these forces which constitute its freedom.” (Smith 2015, 145) Vernon Cisney makes an even more compelling 
account by tying the self-affection of a force to Deleuze’s treatment of the eternal return in Difference and 
Repetition. Because of the hypothesis on the relationality of forces, subjectivation must be the self-affection of a 
force that is doubled by an encounter with the outside of savoir, namely power itself: “the necessity of the passage 
of thought to the outside is always doubled back in a movement that folds the force back upon itself…opening a 
genuine Deleuzean space of freedom…Will to power wills itself…as that ‘which is capable of transforming itself,’ 
as this is the mark of the highest degree of power. The will to power thus wills a differencial Self, which is…an 
ongoing…process of individuation.” (Cisney 2014, 56) While Armstrong uses Deleuze to talk about how thought 
precipitates a process of desubjection by way of the history of the present, neither Zizek nor Armstrong discuss its 
relation to the intolerable, the unlivable, or the aesthetic in general. Furthermore, Foucault’s concept of power-
knowledge does conceive of knowledge as an effect that outstrips and conditions its cause (power). I will only cite 
two reasons in this regard (though there are certainly others). First, at its most basic level, knowledge is an effect of 
power that is taken up by the forces that produce it so as to enhance their power to act within the field of forces of 
which they are a part. Therefore, knowledge is transformative of power relations. Second, knowledge consists of 
signs and signs are themselves interpretations of force relations that impose their interpretation. As Deleuze and 
Guattari would go on to say in A Thousand Plateaus (and as Deleuze himself already said in The Logic of Sense) 
signs effectuate an incorporeal transformation of bodies and the forces that constitute them.114 So, knowledge is not 
just an effect of power, but reacts upon it and causes transformations in it in turn. And insofar as the subject is an 
object of knowledge (because it is subjected to norms that operate as discursive rules), then the subject is itself a 
transformation of forces. Yet, Zizek would still be right to ask how the subject could resist in its strategic 
conjuncture. However, I have argued here that one must track “the being of language” in Foucault’s work to 
understand the function of “the outside,” which generally refers to the outside of knowledge. On this reading, power 
is the outside of knowledge, which is a necessary prerequisite for arguing that a free space opens up when a force 
affects itself and becomes “the inside of the outside.” See the distinction Deleuze makes in Foucault between 
exteriority and the outside with respect to power-knowledge. (Deleuze 1988, 86)  
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(and perhaps in the reader) and the use of the history of the present to (re-) problematize both 
one’s assumptions and one’s way of life. Philosophical writing translates the play of limits that 
occurs in the experience of the intolerable into an aesthetic creation with a technological role in 
the aesthetics of existence. For the experimental task of philosophical writing is to test the limits 
of both the present and one’s subjectivity at once—the impossible—so as to open the possible. In 
experience books, “the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis 
of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.” 
(EFS, 56) While subjectivation (particularly parrhēsia, as I’ll discuss later) may be Foucault’s 
last word on politics in the “order of discovery,” desubjection must continue to supply the 
possibility of self-critique for self-formation in one’s relation to ethical knowledge.  
In this chapter I have showed how Foucault turned to Nietzsche in order to account for 
the continued existence of anthropology as an effect of subjection to emergent knowledges 
created in the context of power relations. This allowed Foucault to provide an alternative to 
ideology critique so as to avoid its epistemological pitfall of reducing the ungrounded and 
indefinite character of power relations to the general contradiction between labor and capital. 
More importantly, it enabled him to redefine critique as the politics of truth, which aims to 
intensify the will to struggle against contemporary forms of subjection by helping to create 
political strategies of refusal. Moreover, it enabled him to redefine his conception of writing as a 
test of both author and reader that attempts to make possible an ethos of thinking and living 
differently in relation to power and truth. In the next chapter, I would like to show how 
continued to test his own thought by way of his studies on neoliberalism, which occurred just as 
he was deepening his engagement with ethics following the Iranian Revolution. 	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Chapter 4: Governmentality and the Limits of the Politics of Truth 
 
And if it is necessary to ask the question about 
knowledge in its relationship to domination, it 
would be, first and foremost, from a certain 
decision-making will not to be governed 





Foucault’s concept of the politics of truth underwent a decisive shift during the last few 
years of his investigations into power relations. Between the years of 1978 and 1980—just 
before he turned to study practices of subjectivation—he conceptualized a new mode of power, 
governmentality, and reconceptualized his understanding of resistance and desubjection through 
the notion of counter-conduct. In the last lecture course that he would dedicate to the study of 
power relations, Foucault undertook an analysis of a peculiar type of governmentality, namely, 
neoliberalism.  
In this chapter, I would like to explain the turn in Foucault’s thought to neoliberal 
governmentality. I will argue that, just as the politics of truth tests the limits of power-knowledge, 
neoliberalism emerges in Foucault’s work as a case that tests the limits of the politics of truth. 
Foucault’s critique of neoliberal governmentality is, consequently, also a self-critique.  
 
4.1 From the Critique of Discipline and Biopower to Governmentality 
Foucault’s turn to governmentality began as a reconsideration of the analysis of biopower 
at the ends of The History of Sexuality and Society Must Be Defended. Biopower is the mode 
through which Foucault first thinks the emergence of human populations as the target of power 
and as an object of knowledge in their statistically observable phenomena and conditions. (HS1, 
139) The reasons for this turn to the study of governmentality have been well-documented in 
secondary literature, however two bear mentioning because they pertain directly to the politics of 
truth and what it means to challenge the effects of power in oneself.   
Warren Montag identifies the first when he traces Foucault’s shift to a problem that 
Society Must be Defended poses to his understanding of power up to that point. Starting from the 
beginning of his time at the Collège, Foucault hypothesized that power relations could be 
understood on a continuum as different ways of waging war. Foucault’s target was often Hobbes 
and Locke, who posited the state of peace on the basis of the cessation of man’s natural condition, 
the war of all against all. Starting with Carl von Clausewitz’ famous dictum, “War is politics by 
other means,” Foucault critiqued the understanding of power relations according to the binary 
opposition between war and peace in which the latter is understood as the condition of politics. 
Foucault famously inverts this formula and hypothesizes, instead, that “Politics is war by 
other means.”115 In other words, all political regimes and every apparatus of power that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Most of Foucault’s readers know the war hypothesis from Society Must be Defended, though, arguably, Foucault 
proposes it as early as Archaeology of Knowledge and begins using it in his first lecture course at the Collège. The 
former puts forth the possibility of the war hypothesis in stating, “It seems to me that one might also carry out an 
analysis of the [archaeological] type on political knowledge…Instead of analysing this knowledge—which is always 
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effectively neutralizes political conflict may be understood either as the consequence and 
continuation of an ongoing civil war. Society Must Be Defended troubles the war-peace binary 
maintained in this reversal by pointing to its reliance on a negative understanding of power as the 
repression of open conflict, however, it does not replace the hypothesis. The History of Sexuality 
also casts doubt on the aforementioned reversal and picks up the task of reformulating the war 
hypothesis:  
If we still wish to maintain a separation between war and politics, perhaps we should 
postulate rather that this multiplicity of force relations can be coded—in part, but never 
totally—either in the form of “war” or in the form of “politics”; this would imply two 
different strategies (but the one always liable to switch into the other) for integrating 
these unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable and tense force relations. (HS, 93)  
The History of Sexuality offers a radicalization of the relation between politics and war while 
continuing the critique of the classical contractarian notion first put forth in The Punitive 
Society.116 Here it is a matter of resisting the move to prioritize war over politics; instead, one 
must view war and politics as different strategies for stabilizing the inherent instability of power 
relations. Power can be viewed as a question of enmity between different groups or it can be 
viewed as a practice of imposing or manipulating the rules of engagement with one’s opponents. 
For instance, biopower involves a politics of enhancing the life of the population by way of the 
psychiatrization of perversions, the hysterization of women, control over the married couple, and 
the sexualization of children. Biopower also implies the exercise of power as war, for instance, 
race war as a purification of the race or species. Yet these do not necessarily coincide. Montag 
goes on to interpret this shift as the sign of a further commitment to a positive conception of 
power. (Montag 2013a, 134)117  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
possible—in the direction of the episteme that it can give rise to, one would analyse it in the direction of behavior, 
struggles, conflicts, decisions, and tactics.” (AK, 194) The latter uses the war hypothesis when it states, “In short, it 
is a matter of seeing what real struggles and relations of domination are involved in the will to truth.” (WK, 2) As 
Warren Montag shows, Foucault continues to develop this hypothesis, starting from 1970 to the first lecture course 
of Society Must be Defended in 1976. (Montag 2013a, 127-36) During that span of time, the hypothesis takes the 
form of a war-repression schema in which every politics is a set of power strategies resulting from a war and aiming 
at repression of the defeated by the victorious. (SMD, 15) Starting in Society Must be Defended, Foucault drastically 
revises the war-repression hypothesis, which, in History of Sexuality Vol. 1 ends up stating, “[P]ower is in the 
moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the 
latter are always local and unstable…And ‘Power’…is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these 
mobilities,…power…is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular 
society…Should we turn the expression around, then, and say that politics is war pursued by other means? If we still 
wish to maintain a separation between war and politics, perhaps we should postulate rather that this multiplicity of 
force relations can be coded—in part, but never totally—either in the form of “war” or in the form of “politics”; this 
would imply two different strategies (but the one always liable to switch into the other) for integrating these 
unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable and tense force relations” (HS, 93) 
116 In 1973, Foucault begins his analyses of punishment by framing punishment as a mechanism of civil war: “Now I 
would like to conduct the analysis by considering, rather, that civil war is the permanent state on the basis of which a 
number of these tactics of struggle, of which penality is precisely a privileged example, can and should be 
understood. Civil war is the matrix of all struggles of power, of all strategies of power, and, consequently, it is also 
the matrix of all the struggles regarding and against power.” (PS, 13) And later, as a consequence of the principle of 
exteriority, he states the inversion of Clausewitz, “For an analysis of penality it is important to see that power is not 
what suppresses civil war, but what conducts and continues it. And, if it is true that external war is the continuation 
of politics, we must say, reciprocally, that politics is the continuation of civil war. (PS, 32) 
117 Deleuze and Guattari critique Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz in A Thousand Plateaus by stating that it is only 
possible under the condition of the total appropriation of the war machine by the state, which turns the state of peace 
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This shift is notable for the problem it presents to the possibility of resistance. As I 
discussed the politics of truth in the preceding chapter, the history of the present involved 
understanding how the encounter between heterogeneous forces gave rise to apparatuses of 
power-knowledge, which in turn reinforced themselves through processes of subjection. 
Desubjection struggles such as the GIP were understood to be about reversing an apparatus’ 
power relations in order to create both a new logic of connections between forces and a discourse 
from the position of the subjected and excluded. However, if the story about power is not how 
apparatuses emerge from direct relations between forces in war, then the politics of truth must be 
more than reversing relations of repression. Just as the war hypothesis risks resting on a negative 
understanding of power as repression, as Kevin Thompson points out, so too does understanding 
resistance as a tactical reversal: “Their agenda is determined by…[what] they seek to disrupt.”118  
In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault reconsidered the problem of populations—
this time in terms of governmentality instead of biopower. Moreover, he also reconsidered 
resistance not as a tactical reversal of power relations, but as a counter-conduct. The lecture 
course came two years after the first volume of The History of Sexuality and after a one-year 
sabbatical. As I discussed earlier, this is where Foucault affirms (or reaffirms) the politics of 
truth: “this analysis of mechanisms of power is the politics of truth…I see its role as that of 
showing the knowledge effects produced by the…battles that take place within our society, and 
by the tactics of power that are the elements of this struggle.” (STP, 3)  
Security, Territory, Population introduces the concept of governmentality as a threefold 
concept that includes naming a mode of power (in the sense that discipline or biopower are 
modes of power), a historical line of descent or tendency in Euro-American societies, and the 
historical process by which the European state became taken over by discourses on the art of 
government. For my purposes here, I will focus on the first element of Foucault’s definition:  
First, by ‘governmentality’ I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political 
economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential 
technical instrument.119 (STP, 108-109)  
First, the population, which, like the individual in Foucault’s studies on discipline, 
emerges as a problem, or a problematic object of knowledge, before it is programmed as a 
subject of action. Foucault speaks of an epistemic “caesura” between the individual and the 
population as objects of power: the population is not a multiplicity of individuals, but the 
massive, statistical level of reality that is pertinent for governmental action; individuals are only 
a “relay, or condition for obtaining something at the level of the population.” (STP, 42) Second, 
it is thanks to the population that economics could emerge in the 18th century as a theoretico-
practical discourse of government. As “population” the family and the household as the index of 
oikonomia, the economy became a privileged level of governmental intervention and political 
economy became the privileged discourse on the art of government. And finally, 
governmentality emerged through the disparate emergence of mechanisms of power aiming at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in the state of terror and which makes war an end in itself of the state. Their example is The Cold War, though with 
some modifications it could just as well apply to the state in The War on Terror. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 421-2)  
118 I disagree with his characterization of resistance practices of tactical reversal like the GIP as “wholly negative,” 
insofar as they engender “active forces,” invent a new mode of collectively assembling such forces, and invent new 
was of producing knowledge. (Thompson 2003, 123)  
119 My italics. 
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the security of populations.  
Security mechanisms bear a number of characteristics that distinguish them from those of 
disciplinary power. The first is that they operate on a given milieu in which there already exist 
flows of populations or goods, instead of building an ideal space from scratch à la disciplinary 
power. The milieu is the medium in which populations and things exist, along with their 
conditions. It is the material space in which “action at a distance of one body on another” is 
possible. (STP, 20-21) This is because, second, security mechanisms seek to identify in milieus 
sets of circular causal links that obtain between technical objects, environmental conditions, 
populations, and statistically observable phenomena (for instance, the relations between 
overcrowding, disease, and mortality rates). Third, as opposed to ensuring the actualization of an 
optimal model, security apparatuses attempt to minimize cost and risk while maximizing 
beneficial outcomes. While disciplinary power establishes a norm, imposes it on bodies, and then 
separates normal cases from abnormal ones (what Foucault calls normation), security 
mechanisms plot normal rates of a phenomenon for a population over time, calculate the norm, 
and then act on the population’s milieu so as to either improve the norm or secure its status quo. 
(STP, 63) Thus, fourth, as security mechanisms function to reduce risk, they are oriented toward 
a probabilistic future that they must manage so as to ward off the threat of harmful aleatory 
events.120 (STP, 21) It is particularly with respect to the temporal dimension of governmentality 
that the problem of the security of populations outstrips the powers and solutions of the 
discipline of individuals. 
Foucault lists the following meanings of the French word gouverner: the spatial sense, 
“to direct, move forward,” the material sense, “to support” (by subsistence, for example), as well 
as the moral sense, “to conduct someone” or “to impose a regimen.” (STP, 121) All senses of 
gouvernement have to do with governing people. It is on this basis that Foucault traces 
governmentality’s line of descent back to the Christian pastorate and its regime of pastoral power, 
which revolved around the power of the shepherd to care for his flock of souls and lead it to 
salvation, thus forming the essential aspect of the relation between God and his people. The 
watershed moment in the history of pastoral power and governmentality came with the 
conversion of Constantine in 312 and the turn against paganism, which eventually led the Church 
fathers to have to codify their pastoral duties and techniques in the face of the possibility of a 
flock that extended at least as far as the limits of the Roman Empire. Foucault points out that 
Gregory Nazianzen termed “the pastorate, oikonomia psychōn...the economy of souls.” (STP, 
192) Foucault settles on a more appropriate translation for oikonomia, namely, conduit, or 
conduct, which, in the French language, possesses a range senses expressing a number of 
different possible relations of conduct:  
“Conduct is the activity of conducting (conduire), of conduction (la conduction) if you 
like, but it is equally the way in which one conducts oneself (se conduit), lets oneself be 
conducted (se laisse conduire), is conducted (est conduit), and finally, in which one 
behaves (se comporter) as an effect of a form of conduct (une conduite) as the action of 
conducting or of conduction (conduction). (STP, 193) 
Conduction harbors both activity and passivity, especially in the French verb conduire: the 
activity of conducting another and subjecting them to one’s imperatives, the ambiguous passivity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Foucault summarizes: “…the central point of all this—all these mechanisms, unlike those of law or of discipline, 
do not tend to convey the exercise of a will over others in the most homogeneous, continuous, and exhaustive way 
possible. It is a matter rather of revealing a level of the necessary and sufficient action of those who govern…the 
population with its specific phenomena and processes.” (STP, 66) 
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of letting oneself be conducted, and the ambiguous duality of conducting oneself in a practice of 
subjectivation.  
The genealogy of governmentality leads back to pastorate because the concept of conduct 
in the latter serves as a grid of intelligibility for the former. To govern is to conduct the conducts 
of others. The signature modal category of governmental conduction is possibility. Even the 
most rigid forms of conducting others operate not directly on their bodies, but “on the field of 
possibilities in which the behavior of active subjects is able to inscribe itself.” (EF3, 341) 
Conducting the conduct of others, then, is an exercise of power over others that acts on the 
possible actions they may take: “To ‘conduct’ is at the same time to ‘lead’ others (according to 
mechanisms of coercion…) and a way of behaving within a more or less open field of 
possibilities…To govern…is to structure the possible field of action of others. (EF3, 341) As 
Deleuze might have put it, to govern is to determine what a body can do. Governmentality 
shapes form to the possible and does what is necessary to secure or suitably alter that form. 
Hence, to conduct oneself is to act within a practical horizon that has been structured in advance.  
One of the main objectives of pastoral conduct was the pursuit of apatheia, or the 
absence of passions and the relinquishment of one’s will by absolute obedience to a pastor. Yet, 
“the conduct of souls” emerged in relation to an “intoxication of religious behavior,” that is, a 
whole host of deviations from and struggles against its system of conducts. Foucault calls these 
counter-conducts. They include Gnostic sects that identified evil with the material world, 
mysticism, the reading scripture outside of pastoral guidance, and eschatological faiths that 
circumvented pastoral intermediaries between the subject and God. There was also individual 
asceticism, which used an “exercise of the self on the self” in place of the pastor’s direction to 
reach apatheia. And finally, there were alternative communities that formed around different 
collective practices based on deviations from ecclesiastical doctrine. (STP, 207-14) 
Counter-conducts do not resist or seek to negate the pastorate as such, but “struggle 
against the processes implemented for conducting others.”121 (Ibid., 201) Counter-conducts seek 
different forms of conduct: “wanting to be conducted differently, by other leaders (conducteurs) 
and other shepherds, towards other objectives and forms of salvation, and through other 
procedures and methods. They are movements that also seek…to escape direction by others and 
to define the way for each to conduct himself.”122 (Ibid., 194-5)  
One must immediately add that this does not mean that pastoral conduct came first and 
then revolts of conduct sprung up afterwards in reaction to it. Although many counter-conducts 
followed after Nazianzen’s codification of the pastorate, the pastorate itself emerged in part as a 
reactive process of neutralizing religious intoxication and homogenizing religious practice—just 
as some counter-conducts emerged as direct attacks on the pastoral regime. As opposed to a 
resistance that defines itself negatively against a form of power (as a tactical reversal would), 
counter-conducts take up marginal elements of an apparatus such as Christianity and tactically 
reinscribe them in a different direction and a different relation of conduct. They are an immanent 
and novel use of the politics of truth in which one finds oneself.  
If conduction is a matter of structuring and managing the possible field of actions 
available to a subject, then counter-conduct makes a different use of an existing set of practices 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 My italics 
122 It is important to underscore the fact that not all counter-conducts are conducts of self or subjectivations. They 
can be different ways of letting oneself be led by another. My favorite anecdote that Foucault relates to this is that of 
two Oberland Friends of God who “made a pact of reciprocal obedience…For twenty-eight years each agreed that 
they would obey the other’s orders as if he were God Himself.” (STP, 211) 
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and codes, which distinguishes it from simply choosing amongst a set of possibilities given by an 
apparatus. Thus it either invents a new field of possibilities of existence or creates a possibility of 
living that is not given by a regime of government, and thereby changes the makeup of what is 
possible. For, if counter-conducts were reducible to the choice of an unsanctioned possibility, it 
would be difficult to distinguish them from a banal transgression.123 And, of course, counter-
conducts may be appropriated and diverted in turn, as in the Counter-Reformation, which 
coopted elements of mysticism, new religious orders, and forms of community in order to 
neutralize them while strengthening itself.  
There are three consequences of the concept of counter-conduct on the politics of truth 
that I would like to note here. The first concerns the relation between “the creation of 
possibilities” attached to the concept of counter-conduct and “the limit of possibility” attached to 
the concept of resistance as a tactical reversal of power relations. Let us recall that both “tactical 
reversal” and philosophical writing were understood in the previous chapter primarily in relation 
to the category of the impossible. Tactical reversal drew its force from the affect of intolerance, 
or the subjective threshold of resistance. Philosophical practice is politically related to the 
intolerable, but it is more generally a pursuit of “the unlivable,” which it makes the aesthetic 
object of a trial of desubjection. In philosophy, one asks oneself, “What is the limit of what I can 
no longer be; what is the limit of my ability to no longer think in relation to my subjections?” In 
this sense, tactical reversal and philosophy both open new possibilities only on the basis of an 
experience of the impossible.  
Things appear to be different with counter-conducts, as they simply point to the openness 
of the pastorate, or the impossibility of controlling all elements of its apparatus. For instance, it is 
difficult to see how a limit experience is a necessary for reading scripture without pastoral 
guidance. Yet the theme of the limit-experience continues in Foucault’s concept of counter-
conduct and the creation of possibilities it entails, most notably in mysticism, eschatology, and 
asceticism.  
Asceticism in particular required a certain relationship with the limits of the possible as it 
involved a constant test of oneself, as in practices of self-flagellation which pursued the limit of 
one’s capacity to endure suffering by performing the passion of Christ. The theme of the test in 
Foucault’s work goes at least as far back as his studies of Greek justice in The Will to Know.124 I 
maintain that pursuit of the unlivable, as a pursuit of desubjection, explains why Foucault calls 
the modern attitude an asceticism in “What is Critique?” (in relation to Baudelaire’s dandyism); 
it also explains why he calls philosophical critique itself an askēsis in the Introduction to The 
History of Sexuality, Volume II, and why askēsis would become one of the central themes of his 
courses immediately following his lectures on neoliberalism. (EFS, 50 and HS2, 9)  
Secondly, Foucault continues to use a strategic analysis in the context of a modified 
concept of power relations as conduction. This means that here, too, it is still a matter of thinking 
the politics of truth as a practice of struggle, as the opening remarks of Security, Territory, 
Population bear out. Yet, previously his analyses focused on direct encounters between forces, 
where force relations were conceived along the lines of a duel, or a direct test of strength. In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 This leaves open a question about what makes it possible for counter-conducts to arise as acts that open up new 
possibilities of existence. 
124 In particular, see the distinction in Greek juridical discourse between two types of judgment, dikazein and krinein. 
Dikazein, found in Classical Greece, involves a contest between two disputants who take an oath to let the result 
determine the truth of their disagreement. Later, krinein emerges, whereby a neutral third party takes an oath in 
which they swear determine the truth of the dispute. (WK, 83-97) 
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analysis of governmentality, analysis is brought to bear on the strategies of forces that first relate 
to their own field of possibilities in conducts before they relate to their opponents. However, as 
Grégoire Chamayou points out regarding the Church’s manhunts for heretics during the 
Inquisition, indirect power relations of conduct can exist alongside and in relation to direct force 
relations (or war relations).125  
The third important issue here is that counter-conduct further elaborates Foucault’s non-
dialectical account of power. For him, the exercise of power doesn’t negate itself, which in this 
context means that one cannot arrive at a counter-conduct through the negation of what it 
contests. This lesson is absolutely crucial, especially for contemporary capitalism, in which some 
are still waiting for revolution from capital’s negative moments.126 In place of the notion of 
tactical reversal, Security, Territory, Population offers a concept of resistance that, as Thompson 
states, “is no longer merely the sabotaging of a reigning epoch’s agenda,” but involves “the 
constitution of…new forms of life…The work of critique is, in short, self-formation.”127  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Chamayou critically compliments Foucault’s genealogy of the pastorate, arguing that the contrary of the good 
shepherd is not a shepherd that fails to conduct it to salvation, but the hunter-shepherd, who embodies the figure of 
the wolf in hunting black sheep in his own flock as an extreme measure of securing it. (Chamayou 2012, 11-5) As 
Chamayou points out, there were direct force relations between the Church and the counter-conducts arising on its 
margins. Confronted with the threat of its “black sheep,” which threatened to lead the flock astray, the Church 
flipped into a predatory, cynegetic mode, and shepherds became the very wolves from which they normally 
protected their sheep. “Cynegetic” is a neologism drawn from the Greek kunēgetikós, meaning “of hunting”. The 
Inquisition involved hunts that either excommunicated or executed heretical elements. On the other hand, there were 
very real threats to the pastorate, like the Medieval Beghards, a quasi-nomadic community of poor mystics who 
struggled against all worldly wealth and authority as the agency of the Antichrist. Under the threat of the Inquisition, 
they went underground and infiltrated the Church for the purposes of intelligence and recruitment. (Cohn 1970, 148-
86)  
126 This is not only because such resistance risks being reactive, but for reasons I’ll explain later having to do with 
the neoliberal character of subjectivity, which constitutes a limit to the possibility of resistance.  
127 I disagree on both textual and theoretical grounds, however, with Thompson’s argument that Foucault gives up 
on the fundamentally strategic character of power relations. Firstly, not only does Foucault reiterate the need for a 
strategic analysis of the pastorate and counter-conducts (as opposed to a critique of their ideological contents that 
would have them reflect the economic crises of Feudalism), but he also reiterates it in Birth of Biopolitics for 
thinking about the birth of liberalism (see STP, 282-3 and BB, 42). And, as I mention above, he calls counter-
conduct “struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others.” (STP, 201) And secondly, while 
“conduct” is more general in that it applies to modern governmentality, the Christian pastorate, and even certain 
elements of discipline, I do not read governmentality as a total replacement of Foucault’s earlier theory of power, 
but as a distinct mode of power, akin to disciplinary power. It is one historical matrix or grid of intelligibility for 
understanding power relations among others. Admittedly, Foucault does indicate the contrary on one occasion in 
“The Subject and Power,” when he states, “The relationship proper to power would…be sought not on the side of 
violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary contracts (all of which can, at best, only be the instruments of 
power) but, rather, in the area of that singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is government.” 
(EF3, 341, my italics) However, two comments are in order. First, this would suggest that government is being used 
synonymously with conduct, which implies a distinction between governmentality, the dominant mode of power in 
modernity, and government, a quasi-general matrix for understanding power relations across different historical 
periods and geographies. Secondly, Foucault seems to equivocate here, for while what is proper to power is not on 
the side of struggle, he soon adds, “At the very heart of the power relationship…are the recalcitrance of the will and 
the intransigence of freedom…it would be better to speak of an “agonism”—or a relationship that is at the same time 
a mutual incitement and struggle; less a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a permanent 
provocation.” (EF3, 342, my italics) As Deleuze and Guattari would say a few years later of the nomadic war 
machine, counter conducts do not have struggle as their object, but they result in struggle in their encounters with 
apparatuses. And yet (unlike nomadology), there is perhaps a sense in which counter-conducts do involve struggle, 
for while counter-conducts do not have struggle against apparatuses as their object, they are still nonetheless 
counter-conducts because they either pose a challenge to conduction or they challenge the conduction to which one 
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The end of the war hypothesis, then, offers a dimension of critique that develops 
desubjection into a practice of subjectivation, as I showed toward the end of the previous chapter. 
Yet it would be wrong to think that desubjection ceases to be the impetus of Foucaultian critique 
with the introduction of counter-conducts. The situation is rather the opposite: the term 
desubjection appears more frequency in 1978 than perhaps in any other. There is an abundance 
of textual evidence to show that the concept of critique as a counter-conduct amplifies Foucault’s 
understanding of philosophy as a practice of desubjection. As I stated in the previous chapter, 
Foucault called his writing “a project of desubjectivation” just months after the end of Security, 
Terdiritory, Population. And two of Foucault’s most famous stand-alone lectures from 1978, 
“What is Enlightenment?” and “What is Critique,” both historically situate critique in two 
modern lines of descent: revolts of conduct against governmentality and the aesthetic creation of 
the self, starting with Baudelaire.128 And what is more, he directly ties critique to politics, when 
he states in “What is Critique?” that it “[ensures] the desubjection of the subject in the context 
of…the politics of truth.”129 (EFS, 266) Moreover, what is important in every experimental test 
in desubjection is not the resulting form of counter-conduct or subjectivation, but the movement 
of critique as a historical line of force that is asymptotically oriented toward ungovernability. 
That is, what matters, is the continual mutation of critique as an affirmation of the escapability of 
subjection, or simply, an affirmation of the groundlessness of power.130  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
has already submitted. Even if counter-conducts do not challenge the authority of a pastoral or governmental regime, 
counter-conducts always involve some kind of test or challenge that involves struggle, as in the case of ascetic self-
flagellation. Thus one can talk about struggles involving challenges to oneself in counter-conducts of self on the one 
hand and struggles involving challenges to pastorate. The first sense of struggle is like a trial or test of strength that 
measures itself against a positive conduct, while the second is a struggle against a certain regime of conduction. In 
both cases what counter-conducts share with tactical reversal is a struggle against the effects of power in oneself by 
questioning the procedures for the production of truth. Therefore, tactical reversal was also ethical (though 
implicitly so) insofar as it was about summoning forces within the body and without in ways that do not reinscribe 
one’s subjection. In other words, while counter-conducts do not necessarily lead to a confrontation with an apparatus 
of power, they presuppose a desubjection insofar as they require a disinvesment in the techniques of producing 
knowledge and in the corporeal relations attached to the body. That is why they can have the effect of summoning a 
strategic response in the apparatus that they pervert, at which point a series of direct engagements may ensue. In sum 
one can still apply the term “strategy” both to cases of counter-conducts that target a dominant apparatus and to 
those that invent a new procedure of producing knowledge. (Thompson 2003, 123)  
128 “What is Critique?” traces the history of critique as it tracks with that of governmentality, the threshold of 
modernity. In summing up such diverse critical discourses as religious counter-conducts, the rights discourse of 
natural law, and the liberal themes of public reason as a challenge to authority, he states that the guiding question of 
the first critiques of governmentality was “how not to be governed like that?” (EFS, 265) Foucault identifies in such 
critiques the beginnings of a modern “political and moral attitude”—and it is within this line of descent that he 
situates his work as an “art of not being governed” based on “voluntary inservitude” or “reflected indocility.” (EFS, 
265) In “What is Enlightenment?,” the focus is more on the question of the history of the present (“What are we 
today?”), which identifies the contingency and arbitrariness of those limits that our present gives to us as necessary. 
Accordingly, it indicates “the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.” (EFS, 54) 
129 My emphasis. 
130 In Michel Foucault, Eribon relays the story of Foucault’s encounter with the Madrid police when he, along with a 
number of others, went to protest the summary execution of 11 men and women by the Franco regime. The police 
broke up their press conference and one of the officers tried to take Foucault’s papers from him. Foucault refused. 
Claude Mauriac, who accompanied Foucault, recounts the intensity of “his refusal, his aggressiveness…one 
felt…that for him it was both a physical reaction and a moral principle: the bodily impossibility of being subjected 
to the contact of a police officer and taking an order from him.” Foucault commented on the incident shortly 
afterwards: “I consider that it is the cop’s job to use physical force. Anyone who opposes cops must not, therefore, 
let them maintain the hypocrisy of disguising this force behind orders that have to be immediately obeyed.” (Eribon 
1991, 265) 
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One can also find direct evidence for this his 1980 lecture course, On the Government of 
the Living. I will quote here at length, as it provides one of Foucault’s most concentrated 
statements on critique as the unity of the history of truth and desubjection in the politics of truth. 
[G]iven my desire, decision, and effort to break the bond that binds be to power, what 
then is the situation with regard to the subject of knowledge and the truth...It is the 
movement of freeing oneself from power that should serve as revealer in the 
transformations of the subject and the relation that the subject maintains with the truth. 
You can see that this form of analysis—like any other analysis of this type, moreover, 
and like the opposite analysis—rests more on a standpoint than a thesis. But this is not 
exactly the standpoint of, say, the epochē, of skepticism, of the suspension of all 
certainties or of all thetic positions of the truth. It is an attitude that consists, first, in 
thinking that no power goes without saying, that no power, of whatever kind, is obvious 
or inevitable, and that consequently no power warrants being taken for granted…On the 
basis of this position, the approach consists in wondering, that being the case, what of the 
subject and relations of knowledge do we dispense with[?]…Let us say that if the great 
philosophical approach consists in establishing a methodical doubt that suspends every 
certainty, the small lateral approach on the opposite track that I am proposing consists in 
trying to bring into play in a systematic way, not the suspension of every certainty, but 
the non-necessity of all power of whatever kind. (GL, 77-8) 
This passage clearly shows how Foucault poses the question of subjectivation—of the subject 
and its relation to truth—on the basis of the contingent relation to power. That is to say, the 
whole question of subjectivation turns on the will to desubjection where this will is understood to 
be immanent to nnon-necessary power relations. 
At this point, one seems to be very far away from the problem of anthropology. Yet I 
read Foucault’s lectures on governmentality as an indication that we are still caught in that 
problem today. The genealogy of governmentality continues the work of explaining how “man” 
still exists on the basis of anthropological subjection. Starting with Security, Territory, 
Population, he reestablishes his archaeology of the human sciences by showing that the 
population, the target of governmental power-knowledge, was the object of knowledge on which 
man became the subject of the discourses on life, labor, and language. Keeping things restricted 
to political economy, he discusses how it was Quesnay who introduced laboring man as an 
objectified subject of knowledge by identifying “[T]he population and employment…[as] the 
main objects of the economic government of states.”131 Malthus and Marx follow Quesnay on 
this terrain, but according to Foucault. They diverge in the way they pose the problem of the 
population. The population becomes either a “bio-economic” problem of reproduction in relation 
to an external condition of scarcity (Malthus) or a “political-economic” problem of class 
contradiction, which produces scarcity as an effect internal to itself. (STP, 76-7) Security, 
Territory, Population thus resituates economic anthropology as a discursive event in the history 
of governmentality: “After all, man, as he is thought and defined by the so-called human 
sciences of the nineteenth century, and as he is reflected in nineteenth century humanism, is 
nothing other than a figure of population.” (STP, 79) For the politics of truth, then, this means 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Quoted in STP, 85, n. 40; my italics. Whereas The Order of Things placed Quesnay squarely within the classical 
episteme, this situates him on the cusp of modernity—a move which is only reinforced when Foucault points out 
how he was one of the first to identify the market as a site of veridiction with regard to prices. (BB, 31) This would 
become the basis for conceiving the market as a natural process external to the state and as a reality from which it is 
possible to critically delimit the governmentality of the state. 
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“man” is an effect of governmentality.  
 
4.2 From the Critique of Governmentality to the Neoliberal Test of Critique 
Just as the politics of truth tests the limits of the current state of our anthropological 
subjection, every such test also tests the will to desubjection in the politics of truth. The year 
after Security, Territory, Population, Foucault’s Birth of Biopolitics lecture course went on to 
perform another such test of his notion of critique by putting it up what was then becoming the 
dominant form of governmentality—or anthropological subjection—namely, neoliberalism. If 
the Enlightenment question inherited from Kant is “What difference does today introduce with 
respect to yesterday?” then history has proven Foucault to be prescient in his analysis of 
neoliberalism at the end of the 1970s. (EFS, 45) On January 31, 1979, Foucault announces his 
transition from an analysis of liberalism to neoliberalism by stating that he would like to “[Start] 
from how liberal governmentality is currently programming itself.”132 (BB, 78) As David Harvey 
points out, within the space of just a couple years, from 1978 to 1980, Den Xiaoping began 
liberalizing China, Paul Volcker became chairman of the Federal Reserve and started introducing 
monetarist reforms to fight inflation, while Margaret Thatcher launched a war against organized 
labor that has put it on the defensive ever since. (Harvey 2005, 1)  
Today’s dominant image of “man” is homo oeconomicus, the neoliberal subject of human 
capital. Homo oeconomicus is the anthropological form of life that neoliberal governmentality 
continues to create and govern. It is characterized by the way its knowledge and powers of action 
function as human capital, which is distinct from physical and financial capital in that it is 
inseparable from the subject who owns it. Human capital is a way of investing time and money 
in subjective capacity according to the directions shown in the price signals of the market. And 
as capital, such capacities and knowledge have one ultimate telos: procuring an income (and 
preferably, an indefinitely increasing income through continual self-investment). As all of homo 
oeconomicus’ life activities are acts of self-investment for the purposes of its employability, it is 
a mode of existence that identifies life with work.  
With its brand of homo oeconomicus, neoliberalism achieved a synthesis of disciplinary 
individuality and the massive multiplicity of the biopolitical population. The History of Sexuality 
taught that, since the 19th century, sexuality has been a privileged target of power because it 
functioned as a relay between the caesura that separates individuals from populations: by taking 
disciplinary measures regarding the sexuality of individuals, one could produce biopolitical 
effects on populations. Human capital is yet another such relay that synthesizes discipline and 
biopower.  
As the new anthropology of labor, neoliberalism operates on the premise that human 
beings should both be conducted and conduct themselves according to a form of life that, 
curiously, reflects the form of capital itself: infinite quantitative expansion (ever increasing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 After discussing German neoliberalism, or ordoliberalism, Foucault introduces American neoliberalism by 
remarking that it was already becoming a “pet theme in France.” (BB, 215) Here Foucault is referring to the spread 
of American neoliberal ideas to France thanks to a trio of key relays in France, all of them economists. In 1977, 
Florin Aftalion and Jean-Jacques Rosa published a collection of essays on American neoliberalism titled 
L’économique retrouvée. Vieilles critiques et nouvelles analyses. The year after, Henri Lepage published Demain le 
capitalisme, a book-length study of the ideas of The Chicago School, primarily those of Milton Friedman and Gary 
Becker. He would go on to write Demain le libéralisme in 1980 and his most significant work, Pourquoi la 
propriété in 1985. Lepage, Aftalion, and Rosa all went on to become members of the decisively influential 
neoliberal organization, The Mont Pérelin Society. Rosa is currently a fellow of The Hoover Institute. Aftalion has 
worked as an advisor for Crédit Lyonnais and Chase Manhattan Bank, among others. (BB, 234) 
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employability and income prospects) through indefinite qualitative transformation (continual 
acquisition of knowledge and capacities in reaction to the demands of the market). Perhaps the 
principal paradox of neoliberalism—and possibly the limit of the politics of desubjection—then, 
is this: neoliberalism simultaneously leads subjects to their own subjection by modeling 
subjectivity on constant flux and self-transformation. Neoliberalism governs its subjects by 
compelling them to fashion and continuously reinvent themselves. It is a paradox that is similar 
to the one put forth by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus: capitalism’s novelty is that it 
operates as a great machine of deterritorialization and decoding. Anything can be incorporated 
into the body of capital and serve as a source of surplus-value. Yet whereas Deleuze and Guattari 
postulated schizophrenic desire as an absolute limit of capitalism, Foucault neither hypothesized 
such a limit, nor did he propose a type of counter-conduct for resisting neoliberal capitalism 
along the lines of the GIP.  
What critical lessons, then, can be gleaned from Foucault’s study of neoliberalism? What 
resources are there in the politics of truth for responding to the neoliberal paradox, which seems 
to deploy desubjection as its secret to governing us into lives made up of nothing but work? And 
what possibilities remain for philosophy to continue to be a “counter-power” that “[intensifies] 
the struggles that unfold around power?” 133 (DE2, 540-1) These are the questions that will make 
up the focus of the remainder of my dissertation.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 My italics. 
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Chapter 5: Toward a Foucaultian Critique of Neoliberalism and Its 
First Paradox of Unnatural Naturalization 
 
[The] problem of neoliberalism is…how the 
overall exercise of political power can be 
modeled on the principles of the market 




Neoliberalism defines us today in that it marks out the limit of what we can think, say, 
and do. It is our prevailing mode of subjection. The observable effects of neoliberalism are 
exponentially more pervasive now than they were in 1979. The state is declining as a political 
instrument of popular sovereignty as it increasingly assumes the form of an enterprise whose 
services are aimed at “citizen-consumers.” (Dardot and Laval 2013, 303) Consequently, public 
goods and services continue to be privatized or eliminated (along with their attendant public-
sector jobs). In both public and private sectors, the state has launched a series of attacks on 
organized labor in the name of anti-inflation, anti-trust, and the efficiency of market competition. 
Central banks have gained greater independence from legislative power, particularly in advanced 
capitalist economies. Gentrification has run apace with the urbanization of global populations, as 
urban space becomes the securitized domain of human capital. And entrepreneurialism has 
become status quo as a social practice and a cultural form beyond the likes of business people, 
traditionally understood.  
Nevertheless, the claim about our neoliberal present is not fundamentally empirical, but 
philosophical.134 For I want to argue that what makes neoliberalism characteristic of our time is 
that it pushes the naturalization of its own apparatus and techniques of subjection to their limit. 
And, in so doing, neoliberalism presents two paradoxes. First, neoliberalism affirms the artifice 
of its governmentality while nevertheless naturalizing itself in its effects. I call this the paradox 
of unnatural naturalization. And second, neoliberalism turns desubjection (becoming different) 
into an instrument of subjection to the regime of human capital. I call this the paradox of 
subjection by desubjection, which I briefly hinted at in the previous chapter. In short, what marks 
neoliberalism is that it pushes governmentality to the extreme limit of its possibility by 
integrating historical contingency and freedom into itself. This is also what makes neoliberalism 
stand as a test for the politics of truth. For the politics of truth always seeks to determine what is 
contingent in the limits set by the present and to see how far one can go in refusing what we are 
as effects of historically contingent power relations.135 From this perspective, then it appears that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 By stating that neoliberalism is the predominant mode of power in advanced capitalist economies I do not mean 
to imply that neoliberal governmentality is exercised to the exclusion of other types of power. When Foucault 
introduced the concept of security apparatuses (the mechanisms of governmentality) in Security, Territory 
Population, he made sure to point out that his typology of modes of power was not to be taken as a linear 
chronology or periodization: “there is not a succession of law, then discipline, then security, but…security is a way 
of making the old armatures of law and discipline function in addition to the specific mechanisms of security.” (STP, 
10) I will argue the same claim for neoliberal governmentality since it both exists along side and transmutes certain 
disciplinary and sovereign functions by submitting them to economic rationality.  
135 One could certainly try to argue that these “paradoxes” are not paradoxes at all, but that they arise as expressions 
of the unsurpassable limit that is neoliberalism for Foucault’s work—that point where the critique of power-
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neoliberalism is governmentality’s appropriation of the two-fold gesture of critique.  
Yet it is first necessary to understand the terms of this test in order to determine whether 
or not critique qua the politics of truth can pass it. The present chapter will begin this work of 
comprehension by framing Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism and defining the first paradox. 
The following chapter will define the second paradox and explore whether Foucaultian critique 
can envision a counter-conduct that adequately responds to the paradoxical character of 
neoliberalism.  
This chapter begins by situating Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism in The Birth of 
Biopolitics with respect to the explosion of critiques of neoliberalism in recent years. And since 
the most strident critiques have come from Marxist perspectives, I will spend some time 
answering what might be a very obvious question, namely, “Why not use Marx?” This answer 
amounts to presenting Foucault’s reasons for distancing himself from Marxism, which continued 
through his critique of neoliberalism. Section 2 continues in a preparatory fashion by situating 
The Birth of Biopolitics within the horizon of Foucault’s critiques of biopower and 
governmentality, as well as his concerns about the politics of gay counter-culture and the Iranian 
Revolution. After Section 3, in which I provide a brief overview of the lecture course, I begin my 
reading of The Birth of Biopolitics in earnest in Section 4. The main focus will be to show how 
Foucault’s lecture course points to the paradox of unnatural naturalization. There I will take up 
the market as an artificial field of economic relations and competition as a norm of human 
conduct. Moreover, I will show how market competition effectuates unnatural naturalization 
through a series of circular causal relations, or feedback loops between human conduct, power, 
and knowledge.  
 
5.1 Situating a Foucaultian Critique of Neoliberalism—“Why Not Marx?” 
Foucault predates the explosion of discourse on neoliberalism amongst various critics on 
the left and in the human sciences, which conveniently separates him from the fuzzy and 
sometimes contradictory mass of definitions given to the term. Jamie Peck analyzes how this 
began in the 1990s and picked up steam in the mid-2000s, just after the French publication of 
Naissance de la Biopolitique. He points out that 1997 marked the first year that the number of 
articles published on neoliberalism in the social sciences exceeded 100 per year. (Peck 2010, 13) 
By 2008 that number spiked to almost 700 and, as Michelle Brady claims, between 2004 and 
2014 neoliberalism was a keyword in a third of the articles published in cultural anthropology 
and sociology. (Brady 2014, 12) This has helped contribute to “neoliberalism fatigue,” as Peck 
argues that “practically all uses of the term [in the social sciences] seem to be situational” and it 
is “often…used as a sort of stand-in term for the political economic zeitgeist, as a no-more-than 
approximate proxy for a specific analysis of…relations of social power.” (Peck 2010, 13-14) An 
extreme example of this fatigue can be seen in the recent writings of Kean Birch, who argues not 
only that the financial crisis of 2008 had nothing to do with neoliberalism, but also that, as the 
title of his latest book tells us, We Have Never Been Neoliberal.136 (Birch 2015, 6-9) On the other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
knowledge accepts defeat and turns to the history of ethics so as to discover lessons for aestheticizing what is 
necessary in our contemporary situation. To call them paradoxes, then, would be to misrecognize the fundamental 
compatibility of Foucault’s project with neoliberalism—or at least that would be the objection. In other words, these 
paradoxes would only be apparent paradoxes, or optical effects of the inability of the politics of truth to see itself in 
the neoliberal mirror. And the misrecognition would be due to the thought of becoming-other finally settling into its 
identity because it is unable to keep moving.  
136 I disagree with Birch’s argument, which primarily addresses assumptions about the relation between 
neoliberalism and the financial crisis. He argues that neoliberalism is not responsible for the financial crisis because 
	   90	  
hand, no less a neoliberal than Gary Becker has stated that the financial crisis proves that we are 
far from being neoliberal enough, citing a mixture of government social planning and economic 
policy decisions as the reasons for the 2008 crisis.137 (O’Grady 2009) 
Given the explosion of critical discourse on neoliberalism after (but not necessarily 
following) Foucault, it is impossible to situate him within its multiplicity of alternatives. Things 
are easier when it comes to politics and I will point out where Foucault fundamentally diverges 
from major political traditions and values in what follows. However, if there is one approach to 
the study of political economy that Foucault explicitly defines himself against in The Birth of 
Biopolitics—and which also has its own niche industry of critiquing neoliberalism—it would be 
that which falls under the name of Marx.138 In order to show how Foucault distinguishes himself 
from Marx, I will make extensive reference to Althusser because of his proximity to Foucault 
biographically and because Althusser evades some of Foucault’s criticisms of Marx, either by 
virtue of adapting to them or simply by virtue of his anti-humanism.  
So, why not Marx? On the one hand, this question is obvious. It appears that few have 
been as consistent as Marxists in their vehement rejection of neoliberalism, certain 
accelerationists notwithstanding.139 If there were anything like a guarantee that thought would 
always side against capital (and neoliberalism today), it would be Marx’s definition of critique 
from the Postface to the Second Edition of Capital Volume I: “Insofar as…critique represents a 
class, it can only represent the class whose historical task is the overthrow of the capitalist mode 
of production and the final abolition of all classes—the proletariat.” (Marx 1976, 98) Of course, 
with the representational link between thought and class position in the economic relations of 
production, one is squarely back within the critique of political economy as ideology, which I 
will turn to once again below. And yet, without going into too much detail, I would like to 
present six reasons why Foucault does not approach political economy—and hence 
neoliberalism—through Marx. For a careful reading of The Birth of Biopolitics reveals that these 
reasons are at play throughout it and it is Foucault’s ongoing critique of Marx throughout the 
lecture course that sometimes gives the (false) appearance of an alignment with neoliberalism. 
First off, Foucault never backs down from his reading of Marx in The Order of Things, 
where he claims that Marx belongs to the anthropological episteme of the 19th century. Foucault 
certainly expresses respect at times for Althusser’s structuralist reading of Marx and even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
financial crises predate neoliberalism both as a set of theories and a set of practices. However, this does not preclude 
the possibility that each crisis has its own practical and theoretical conditions. Second, he argues that while 
neoliberals espouse the promotion of free markets, their actual “ideas, politics, and processes” “support corporate 
monopoly and the concentration and inter-dependence of economic (and political) power.” (Birch 2015, 9) As we 
will see in Foucault’s account, neoliberalism in its French, German, and American variants all agree that the market 
is not only not independent of political power (namely, the state), but that the market is the target of state 
governance. As for the claim about monopolies, Brett Christophers’ review of We Have Never Been Neoliberal 
helpfully points out that the only liberal political theory to hold that free markets are completely incompatible with 
free markets is neoclassical economics. (Christophers 2015, 12)  
137 In particular, Becker cites the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 and Alan Greenspan’s decision as 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve to lower federal interest rates.  
138 Foucault is usually careful to distinguish between Marx and Marxism. When he uses the latter, he usually has in 
mind specific players in France’s intellectual and political worlds. Sometimes it refers to academic Marxists 
affiliated with the French Communist Party, sometimes it refers to a particular intellectual like Sartre or Althusser, 
and at other times it might refer to particular sects, like the French Maoists. Here, the referent is the thought of Marx.  
139 Of course, this is an important exception, since a certain accelerationist reading of Marx could claim that certain 
aspects of neoliberalism advances the destructive logic of capital by which “All that is solid melts into air”—
including man. (Marx 1978c, 476) For a take on accelerationism that proceeds through Marx and is at least 
ambivalent concerning neoliberalism, see Nick Land’s “Teleoplexy: Notes on Acceleration.” (Land 2014) 
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excludes Althusser from the extension of his reading of Marx to Marxism. (DE2, 170, 271-2) Yet 
Foucault never arrived at the same conclusion regarding the existence of an epistemic break 
between the early and late Marx. (EF2, 281-2) As such, on Foucault’s reading, Marx is stuck 
within the horizon of anthropology and there does not appear to be any interest in testing the 
concept of the break in Marx as a hypothesis. In the discussion following the “Truth and 
Juridical Forms” lecture series in 1973, Foucault states: 
Someone said: the concrete essence of man is labor…We find it in Hegel, in the post-
Hegelians, and also in Marx, the Marx of a certain period, as Althusser would say. As I 
am not interested in authors but in the functioning of statements, it matters little who said 
it or when it was said. What I would like to show is that in fact labor is absolutely not the 
concrete essence of man or the existence of man in its concrete form. In order for men to 
be effectively placed in labor, to be tied to labor, there must be…a series of operations by 
which men effectively find themselves…tied to the apparatus of production for which 
they work. There must be an operation or a synthesis operated by a political power in 
order for the essence of man to be able to appear as labor. (DE1, 1489-90) 
This is Foucault’s most concise statement on the need to politicize the anthropological 
problematic (as it pertains to labor, no less). If man became a transcendental object of knowledge 
as a speaking, living, and laboring being, the question that must be asked upon the genealogical 
turn to the politics of truth is, what strategies of power successfully brought about this invention 
of man as a being who is defined by his labor and who must be made to understand himself as 
such? If Discipline and Punish and, to a lesser extent, The History of Sexuality answered this by 
means of disciplinary and biopower, they nonetheless leave open the question of how subjection 
to labor functions in capitalist societies today. Moreover, since the histories told in those books 
end well before the emergence of neoliberal discourse, they risk ignoring the historical 
singularity of the present.  
 It would be tempting to look at the quote above and simply note Foucault’s repetition of 
methodologically rejecting the author as a discursive unity—and move on. (AK, 28-9) Yet, one 
could ask, would not the Althusserian notion of an epistemological break provide the coordinates 
for an answer to this question? For it would allow one to show that laboring man is not merely 
alienated from his concrete essence as the subject of history, as in Marx’s writings prior to 1845. 
(Althusser 2006, 228) Instead, it would show that laboring man is an ideological effect of 
interpellation by state apparatuses, whose existence is required for the reproduction of the 
structure of capitalist society. (Althusser 2001, 182) This structure does not arise as the effect of 
human needs. Instead, the structure of the capitalist mode of production is both an effect of 
capital itself as an absent cause (capital as such is nowhere to be found in the mode of 
production) and an immanent cause with respect to its elements (“the existence of the structure 
inside its effects”). (Althusser and Balibar 2006, 189) As such, capital only appears fetishistically 
as an “objective appearance” to ideologically constituted—not constitutive—subjects. (Ibid., 67; 
192; 264-5) An Althusserian reading of Marx would be able to show how he surpasses 
anthropological positivism by conceiving of laboring man is an effect of ideological 
apparatuses.140 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 As for the use of anthropological finitude to ground political economy, this is what Althusser, in his critique of 
positivist economists and their demand that political economy study only what is measurable, “naïve anthropology:” 
“That is to say that Classical Economics can only think economic facts as belonging to the homogeneous space of 
their positivity and measurability on condition that it accepts a ‘naïve’ anthropology which founds all the acts 
involved in the production, distribution, reception and consumption of economic objects on the economic subjects 
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But The Order of Things claims that positivism is only one pole of an anthropological 
oscillation for thinkers like Marx. The other pole is eschatology. In a 1978 interview, Foucault 
praises Marx for his attention to the theme of struggle and war, presumably because, at these 
points, Marx is closest to thinking power relations. Still, Foucault chides him for the underlying 
prophetic mode of discourse that suggests the eschatological theme of anthropological 
disalienation:141 “What attracts me to Marx are his historical works, like his essays on the coup 
d’État of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, on the class struggles in France, or on the 
Commune…However, these analyses, in the historical works, always end with prophetic 
speeches.” (DE2, 612) Foucault therefore also critiques the attitude and style of Marx’s historical 
works, saying that their “solitary and somber character” is due to “the fact that the objective in 
these struggles is always mystified by prophecy.” (DE2, 615) Such remarks harken back, no 
doubt, to the transcendental doublet and the alternative that it founds between the themes of 
positivism and eschatology, depending on whether one locates truth in the object of discourse 
(the positivism established by human needs, for instance) or in the discourse on its object (the 
eschatology established in anticipation of the undoing of man’s illusions). (OT, 320) The 
eschatological mode of discourse is precisely the result of the critique of ideology, including the 
ideological positivism of the man who labors for his needs. Furthermore, this presages the 
political problem of ideology critique, which I will address momentarily, namely, theoreticism, 
or the privileging of theory over political practice. 
Suppose, however, that the Althusserian critique of ideology would not anticipate a 
coming epoch in which Man would be reconciled with himself beyond all ideology (“Only an 
ideological world outlook could have imagined societies without ideology”). (Althusser 2006, 
232) Even still, it would appear that Althusser’s nominalist critique of ideology does not go far 
enough in challenging the constitution of truth. In relation to Marx, The Order of Things states, 
“there is a more obscure and more fundamental division: that of the truth itself.” (OT, 320) For 
one carries out the critique of in the name of science, which strives to theoretically transcend it. 
“It is necessary to be outside ideology, i.e. in scientific knowledge, to be able to say: I am in 
ideology (a quite exceptional case) or (the general case): I was in ideology,” as Althusser 
explains. (Althusser 2001, 175) This is why one reads in Society Must be Defended, “…if there is 
one objection to be made against Marxism, it’s that it might well be a science.” (SBD, 10) This is 
because establishing criteria of scientificity effectively excludes other discourses from truth. As a 
consequence, such a science can never question the opening division between truth and falsity 
that constitutes a field of statements. As such, even if one manages to break with the 
anthropological basis of Marx’s critique of political economy, one does not manage to leave its 
dogmatic relation to the division between the true and the false, which sets up the division 
between science and ideology. Foucault is of course not concerned here with bourgeois 
ideologues, but he does care about those who are politically excluded because their knowledge is 
politically disqualified by a self-proclaimed science, whether it is bourgeois political economy or 
its Marxist critique. For instead of returning to those disqualified by the strategies of political 
economy (as in the desubjection of subjected knowledges), Althusser’s Marxist science gives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and their needs.” (Althusser and Balibar 2006, 163) Althusser thus argues that the critique of political economy 
proceeds by simultaneously attacking the positivism of relying on a given domain of economic measurability and the 
anthropology of human needs: “If surplus-value is not measurable, that is precisely because it is the concept of its 
forms, which are measureable.” (Ibid., 162)  
141 I discuss the anthropological basis of this theme in Chapter one with reference to The Order of Things. (OT, 320-
1)  
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itself the right to lead them from a privileged theoretical position. In an interview that appeared 
in the first issue of Libération, Foucault points out against such theoreticism that the most daring 
workers’ revolts in French history occurred by way of wild-cat actions outside of the party and 
union leadership. (DE1, 1268) Therefore, even if it escapes the anthropology of the doublet, the 
Althusserian critique of ideology dogmatically distinguishes between truth and falsity, is blind to 
the evental opening of that distinction in discursive singularities, and thereby establishes a 
relation of political conduction between theoretical practice and political practice. 
One must, however, recognize that Althusser sought to correct his “theoreticist tendency” 
by putting an end to his equivocation on two uses of the term “ideology” in For Marx and 
Reading Capital. This equivocation involves is the slippage of ideology qua interpellation into a 
rationalist sense of ideology as error (which are opposed to science and truth, respectively).142 
(Althusser 1976, 120) What makes this amendment possible is what also serves to correct the 
theoreticist tendency that would privilege theoretical activity over political activity, namely, the 
realization that it was proletarian struggle that made it possible for Marx to break with the 
bourgeois ideology of humanism. In other words, Marx’s scientific revolution consisted not in 
escaping ideology tout court, but only in escaping bourgeois ideology:  
[Marx] was only able to break with bourgeois ideology in its totality because he took 
inspiration from the basic ideas of proletarian ideology, and from the first class struggles 
of the proletariat, in which this ideology became flesh and blood. This is the “event” 
which, behind the rationalist facade of the contrast between “positive truth” and 
ideological illusion, gave this contrast its real historical dimension. (Althusser 1976, 122)  
Marx’s break does not place him in a science outside of ideology, but in proletarian ideology 
generated out of class struggle, which makes science possible. Consequently, reversing the 
primacy of theory over practice by way of struggle puts Althusser in agreement with a 
fundamental tenet of the politics of truth, namely, that struggle enables critique. Yet this does not 
prevent Althusser’s theoretical practice from retaining a hold on political practice in the form of 
the French Communist Party.  
Even though Althusser’s self-criticism leads him to renounce his Stalinist orientation and 
opt for a concept of the party that takes its direction from the “responses and aspirations” of the 
masses, the party is still understood as an instrument that “gives these shape.” (Althusser 1976, 
215) Therefore, the problem that remains is still a political one, namely, the governmental 
relation between party theorists and the masses, which in turn are centered around the proletariat. 
While some Marxist organizations have taken up the problems that Foucault was interested in—
sexual politics, mental health, prisons, education, and so on—this has come belatedly and only 
after these struggles have done much on their own to become visible. The party politics that 
Althusser advocated did not orient itself around the “anarchistic struggles” that oriented 
Foucault’s thought. (EF3, 330) And these anarchistic struggles around health and sexuality, 
prisons and education, all organized themselves outside of the party form.  
In the end, where Foucault decisively breaks with Marx—including Althusser’s Marx—is 
on (1) the form of strategies that condition the division between truth and falsity in history, (2) 
the cause of subjection (its real mechanisms), and (3) the historical singularity of apparatuses. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 As Jason Read points out, Antonio Negri’s critique of entrepreneurial subjectivity as an ideological error 
regarding real subsumption (the production of the subjective powers of the worker by capital) still remains within 
this slippage: “For Negri, neoliberalism and the idea of human capital is a misrepresentation of the productive 
powers of society… It would appear that for Negri real subsumption is the truth of society, and neoliberalism is only 
a misrepresentation of that truth.” (Read 2009, 34) 
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For Foucault, subjection is not ideological because its cause is not ultimately economic. And 
strategies are not linked to a dialectic of class whose generality is guaranteed by the economic 
determination of society “in the final analysis”—even if this generality is overdetermined by 
super-structural contradictions (Althusser 1997, 245) In Chapter Three, I discussed how the 
critique of ideology misses (or at least reduces) the strategic dimension of power, which consists 
of the multiplicity of struggles. In the same 1978 interview I referenced a moment ago, Foucault 
again praises Marx’s writings on concrete struggles, but this time he questions him for 
interpreting them within a historical dialectic:  
Up to now, no one has examined nor deepened the question of knowing what struggle is. 
What is struggle when one says “class struggle?” Since one says struggle, it is a question 
of war and conflict. But how does this war develop itself? What is its objective? What are 
its means? What rational qualities is it based on? I would love to discuss how it is not 
from the sociology of classes but the strategic method concerning struggles that one must 
begin with Marx. It is there that my interest in Marx is anchored and it is starting from 
there that I would like to pose problems” (DE2, 606).  
The eclipse of the strategic by the dialectic is an underlying theme in The Birth of Biopolitics. Of 
course, Foucault’s critique is not for these reasons a critique of neoliberalism as an ideology. For 
even in Althusser’s least theoreticist version of such critique, that would mean placing 
neoliberalism within a dialectic of illusion and truth on the basis of a dialectic of class 
contradiction—it would mean critiquing it as an illusory relation to the relations of production.  
It is precisely this dialectical logic that Foucault calls out in the second lecture of The 
Birth of Biopolitics. For one of the primary goals of the course is to retrieve the strategic 
dimension of the formation of neoliberalism without assuming what form that strategy would 
take. The following passage arises in the context of a discussion about two heterogeneous 
discourses in liberal governmentality that function to limit it, the juridical discourse of individual 
rights and the economic discourse of the utility of governmental intervention; however, it speaks 
to a fundamental point about strategic analysis: 
We should keep in mind that heterogeneity is never a principle of exclusion; it never 
prevents coexistence, conjunction, or connection. And it is precisely in this case…that we 
[must] emphasize…a non-dialectical logic if want to avoid being simplistic. For what is 
dialectical logic? Dialectical logic puts to work contradictory terms within the 
homogeneous. I suggest replacing this dialectical logic with what I would call a strategic 
logic. A logic of strategy does not stress contradictory terms within a homogeneity that 
promises their resolution in a unity. The function of strategic logic is to establish the 
possible connections between disparate terms which remain disparate. The logic of 
strategy is the logic of connections between the heterogeneous and not the logic of the 
homogenization of the contradictory. (BB, 42) 
One needs to recall that genealogy consists of tracing the heterogeneous elements of formations 
of power-knowledge back to encounters between heterogeneous forces. The strategies that 
develop into nexuses of knowledge-power are “both intentional and non-subjective,” as Foucault 
puts it in the first volume of The History of Sexuality. (HS1, 94) As with Althusser’s 
structuralism, one of the austere features of Foucaultian analysis is that it does not give itself the 
pleasure of pointing the finger at the powerful class-representatives “guilty” for our prevailing 
mode of subjection; it does not suffice to understand one’s subjection according to the interest of 
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the exploiting class.143  But as opposed to the impersonality of class structures, for Foucault, it is 
a matter of showing how a series of locally invented tactics connect up with one another and thus 
give rise to a logical system of strategic aims. In other words, strategies emerge out of mobile 
relations of power; they are not given in advance.  
It is absolutely essential to understand that Foucault’s critique of neoliberalism (which I 
will soon analyze) targets it as a discourse and a governmental rationality, or as a way of 
organizing power relations. As such, the strategic analysis of neoliberalism must present the 
series of connections that develop between heterogeneous elements and the strategy that 
progressively emerges through their conjunction. One should not assume that neoliberalism is 
the result of a synthesis of previous contradictions within liberalism, nor should one assume that 
it arose as a way of negating the gains of the working class.  
Aside from his discussion of the role that ordoliberalism played in constituting the 
German state following World War II, very little of his analysis deals with the strategies and 
tactics of neoliberalism as it has been concretely practiced.144 It is not—nor could it be—a 
critique of the neoliberal policies, organizations, and practices that started to emerge in the 1970s 
in advanced capitalist economies. Therefore, it is also not (directly) a critique of what David 
McNally calls “the twenty-five year period of neoliberal expansion (1982-2007)”—which is the 
object of so many empirical studies on neoliberalism in the social sciences. (McNally 2011, 9) 
Critiques of neoliberalism during its expansionary period dialectically frame it as a hegemonic 
ideology that emerged because of its ability to perform certain class-war functions while 
ensuring continued capital accumulation. This might explain certain deployments of 
neoliberalism, but it does not explain the emergence of neoliberal discourse in the first place. In 
contrast to studies of neoliberalism’s predominance, Foucault takes up neoliberalism during its 
weakest stage in its inchoate, marginal, and embattled beginnings during the middle part of the 
20th century. At this point, neoliberalism’s adversaries are not so much political-economic 
entities (whether individual or collective), but theoretical alternatives: it targets Marxism, of 
course, but it gives just as much focus to Keynesiansim, Nazism, and even certain elements 
within its own liberal tradition.  
 The question, “Why not Marx?” receives five answers. First, to the extent that Marx falls 
within anthropology, his thought falls prey to positivism in claiming that man is homo faber; thus 
he cannot think this determination as the synthetic effect of subjection. Second, as an 
anthropology, Marx also falls prey to an eschatological dialectic of truth and illusion. Third, 
Marx’s claim to scientificity dogmatically assumes a division between truth and falsity and 
therefore cannot think the division between the true and the false as an event conditioned by 
strategies of power. Fourth, when Marx does think strategy, it is decided in advance that it will 
be determined by class contradiction. And finally, for Marx, political practice is subordinated to 
theoretical practice, which hierarchizes all struggles under class struggle and subjects class 
struggle to theory by means of the party apparatus. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Althusser also understands class contradiction in historical society as a “process without a subject.” (Althusser 
1976, 94-9). 
144 And beyond the issue of Germany, Foucault did not address the other major neoliberal event prior to 1979, 
namely, Nixon’s annulment of the Bretton Woods System in 1971, which ended the gold standard for the capitalist 
world’s major currencies and ushered in an international currency market based on floating exchange rates in 1973. 
Support for floating exchange rates can be traced back to a memorandum written by Milton Friedman in 1950, when 
he was working as U.S. consultant on the Marshall Plan. (Friedman 1953b) Friedman also publicized his views on 
the need to abandon Bretton Woods in a Business Week column in 1968, titled “The Price of Gold”: “We should let 
the price of gold be a free market price, not a pegged price.” (Friedman 1972, 99)  
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 As Jason Read and Warren Montag have shown vis-à-vis Althusser, Marx is crucial to 
understanding subjection as a social phenomenon.145 However, Foucault’s distinctive 
contribution to the critique of neoliberalism consists of thinking about neoliberalism in its 
singularity without assuming historical universals and without leading critique into the familiar 
terrain of the party form. It consists of conceptualizing its strategies of power without 
determining the form of these strategies in advance. It involves understanding the way it opens 
the distinction between the truth and falsity without having already decided upon this distinction 
for itself. And finally, it includes thinking about neoliberal subjection that does not reduce it to 
ideology, but situates it in its own strategy and even opens it to considerations about ethical life 
(subjectivation).  
 
5.2 Situating the Critique of Neoliberalism in Foucault 
 There are two ways to situate The Birth of Biopolitics that are essential for its status as a 
critique and not as a newfound fascination or as a “solution” to the problems of discipline and 
biopower. Here I am thinking of the recent outpouring of critiques of Foucault that have sought 
to damn him as a neoliberal, such as those which can be found in books like Foucault and 
Neoliberalism. The first way is to situate the analysis of neoliberalism in terms of the critique of 
man, which sets up the itinerary of Foucault’s thought. The second is to situate it in terms of the 
politics of truth as a critique of subjection as it stands in the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality and Security, Territory, Population. 
Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics make up Foucault’s first 
sustained engagement with political economy since The Order of Things. In certain respects, one 
may read them as updates to the archaeology of “economics.” More precisely, albeit implicitly, 
The Birth of Biopolitics is a critical return to the anthropological a priori in the domain of 
political economy. But whereas the later lecture shows how neoliberal governmentality uses a 
regime of truth to create a new image of “man” as homo oeconomicus, The Order of Things 
shows us how homo oeconomicus emerges in the modern episteme on the basis of the rules of 
anthropological knowledge, which I discussed in Chapter One.  
 Foucault’s archaeology of economic discourse in The Order of Things concerns itself 
with showing how it is ordered according to the three epistemic periods of Western thought in 
the latter half of the second millennium. It thus treats economic discourse to the same epochal 
scheme that organizes the rest of the book, though I will pass over his treatment of the 
Renaissance since he doesn’t return to it in The Birth of Biopolitics. The classical episteme, 
which begins around the turn of the 17th century, is characterized by the historical a priori of 
representation: the truth and groundedness of the representational link between signs and things 
consists of their ability to represent their power to represent. That is, signs function only to the 
extent that they are indexed to their own representative power, as opposed being principally 
indexed to their object. This is evidenced in classical economic discourses as their primary 
concern is to account for the power of money to exchange itself, which establishes its ability to 
represent wealth.  
The representational power of money in classical economics is grounded in an agreed-
upon fiction, or pledge, as opposed to the intrinsic value of the metal it contains. This presents a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 See Read’s The Micro-Politics of Capital on the intersection of Marx, Althusser, Italian Autonomism, Foucault, 
and Deleuze and Guattari. (Read 2003, 15) See also Montag’s chapter on Althusser and Foucault in Althusser and 
His Contemporaries, which unites the two thinkers in their conception of subjection by way of material apparatuses. 
(Montag 2013b, 161) 
	   97	  
number of problems, however. Politically, sovereigns must use the money supply to make sure 
that (1) they do not lose their population to countries where wages are high and (2) they do not 
lose their currency to countries where prices are low. Theoretically, a problem emerges 
concerning the origin of value (an origin which money always represents): does value arise from 
the relative estimations of the utility of things in the minds of people who exchange? Such is the 
thinking of the “psychological theory” of utility, featured prominently in the work of Étienne 
Bonnot de Condillac and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot. (OT, 191) Or does value emerge in the 
economic Providence of God, as represented in the annual yield of the land? This would be to 
say that the representational power of money is based in its power to represent the agricultural 
basis of the economy. This was the line pursued by the Physiocrats, starting with François 
Quesnay in 1758—one of the first thinkers whom Foucault deals with in The Birth of Biopolitics 
to discuss the market as site of truth.  
Beyond showing that economic discourse situates itself on the same archaeological 
ground as the discourses on life and language (which subjects it to the same historical 
discontinuities), the main objective of The Order of Things concerning economic thought is to 
describe its contribution to anthropology in the modern episteme. Economic discourse enters the 
modern episteme of anthropology when Adam Smith displaces the entire ground of economic 
discourse away from the nature of money toward the question of the origin of value. Foucault 
writes, “[Smith] formulates a principle of order that is irreducible to the analysis of 
representation: he unearths labor, that is, toil and time, the working-day that at once patterns and 
uses up man’s life…if there is an order regulating the forms of wealth….it is because [men] are 
all subject to time, to toil, to weariness, and in the last resort, to death itself.”146 (Ibid., 225) Or 
again, “Homo oeconomicus is not the human being who represents his own needs to himself, and 
the objects capable of satisfying them; he is the human being who spends, wears out, and wastes 
his life in evading the imminence of death.” (Ibid., 257) The measure of value no longer lies in 
money but in something that money cannot represent on its own: the relation between the labor-
time that consumes human life and the history of progress in the division of labor and the means 
of production. Thus, the four sides of the anthropological a priori articulate “laboring man” as 
the basis of wealth in the anthropological a priori: the insuperability of need and death in finite 
man, the positivity of labor to which these limits give rise, the historicity of labor’s forms within 
economic progress, and the location of the conditions of thought in that which is not of thought’s 
order. (OT, 257) Man emerges as a subject who represents exchange value to himself according 
to his own interests only on the basis of death, time, and labor.147 
It is essential to read The Birth of Biopolitics and its analysis of homo oeconomicus, or 
“economic man” in neoliberalism as a return to the critique of anthropology in The Order of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Foucault points out that the notion of man’s labor as a measure of value precedes Smith by at least 40 years. The 
idea that man’s labor is equal to the cost of his basic necessities can be found at least as early as Richard Cantillon’s 
1730 Essay on the Nature of Trade in General. But Smith introduces the notion that labor is the measure of wealth 
because the value of anything can be determined by the total quantity of labor invested in it, including the labor 
contained in the tools used in production.  
147 It is only on the archaeological basis of having to be a laboring being subject to the finitude of its time that 
marginalism will revive the psychological theme of subjective utility first found in Turgot and Condillac. It is also 
worth pointing out that, while discourses on language may have a privileged role in The Order of Things, economic 
discourse has its own peculiar status. For Foucault points out twice that such discourse is unique in that the 
epistemic breaks that affect it are synchronized with those affecting discourses on life and language. (OT, 168, 180) 
He argues that economic discourse is late in shifting toward new epistemes because it is “linked to an entire praxis, 
to a whole institutional complex…Neither natural beings nor language needed the equivalent of the long mercantilist 
process in order to enter the domain of representation.” (Ibid., 180) 
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Things. For that is the basis on which The Birth of Biopolitics is a critique of neoliberalism as a 
discourse of anthropological subjection. As I will discuss in further detail, The Birth of 
Biopolitics returns to the homo oeconomicus of classical liberalism as a man of exchange and 
contrasts it with neoliberal “economic man” as a governmental subject that stands at the limits of 
anthropology.148 In Section 6.2, I will argue that the neoliberal break with exchange as the basic 
activity of homo oeconomicus signifies a deeper shift in finitude as a rule of anthropological 
knowledge.  
The second reference point for situating The Birth of Biopolitics is perhaps, more than 
anything else, what is responsible for the debate surrounding Foucault’s work and neoliberalism. 
For, in a way, it is the absence of an explicit reference to struggle and resistance in the analysis 
of neoliberalism that makes it so difficult to read it as a critique as opposed to a mere description, 
or worse, as a proposal for improving power relations. Unlike his writings on prisons, one cannot 
say that the critique of neoliberalism was made possible by struggles that directly targeted it 
outside of the domain of theory. There is no explicit reference to anything like the perspective of 
the pleb. Certainly, Foucault’s interest in neoliberalism, with its origins mostly in Germany and 
the United States, was to some extent prompted by the fact that he had been visiting these 
countries off and on throughout the 1970s.149  
But the real motives behind the critique of neoliberalism shows that it began as a 
digression, or an inessential curiosity, that became essential to the development of Foucault’s 
work. For the motivations behind the subject matter of The Birth of Biopolitics do not directly 
have anything to do with neoliberalism. Instead, they may be traced principally back to The 
History of Sexuality, Volume I and Security, Territory, Population. And what one cannot say 
about The Birth of Biopolitics can be said about those two texts: they were both enabled by 
struggles against subjection. For The History of Sexuality, it was the gay and lesbian movements 
of the 1960s and 70s; for Security, Territory, Population, it was the Iranian Revolution.150 There 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 On this point it is helpful to recall the following quote from a 1975 interview with Foucault: “What one must 
destroy is the ensemble of qualifications, of specifications, and sedimentations by which some human essences have 
been defined since the 18th century. My error has not been to say that man does not exist, but to imagine that he 
would be so easy to demolish.” (DE1, 1685) 
149 Foucault travelled to West Germany twice before the lectures of The Birth of Biopolitics. In 1977, Foucault was 
detained by West German police along with Daniel Defert after someone reported them for having discussed Ulrike 
Meinhof openly at a café. All papers and notebooks were photocopied and they were interrogated regarding their 
contents. Foucault described the ordeal as “frightening.” (Eribon 1991, 261) He also travelled there in January 1978 
to participate in the militant-leftist TUNIX conference and a march it organized for academic freedom. (Ibid., 261) 
Foucault first went to the U.S. in 1970 and travelled there more frequently a few years later, eventually making 
habitual visits to New York and California. (Ibid., 311-6) 
150 It must be noted, however, that, here again, one meets an ambiguity that arises from the relation between struggle 
and truth. For Foucault expressed his desire to write a history of sexuality in 1965 following the publication of The 
Order of Things. (Eribon 1991, 270) This is no doubt due to the reason offered by “A Preface to Transgression” 
(1963) for why language arises to the exclusion of man as the privileged problem at the end of modernity: “the 
appearance sexuality as a fundamental problem marks the slippage of a philosophy of man as worker to a 
philosophy based on a being who speaks; and insofar as philosophy has traditionally maintained a secondary role to 
knowledge and work, it must be admitted, not as a sign of crisis but of essential structure, that it is now secondary to 
language. Not that philosophy is now fated to a role of repetition or commentary, but that it experiences itself and its 
limits in language and in this transgression of language which carries it, as it did Bataille, to the faltering of the 
speaking subject.” (EF2, 85) However, The History of Sexuality that Foucault wrote is completely different than the 
one that he would have written had he undertaken the project in the mid-60s. For there is the break with the idea of a 
neutral literature and the idea that literature is a space of transgression by virtue of its privileged link to sex. (DE1, 
990-1). And then there is the discovery of power directly connected to this link (the Nietzschean turn), which 
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are, then, two struggles, two texts, and two threads that lead Foucault to the critique of neoliberal 
governmentality. 
The first of these is the critique of biopower that Foucault begins in Society Must Be 
Defended and refines in The History of Sexuality, Volume I. In the latter, Foucault attacks the 
“repressive hypothesis” that says if sexuality is repressively locked down, then sexual liberation 
is the key to unlocking the secret of our being and the site of our happiness. At the end, he 
concluded, “The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought 
not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures.” (HS1, 157) This is the second clue that The Birth 
of Biopolitics contains a critique of neoliberalism, as Foucault will go on to show how 
neoliberalism subjects bodies as sites of human capital and pleasures as signs and effects of 
one’s productivity. That is, neoliberalism ties bodies to practices of self-investment in which 
pleasure is a sign of a productive investment strategy. This runs counter to the spirit of 
Foucault’s rallying cry, as David Halperin interprets it. For Halperin, the rallying cry in The 
History of Sexuality should call us to abandon the use of sexuality to subject ourselves to the 
truth of our identity so as to invent a gay way of life. (Halperin 1995, 96-7) This entails a diverse 
set of practices, such as experimenting with the limits of pleasure, practicing collective counter-
conducts, and creating an archipelago of heterotopic spaces for these collective practices.151 
What Foucault was interested in was a collective counter-power based on different, non-
normative forms of life. Of course, this entails risk, for anticipating the major problem of 
liberalism that Foucault discusses in The Birth of Biopolitics, namely, security, one might say 
that the rallying cry above speaks of using our bodies dangerously, of taking seriously only those 
pleasures in which we risk ourselves outside of the safety and security advised by liberal 
morality.  
The second thread that leads into the critique of neoliberalism is the critique of 
governmentality. The critique of governmentality in Security, Territory, Population picks up 
where the critique of biopower left off. In the previous chapter, I showed how the critique of 
biopower shifts toward governmentality for two reasons. First, Foucault shows how modern 
governmentality emerged when liberal political economy developed the concept of the 
population. This puts liberalism at the center of the critique of governmentality in modernity 
since liberalism made “freedom…nothing else but the correlative of the deployment of the 
apparatuses of security.” (STP, 71) Second, just as the object of Foucault’s critique changes, so 
too does his concept of resistance, or what it means to struggle against subjection. The genealogy 
of governmentality goes beyond the largely negative concept of resistance to the positivity of 
counter-conducts. And, arguably, this change was at least partially due to the impact of the 
Iranian Revolution, which influenced Foucault considerably. While drafts of the lecture course 
may have preceded the Iranian Revolution, it had already kicked off in October 1977—three 
months prior to the start of Security, which is more than enough time to bestow a sense of 
urgency on the problem of resistance (Foucault introduces the concept of counter-conduct on 
March 1, 1978). Regardless of how one might evaluate Foucault’s enthusiasm for a revolution 
that violently purged the initial multitude of voices within itself, one thing is certain: what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
eventually allows Foucault to throw into question the exclusion-transgression schema that underwrites the repressive 
hypothesis.  
151 Halperin states, “Fist-fucking and sadomasochism appear in this light as utopian political practices, insofar as 
they disrupt normative sexual identities and thereby generate—of their own accord, and despite being indulged in 
not for the sake of politics but purely for the sake of pleasure—a means of resistance to the discipline of sexuality, a 
form of counter-discipline—in short, a technique of ascesis.” (Halperin 1995, 97) 
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attracted Foucault to it was that it involved a counter-conduct that starts with the experience of 
the intolerable and proceeds toward the absolute risk of death.152 In his “Open Letter to Mehdi 
Bazargan,” from April, 1979, Foucault states, “Nothing is more important in the history of a 
people than the rare moments when it rises up as a body to strike down a regime it can no longer 
tolerate.”153 (EF3, 440) I emphasize the bodily force that is risked in revolt to point out the 
continuity with The History of Sexuality. And I emphasize the irreducibility and inexplicability 
of this risk in order to highlight its place outside of governmental rationality.154  
The two threads that lead to the critique of neoliberalism coincide on numerous points. 
For both the critique of biopower, with its practical condition of gay practices around bodies and 
pleasures, and the critique of governmentality, with its inspiration from the Iranian Revolution, 
draw from struggles that have to do with dangers and risks that appear to fall outside of the 
market and the economization of means and ends. For one of the key elements of neoliberal 
governmentality is the action of market competition on the life possibilities of individuals, which 
governs them into adopting the economic rationality of allocating scarce resources to competing 
goals. Moreover, the pivotal link between the critique of biopower in The History of Sexuality 
and the critique of neoliberalism is the problem of the security of populations.  
And yet does not the market encourage and often reward risk? Even of classical 
liberalism, Foucault states that its “motto” is “Live dangerously” and that this even precipitates a 
“political culture of danger.” (BB, 66) And what is the entrepreneur if not the subject whose 
principal virtue is their courage to take risks in the market? On the other hand, however, it also 
appears to be the case that liberalism only encourages risk-taking “within reasonable limits,” for 
it creates various institutions and mechanisms for minimizing or averting risk. One might “lose 
everything” in the marketplace, but the market does not normalize this as the point of one’s 
conduct. Consequently, what appears to be unintelligible to the market—and what it even 
appears governs against—are the kinds of “absolute risks” involved in wrenching oneself away 
from one’s identity or in risking death in the utter uncertainty of revolt. Perhaps in posing 
neoliberalism as a test of the politics of truth, it also stands as a test of the heterogeneity of these 
struggles with respect to governmental reason. 
Or this, at least, would be the question: is Foucault is a critic of neoliberalism who 
contributes to thinking about the possibility of resistance against it? Or did his fascination with 
its motifs of risk and entrepreneurial self-fashioning (amongst others) lead him to view his work 
as an extreme possibility within it? As already indicated, I will place my wager—and I do not 
think there is much risk in it—on the former and claim that Foucault is no friend of neoliberalism. 
Here I have provided four reasons for this by way of situating The Birth of Biopoloitics: (1) 
going back to the archeological period, Foucaultian critique has always taken aim against 
subjectivity, particularly “anthropological man;” (2) as a critique of anthropology, Foucault’s 
critique included the effort to undermine the homo oeconomicus of classical liberalism; (3) the 
politicization of critique (the politics of truth) led Foucault to critique processes of subjection in 
power relations and ally himself with struggles against subjection; (4) inasmuch as neoliberalism 
is a form of governmentality that bodies and populations to its version of homo oeconomicus, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 This is not to mention the renewal of the revolutionary theme of a collective will that is connected to counter-
conduct. In a piece from April 1979, Foucault writes: “What has given the Iranian movement its intensity has a 
double register: on the one hand, the emphatic affirmation of a politically collective will, and, on the other hand, the 
will to a radical change in existence.” (DE2, 754) 
153 The italics in this and the next two quotations are mine.  
154 I will return to these issues toward the end of Chapter Six.  
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Foucaultian critique will involve strategically analyzing it in order to show how it organizes 
power relations and to show where it is vulnerable to counter-attack and counter-conducts.   
 From the perspective of this wager, the analysis of neoliberalism is a critique. And while 
it is one that is not directly enabled by struggles against it, it is indirectly enabled by struggles 
against biopower and the popular counter-conducts Foucault witnessed in Iran. Unfortunately, 
this means that The Birth of Biopolitics is an incomplete critique because it does not take up the 
question of struggles that would have neoliberalism as its object. This is why The Birth of 
Biopolitics reads more like an archaeology à la The Order of Things than it does like a genealogy 
such as Discipline and Punish. Let us recall that it is only from the perspective of a counter-force 
that critique can apprehend not only how various knowledges (in the sense of connaissance) 
propose models of subjection, but how these fit within an over-all apparatus with its own 
strategic rules of subjection through power and knowledge (in the sense of savoir). The Birth of 
Biopolitics fails to articulate neoliberalism within the limits of its historical a priori—perhaps 
because this was still in the process of emerging and struggles against it had not yet begun in 
earnest. But more importantly, due to the lack of anything like a pleb at the basis of Foucault’s 
lectures on neoliberalism, they also leave open the question of their own strategic value. Could 
The Birth of Biopolitics be used in the same way that he suggested using Security, Territory, 
Population, namely, as a map of blockage-points for struggle and lines of force—that is, as a 
book of tactical pointers? This would mean taking up a perspective on neoliberalism that situates 
itself at the limit of its apparatus, or in the perspective of its counter-blow. What sort of 
equivalent is there to the “pleb” in the context of neoliberalism?  
A properly Foucaultian study of neoliberalism would begin with this question and use 
that as the basis to analyze the governmentality of which neoliberalism is a part. That, however, 
is outside of the scope of this dissertation, which seeks to use Foucault’s analysis merely to 
arrive at the point where it is possible to evaluate which struggles are important for undertaking a 
history of the present today. In the remainder of this chapter and throughout the next, I will offer 
a close reading of The Birth of Biopolitics in order to home in on neoliberal subjection. The 
question of resistance will have to wait until the Conclusion of the dissertation. 
 
5.3 The Birth of Biopolitics: An Overview 
As of 2016, Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberalism has been available through secondary 
literature for almost twice as long as it has through The Birth of Biopolitics itself. Thomas 
Lemke’s 2001 essay was the first to synthesize Foucault’s lectures into a thoroughgoing concept 
of neoliberalism.155  More recently, books by Wendy Brown, Maurizio Lazzarato, and Pierre 
Dardot and Christian Laval—not to mention a slew of variously authored essays—have done 
much to interpret and amplify Foucault’s analysis.156 Given the discourse on neoliberalism that 
Foucault helped to generate, it will be necessary to make consistent reference to it throughout. 
Before considering the elements of neoliberalism in detail, I would first like to provide a brief 
overview.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 See Lemke’s “‘The birth of bio-politics’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-liberal 
Governmentality.” (Lemke 2001) 
156 I have in mind the following books: Wendy Brown’s Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics 
(2005) and Undoing the Demos (2015); Dardot and Laval’s The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society 
(2009); and three books by Maurizio Lazzarato: The Making of Indebted Man (2011), Governing by Debt (2013), 
and Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity (2014). All books but those by Brown list 
the year of their French publication.  
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 As the story goes, “neoliberalism” was coined in Paris in 1938 at the Walter Lippman 
Colloquium, which was convened by Louis Rougier to celebrate the publication of Lippman’s 
book, An Enquiry into the Principles of the Good Society. In the domain of political economy, 
the term has come to name a heterogeneity of schools and tendencies, however, Foucault uses 
the term to collectively refer to schools of economic thought:157 the Freiburg School of the 
ordoliberals and the American camp of the Chicago School economists. The Freiburg School 
includes Walter Eucken (its founder), Franz Böhm, Wilhelm Röpke, and Alexander Rüstow, who 
were instrumental for Germany’s “social market economy” and its “Economic Miracle” 
following the Second World War. They became known as the ordoliberals because they sought 
to elaborate a concept of the market as a Wirtschaftsordnung, or an economic order. (BB, 167) In 
the Chicago School, Foucault mainly deals with Gary Becker, Theodore Schultz, and George 
Stigler, who are responsible for the theory of human capital. Foucault also briefly treats Milton 
Friedman, the leading founder of the Chicago School, who is best known for monetarism, or the 
theory that the money supply determines economic growth and price levels.158 Additionally, 
Foucault analyzes Louis Rougier and Walter Lippman, two French economists whose work was 
very similar to that of their German contemporaries in the 1930s. Finally, there are the Austrian 
neoliberals, who bear a greater affinity with the Chicago School. This is in part because the most 
famous Austrian, Friedrich Hayek, joined the Economics Department at the University of 
Chicago between 1950 and 1962. Foucault’s main interest in Hayek pertains to his concept of 
“the rule of law,” a juridical framework for the market. 
What all of these lines share is a conception of the market as a juridical-economic 
framework that normalizes entrepreneurial subjection thanks to competition between individuals 
and the price mechanism. The differences between various neoliberal thinkers amount to how 
they respond to the emergent problem of their discourse. “[The] problem of neoliberalism,” as 
Foucault states, “is…how the overall exercise of political power can be modeled on the 
principles of the market economy.” (Ibid., 131) This problem leads all of them to a paradoxical 
position regarding the market: while all neoliberals affirm that the market does not have a 
foundation in human nature, they all effectively posit it necessarily as the ideal form of socio-
economic organization; that is, they all naturalize it nonetheless. This is the paradox of unnatural 
naturalization. And the effect of the market as a model of power relations is a form of subjection 
in which competition and innovation endlessly force subjects to adapt themselves to the demands 
of the market. This leads to a second paradoxical position that is characteristic of neoliberalism, 
namely, that neoliberal subjection occurs through a process of constant “desubjection,” or a 
constant process of unbinding oneself from certain capacities of action and knowledge. I will 
take up the first of these in the following section; the second will be the subject of the following 
chapter.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 It is worth noting that Foucault uses “neoliberalism” to refer to all of these tendencies, though he applies it to the 
Americans with more consistency. In his commentary on ordoliberalism, Lüder Gerken points out that, inasmuch as 
neoliberalism is either confusedly identified with laissez-faire or is taken to mean the use of laissez-faire as a 
“permanent economic tribunal confronting government,” it would have been rejected by the likes of Walter Eucken, 
a founding leader of ordoliberalism. (Gerken 2000, 37; BB, 247) 
158 My italics. Foucault sometimes calls the American neoliberals “anarcho-capitalists” or “anarcho-liberals,” 
indicating that he had read Lepage’s Demain le capitalisme, which uses this phrase. (BB, 104; 117) The ordoliberals 
were so named after the journal that they ran starting in 1948, titled Ordo, which refers back to an earlier series of 
studies they collected, which was called Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft (The Order of the Economy). 
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5.4 The Paradox of Unnatural Naturalization I: Of the Market Apparatus and its 
Norm, Competition  
In this section I will present Foucault’s analysis of the first two elements of 
neoliberalism: its apparatus of power-knowledge, the market, and its norm, competition. These 
two elements directly concern the paradox of unnatural naturalization. The focus here will 
generally remain on the ordoliberals and Hayek, as the American neoliberals are the ones who 
theorize entrepreneurialization per se. Much of this section contains a reconstruction of 
Foucault’s readings of the ordoliberals and Hayek. However, in this section, I will add to his 
reading in two ways.  
The first is by conceptualizing the paradox of unnatural naturalization, which defines 
neoliberalism’s way of naturalizing market competition on the basis of avowedly artificial 
epistemological starting points. I base my formulation of this paradox on Foucault’s comments 
on neoliberal market competition, however, nowhere in The Birth of Biopolitics does Foucault 
explicitly formulate it. It states that the market is an unnatural apparatus of normalization that 
produces a naturalized subjection. Neoliberalism plays upon an inherent ambiguity in the 
ontological status of its object. All neoliberals share the view that neither the market nor homo 
oeconomicus is a natural, empirical given; they must be created through policies and institutions. 
And yet, neoliberalism ends up effectively naturalizing the market and homo oeconomicus. 
Ironically, this would not be a paradox if neoliberalism (falsely) posited the market as a natural 
reality or as derived from one. In that case, the critique would concern the naturalization of the 
relations and effects of the techniques of power. This paradox instead stems from the affirmation 
of the market as an artifice without natural foundation.  
The second way that I will add to Foucault’s work on neoliberalism is by showing how 
neoliberalism naturalizes itself by a series of circular-causal relations between market-driven 
power relations, the politico-economic conducts they induce, and their resulting knowledge-
effects. Here again, the materials for formulating these circular relations, or circuits, can be 
found in Foucault’s readings of the neoliberals. Yet, with only one exception, they do not 
explicitly appear in The Birth of Biopolitics. What is common to all of these circuits is that they 
function as feedback loops, that is, by feeding the effects of the exercise of economic liberty into 
the power relations of neoliberal governmentality. The diagram of these circuits, like the diagram 
of the panopticon in Discipline and Punish, is an “ideal form” of the functioning of power 
relations, abstracted from any particular use.159 (DP, 205) I will detail the first three through 
Foucault’s reading of the ordoliberals, whereas I will cover the last two by turning to Hayek.  
At the heart of the neoliberal paradox of unnatural naturalization is the characterization of 
the market according to competition instead of exchange. Furthermore, neoliberals maintain that 
the market alone provides the state with a legitimate foundation. The neoliberal state is a 
depoliticized state: it possesses no political foundation independent of its capacity to ensure the 
market. Likewise, neoliberals agree that society must be wholly normalized by competition, that 
is, they argue that society must be organized as a competition between enterprises.  
Where neoliberals disagree, however, is on the concept of laissez-faire. On the one hand, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 I should also add that Foucault’s encounter with neoliberalism is a turning point for thinking about 
governmentality, since neoliberalism presents a mode of governing others that is intrinsically tied to the way that 
subjects govern themselves. In a lecture at Dartmouth in 1980, Foucault claims that Government is “where the 
technologies of domination of individuals over one another have has recourse to processes by which the individual 
acts upon himself” and where “the techniques of self are integrated into structures of coercion or domination.”159 
(Foucault 1993, 203) 
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the ordoliberals (and, to a certain extent, Lippman and Rougier) seek a “third way” between the 
naturalism of classical laissez-faire and socialism; they call this the “policy of society” 
(“Gesellschaftspolitik”), which allows the state to plan ends for society that enhance market 
competition (this is opposed to planning the economy in favor of social interests). On the other 
hand, the Austrians and the Americans maintain that the state should refrain from social planning 
and simply let the market do the work of governing and shaping society. Hayek, for instance, 
affirms a “denaturalized” laissez-faire by restricting all state action to the rule of law, or market 
rules that regulate the market while abstaining from planning economic activity.160 At this point, 
I would like to first take up the circuits of unnatural naturalization in ordoliberalism before 
considering Hayek.  
Theoretically, Foucault situates ordoliberalism within the problem of capitalism set forth 
by Max Weber, who takes it to be not the contradictory logic of capital that it is for Marx, but 
“the irrational rationality of capitalist society.”161 (BB, 105) The ordoliberals locate the 
irrationality of capitalist society not in its economic form, but in the social domain itself. For 
society tends to demand things from the state such as rising standards of consumption, full 
employment, and a broad safety-net. These social demands require the state to intervene on the 
market in order to reduce economic inequality, partially socialize consumption, and increase 
social policy as the economy grows.162 Such demands irrationally lead to bureaucracy and 
diminished competition, which the neoliberals generally argue to be the source of economic 
growth. Society would thus destroy the very machinery of its welfare. Furthermore, ordoliberals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 The Chicago School follows the latter route and goes even further by turning laissez-faire into the rule of a 
“permanent economic tribunal confronting government.” (BB, 247) I will take this up in the following chapter. 
161 For Weber, the primary features of this problem is the increasing rationalization of society along bureaucratic 
lines, with its effects of irrational social control that diminish the individual. Foucault shows how a strategic 
alternative between the Freiburg School of economics and the Frankfurt School of critical social theory develops out 
of Weber. The question is whether the irrationality of modern capitalism is social or economic in nature. The 
Frankfurt School (Foucault specifically mentions Max Horkheimer, though he certainly is also thinking of Jürgen 
Habermas) locates irrationality within the economy, namely, the suffering it causes, and seeks to redress it by means 
of a specifically social rationality, namely, social justice. One must intervene on the economy for the sake of society. 
The Freiburg School, conversely, locates the problem of capitalism’s irrationality in the domain of the social, which 
generates a whole host of “anti-competitive mechanisms.” (BB, 160) Horkheimer abandons the possibility of 
rationality to redress its instrumentalization in the 1940s. Before then, however, he locates capitalism’s irrationality 
in the suffering produced by the pursuit of self-interest, which excludes a margin of society from labor and the 
ability to meet their needs: “[T]here exists no rational connection between the free competition of individuals as 
what mediates and the existence of the entire society as what is mediated…This irrationality expresses itself in the 
suffering of the majority of human beings. The individual, completely absorbed in the concern for himself and “his 
own,” does not only promote the life of the whole without clear consciousness; rather, he effects through his labor 
both the welfare and the misery of others and it can never become entirely evident to what extent and for which 
individuals his labor means the one or the other.” (Horkheimer 1993, 19-20) To this economic rationality, he 
opposes social justice as the guiding end of social rationality: “As a universal principle to be realized in this world, 
Justice in connection with Freedom and Equality first found recognition in bourgeois philosophy; though only today 
have the resources of humanity become great enough that their adequate realization is set as an immediate historical 
task. The intense struggle for their fulfillment marks our epoch of transition.” (Ibid., 38)  
162 The “policy of society,” which the ordoliberals espouse is opposed to “social policy,” which they emphatically 
reject in that the latter amounts to state planning for social welfare, whereas the former involves governing society 
so that economic growth can answer the call for social welfare. Dardot and Laval clarify this difference with the 
following: “To obviate any confusion, Gesellschaftspolitik must…always be translated as “policy of society,” not 
“social policy.” The objective genitive plays an essential role in as much as it signifies that society is the object and 
target of governmental action—and not that this action should involve transfers from the highest incomes to the 
lowest.” (Dardot and Laval 2013, 93) 
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have it that the problems of industrial capitalism identified by Marxism can be solved by the 
adoption of social policies by capitalist governments. The ordoliberals refuse to view things like 
proletarianization and urbanization as inevitable consequences of capitalist competition and 
revolutions in the forces of production. And figures like Röpke argue that such problems are only 
worsened when welfare states increase the dependency of the propertyless on the state for 
welfare and housing.  
 This exemplifies Foucault’s interest in neoliberalism as a discursive strategy that 
polarizes discourse on society and the economy. The ordoliberals use the problem of the 
irrationality of society to intervene in a series of crises. These crises include the Great 
Depression, the rise of Nazism, and the necessity of founding a German state after the War while 
neutralizing the totalitarian logic of statism. And as they intervene in these crises, they also 
define themselves against their strategic adversary, namely, Nazism. While all neoliberals target 
Nazism (or more broadly, totalitarianism), this adversary affected the ordoliberals directly—and 
quite personally in the case of Eucken and Röpke.163 According to Foucault, Nazism functions 
for the neoliberals as an “economic-political invariant” that “possesses its own logic and internal 
necessity.” (Ibid., 111) This enables neoliberalism to polarize the political field of discourse and 
position themselves as the only acceptable alternative to economic interventionism; for the 
neoliberals say that the latter always leads to Nazism. All other adversaries—including 
Keynesianism—are but variants of this one invariable adversary. Equally important, however, is 
how the ordoliberals use the Nazi invariant to locate the Weberian of irrationality in society. For 
the logic of Nazism connects three elements: (1) an economic invariant in which protectionism, 
state aid, planning and Keynesianism all mutually lead to and reinforce one another, even if they 
are apparently discontinuous; (2) a political, totalitarian invariant which, as a necessary 
consequence of economic interventionism, consists of the growth of the state into a party-state 
that uses the state apparatus as an instrument to dominate the social body; and finally, (3) an 
inversion of the critique of mass capitalist society in which the constant dissolution of society 
and traditional communities, the standardization of consumption, and the production of mass 
spectacles are all effects or signs of state interventions (not the movement of capital). (Ibid., 109-
15)  
Within neoliberalism generally (and ordoliberalism in particular), the invariable anti-
liberal threat in the irrationality of society is the target of what Foucault calls the “inflationary” 
critique of the state. This is one of the few areas in The Birth of Biopolitics where Foucault’s 
critique of neoliberalism is plainly self-evident. The neoliberal critique of the state is a necessary 
part of its discourse because it is the condition under which neoliberalism’s self-identification is 
possible. That is, in order to determine what it is for itself, neoliberalism first determines its 
principal threat, or enemy, and then inflates it to the point where it has subsumed all other 
political and economic alternatives. Foucault critiques neoliberal “inflationism” for (1) failing to 
account for the historical specificity of the state by accepting an essential continuity between all 
not-strictly-liberal state forms, (2) practicing a critique of “general disqualification by the worst” 
to disqualify other political discourses through fear-mongering, and (3) maintaining a “great 
fantasy of the paranoiac and devouring state” instead of political actuality and (4) failing make 
its critique of the state recursive, or as Foucault plainly states, “it does not carry out a criticism or 
analysis of itself.” (Ibid., 188) As a discursive strategy, constructing an anti-liberal invariant 
makes it possible to implicate neoliberalism’s liberal rivals (for instance, Keynesianism) and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Röpke was forced into exile and two of Eucken’s friends connected with the 20 July Plot were arrested and 
executed.  
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non-liberal enemies (for instance, socialism) in homogenous economic and political 
phenomena—and thereby denounce them. As a discursive constitution of its object, this invariant 
makes it possible to locate the irrationality of capitalism in the relation between society and the 
state, which calls for the imposition of an economically rational form on society.  
Following the War, with the reconstruction of Western Germany, the ordoliberals seized 
the chance to counter Nazism, attack the Allied Control Council’s interventionism of price and 
production controls, and establish the fledgling German state on market principles. While all of 
the ordoliberals were influential in framing post-War economic policy for Germany, Walter 
Eucken and Wilhelm Röpke stand out for having served as advisors to Ludwig Erhard. Erhard 
was the Director of Economics for the Bizonal Economic Council in 1947 and became Western 
Germany’s Minister of Economics in 1949.164 Under Röpke’s advice on fighting post-war 
inflation, Erhard abolished the Council’s initial policies of price fixing and controls on 
production. However, Foucault’s account gives special importance to a statement from a speech 
by Erhard upon becoming economic director of the Bizone Council. The statement runs, “We 
must free the economy from state controls…[O]nly a state that establishes both the freedom and 
responsibility of its citizens can legitimately speak in the name of the people.” (Ibid., 81) This 
statement simultaneously calls for the liberalization of the German economy and the foundation 
of the state on the principles of the market. For what the statement does is it converts the 
population’s exercise of freedom in the West-German market into its tacit consent to the state, 
whose sole purpose is to secure the conditions of the market. Foucault points out that by giving 
citizens “freedom to act” in the market, the new German state “produces permanent consensus as 
a surplus product.” (Ibid., 85) By playing the market game, making competition function, and 
generating economic growth, the players in the market give de facto legitimacy and 
representative power to the state. Foucault characterizes this production of consent as a circuit: 
“the production of well-being by economic growth will produce a circuit going from the 
economic institution to the population’s overall adherence to its regime and system.” (Ibid., 85) 
And since ordoliberalism frames itself as inherently anti-totalitarian, this allows Germany to 
appear to sever itself from its Nazi past and claim repentance for its crimes during the Second 
World War.  
Ordoliberalism presents the first circuit by which the market apparatus naturalizes an 
artificially instituted set of power relations. It is the circuit of surplus tacit consent: by founding 
the state on economic freedom, it converts the economic activity of meeting needs into the 
exercise of liberty and, in turn, it converts this exercise of liberty into consent to the state. 
Foucault concludes that this circuitous consent in effect legitimizes the state on the basis of the 
market, as it guarantees “a permanent genesis…of the state from the economic institution.” (Ibid., 
84) That is, ordoliberalism codifies any act that realizes the price mechanism of supply and 
demand in advance as consent to the state’s governance. Hence, the state’s legitimacy is 
contingent upon its ability to not only secure the functioning of the market, but also ensure the 
economic rationalization of society. Historically, the ordoliberal effort to found the state on the 
market will serve as the prelude to all further neoliberal statecraft in times of crisis wherein crisis 
itself serves as the opportunity for circumventing all traditional methods for constituting the state.  
Yet what makes it possible for surplus consent to found the ordoliberal state upon the 
market? In Foucault’s reading, it has to do with the artificiality of the competitive market in 
ordoliberalism. The ordoliberals break with the laissez-faire of classical liberal theory, since they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 He joined the Mont Pérelin Society a year later. The Bizone Council was the governing body responsible for the 
administration of the Anglo-American Zone, or the British and American controlled Western half of Germany.  
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reject what Foucault calls the “naïve naturalism” of classical liberalism, namely, the notion that 
the market is a natural, empirically given reality that the state must accept as its external limit. 
(Ibid., 120) Foucault’s claim regarding the ordoliberal break with naïve naturalism is twofold: 
first, ordoliberalism proceeds from a phenomenological critique of the natural attitude toward the 
economy and, second, it maintains that the competitive market cannot arise naturally via laissez 
faire, but must be produced by the government.  
First, Foucault draws attention to the fact the two ordoliberals behind this break, namely, 
Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm, were students of Husserl. Eucken led the ordoliberals by 
applying a Husserlian method of eidetic variation to economics. Economics, he thought, must 
begin by suspending the economist’s natural attitude toward goods and activities that reduces 
them to pre-given facts and uncritically inherited concepts.165 (Ibid., 103) Starting with the facts 
of economic life—whether they pertain to a household or a historically existing economy—the 
economist must then perform what Eucken calls “isolating abstraction.” (Eucken 1992, 107) 
Unlike “generalizing abstraction,” which reduces many phenomena to their commonalities, 
isolating abstraction takes an individual phenomenon and identifies its eidos—or ideal form—
with its “distinguishing or significant characteristics.” (Ibid.) It is important to point out that this 
phenomenological requirement already makes laissez faire impossible, since, as Foucault says, it 
means that the essence of the market is “not a natural given.” (BB, 120) 
After studying a variety of historically existing economies of varying scales, Eucken 
maintains that the economist will find two recurring characteristic activities: planning and 
exchange. Every historically existing economy involves some combination of the two. (Ibid., 
109) However, Eucken demands to know what the market economy is purely in its essence. A 
market economy is one in which exchange mediates between supply and demand. And in these, 
Eucken writes, “Supply and demand are ‘open’ if every individual or group, has access to the 
market as supplier or demander, and if each individual can supply or demand whatever quantity 
he thinks fit.” (Eucken 1992, 184) Economies that emphasize planning tend to limit this 
openness, which leads Eucken to view competition as the underlying essence of the market. 
Competition is the essence of exchange because it is the only condition under which the price 
mechanism exclusively governs the plans of economic agents. As Eucken maintains, “What is 
decisive under competition is not the actual reactions resulting from an individual’s 
conduct…but just the fact that, owing to the considerable size of the market and the negligible 
size of his supply or demand, the individual does not reckon with any such reaction in his 
economic plan; but takes the price as a planning datum and acts accordingly.” (Ibid., 139-40) Put 
simply, to compete is to conduct oneself in accordance with price signals. As Foucault states, 
summing up Eucken, “Competition is an essence. Competition is an eidos…It is, as it were, a 
formal game between inequalities; it is not a natural game between individuals and behaviors.” 
(BB, 120) Therefore, the methodological shift away from naturalistic empiricism is accompanied 
by another characteristic neoliberal shift: it replaces the equality of exchange values as the basic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 In the Introduction to The Foundations of Economics, Eucken critiques the formalist tendency of neoclassical 
economists, stating, “Because the ‘essences’ of things are studied before the things themselves, the first result is 
merely vacuous verbiage, while the things themselves and their problems pass unnoticed.” (Eucken 1992, 54) To 
discover the essence of economic things, Eucken states that one must begin from the objects of everyday life, 
identifies the economic unit of analysis (anything from a given household to an economy), and then proceeds to 
phenomenological abstraction: “The individual features of an individual phenomenon…are extracted and ideal types 
built up out of them. This is in sharp contrast to ‘generalizing’ abstraction, which seeks to fasten onto what is 
common to many phenomena. The method of “isolating” abstraction, or of abstraction of the distinguishing or 
significant characteristics starts from the individual fact.” (Ibid., 107)  
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theme of political economy with that of the inequality of competition between enterprises.166  
Ordoliberalism’s second break with “naïve naturalism” follows from the first and has to 
do with the way the ordoliberals propose to make the competitive essence of the market actually 
appear as a historical reality. Since Eucken maintains that all historical economies have involved 
some combination of planning and exchange, the competitive essence of the market cannot 
appear as such in its purity by being left to the spontaneous trade of economic agents. 
“Competition,” says Foucault, “is…an historical objective of governmental art and not a natural 
given that must be respected…pure competition, which is the essence of the market, can only 
appear if it is produced, and if it is produced by an active governmentality.”167 (Ibid., 120-1) 
Therefore, the competitive market as ordoliberals conceive it is a “denaturalized” essence that 
forms the political-economic ideal of ordoliberal governmentality.  
This is already apparent in Erhard’s claim that governmental legitimacy rests upon its 
ability to install and secure market conditions. Yet in order to produce the market, the 
ordoliberals propose two conditions. First, the state must govern society so as to cancel out its 
aforementioned irrationality. If competition is the essence of the market and the norm of a 
rational economy, then social demands that reduce competition (say, for safety-nets, full 
employment, and socialized consumption) appear to be economically irrational inasmuch as they 
plan supply and demand and thus inhibit the price mechanism. The irrational tendency of society 
to demand economic planning from the state must be managed at its source. This is the task of 
what Müller-Armack (Erhard’s Secretary of State) calls Gesellschaftspolitik, or a policy of 
society. Gesellschaftspolitik was the basis of Germany’s “social market economy” after the 
War—a phrase that Müller-Armack also coined—which subsequently became famous for its 
miraculous recovery from the War. (Ibid., 146; 144) The second condition is that the state must 
institute and oversee the market according to a juridical framework that serves to maximize 
competition. (Ibid., 166) The ordoliberals call this an Ordnungspolitik, or the politics of order. 
(Dardot and Laval 2013, 83) Below, I will primarily focus on the ordoliberal policy of society. 
Continuing from their phenomenological underpinnings, Gesellschaftspolitik 
distinguishes the ordoliberals in that not only do they share neoliberalism’s general tendency to 
intensify competition by reducing social welfare measures to a minimum, but they pursue a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Classical political economy holds that competition ensures the functioning of the price mechanism as a means of 
measuring value and governing choices. (BB, 119-20) Foucault points out that this is what constituted the market as 
a site of veridiction, as its functioning was thought to ensure the true value of things to appear in the form of prices. 
(Ibid., 32) In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault states that the question of his work had become “How is the 
relationship between truth-telling (veridiction) and the practice of the subject established, fixed, and defined? Or 
More generally, how are truth-telling and governing (governing oneself and others) linked and connected to one 
another?” (HS, 229) This theme already finds its place in The Birth of Biopolitics, where Foucault uses the term 
veridiction to refer to the production of true discourse. More broadly, it refers to apparatuses for producing a true 
discourse on the basis of previously established rules for separating the true and the false: the “[The] political 
critique of knowledge […] consists in determining under what conditions and with what effects a veridiction is 
exercised, that is to say, a type of formulation falling under particular rules of verification and falsification.” (BB, 
36) This is not the same usage that one finds when he goes to link it to subjectivation as truth-telling, whether in 
pastoral practices of confession or in parrhēsia. Nevertheless, what the concept of governmentality introduces into 
Foucault’s thought is a way of showing how veridicition in the sense of true discourse extends into practices of 
subjectivation. Heading in the direction of subjectivation and parrhēsia, in 1980 Foucault states that government is 
“where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the 
individual acts upon himself” and where “the techniques of self are integrated into structures of coercion or 
domination.” (Foucault 1993, 203) I pursue this chiasm of power and subjectivation in governmentality with respect 
to neoliberalism below in Section 6.1. 
167 My emphasis.  
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positive series of state interventions on society.168 As Foucault observes, ordoliberalism evinces a 
defining trait of governmentality, namely, that the role of the state is not to act on individuals 
directly, but on their milieu, or their environment. (BB, 160) In order to incite the population to 
exercise economic freedom and internalize economic rationality, the state must first govern what 
Müller-Armack terms “‘die soziale Umwelt’: the social environment.” (Ibid., 146) And once a 
population is conducted into market competition, Foucault states that competition will produce 
“a general regulation of society” as participants act in the manner of enterprises.169 (Ibid., 145)	  
Following the World War II, ordoliberalism faced three varieties of what it took to be the 
same anti-liberal invariant, namely, Keynesianism, socialism, and Nazism. To combat them, 
ordoliberalism proposed a series of negative short-term aims for Gesellschaftspolitik that are also 
characteristic of neoliberalism more generally. Foucault enumerates these as (1) the privatization 
of social policy, including all forms of socialized consumption and insurance against risk; (2) 
obtaining a balance of payments, or avoiding budgetary deficits (instead of prioritizing social 
spending); (3) ensuring price stabilization, or warding off the tendency to inflation (instead of 
seeking full employment, work-day limits, and minimum wage laws); and finally, (4) eliminating 
the monopolistic dangers created by the state, which may be due to preferential treatment 
towards certain enterprises, laws that allow for the undue accumulation of capital, and the 
inherently anti-competitive effects of strict borders around national economies. (Ibid., 135; 142-
5)  
As Foucault shows, the policy of society is not merely negative in its governance of 
society; it also involves definite positive measures, which are exemplified by Alexander 
Rüstow’s concept of Vitalpolitik. (Ibid., 146) Vitalpolitik significantly distinguishes 
ordoliberalism from its Austrian and American counterparts, as it involves extensive social 
planning by the state. Adding to Foucault’s account, Dardot and Laval underscore how the main 
objective of these measures was to combat the proletarianizing and “uprooting” effects of 
industrial capitalism that strip workers of private property and lead them to demand welfare from 
the state. (Dardot and Laval 2013, 98) It is a matter of integrating them into civil society by 
turning them into property owners with policies that encourage home ownership, small family 
farms, artisanal forms of labor, and small businesses. Further measures include city planning that 
decentralizes the urban concentration of industry so as to favor development according to the 
model of regional neighborhoods and towns and greater integration between rural and urban 
zones. Summing up Röpke, Dardot and Laval underscore how ordoliberal social interventionism 
is a moral enterprise: “By becoming property owners and family farmers, individuals will 
rediscover the virtues of prudence, seriousness, and responsibility that are so indispensable to the 
market economy.” (Ibid.) Ordoliberalism not only proposes to throw society into competition, 
but to give it an economic order that selects for the forms of life needed by the market, as 
opposed to the market fulfilling this function entirely on its own (which will characterize the 
vision of Hayek and the Chicago School).170  
Ordoliberalism’s social interventionism in the form of Gesellschaftspolitik (Müller-
Armack) and Vitalpolitik (Rüstow) is its way of solving what Foucault takes to be the general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 With Hayek, Mises, and the Chicago School on the contrary, it is solely a matter of negative measures that reduce 
the state and allow the market to govern society on its own. 
169 Foucault emphasizes this point repeatedly in The Birth of Biopolitics; in another instance, he states, “the 
economic game…is a…general regulator of society that…everyone has to accept and abide by.” (BB, 143) 
170 Dardot and Laval go on to say, “According to [Röpke], people are only free if they are property-owners, 
members of a familial, entrepreneurial, and local natural community, able to count on local solidarity (family, 
friends, colleagues), and possessed of the energy to face general competition. (Dardot and Laval 2013, 98-9) 
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problem of neoliberalism at the level of the politics of truth, which, to recall, is that of modelling 
power relations on the market. Every variant of neoliberalism accomplishes this by governing the 
environment in which individuals conduct themselves such that they are subjected to economic 
rationality and constitute themselves in an entrepreneurial form of life. Foucault argues that the 
ordoliberals arrive at this by governing the social conditions of economic conduct: “[I]t is…a 
matter of constructing…a social fabric in which precisely the basic units would have the form of 
the enterprise…this multiplication of the ‘enterprise’ form within the social body is what is at 
stake in neoliberal policy.”171 (Ibid., 148)  
This makes up the second circuit involved in the unnatural naturalization of the market: 
the circuit of economic rationalization: thrown into competition, the population is compelled to 
exercise liberty, maximize competitive advantage through economic rationality, and thus become 
individualized into enterprises. That is to say, ordoliberalism subjects society to the 
governmental effects of market competition by turning its members into entrepreneurs (suppliers) 
and consumers (demanders). Hence, the competitive essence of the market is also the norm of 
the economic rationality of its subjects, that is, the circuit of economic rationalization is a circuit 
of competitive normalization. As such, the entrepreneurial effects of economic rationalization 
help to transform society into a domain of competition. As I will explain later, in their own ways, 
the Austrians and the Americans arrive at this result through laissez faire, such that competition 
proves itself to be the dominant norm of neoliberalism in general.  
The third circuit of neoliberalism is the circuit of the economization of the state, which I 
have already touched on above. This is already established by the fact that, as Foucault points out, 
the neoliberal state is entirely founded on the market economy: 
“[The market is the] organizing and regulating principle of the state, from the start of its 
existence up to the last form of its interventions. In other words: a state under the 
supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the state.” (Ibid., 116)  
The raison d’être of market competition has nothing to do with its naturalness, but with its utility 
function of promoting economic growth; consequently, the ordoliberal state has an exclusively 
economic rationality that posits growth as the general interest and competition (the openness of 
supply and demand) as its cause. What measures the political performance of the ordoliberal 
state is the same criterion as every other economic agent, namely, competitiveness. The better 
the state is at governing society through competition and subjecting its members to 
entrepreneurial life, the better the market will perform, and the more legitimate the state will be. 
Therefore, the truth of state activity—the extent to which it ensures the price mechanism—
appears in the market in the form of economic growth. The market is not just a site of veridiction 
for the prices of things and subjects; it is also a site of veridiction for neoliberal governmentality 
itself.172 
Extrapolating from Foucault’s reading, ordoliberalism effectuates a reversal of the 
classical, critical function of the market as a transcendent limit of the state. Here, the entire 
relation between society and the state becomes immanent to the market. Thus, the economization 
of the state is also its depoliticization and desocialization because it denies traditional principles 
such as popular sovereignty or social justice from the start. Dardot and Laval point out how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Lemke states that neoliberalism seeks “to generate a model for social relations per se from the economic 
mechanisms of…competition.” (Lemke 2001, 195-6) 
172 This is why, in writing on the crisis of 2008, Dardot and Laval are right to claim that it was a crisis of 
governmentality—and not simply a housing crisis or a financial crisis—affecting everything from the value of the 
market to the legitimacy of government and its political-economic assumptions. (Dardot and Laval 2013, 11-2) 
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indexing state legitimacy to economic growth replaces the political subject of the citizen with the 
“citizen-consumer,” who in turn reinforces the replacement of “the shared symbolic principles 
that hitherto underlay citizenship” with “[m]anagement categories” and the measurement of state 
action in terms of efficiency and productivity.173 (Dardot and Laval 2013, 303) The 
economization of the state feeds back into normalizing competition, as the state intensifies 
entrepreneurialization in its abandonment of political or social principles. This is what Lemke 
calls “the neoliberal agenda for the ‘withdrawal of the state’…as a technique for government,” 
which he claims is not a reduction of state control, but a change in its mode by “shifting the 
regulatory competence of the state onto ‘responsible’ and ‘rational’ individuals.” (Lemke 2001, 
201-2) Neoliberalism tiptoes around the contradiction between governing individuals on the one 
hand and refusing any responsibility for them. For by subjecting the state and society to 
economic rationality, neoliberalism throws individuals into a competitive game that both 
conducts their conduct and requires them to assume responsibility for their own risk. Lemke 
states, “Neo-liberalism is a political rationality that tries to render the social domain economic 
and to link a reduction in (welfare) state services and security systems to the increasing call for 
‘personal responsibility’ and ‘self-care’.” (Ibid., 203) I will have the opportunity to return to the 
economization of the state in the context of American neoliberalism in the following chapter.  
Finally, it bears mentioning that neoliberals envision the state within a strategy of 
permanent crisis governance. Crisis is not the exception to the normal functioning of neoliberal 
governance; crisis is the rule of neoliberal governmentality. Within the framework of neoliberal 
thinkers (it does not matter which), economic downturns and crises do not definitively 
delegitimize the state as the guarantor of economic liberty. Instead, such aleatory threats 
summon the state as a guarantor of market security. This makes possible the awkward situation 
in which the state’s inability to ensure the performance of the market simultaneously 
delegitimizes the state and makes its governance all the more necessary. Moreover, it makes 
possible a governmentality that draws upon crises as its perpetual historical support. For if the 
neoliberal state can found itself on the market in times of crisis by codifying any act of exchange 
as an exercise of liberty, then neoliberalism diverges from classical liberalism by productively 
using crises as a fundamental means of its governance. As Friedman said, “Only a crisis—actual 
or perceived—produces real change.”174 (Friedman 1982, ix) Here we can see how neoliberal 
crisis governance ensures the continued operation of its strategy even when it breaks down in its 
ideal functioning.  
Before moving on to Hayek, who serves as a sort of historical link between the 
ordoliberals and the Americans of the Chicago School of Economics, I would like to review the 
ground covered so far. Up to this point, I have considered the paradoxical character of the 
historical production of the ordoliberal market to consist of the unnatural naturalization of its 
form of governmentality. This is due to three circuits through which ordoliberal governmentality 
produces the market-reality: the circuit of surplus tacit consent that uses the market to legitimate 
the state, the circuit of economic rationalization whereby the production of the market produces 
economically rationalized subjects (whose conduct now reinforces state legitimacy), and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Trent Hamann also notes, “The role of government is defined by its obligations to foster competition through the 
installation of market-based mechanisms for constraining and conditioning the actions of individuals, institutions, 
and the population as a whole.” (Hamann 2009, 41-2) 
174 The rest of the quote, which is just as important, reads, “When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend 
on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, 
to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.” (Ibid.) 
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circuit of the economization of the state (whereby market citizens become consumers of state 
performance). At this point, I would like to show how the second and third circuits I have just 
listed operate in the work of Friedrich Hayek.  
 
5.5 The Paradox of Unnatural Naturalization II: The Rule of Law and Market 
Subjection in Hayek  
In beginning my discussion of ordoliberalism, I stated that all neoliberals depart from 
classical liberalism by conceiving of the market as lacking any basis in “nature,” however they 
disagree on the utility of laissez faire for making the market a historical reality. This split largely 
originates with Hayek, as most American neoliberal uses of laissez faire are indebted to his 
concept of the rule of law. The rule of law also founds the state on the market, normalizes 
subjects into thinking of themselves as competitive players, and pegs the state’s rationality to its 
economic performance—thus arriving at many of the same positions as the ordoliberals, though 
by different means. That is, Hayek’s concept of the rule of law and laissez-faire reveals a 
different path toward the economization of the state and economic subjection to market 
competition. He thus sheds a peculiar light on the neoliberal paradox of unnatural naturalization, 
particularly with his treatment of the price mechanism as a means of rationalizing human 
behavior.175 Hayek is the most illuminating neoliberal theorist of the price mechanism because 
one of his guiding questions was how to understand the spontaneous, self-organizing character of 
societies. This led him to argue that, more than any other form of social organization, the price 
mechanism enables market societies to conform to the spontaneous, self-organizing character of 
human social life. This also why he believed that such societies are freer.  
Hayek’s understanding of the economic rationalization of the state stems from his 
concept of the rule of law. According to Foucault, what is essential to the rule of law as the 
principle of laissez-faire is that the state’s primary role is to decide on the form of the game. In 
fact, it is Friedman who, following Hayek, provides the most concise formulation of the rule of 
law in Capitalism and Freedom: “government is essential both as a forum for determining the 
‘rules of the game’ and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on.” (Friedman 
1982, 15) That is, the government is both “Rule-Maker and Umpire.” (Ibid., 25) The rule of law 
reduces the mode of state action to the institution and arbitration of the market as an economic 
game. Foucault sums this up, stating: “the state can make legal interventions in the economic 
order only if these legal interventions take the form of the introduction of formal principles.” 
(BB, 171) Were state legislation to determine the economic content of society, that is, to plan the 
outcome of the economic game, the state would in effect make choices for market players about 
the ends of their own activity. While Hayek objects to this on the political grounds that it would 
reduce the amount of freedom within the game, ultimately, his objections are epistemological. 
For the state can only make economic plans on the false epistemological assumption of being 
what Foucault calls the market-game’s “universal subject of knowledge.”176 (Ibid., 172) This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 It bears repeating that these circuits are not to be found in Foucault’s lectures, but they are my way of organizing 
his basic insights into neoliberalism. 
176 Hayek, in “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” writes, “The peculiar character of the problem of a rational 
economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make 
use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently 
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not 
merely a problem of how to allocate ‘given’ resources—if ‘given’ is taken to mean given to a single mind which 
deliberately solves the problem set by these ‘data.’ It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources 
known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put 
	   113	  
restriction of the state to what it can legitimately know simultaneously constitutes the rule of law 
as a free juridical system. Freedom, then, appears within the division between the rational and 
the irrational as a correlation between the self-limitation of state ends-making and the practice of 
economic rationality.177 Restricting economic legislation to formal principles leaves the choice of 
economic ends to the decentralized knowledge of market players; and it is the price mechanism 
that makes possible the spontaneous self-organization of the market out of said knowledge. 
As Foucault states, for the neoliberals, “The history of capitalism can only be an 
economic-institutional history.” (Ibid., 164) For both ordoliberalism and Hayek, the market has 
juridico-political conditions for its existence. The difference between the two is that one allows 
the state to plan the social conditions of the market, while the other does not (neither allow the 
state to determine the economic ends of market agents). Lemke writes that this entails an 
“institutionalist” image of capitalism.178 This means that market capitalism is in every instance 
the result of the rule of law as overseen by a governing authority whose task is to modify the 
juridical conditions of the market as its historical conditions require. (Lemke 2001, 195) Juridical 
modifications to the market are only to be made in response to historically novel market events, 
such as technological innovations and economic crises.179 Therefore, as rule-maker, government 
functions technocratically to adapt the market to its own aleatory phenomena. Whether it is 
governed by the rule of law or the policy of society, the historical existence of the capitalist 
market is thus both the principle and effect of its own regulation, since it will have to adapt to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.” (Hayek 1958a, 
77-8) 
177 Hayek states regarding the rule of law and individual freedom, “The conception of freedom under the law…rests 
on the contention that when we obey laws, in the sense of abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to 
us, we are not subject to another man’s will and are therefore free.” (Hayek 1960, 153) 
178 Foucault’s statement above means that, for neoliberalism, the juridico-political conditions of the market prevent 
capitalism from being understood along the historical-materialist lines of a mode of production. Against economist 
interpretations of Marx, neoliberals refuse the notion that the essence of capitalism historically appears according to 
a necessary logic driven by the forces of production. Hence, they would reject the idea that the economic base of 
society “generates the juridico-political order it requires at each stage of its development,” as Dardot and Laval put it. 
(Dardot and Laval 2013, 10) And, as Lemke writes, “Foucault emphasizes three important strategic functions of this 
anti-naturalism: (1) It initially means in theoretical terms that the strict separation between an economic base and a 
political-legal superstructure is inappropriate…[194] [T]he economy is not a domain of natural mechanism, but 
instead defines a social field of regulated practices. (2) The historical significance of this hypothesis is that it rejects 
a concept of history that attempts to derive socio-political changes from the economic transformation processes of 
capitalism. For the Ordo-liberals, the history of capitalism is an economic-institutional history…(3) The political 
dimension of this hypothesis addresses the survival of capitalism…What is called…historical capitalism cannot be 
derived from a ‘logic of capital’…a firmly circumscribed and defined structure (capitalism, which possesses an end 
we can forecast owing to its contradictory logic) but instead…is historically singular…capitalism is a 
construct:…we must be able to intervene in this ensemble in such a way that…we both change capitalism and 
‘invent’…a new capitalism.” (Lemke 2001, 193-4)  
179 Foucault quotes from Louis Rougier on the theme of traffic and the use of traffic codes in neoliberal political 
economy to talk about the rule of law: it does not allow for disorderly chaos (“anarcho-capitalism”), nor does it 
dictate where to go and when (“planning”), but it “[imposes] a Highway Code, while accepting that at a time of 
faster means of transport this code will not necessarily be the same as in the time of stagecoaches.” (BB, 162) While 
this quote is from Rougier, other neoliberals quickly adopted it, such as Hayek in his popular The Road to Serfdom. 
There he uses it to specify the rule of law: “The distinction we have just used between formal law or justice and 
substantive rules is very important and at the same time most difficult to draw precisely in practice. Yet the general 
principle involved is simple enough. The difference between the two kinds of rules is the same as that between 
laying down a Rule of the Road, as in the Highway Code, and ordering people where to go; or, better still, between 
providing signposts and commanding people which road to take.” (Hayek 1944, 77-8) 
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effects of the politico-juridical conditions that constitute it.180 (BB, 174)  
Now I would like to deal with the final circuit of unnatural naturalization, which is the 
circuit of semiotic subjection to the price mechanism. Here I will stray from Foucault a bit and 
rely on my own reading of Hayek. However, I believe that this is important because without 
treating the role of the price mechanism, it is impossible to have a complete grasp on how the 
market can produce economic subjects who have internalized economic rationality. Certainly, 
the circuit of normalizing competition makes up part of the story, however, in Hayek one sees 
the other half of economic normalization. For if the state is barred from economic planning 
because of its epistemological inadequacy, the question remains of how it can leave economic 
planning to economic subjects themselves.  
The theme of epistemic finitude in the market goes back to classical liberalism. As 
Foucault discusses in the penultimate lecture of The Birth of Biopolitics, Adam Smith may not 
have intended the invisible hand to be the definitive metaphor for the market, but its regular 
appearance in economics is no doubt due to its effectiveness in defining the market economy in 
its independence from another organ of power, namely, the knowing eye of the sovereign. (Ibid., 
278) What prevents the eye of sovereign power from acquiring a total knowledge of the 
economic field is its blindness to individual interests. While the sovereign eye can recognize 
subjects of right because they renounce certain natural rights before it, the only ones who know 
the interests of economic subjects are these subjects themselves and their partners in exchange. 
On Foucault’s reading, the function of the exchange mechanism is to effectuate an involuntary, 
unplanned convergence of many particular interests into a single general interest: exchange 
converts the self-interest of each individual into the common interest of all. This conversion is 
the unseen and unknowing work of the invisible hand. Hence, Foucault draws the following 
opposition: the visibility of political rights to the knowing eye of the sovereign versus the 
invisibility of economic interests in the unknowing hand of the market. (Ibid., 274-8) Finally, as 
Foucault notes that the classical liberal conception of the market functions as a site of veridiction, 
since supply and demand allows for the appearance of the true prices of things.181 Or, continuing 
with the prosopopoeia of the market, one might say that classical liberalism links the invisible 
hand to an invisible mouth. 
Foucault never relates his discussion of the invisible hand and the sovereign eye to 
neoliberalism. And it appears that he missed a great opportunity to talk about the specificity of 
the price mechanism in neglecting to do so. For Hayek’s take on laissez faire centers itself on the 
price mechanism as a mechanism of veridiction. And this in turn is because he took the classical 
liberal insistence on the excess of the market over any possible subject of knowledge as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 The other side of the rule of law is that the state’s role in the economy is intensely judicial. By intensifying 
competition, one also increases the probability of disputes and litigation, which increases demand for judicial 
arbitration by the state: “justice tends to become, and must become, an omnipresent public service.” (BB, 176) Here 
too one sees something akin to the function of market participation as tacit consent to state power, for the 
spontaneous order that emerges in the market will not be without its excessive frictions. In other words, the 
entrepreneurial subjectivity generated by the market also functions as a mechanism for generating a positive demand 
for the state as a judicial service: “It is a matter of making market, competition, and so the enterprise, into what 
could be called the formative power of society.” (Ibid., 148)  
181 Campbell Jones’ recent book, Can the Market Speak?, takes up this image of the market as a subject of 
enunciation in order to develop the contradiction in economic liberalism between economic rationality and 
metaphysical superstition. (Jones 2013, 2-3) Related to this, Foucault notes the usual reading of the invisible hand as 
a hold-over of theistic natural order. He links Smith to Malebranche on this point: “Smith’s invisible hand would be 
something like Malebranche’s God, whose intelligible extension would not be occupied by lines, surfaces, and 
bodies, but by merchants, markets, ships, carriages, and roads.” (BB, 279) 
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problem: how is the spontaneous self-organization of the market possible in the absence of a 
universal subject of economic knowledge?  
Hayek diverges from the ordoliberals in that the market is not artificial (a product of 
human design); but he also diverges from the naturalism of classical liberalism. Instead, he views 
it as a product of human action—and one that its users do not have to understand in order for it 
to function.182 Following Michael Polanyi, Hayek calls the market a “spontaneous order,” or a 
“polycentric order.” (Hayek 1960, 160) It is spontaneous because it is the result of individuals 
carrying out their own plans and interacting with one another without any pre-designed purpose. 
Its orderliness derives from the fact that its constituents obey rules and give rise to stable 
relations (namely, the price mechanism), which in turn coordinate interactions and make 
individuals predictable.183 (Hayek 1982a, 43) Hayek’s approach here is evolutionary: while the 
rule of law is a product of human deliberation, the rules that become codified in law are initially 
discovered by an unintentional process of selection: “a process in which practices which had first 
been adopted for other reasons, or even purely accidentally, were preserved because they enabled 
the group in which they had arisen to prevail over others.”184 (Ibid., 9)  
In “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” Hayek states: “The economic problem of society 
is…how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends 
whose relative importance only these individuals know…it is a problem of the utilization of 
knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.”185 (Hayek 1958a, 77-8) For Hayek, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 While spontaneous order can be found in nature, the specificity of society consists in this order being the result of 
human action: “It would be no exaggeration to say that social theory begins with-and has an object only because of-
the discovery that there exist orderly structures which are the product of the action of many men but are not the 
result of human design.” (Hayek 1982a, 37) Moreover, Hayek draws a distinction between social and biological 
wholes “are not given to us as natural units…but are recognizable only by a process of mental reconstruction.” 
(Hayek 1955, 82) And while the teleological activity of working to preserve the whole may be found in the 
biological relations between organs and their organism, such teleology would be an unnecessary and false 
reconstruction of the relation between individuals and society: “We find again and again that if it were somebody’s 
deliberate aim to preserve the structure of those wholes, and if he had the knowledge and power to do so, he would 
have to do it by causing precisely those movements which in fact are taking place without any such conscious 
direction.” (Ibid., 82) And on this basis, he withdraws the spontaneous order of the market from the domain of 
natural phenomena and places it within the same category as that of human knowledge, namely, the category of 
products of human action, as opposed to products of human design: “There is nothing more mysterious in the fact 
that, e.g., money or the price system enable man to achieve things which he desires, although they were not designed 
for that purpose, and hardly could have been consciously designed before that growth of civilization which they 
made possible, than that, unless man had stumbled upon these devices, he would not have achieved the powers he 
has gained.” (Ibid., 82-3) Compare with his characterization of the individual’s relation to human knowledge: 
“Though our civilization is the result of accumulation of individual knowledge, it is not by the explicit or conscious 
compilation of all this knowledge in any individual brain, but by its embodiment in symbols which we use without 
understanding them, in habits, and institutions, tools and concepts, that man in society is constantly able to profit 
from a body of knowledge neither he nor any other man completely possesses. Many of the greatest things man has 
achieved are not the result of consciously directed thought, and still less the product of a deliberately coordinated 
effort of many individuals, but of a process in which the individual plays a part which he can never fully understand.” 
(Ibid., 84) 
183 This predictability is a result of subjections whose genealogy is the task of the politics of truth. Hayek provides 
the following definition of order: “By ‘order’ we shall throughout describe a state of affairs in which a multiplicity 
of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial 
or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least expectations which have a 
good chance of proving correct.” (Hayek 1982a, 36)  
184 Yet this is not to be equated with the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer, since the units of selection are 
institutions and practices, not individuals or groups. (Hayek 1982a, 23) 
185 Herbert Simon was the first to call this “bounded rationality,” or the finitude of relevant knowledge in the conduct 
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virtue of the market is that it affirms two things: (1) more relevant knowledge is available to all 
of the agents in the market collectively than can be had by a single person and (2) competition 
functions to “decentralize planning by many separate persons” as opposed to centralizing 
planning by a subject with inadequate information. (Ibid., 79) Consequently—and this is 
crucial—the market is not based on human need, but the finitude of human knowledge. As with 
any neoliberal, Hayek maintains that the competitive market can satisfy more human needs than 
any other economic system, but he is quick to add that this is precisely because it does not begin 
from the problem of human finitude in the form of needs.186  
According the Hayek, the price mechanism is suited to the finitude of human knowledge 
because it makes the market a “wealth-creating game:”  
[In markets] the returns of the efforts of each player act as the signs which enable him to 
contribute to the satisfaction of needs of which he does not know, and to do so by taking 
advantage of conditions of which he also learns only indirectly through their being 
reflected in the prices of the factors of production which they use. (Hayek 1982b, 115)  
Prices function like Nietzschean signs in that they impose both an interpretation of objects and 
an interpretation of one’s own conduct and desire. In “The Meaning of Competition,” Hayek 
concludes:  
Competition is essentially a process of the formation of opinion: by spreading 
information, it creates that unity and coherence of the economic system which we 
presuppose when we think of it as one market. It creates the views people have about 
what is best and cheapest, and it is because of it that people know at least as much about 
possibilities and opportunities as they in fact do.” (Hayek 1958b, 106) 
The price mechanism induces subjects to conceive of their desires as object-preferences and to 
economize expenditures to meet them.187 The commonsense interpretation of the price 
mechanism proceeds by way of supply and demand: price-signals aggregate knowledge of the 
supply of and demand for their object, while also relaying information about other prices, 
including the cost of production and the prices of competing products. In general, then, one can 
say that the price-sign is an aggregate interpretation of the market conditions of its object. Yet 
one must draw this thought out to its conclusion: if the mechanism of prices aggregates 
knowledge and preferences, then prices, qua aggregations, in turn function to conduct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of economic rationality.185 Famously, bounded rationality poses an insurmountable obstacle to the neoclassical 
theory of “perfect competition” in which agents must be able to make rational choices on the basis of available data. 
This, along with other obstacles to perfect competition, is why Hayek states that the difference between perfect and 
imperfect competition is less important than the difference between imperfect competition and no competition at all. 
(Hayek 1958b, 105) Hayek provides this definition in order to avoid an anthropomorphic concept of order as 
resulting from technical design.  
186 This point will be key to recall in the Section 2 of the next chapter, which takes up the question of 
neoliberalism’s anthropological status. For the American neoliberals of the Chicago School, anthropological finitude 
appears in the form of the finite supply of time that forms the most basic kind of human capital.  
187 I would argue that this is because the price mechanism induces economic rationality by splitting satisfaction or: 
the satisfaction of these preferences is double in that the condition of taking satisfaction in a preferred object is the 
surplus, or supplemental, satisfaction of acquiring the object at the least possible cost. Economic rationality is not 
just an empty “calculus,” it is tied to pleasures, and hence libidinal.187 (Hayek 1958a, 93) “Saving” and successful 
risk taking are experiences of winning, where pleasure in oneself translates into the investment of desire in the game. 
This takes on a magnified significance in the context of the theory of human capital, where the price mechanism 
assumes the function of governing what one becomes, that is, what powers of action one acquires through practices 
of self-investment by determining the value of human capital investment choices. 
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knowledge and preferences by subjecting them to economic rationality.188 Prices conduct the 
conducts of market agents who necessarily lack complete knowledge of their economic 
conditions.189  
Following Foucault, I discussed above how the exchange market converts private interest 
into public benefit by virtue of the invisible hand. Smith’s image of the market is organic: it 
converts the self-interest of private individuals into a common interest through their direct 
exchanges with one another. It turns individuals into parts of a whole. Yet when neoclassical 
political-economy began replacing the theme of exchange with competition in the late 19th 
century, the concept of the market became semiotic and computational. This applies to Hayek’s 
notion of the price mechanism as well, since price-signals function within feedback loops of 
circular causality as prices interpellate subjects to economic rationality. This image of the 
competitive market as a decentralized, spontaneous, and mechanistic order is cybernetic in the 
sense that Norman Weiner spoke of the term: it is a machine that functions simultaneously to 
control by means of communication and communicate by means of control.190  
The paradoxical character of market competition now appears with sharper focus. Earlier, 
I defined the market as an unnatural mechanism (artificial in the case of the ordoliberals, social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 A price is like a Leibnizian monad reflecting the entirety of the economic universe of decentralized knowledge: 
“There is hardly anything that happens anywhere in the world that might not have an effect on the decision [one] 
ought to make”. (Hayek 1958a, 84) But instead of a transcendent God, the price mechanism must be understood as 
the immanent multiplicity of price-effects resulting from the interactions of economic agents. That is, the price 
mechanism is an instance of what Deleuze and Guattari call the quasi-cause when they speak of the fetishism of 
capital: it is an overall effect of social interaction that both appears as its “natural or divine presupposition” and 
really effectuates an “incorporeal transformation” of conducts in the market. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 10; 1987, 
81) The price mechanism conducts populations into economic rationality (incorporeal transformation) and thereby 
comes to “objectively appear” and be perceived as a natural feature of economic life (its natural presupposition). 
The conduction of market conducts by prices points to a fundamental characteristic of the market as a semiotic 
machine, or a regime of signs: it is expressly pragmatic. In Chapter One, I described the Nietzschean concept of the 
sign, which does not communicate information so much as impose an interpretation of a phenomenon and interpret 
other signs (which are also interpretations). Signs for Nietzsche are pragmatic extensions of forces in the will to 
power as each force seeks to impose its interpretation on other forces. This is what Deleuze and Guattari call the 
“order-word” as the basic unit of language; order-words command an action as a precondition of any other type of 
linguistic functioning. Deleuze and Guattari: “[Order-words] do not flow from primary significations or result from 
information: an order always and already concerns prior orders, which is why ordering is redundancy.” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 75) 
189 This is a second reason why state planning is impossible. For if there is no subject capable of planning ends for 
everyone in the market, then there is no one capable of planning to meet human needs as well: “If there is no 
accepted order of rank of the different needs, there is no way of deciding which among the different combinations of 
goods corresponding to this horizon is larger than any other.” (Hayek 1982b, 119) This is why justice for Hayek can 
only be a quality of human conduct with respect to the rules of the game, not a quality of their results. 
190 “We have decided to call the entire field of control and communication theory, whether in the machine or in the 
animal, by the name Cybernetics, which we form from the Greek kybernētēs or steersman. In choosing this term, we 
wish to recognize that the first significant paper on feedback mechanisms is an article on governors, which was 
published by Clerk Maxwell in 1868, and that governor is derived from a Latin corruption of kybernētēs.” (Wiener 
1961, 11-2) In this sense, Hayek’s take on the competitive market that conforms in certain respects to the “linguistic” 
a priori that replaces man since its primary characteristic is semiotic. Interestingly, both Hayek and Norman Weiner, 
the inventor of modern cybernetics, appeal to a Bergsonian concept of time in which time is irreversible and 
generative of novelty, as opposed to Newtonian time. For Wiener, this makes it possible to conceive of circular 
causality. In this light, Hayek’s conception of the price mechanism is not mechanistic in the Newtonian sense 
defined by Franz Reuleaux. It does not convert force into work through the resistances of its internal parts. Instead, 
it is a machine in which the user is also a part that feeds the work or effects it produces (prices, adaptation to prices 
in the form of economic rationality) back into itself as causes of its own mechanism.  
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in that of Hayek) that produces a naturalized subjection. Market competition arises as an 
unnatural object of economics on the basis of either phenomenological reduction 
(ordoliberalism) or an economic analysis starting from the finitude of economic knowledge 
(Hayek). When market competition becomes a program, its unnaturalness means that its actuality 
will have the status of a political construction. For it will result from a state that institutes the 
rule of law (Hayek) or the policy of society (ordoliberalism).  
How, then does the artificial construction of an unnatural idea become naturalized? As 
Foucault says, the general aim of neoliberalism is to model the power relations that condition 
subjective life on the market. As such, market competition appears to neoliberal subjects as a 
quasi-natural given. The first step is when the state interprets a population’s use of the market as 
consent to the rule of the state as the guarantor of economic liberty. Neoliberal states may 
therefore emerge in any society that features widespread market practices. All that is required is 
the conversion of the factual existence of a market into the de jure consent to the state, thus 
allowing the state to forego any social contract. This has the added effect of normalizing the 
state’s governance along the lines of the managerialism of the firm and assigning it to the role of 
ensuring the permanent existence of the market. As neoliberal governance reduces social and 
political relations in society to economic relations between competitive enterprises, individuals 
are normalized according to competitive conduct, which reinforces the market as the basis of 
social relations. And, finally, there is the price mechanism and its semiotic subjection. While 
competition names the economic-normative mode of neoliberal social existence, the price 
mechanism is the its veridictional core. The price mechanism communicates knowledge of the 
economic activities of others and of the value of one’s own conduct, thus inducing cost-benefit 
rationality in market players and conducting their preferences. The value of all economic practice 
objectively appears in prices. Therefore, the price mechanism makes possible the self-conduct of 
the market through its own objective appearance to itself. 
The unnatural naturalization of the market consists of obtaining consent of the governed 
to their governance and normalizing subjects to competitiveness, such that neoliberal 
governmentality not only renders itself acceptable, it naturalizes itself by making anything else 
appear to be impossible. Anything else would simply impose unintelligible costs and therefore 
be economically impossible. Despite the avowedly unnatural character of the market, it 
naturalizes the political-economic conditions of entrepreneurial subjectivity by making them 
appear as necessary, even if their particular configuration at any given moment in history is not. 
The formal rules of the game can change as the state adjusts the market to the latest urgency, but 
competition, the price mechanism, the neoliberal state, and entrepreneurial subjectivity are 
beyond question. This is the political function of Thatcher’s famous statement about market 
capitalism, which she made repeatedly, namely, that “There is no alternative”: the game of the 
market is not up for debate. It is unavoidable. How, then, to critique the naturalizing effects of 
neoliberal governmentality if their unnatural bases can be readily affirmed? What grounds does 
critique have here? This first paradox of neoliberalism is compounded by the second, the 
paradox of subjection by desubjection, which pertains directly to the self-conduct of the 
neoliberal subject.191 For that, following Foucault, I will turn to the thinkers of the Chicago 
School on human capital.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 I would stress a difference in modality between normalization and naturalization, but Dardot and Laval cite a 
useful instance of this: “In a situation of an imposed market, one has to play. ‘Publish or perish:’ this maxim of 
researchers is only a translation of a maxim from another sector, ‘sell or die’—‘sell or die’ on the labor market.” In 
other words, the logic of the situation consists of naturalizing what is politically constructed, of making subjects end 
	   119	  
Chapter 6: On the Critique of the Neoliberal Paradox of Subjection by 
Desubjection and the Remnants of Anthropology 
 
[H]omo oeconomicus…appears precisely as 
someone manageable, someone who responds 
systematically to systematic modifications 
artificially introduced into their environment. 
Homo oeconomicus is someone who is 




In the previous chapter, I showed how neoliberalism affirms its own artificiality, which 
presents a limit to any critique of naturalization. And yet, neoliberalism naturalizes market 
competition all the same at the level of its effects, not its “ideology.” The present chapter will 
define the second paradox of neoliberalism, the paradox of subjection by desubjection. I already 
raised this paradox when I introduced neoliberalism in Foucault’s work at the end of Chapter 
Four. I take it to be the more decisive of the two paradoxes and the most distinctively 
Foucaultian contribution to our understanding of neoliberalism. From the point of view of the 
“art of ungovernability,” neoliberal governmentality is paradoxical because it governs subjects 
into becoming different by fashioning themselves through investment in their human capital. 
Thus, neoliberalism turns an essential dimension of the politics of truth—desubjection—into a 
moment of subjection to anthropologized capital. Or, in other words, neoliberal governmentality 
gets a hold on its subjects by means of their liberty. This is what I call the paradox of subjection 
by desubjection. As with the first paradox, it does not explicitly appear in Foucault’s lecture 
course, but I will argue that his reading suggests it nonetheless.  
Section 6.1 will delineate this paradox in Foucault’s lecture course by delving into 
neoliberalism’s third element, entrepreneurial subjectivity (the first two being the market 
apparatus and its norm, competition). The Chicago School will take center stage, since, as 
Foucault points out, its concept of human capital goes further than any other neoliberal school in 
conceptualizing the subject of economic rationality, that is, homo oeconomicus, or “economic 
man.” (BB, 225) This is a subjectivity that, for all its liberty, is, as Foucault puts it, “eminently 
governable.” (Ibid., 271) As I will show, following Foucault, this subject is not only governed by 
market competition and its price signals, but also by the neoliberal state’s effort to expand their 
scope through a thorough redefinition of laissez faire. Moreover, it is a subjectivity that is 
governed by the market into taking itself as an ethical project of subjectivation (or self-
fashioning).192 Section 6.2 will build upon The Birth of Biopolitics by relating its reading of 
neoliberalism back the anthropological quadrilateral. This section will explore the ways in which 
Foucault’s lecture course still implicitly operates as critique of anthropology. Recalling the turn 
to power in Foucault’s work as a way of showing how “man” is made to exist, his reading of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
up seeing their functioning in the regime of competition as normal.” (Dardot and Laval 2010, 48) 
192 Foucault distinguishes between the classical liberal version of homo oeconomicus, whose basic activity is 
exchanging, and the version one finds in neoliberalism, which is the subject of human capital whose primary activity 
is self-investment. From here on, when I use the term “homo oeconomicus” without any qualifier, I am referring to 
its neoliberal version. 
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neoliberals makes possible an analysis of how our present continues to operate under the sway of 
the anthropological a priori. There, I will show how homo oeconomicus is grounded in the 
scarcity of its capital, how its content derives from its choices in response to market pressures, 
how economic rationality forms the unthought of its thought, and how its history is that of the 
truth of the market system that governs it.  
 
6.1. The Paradox of Subjection by Desubjection: Of Entrepreneurial Subjection 
The two distinguishing features of American neoliberalism are the use of laissez-faire as 
a tribunal for governing the state and the analysis of human capital, which is the most concerted 
neoliberal definition of entrepreneurial subjectivity. Foucault insists that both the American 
concept of laissez-faire and the theory of human capital are “grids of intelligibility” that both 
analyze and program their object: the state in the case of the tribunal and human behavior in that 
of human capital. (BB, 225)  
The Americans follow the general neoliberal tendency to denaturalize the market and 
economic subjectivity, while privileging competition over exchange as the characteristic activity 
of both. However, the Americans follow the Austrians in rejecting ordoliberalism in the name of 
laissez-faire.193 In fact, according to Foucault, what first sets the Americans apart is how they 
problematize laissez-faire. While Hayek viewed laissez faire as both the form and product of a 
distinctively social type of evolution (it comes about neither by nature nor by human design), the 
Americans view it as critical concept, that is, as a criterion for conducting a tribunal that presides 
over the state in the name of positivist economics.  
Though Foucault only briefly mentions logical positivism in The Birth of Biopolitics, its 
importance to the Chicago School cannot be overstated. The Americans do not arrive at their 
concept of the market by applying eidetic variation to the history of macro and micro economic 
orders. Market competition is not an essence, according to the Americans—though neither is it a 
natural given. Instead, starting with Friedman, they aim for a scientific account of market 
competition by formulating conjectural hypotheses about economic problems and testing them 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Friedman founds his economic theory on the separation of fact and norm: “Positive economics is in principle 
independent of any particular ethical position or normative value judgment.” (Friedman 1953a, 4) Foucault’s 
account of neoliberalism as governmentality makes this distinction impossible. Nonetheless, it posits the goal of 
economics to be the development of hypotheses that “[yield] valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic) predictions 
about phenomena not yet observed.” (Ibid., 7) As opposed to the phenomenology of individual cases in Eucken, here 
there is a movement from positive economic facts to generalizing hypotheses about them, which function as models. 
Such hypothetical models are then tested in their power to predict economic facts simply and fruitfully. However, 
Friedman follows Karl Popper’s method of falsifiability, stating, “Factual evidence can never ‘prove’ a hypothesis, 
it can only fail to disprove it, which is generally what we mean when we say, somewhat inexactly, that the 
hypothesis has been ‘confirmed’ by experience.” (Ibid., 9) The word “natural” in phrases like Friedman’s “natural 
unemployment rate” should be placed in scare-quotes since such a rate is not itself a nature given in facts, but a 
hypothesis concerning them. As for Becker, the structure of inquiry is slightly different: given (1) a certain empirical 
economic phenomenon, (2) a relatively simple model for that phenomenon as an economic problem demanding the 
use of economic rationality, and (3) homo oeconomicus as a calculator of positive investment choices within that 
problem, then such and such an economic explanation of the phenomenon becomes possible. It is important to point 
out that Becker is particularly emphatic in his rejection of methodological psychologism. For him, the advantage of 
the theory of human capital over any account that is required to either stop at tastes because they appear irrational or 
assume naturalistic motivations to explain economic behavior. This constitutes a major break from classical and 
neoclassical economics and I will discuss these issues in greater detail below. Regarding the rejection of taste as a 
limit to economic analysis, see “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum.” (Becker & Stigler 1996) For the rejection of 
motivation (including self-interest) as a methodological assumption regarding the psychology of individuals, see 
“The Economic Way of Looking at Life.” (Becker 1996) 
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against economic “facts.” Their positivism is hence consistent with Foucault’s definition from 
The Order of Things, since they take the empirical object as a measure of truth. (OT, 320) 
However, they follow Popper in that the operative concept of the market at any given time 
consists of the set of hypotheses that have withstood factual testing. Hence, strictly speaking, 
there is never a “true” concept of market competition, only one that is “not false.”  
But the market is not just a concept of positivist economics—and here is where things get 
fuzzy for the Chicago School—it normatively functions as a set of criteria for critiquing and 
conducting government. Foucault says that, in the hands of the Chicago School, laissez-faire 
means using the concept of the market as the criterion in a “permanent economic tribunal 
confronting government” that aims to evaluate its economic intelligibility.194 (BB, 247) He states 
that the tribunal involves “filtering every statement whatsoever…every action by the public 
authorities in terms of contradiction, lack of consistency, and nonsense.” (Ibid., 247) The 
American concept of the market (and that of human capital, which I will get to in a moment) 
functions as a grid of intelligibility for both interpreting and programming not only the state, but 
also the power relations and subjects that can be affected by the state.  
The major type of institution for this tribunal is the think tank, which has recruited policy 
makers and armed them with both criticisms of neoliberalism’s enemies and neoliberal policy 
proposals. Foucault names the American Enterprise Institute as one tank along the lines of a 
tribunal-by-laissez-fare, though it is part of a broader network of other tanks, institutes, and 
economics departments through which the neoliberals organizes themselves.195 This version of 
laissez-faire is not a negative principle against government interference in the market; rather, the 
tribunal of laissez-faire has a positive political-epistemological effect. The economic tribunal is a 
means of modeling governmentality on the market and multiplying the enterprise form of 
economic subjectivity. As Foucault sees it, it is a tactic within the overall neoliberal strategy of 
analyzing non-economic phenomena in market terms in order to govern such phenomena into 
assuming an economic form.  
The tribunal of laissez-faire uses the state to expand the market as a “grid of intelligibility” 
for interpreting and programming phenomena that are beyond the traditional sphere of economic 
exchange. By indefinitely extending the market to all corners of social and political life and by 
forcing such life to abide by market norms, as Foucault states, the tribunal generalizes the 
enterprise form “to make it a model of social relations and of existence itself.” (Ibid., 242) That 
is, it potentially dissolves the very distinction between the social and the economic: education, 
health care, environmental protection, natural disaster relief, military services—the tribunal 
seeks to find private market solutions for all of these traditional public and social goods.196 Thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 With this, the Americans directly link the government of society to the logical positivism of Karl Popper. Popper 
was a founding member of the Mont Pérelin Society, along with Friedman, Hayek, Stigler, and Mises. 
195 One could also add The Cato Institute, The Hoover Institute, and The Mont Pelerin Society, with its connection 
to The Atlas Network, among others. 
196 And, more radically than ordoliberalism, the economic tribunal not only seeks to reduce the state, but to make it 
function as an enterprise that must meet the criterion of profitability. Here again, as Dardot and Laval claim, 
citizenship merges with the figure of the consumer as the tribunal economizes the relationship between government 
and the governed. (Dardot and Laval 2013, 87) This is why Brown is right that the neoliberal withdrawal of the state 
must not be understood as a withdrawal of government, but as one instance in the overall change in its form and 
function: “Neoliberal subjects are controlled through their freedom… Such control also means that the withdrawal 
of the state from certain domains, followed by the privatization of certain state functions, does not amount to a 
dismantling of government but rather constitutes a technique of governing; indeed, it is the signature technique of 
neoliberal governance, in which rational economic action suffused throughout society replaces express state rule or 
provision.” (Brown 2005, 44) 
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it is not a reach to call the diffuse network of institutions that make up the tribunal of laissez-
faire a para-state apparatus of neoliberal governmentality. Use economic theory to critique the 
state so that the state can be used to introduce or intensify market competition everywhere: that is 
the strategy of the Chicago School’s laissez-faire.  
This brings us to the second grid of intelligibility in American neoliberalism, the homo 
oeconomicus of human capital. The Americans go further than their counterparts in theorizing 
the subject effect of market competition as a domain of microeconomic theory in its own right. 
For American neoliberalism goes beyond the constitution of the economic subject by prices and 
competition; they theorize how this subject constitutes itself by its own self-conduct qua human 
capital.  
Along with their peculiar version of laissez-faire, Foucault argues that the second grid of 
intelligibility, human capital, also distinguishes American neoliberalism from its classical 
antecedent (as well as from other neoliberal variants). Starting in the late 1950s, Gary Becker 
and Theodore Schultz critique classical economic theory by rethinking labor as a qualitative, 
subjective activity. According to Foucault, such theory had hitherto stated that “land, capital, and 
labor” together determine the production of goods. Labor had only ever been understood as a 
passive object that is quantitatively reducible to either labor-time or financial investment; never 
has it been understood as the activity of a subject. (Ibid., 219-20) That is, classical liberalism 
effectively said that qualitative differences in knowledge and skill amongst laborers lack any 
causal significance in themselves. Foucault shows how the theory of human capital fills a basic 
lacuna in the liberal economic theory of labor by analyzing work from the perspective of the 
worker: “What does working mean for the person who works?”197 (Ibid., 223)  
For the American neoliberals, the worker sees work as the employment of a capital—
namely, human capital—that produces a return—namely, an income flow. This means that all 
work is based on a prior activity of investment in human capital. And the principle behind 
investment in one’s human capital is economic rationality, or the allocation of scarce resources 
to competing ends. (Ibid., 222) If a specific means-ends relation defines the subject that emerges 
from the American redefinition of labor, then what makes up this relation? Foucault sums it up 
thus: “An income is quite simply the product or return on a capital. Conversely, we will call 
‘capital’ everything that in one way or another can be a source of future income…it is the set of 
all those physical and psychological factors that make someone able to earn this or that wage.” 
(Ibid., 224) The scarce means belonging to the Chicago School’s homo oeconomicus is 
comprised of finite resources, time, capacities, and opportunities that can be put to work. The 
competing ends of the worker are the various income flows available on the market, along with 
the ends to which such flows can be put. Ultimately, as Becker says, these competing ends are 
“welfare as they conceive it.” (Becker 1996, 139) 
The homo oeconomicus of American neoliberalism is one who interprets and uses all 
subjective powers as human capital. Moreover, it is one who regards and calculates returns on 
their human capital in terms of their potential as reinvestments in themselves. Human capital can 
thus be divided into two parts: capital that one has received by virtue of the investment choices 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 As Lemke, following Foucault, puts it, the Americans’ method of analysis does not “proceed from objective-
mechanical laws, but takes its starting point in an appraisal of subjective-voluntarist calculations: how do the people 
performing the labour use the means at their disposal?” (Lemke 2001, 199) See Theodore Schultz’s 1960 essay, 
“Capital Formation by Education” and Becker’s 1962 essay, “Investment in Human Beings,” the latter of which has 
since been republished as Chapter III of Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special 
Reference to Education.  
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of one’s parents or caretakers and human capital that one has accumulated through one’s own 
investment choices, which are made possible on the basis of the former.  
The neoliberal axiom that the human is itself a form of wealth takes an incomplete step 
toward the Deleuzean-Guattarian understanding of the machine as a trans-individual agency that 
assembles subjects and technical objects.198 This might be why Foucault uses their language by 
calling the subjectivity of human capital “a machine-stream ensemble,” or a human capital 
machine composed of “capital-[abilities],” which draw off an earnings stream from the flows of 
capital. (BB, 224) All powers of action are hereby captured within the flows of capital through 
the self-conduct of individual economic subjects.199 
Foucault says that the concept of human capital allows American neoliberals to “[give] a 
strictly economic interpretation of a whole domain previously thought to be non-economic,” or at 
least beyond the traditional sphere of monetary exchange. (Ibid., 219) For the economic analysis 
of human behavior is less presupposition-heavy than many believe. Unlike liberal economic 
theory, it does not refer behavior to need and self-interest in order to think about it economically. 
In his 1992 Nobel Lecture, Becker posits the following methodological principle: “Unlike 
Marxian analysis, the economic approach I refer to does not assume that individuals are 
motivated solely by selfishness or gain. It is a method of analysis, not an assumption about 
particular motivations…Behavior is driven by a much richer set of values and preferences.”200 
(Becker 1996, 139) The American neoliberals extend the analysis of human capital to all 
behavior by bracketing motives entirely. As Foucault notes, starting with Becker, the neoliberals 
maintain that all behavior can “be analyzed in terms of investment, capital costs, and profit…on 
the capital invested” (BB, 244).  
Yet economic rationality is not just a “principle of decipherment.” Thanks to the efforts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Dilts notes how American neoliberalism collapses the distinction between the human and the tool by conceiving 
of humans as wealth, contrary to Mill’s position that wealth is rather a tool for human use. (Dilts 2011, 134-5) 
199 Two points are worth mentioning here. First, employers obviously also have a hand in this, as neoliberal 
programming means that they must increasingly conceive of themselves as assemblers of human capital supply 
chains that minimize overhead and provide “just in time” human capital to buyers. And second, the economic 
analysis of human behavior extends not just to investment activities that generate a monetary income flow, or 
production, but also to consumption. Opposed to image of the passive consumer who is dominated by their pleasure, 
Becker views consumption as an activity insofar as it generates a return, even if it is merely pleasure. To the extent 
that consumption involves the selection of an end or a good out of a field of other possibilities, one can analyze them 
as attempts to maximize returns on investment costs of time and resources, regardless of what these returns may be. 
Dilts writes, “This perspective allows all activities, even seemingly non-productive activities, to be theorized as 
forms of capital investment.” (Dilts 2011, 137) Overcome, then, is the apparent contradiction between work and 
enjoyment. For work, as an activity that sacrifices pleasure in the present for greater quantities of utility in the future, 
is the model on which all acts of enjoyment become intelligible. Zizek’s claim is pertinent here that, contrary to the 
image of the super-ego as a bar against enjoyment, today’s capitalism commands enjoyment. And while consumer 
behavior remains captured within narcissistic forms of enjoyment and barred from jouissance, this distinction is 
becoming increasingly porous as sexuality is increasingly conducted through market technologies that replace 
courtship with online shopping and popular discourses on sex advise eroticism as a necessary condition for staying 
motivated in one’s work-life. That is to say, the modern biopolitics of sexuality now joins forces with that of labor.  
200 It is not uncommon to assume egoism as a natural justification for neoliberalism, however, this is something that 
neoliberals like Becker leave to liberalism. For Marxist claims to the contrary of Becker’s statement, see Varoufakis 
2011, 9-10. However, there appears to be some ambiguity in Becker’s account. In a 2010 lecture course devoted to 
human capital at The University of Chicago, Becker states that things like gambling are exempt from economic 
analysis since they are merely acts of consumption, not investment. (Becker 2010) This would appear to contradict 
his earlier assessment that economic analysis does not make assumptions about agents’ motivations. Since the risk-
taking involved in gambling could be motivated by thrill-seeking just as much as it could be motivated by 
desperation.  
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of the economic tribunal, it is also, as Foucault says, the principle of “programming for the 
rationalization of a society and an economy.” (Ibid., 225) That is, it is both an economic way of 
analyzing human behavior and a way of thinking that the market induces in its subjects, which 
are pressured into taking on themselves. The concept of human capital is thus a major instrument 
in the evaluation of government policy according to laissez-faire. And like the American concept 
of laissez-faire, Homo oeconomicus effectively renders its origins in the positivist distinction 
between fact and norm ambiguous as best.201  
Foucault states that, with American neoliberalism, the ordoliberal theme of the enterprise 
as the basic element of social and economic reality is “pushed to the limit,” (Ibid., 225) That is to 
say, programming subjects along the lines of human capital is the most extreme attempt to model 
power on the market.  This is because the shift from exchange to competition entails a shift from 
the classical image of homo oeconomicus as a partner in exchange to the neoliberal subject as a 
competitive enterprise. Foucault points out that the subject of human capital is an “entrepreneur 
of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for 
himself the source of [his] earnings.” (Ibid., 226) This American neoliberal homo oeconomicus 
leads to five implications, which I would like to tease out now. Foucault’s reading points in their 
direction, but they require an expansion of his reading and a return to his primary sources.  
First off, extrapolating from Foucault, just as subjective abilities and income flows are 
two sides of a machinic relation immanent to capital, work names both sides of a single 
economic conduct of allocating scarce resources to competing ends. Work for the neoliberals is 
the activity of the hired worker in the workplace just as much as it is the job-seeking worker on 
the labor market or the future employee-to-be at school. That is, work includes both investment 
in human capital and putting human capital to work (the performance of capital-abilities). In fact, 
as the analyses of Becker and Schultz attempt to show, what determines income is less the job 
one does “at work” than the series of investments in human capital that one makes to “get work.” 
The Chicago School therefore simultaneously collapses the traditional distinction between free-
time and labor-time and makes work the essence of human existence under market conditions.202 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Dardot and Laval call this governmental feedback loop between analysis and programming “the autonomization 
[l’autonomisation] and the extension of ‘market logic’ beyond the sphere of exchange.” (Dardot and Laval 2010, 37) 
202 While Foucault claims that one must pursue a strategic and not a dialectical conception of the relation between 
neoliberalism and its adversaries, it is easy to see why many Marxists have had no trouble interpreting neoliberal 
political economy as ideology. The concept of human capital renders a number of foundational Marxist categories 
inoperative, starting with class contradiction and the value form. Becker himself was perhaps the first to point this 
out: “[T]he concept of human capital remains suspect within academic circles that organize their thinking about 
social problems around a belief in the exploitation of labor by capital. It is easy to appreciate the problems created 
for this view by the human capital concept. For if capital exploits labor, does human capital exploit labor too—in 
other words, do some workers exploit other workers? And are skilled workers and unskilled workers pitted against 
each other in the alleged class conflict between labor and capital?” (Becker 1993, 16) One could take it a step further 
and complete the line of questioning: if one is simultaneously a worker and capital—and a worker only insofar as 
one is capital—do workers essentially exploit themselves? It is along these lines that Jason Read is correct to point 
out that “The opposition between capitalist and worker has been effaced not by a transformation of the mode of 
production…but by the mode of subjection, a new production of subjectivity.” (Read 2009, 32) From the perspective 
of class contradiction, neoliberal homo oeconomicus is the figure of the internalization of class contradiction, which 
synthesizes two polar opposite figures of class in contemporary capitalism: the investment banker and the indebted 
temp worker. But if the contradiction between capitalist and worker has been effaced, this is because the same is 
fundamentally true of the contradiction between capital and labor has as well. Marx argued that capital exploits 
labor by making labor abstract in reducing it to labor time. Yet as Foucault points out, “the neo-liberals say: The 
abstraction of labor…is not the result of the real mechanisms of economic processes; it derives from the way in 
which these processes have been reflected in classical economics.” (BB, 221) It is impossible to determine the rate 
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Theoretically, this is because one can now interpret any action that yields a return as work, which 
of course includes any unpaid action taken to obtain paid work. Practically speaking, however, 
this is because the intensification of market competition by laissez-faire pressures individuals to 
evaluate all of their time-expenditures as human capital investments. The market thus pressures 
individuals into assuming their existence as human capital. Foucault points in this direction when 
he considers how human existence is totalized by economic rationality in the writings of the 
neoliberals—a point to which I will return momentarily.  
Second (and still going beyond Foucault’s reading for a moment), as the market functions 
to govern choices into an economic form by selecting out non-economic forms of conduct, its 
power of veridiction expands in the neoliberal programming of homo oeconomicus. Moreover, It 
is beginning with this initial reduction of existence to an economic form that one must consider 
Hammann’s conclusion that “Homo oeconomicus…is not a natural being with predictable forms 
of conduct and ways of behaving, but is instead a form of subjectivity that must be brought into 
being and maintained through social mechanisms of subjectification.” (Hamann 2009, 42) I 
discussed above how the market is a site of veridiction in that it purports to produce the truth of 
the value of things. As Friedman put it, the distinction between the technological and the 
economic hinges on the quantity of practical ends: a technological problem involves the 
allocation of scarce means to a single end; but once there are multiple, competing ends, the 
problem becomes economic because the choice of ends involves “value judgments.” (Friedman 
2008, 1-2) One can measure the ascendancy of neoliberalism today by the extent to which the 
market is the dominant site of veridiction for the value of subjects themselves. The demand 
function of market signaling tells homo oeconomicus what is valuable and what types of human 
capital investments to make. The life of the new homo oeconomicus is thus fundamentally 
reactive: pivotal life choices become a function of market signals. Recall how Hayek stresses 
that prices function as “signals telling [agents] what to do” before they function as remuneration 
or returns for workers.203 (Hayek 1982c, 142)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of exploitation and surplus value without an analysis of labor time as the basis of the value form. 
203 To foreshadow the sustained anthropology in neoliberal homo oeconomicus, this subjectivity nearly lends itself to 
an existential analytic of its finitude. The finitude of neoliberalism’s economic man is akin to a perverted form of 
Dasein’s guilt. For homo oeconomicus, to live is to obey the call to “Invest in oneself,” which is to say, to “Be 
economically rational.” The neoliberal world is one in which all aspects of experience appear as opportunities for 
self-investment. Life appears as a curve of increasing investment and variable returns. Yet, obedience to the 
imperative to invest presupposes the ability to experience its force as debt, which takes two forms, first at the level 
of the structure of homo oeconomicus itself and second at the level of the financial relations of power through which 
it is maintained. On the one hand, the very gesture of investment involves a sacrificial relation to the present for the 
sake of the future. The loss of wealth in consumption is barred in the present for the sake of enhanced returns in the 
future, which never arrives in full due to the continued injunction to invest. Homo oeconomicus is never adequate to 
its future, which is but the virtual infinity of the accumulation of capital. This is not merely the compulsory 
participation in capitalism that one finds in Marx’s assessment of alienated finitude, which must either compete or 
starve. On the other hand, the ability to invest in oneself in the present is often financed by the future, which 
connects homo oeconomicus to other market players not only through competition, but also through a series of debt 
relations. At this level, human capital is evaluated not only by the returns on its investments, but also through credit 
scores. Such evaluations determine human capital itself by closing or opening access to resources and opportunities 
necessary to continue investing in oneself. However, it is Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus that best orients one 
toward meaning of neoliberalism’s proposal for generalized self-governance. They write: “ But the bourgeois field 
of immanence—as delimited by the conjunction of the decoded flows [of capital and labor], the negation of any 
transcendence or exterior limit, and the effusion of antiproduction inside production itself—institutes an unrivaled 
slavery, an unprecedented subjugation: there are no longer even any masters, but only slaves commanding other 
slaves; there is no longer any need to burden the animal from the outside, it shoulders its own burden…The 
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A third extrapolation from this point concerns competition, which appears differently 
from the perspective of American homo oeconomicus. Under the condition of intensifying 
market competition, the norm of the human capital machine is not primarily work in its actuality, 
for instance, the socially average necessary labor time used in production, which Marx described. 
Rather, because human capital investment is futural, it is work in its possibility. The subjective 
side of market competition is employability.204 Being competitive means making investment 
choices that maximize one’s employability or potential income flows. The direct consequence of 
this is that the only values that matter are those selected for by the impersonal game of market 
competition, which are again reactive. These include the virtues of adaptability, flexibility, and 
the courage to take financial risks. This harkens back to Walter Lippman’s idea that a constantly 
changing economic landscape driven by competition requires a social ethic of adaptation 
(through education and eugenics).205 Equally, it points to Hayek’s vision of the market as a game 
of catallaxy in which the positions of all players are inherently subject to change according to 
market conditions.206  
Finally, the analysis and programming of homo oeconomicus involves more than a 
process of subjection; it involves entrepreneurial subjectivation. Homo oeconomicus functions 
as a relay between subjection and subjectivation. For American neoliberalism distinguishes itself 
by using the market to govern individuals into self-government, such that governmentality 
becomes a way of life.207 This has enabled things like the merger between self-help discourse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
bourgeois sets the example, he absorbs surplus value for ends that, taken as a whole, have nothing to do with his 
own enjoyment: more utterly enslaved than the lowest of slaves, he is the first servant of the ravenous machine, the 
beast of the reproduction of capital, internalization of the infinite debt. ‘I too am a slave’—these are the new words 
spoken by the master.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 254) For Deleuze and Guattari, the slavishness of the bourgeois 
consists of their self-sacrifice and of their inability act outside of the imperative to accumulate capital. One could 
also pursue Walter Benjamin’s insight here that capitalism is a religion that affords no expiation.203 But the reference 
here is to Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, the Second Essay in particular, where Nietzsche hypothesizes 
that Christian love—the love of God for his children and vice versa—is founded on the establishment of an infinite 
guilt though Christ’s sacrifice. (Nietzsche 1967, 91) For Nietzsche, the slave is the one who cannot create their own 
values without deriving them from the negation of another’s. 
204 Frederic Gros links this to the rise of financial capitalism and its having become an existential model of life, 
which he calls “share-holder existence: “Each subject is called on to report to him or herself as one might to a 
business, constructing a life like a series of investments that one counts on to make a profit…The problem is no 
longer knowing one’s price, but anticipating the arc of one’s value.” (Gros 2012, 236) Translation by Emily Apter. 
See Apter 2014.  
205 See Dardot and Laval 2010, 64-68. 
206 In Volume 2 of Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Hayek speaks on employment as a market position that is always 
subject to change, depending on market conditions, one’s skills, and chance. Part of his intent is to attack the idea of 
social justice, which attempts to judge the game according to its results instead of its procedure, in addition to 
organizations such as labor unions and bureaucracies that seek to reward loyalty with job protections: “The 
magnitude of the chances open to him are not of his making but the result of others submitting to the same rules of 
the game. To ask for protection against being displaced from a position one has long enjoyed, by others who are 
now favoured by new circumstances, means to deny to them the chances to which one’s own present position is due. 
Any protection of an accustomed position is thus necessarily a privilege which cannot be granted to all and which, if 
it had always been recognized, would have prevented those who now claim it from ever reaching the position for 
which they now demand protection.” (Hayek 1982b, 95) 
207 The paradox of an unnatural naturalization returns, now within the domain of ethics: entrepreneurial existence is 
both assumed as an existential condition and posited as a goal of ethical conduct. As a recent self-help book titled 
You Inc.: The Art of Selling Yourself axiomatically declares, “Living is selling.” (Beckwith 2007, 3) It assuages the 
reader’s anxieties about “selling out” or reducing life to work and business, insisting, “The question is not, are you a 
salesperson? The question is how to be more effective. Just as important, how might you make your life richer? As it 
turns out, the answer to each question answers the other. Life is a sale. And the path to success at both living and 
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and neoliberalism to address ethics along the lines that Foucault defines it in volume two of The 
History of Sexuality: “the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting 
in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the code.” (HS2, 26) Neoliberalism makes 
possible a discourse of economic spirituality, which goes beyond satisfying needs to become a 
lifestyle that one cultivates as an individual expression of one’s liberty. A life is not only the 
quantitative sum of its investments, but also the set of qualities and abilities that have been 
consciously chosen and combined to form an ethos. That is, entrepreneurialism folds the 
normative rules of competition and investment into the self-relation of a subject that stylizes its 
capital in order to valorize itself in the market game.208  
Hence the status of the entrepreneur today as the hero of the marketplace who receives 
religious levels of praise and investments of belief in established neoliberal markets. The 
entrepreneur embodies the reactive value of adaptability, however, when successful, the 
entrepreneur is sometimes thought to possess an almost mystical intuition of the market’s 
tendencies and the opportunities that exist therein. The successful entrepreneur is the one who 
appears to create novel goods by anticipating and responding to market conditions.209  
I would like to return now to Foucault’s reading to address the problem at the center of 
his critique of neoliberalism as a mode of governmentality. For within the Chicago School’s 
redefinition of labor lies a problem that appears in every aspect of the subject of human capital: 
the totalization of human conduct by economic rationality, which makes it “eminently 
governable.” (BB, 270) Foucault states: 
The most important stake is no doubt the problem of the identification of the object of 
economic analysis with any conduct whatsoever entailing an optimal allocation of scarce 
resources to alternative ends…And we reach the point at which maybe the object of 
economic analysis should be identified with any purposeful conduct which involves…a 
strategic choice of means, ways, and instruments: in short, the identification of the object 
of economic analysis with any rational conduct.210 (Ibid., 268-9)  
The question is whether economic analysis possesses an unlimited power to decipher human 
behavior. For if it does, this would effectively naturalize economic rationality, as it would be 
impossible to act outside of its form without acting irrationally.  
Yet Becker goes further. He argues that even apparently irrational behavior nevertheless 
proves itself to be economically rational, because it minimally responds to economic pressures. 
There would be, then, no outside to economic rationality, homo oeconomicus would effectively 
be our natural essence, and the political economy developed on its basis would be a late attempt 
to finally organize human life according to its nature. As Foucault explains, what makes it 
possible to identify economic rationality with human behavior as such is that the concept of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
selling is the same…The first thing you sell is yourself.” (Ibid., my italics, 4-5) The discourse of self-help is almost 
as old as economic liberalism itself, going back at least as far as Poor Richard’s Almanac by Benjamin Franklin, 
which went beyond the standard almanac contents of astronomical and meteorological information to include 
proverbs, anecdotes, and aphorisms that presented ethical rules for economical living. It became a discourse of its 
own with Samuel Smiles’ 1859 Self-Help, which made industriousness the centerpiece of self-culture. Today this 
discourse gives ethical content to the entrepreneurial form of life.  
208 On this basis, Lemke is correct to point out that Foucault’s studies on techniques of the self are an extension, not 
a replacement, of the genealogy of power. (Lemke 2001, 203) 
209 However, the precondition for the emergence of the entrepreneur is that they have already been made to accept to 
consent to quantitative evaluation—the game—which assigns them ends to which they subject themselves as if they 
were their own. The value of new goods is measured only by consumption. There are no masters in neoliberal 
capitalism (in a Nietzschean sense), only a generalized submission to the market and infinite indebtedness to capital. 
210 My italics. 
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human capital puts forward a subjectivity that is inherently governable. In other words, economic 
man is rational because he is first of all governed, that is, because he is first posited within in a 
regime of governmentality characterized by market competition.  
By way of explaining the priority of governance over rationality, I would like to take a 
moment to spell out Becker’s argument here, since it shows concretely how his of homo 
oeconomicus is the most extreme form of economic subjection. More importantly, it shows how 
homo oeconomicus is not an individual—or at least not merely an individual, as I have presented 
it so far—but the abstract figure of a population. 
 I will take up an article that was important for Foucault’s reading of Becker, namely 
“Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory” from 1962. Becker begins by presenting the 
traditional economic view on household behavior, which he aims to critique. It claims, 
“households choose the best collection of commodities consistent with the limited resources 
available to them.” (Becker 1962, 2) With each economic choice, a household faces what is 
called an opportunity set. Two quantitative variables delimit the opportunity set: income and 
prices. Any given opportunity set contains all of the possible collections of commodities that a 
household can buy with its available income. The traditional view stipulates that a household is 
rational if it uses a rule to buy the best collection of commodities (the most competitive end) in 
the opportunity set. Traditionally, there are two possible rules: preferences and utility.211 
Depending on the rule, the best collection of commodities in the opportunity set is the one that 
will either maximize utility or meet the most preferences. In this view, households are rational 
because they maximize according to a rule (either preferences or utility) within the constraints of 
income and prices. This leads to the following theorem: “the demand curve for any commodity, 
real income held constant, must be negatively inclined.” (Ibid., 2-3) Put differently, given a 
limited income (scarce means) and a rule for allocating it, a household will buy more of the best 
collection of goods as its price falls; the household will buy fewer as its price rises. If a 
household does not purchase more of the commodities that meet its rule, then it is not 
maximizing, which means that it is not acting rationally. Again, for the traditional theory, to be 
rational is to maximize a rule. 
 Becker’s critique is to show that “negative demand curves result not so much from 
rational behavior per se as from a general principle which includes a wide class of irrational 
behavior as well” (Ibid., 4) The principle that accounts for rational, maximizing behavior is that 
market signals cause changes in opportunity sets, which probabilistically determine conduct.212 
That is, prices make people act rationally, regardless of the rule adopted and even regardless of 
the presence or absence of a rule altogether. This is because when prices change, so too does a 
household’s opportunity set, or the possible collections of commodities that it can buy. By acting 
on one’s set of possibilities, price changes induce “a systematic response, regardless of the 
decision rule.”213 (Ibid., 4) For Becker, as opposed to the traditional theory, it is not the adoption 
of a rule that makes behavior rational; it is the effect of market prices on one’s opportunity set. 
To show this he takes two economic agents that would appear to flout economic rationality: 
households that are purely impulsive or obey no rule whatsoever and households that are purely 
inert or habitual, seeking only to repeat past satisfactions without concern for maximizing 
according to a rule. The fundamental theorem of the traditional theory holds true—economic 
agents are maximizers—even in these two cases of irrational behavior where maximization 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 For firms, the rule is profit-maximization.  
212 Opportunity sets are also called budget sets, as they are sets of goods that are affordable within a limited budget. 
213 My italics.  
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appears impossible. 214 This leads Becker to conclude: 
Even irrational decision units must accept reality and could not, for example, maintain a 
choice that was not within their opportunity set. And these sets are not fixed or dominated 
by erratic variations, but are systematically changed by different economic 
variables…Indeed, the most important substantive result of this paper is that irrational 
units would often be “forced” by a change in opportunities to act rationally.215 (Ibid., 12) 
The variables here are prices that signal supply and demand and their correlative impact on 
opportunity sets, or the horizon of possibilities that defines the reality of homo oeconomicus. 
Even irrational economic agents—whether random or compulsively repetitive—will demand less 
when prices rise, and therefore act as if they intentionally acted according to a rational rule.  
It is in this “as if” of the average behavior of a statistical population that the systematic 
response—or economic rationality—of a homo oeconomicus can be found. Rationality, then, is 
not about the rule by which one maximizes the outputs of scarce resources, it is about the effects 
of market signals on the possibilities of a population and thus on its average conduct. Homo 
oeconomicus is not governable because he is rational, predictable, and calculable; he is rational, 
predictable, and calculable, because he is first and foremost governable. And he is governable 
because his existence is completely immanent to the market. As Steven Shaviro writes, “The 
objective function of the market is that it ‘forces us to be free,’ forces us to behave ‘rationally’ 
and ‘efficiently,’ forces us to act concertedly in our own individual interests – any broader 
considerations be damned.” (Shaviro 2010, 8)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 For impulsive households, given a finite income, “every opportunity,” or collection of commodities, “has an 
equal chance of being selected.” (Ibid., 5) Let us say that there are two types of commodities, X and Y (rice and 
beans, for example), which have equal prices. An impulsive household would spend a random, unpredictable 
proportion of their income on X and Y in each instance, sometimes buying more of X, sometimes more of Y, but 
never the exact same proportion. However, at a statistical level, a large multiplicity of impulsive houses would, on 
average, choose a collection of commodities containing an equal amount of X and Y. And any relative price 
increase in X or Y will diminish the amount that an impulsive household can consume of that commodity. When the 
relative price of X goes up, so too does the probability that an impulsive household will decrease its consumption of 
X. In turn, this will increase the ratio of Y to X that an impulsive household consumes on average. (Ibid., 6) The 
principle applies to inert households as well, or those that repeat past consumption choices when possible; they too 
will buy less when prices rise and more when they fall. (Ibid., 6) This is because any relative price increase in 
commodity X or commodity Y will reduce the maximum that a household can purchase of that commodity. Let us 
assume a population of inert households that all have the same limited budget. And let us assume that all face the 
same budget set of all possible ratios of X and Y, where X and Y have equal prices. Some will purchase more X 
than Y, some will purchase more Y than X, and some will purchase an equal amount. They will make their choice 
neither because they prefer it, nor because it maximizes utility, but only because they randomly consumed a certain 
ratio of X to Y once and will now repeat that choice indefinitely. Now let us further assume an increase in the 
relative price of X. When that happens, the choice of those who habitually buy more X than Y will be costlier. 
Depending on the budget and the price increase, some of those inert purchasers who inertly tend toward X will be 
unable to afford to continue repeating their initial choice. The opportunity set of the population of inert households 
will then skew away from X towards Y. Therefore, the average amount of X consumed by all inert households will 
go down. That is, when the relative price of X goes up, so too does the probability that households that repeatedly 
consume more X than Y will decrease their consumption of X. This shows how price-signals act as market pressures 
that induce rationality by acting on opportunity sets. While the above examples concern household consumption, 
similar arguments can be made for the price of inputs in the production process of competing firms, which includes 
both for and non-profit organizations, governments, and, of course, the individual homo oeconomicus.  
215 The text omitted in this quotation lists some of the types of conduct that can be governed qua responses to 
environmental variables, namely, consumption, production, and job-seeking: “a compensated increase in the price of 
some commodities would shift consumption opportunities toward others; a compensated increase in the price of 
some inputs would shift production opportunities toward others; or a compensated decrease in the attractiveness of 
some occupations would shift employment opportunities toward others.” (Becker 1962, 12) 
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It is the passage above to which Foucault refers when he states, “Homo oeconomicus is 
someone who accepts reality. Rational conduct is any conduct which is sensitive to modifications 
in the variables of the environment and which responds to this in a non-random way…economics 
can therefore be defined as the science of the systematic nature of responses to environmental 
variables.” (BB, 269). One will recall that Foucault’s first definition of governmentality consists 
of security mechanisms coupled to political economy, which together target populations. 
Security mechanisms like the market do not act directly on human subjects, but reach them by 
way of their milieu. In particular, they govern them by governing the possibility of events within 
this milieu. (STP, 20-1; 108) By defining homo oeconomicus as one who accepts reality as it is 
given and on that basis becomes rational through a systematic responsiveness “to systematic 
modifications artificially introduced into the environment,” Becker’s homo oeconomicus 
“appears precisely as someone manageable…Homo oeconomicus is someone who is eminently 
governable. From being the intangible partner of laissez-faire, homo oeconomicus now becomes 
the correlate of a governmentality which will act on the environment and systematically modify 
its variables.”216 (BB, 270-1) Economics is the science of what is governable. And one who 
accepts an economized reality is eminently governable. Put simply, governability is the condition 
of economic rationality.  
This is perhaps the most significant statement in The Birth of Biopolitics, for it is 
Foucault’s last word in the lecture course about neoliberal subjectivity and it is the most explicit 
regarding neoliberal subjection. Here, Foucault relates the self-subjection of accepting reality to 
the biopolitical government of a statistical population. Homo oeconomicus forms a relay between 
what Foucault calls the epistemological caesura that separates the individual and the population 
as targets of power. (STP, 42) In a way that is similar to the politics of sexuality, which allowed 
one to target the population through the discipline of the body and to target bodies through the 
biopower of the population, neoliberalism acts upon the environment in such a way that one 
thereby obtains economically rational effects. (HS1, 145-6) Homo oeconomicus is artificially 
naturalized within the gap between the population and the individual. For the artificial constraint 
of behavior at a statistical level by prices imposes necessary adjustments on individuals’ use of 
economic rationality.  
If one also recalls that the stake of neoliberalism is to model power relations on the 
market, then the task of government under the tribunal of economic reason will be to generalize 
economic rationality everywhere by modeling the reality that individuals must accept on the 
market. That is why what is true for the subject of discipline is also true for the subject of human 
capital normalized by the price mechanism: homo oeconomicus “assumes responsibility for the 
constrains of power; he makes them play spontaneously on himself…he becomes the principle of 
his own subjection.” (DP, 202-3) What can be said of the subject of medicalized sexuality can be 
said of homo oeconomicus: “Power comes from below.” (HS1, 94) This is not because it 
circulates in the incitation and consent that makes sex speak, but because it is found in the 
impersonal interplay between market signals and the response they elicit, namely, to procure 
some return through self-investment.  
It should not escape notice that the eminent governability of the subject of human capital 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Lemke states, “[N]eo-liberalism…ties the rationality of the government to the rational action of individuals; 
however, its point of reference is no longer some pre-given human nature, but an artificially created form of 
behaviour…[I]n the neo-liberal thought of the Chicago School he becomes a behaviouristically manipulable being 
and the correlative of a governmentality which systematically changes the variables of the ‘environment’ and can 
count on the ‘rational choice’ of the individuals.” (Lemke 2001, 200)  
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is tied to the basic assumption of Becker’s definition of economic man: economic man accepts 
reality as it is given. That is to say, neoliberal subjectivity is governable and rational at least to 
the extent that it is uncritical of what is given and does not question whether there is any 
contingency in what appears necessary within the given. Neoliberal subjectivity has before it a 
set of possibilities, or liberties, which include both rational and “irrational” choices. This 
subjectivity can be critical of some choices as less rational or less efficient than others. But there 
is no critique of the givenness of the given; it does not enter the domain of alternative choices 
(and why would it?). As Hamann sharply puts it, “just as neoliberal theories of penal law view it 
as an instrument for creating a ‘negative’ demand for crime, one may say that competition 
generally creates a negative demand for non-economic forms of life.” (Hamann 2009, 41) The 
question, then, is what would it mean to refuse to accept neoliberal reality as it is given? This is 
the question for the critique of neoliberalism, since neoliberal subjectivity is generalized and 
effectively naturalized by the neoliberal market. But as critique is inseparable from the 
possibility of desubjection, it is also a question concerning the possibility of a counter-conduct 
that would resist being governed and make a new mode of existence possible—precisely by 
challenging the government of the possible.217  
In this section, I have covered the neoliberal re-conception of labor as the subjective 
practice of economic rationality and the tribunal of laissez-faire as an agency for its proliferation. 
I have delineated how homo oeconomicus reduces all powers of action to capital, transforms 
virtually all human activity into labor, and normalizes subjects according to their employability. 
Further, I have shown how American neoliberalism aims the veridictional powers of the market 
toward the investment choices of economic subjectivities, how it valorizes reactive values, and 
opens up an entrepreneurial ethics. Finally, I have shown how human capital totalizes human 
conduct by way of economic rationality.  
Together, these articulate the paradox of subjection by desubjection in neoliberal 
governmentality. Neoliberalism continues the classical liberal theme of founding government on 
the rationality of the governed.218 By exercising economic freedom, one always already responds 
in a governed way to market signals, tacitly consents to the state that ensures the market, and 
conforms to the only reason recognized by a tribunal that charges itself with governing the state. 
As competition acts on market players who are governed into maximizing their employability 
and investing in themselves, the market is fundamentally instable, such that no position, no 
market identity, no stock of human capital is secure enough to last indefinitely. The game of 
catallaxy is set up to constantly change and thus valorizes market subjection in adaptation and 
entrepreneurial courage. One must constantly change one’s talents, capacities, and knowledge in 
a market that slowly but surely liquefies everything that is solid. But the more one changes, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 For the remainder of The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault shows how neoliberalism reveals the truth of the apparent 
contradiction between classical homo oeconomicus, who appears to be an external limit of governmentality, and 
neoliberal man, who is wholly enveloped within it as a principle of its action. The truth is that classical liberal 
governmentality found a way to fold its economic man within the acceptable exercise of power by inventing civil 
society and inserting him within it as his milieu. The distinction, then, is not between a liberal homo oeconomicus 
who stands as the limit to power and a neoliberal homo oeconomicus who is little more than its relay. Rather, the 
distinction is between a classical homo oeconomicus who is also a homo legalis and a homo socialis on the one hand 
and, on the other, a neoliberal homo oeconomicus for whom the political and the social are completely collapsed into 
the economic.  
218 Foucault states, “This, it seems to me, is what characterizes liberal rationality: how to model government, the art 
of government, how to [found] the principle of rationalization of the art of government on the rational behavior of 
those who are governed.” (BB, 312)  
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more one remains tied to the predicate that supports all the others: one is a worker, an 
entrepreneur, human capital. This kind of life is a recipe for exhaustion, lest one identify strength 
with the capacity to endure one’s subjection, or thought with the ability to coin ad slogans.  
 
6.2. The Critique of Neoliberalism as a Late Anthropology 
Foucault’s reading of the neoliberals makes possible two lines of attack. The first is an 
epistemological critique of neoliberal anthropology as a discourse bound to the contingent rules 
of the quadrilateral. The second is a political critique of neoliberal governmentality that 
challenges its historical necessity from the point of view of a possible desubjection or counter-
conduct. I will devote the remainder of this chapter to the first critique and reserve the second for 
my concluding remarks on Foucaultian critique and neoliberalism conclusion.  
While there has been some debate around whether or not Foucault seeks a political 
critique of neoliberalism, there has been none surrounding the relation between Foucault’s 
analysis and his archaeological critique of anthropology. It is my contention here that 
neoliberalism is an iteration of the rules of the anthropological a priori. This is not to say that 
“man” is a transhistorical structure or principle that expresses itself in neoliberalism, nor is it to 
deny the break that sets neoliberalism apart from the liberalism of Smith and Ricardo. Instead, it 
is to argue that neoliberalism repeats and differentiates the anthropological rules, taking them 
further than they had gone hitherto. The anthropological a priori endures in the neoliberal 
definition of subjectivity in relation to labor as an objective transcendental, that is, as laboring 
man. (OT, 244)  
Without yet delving into the quadrilateral as it is repeated in neoliberalism, one can see 
that the neoliberal reduction of human existence to economic rationality (neoliberal labor) entails 
profound consequences for the other two empiricities of man, life and language. For instance, the 
privileged status of the being of language in Foucault’s early 1960s archaeological writings was 
linked to sexuality. Toward the end of “A Preface to Transgression,” he explains, “the 
appearance sexuality as a fundamental problem marks the slippage of a philosophy of man as 
worker to a philosophy based on a being who speaks; and insofar as philosophy has traditionally 
maintained a secondary role to knowledge and work, it must be admitted, not as a sign of crisis 
but of essential structure, that it is now secondary to language.”219 (EF2, 85) The primacy of the 
being of language over labor as the question of our present would seem to be challenged by the 
total recodification of human existence by economic rationality. The shift from the biopolitics of 
sexuality in Foucault’s research to the study of the governmentality of economic life suggests the 
renewed importance of labor in the relation between power and anthropology.  
 Consider neoliberal subjectivity in terms of the two other empiricities of The Order of 
Things, namely, life and language). The American neoliberals reduce life to labor, as human 
capital comprises all of the vital powers that make up the subject’s life. From the perspective of 
economic rationality, health and genetic inheritance constitute a principal stock of human capital 
and marriage itself is a question of maximizing the human capital of one’s potential offspring. 
(BB, 227-8) Moreover, the privatization of healthcare under a neoliberal paradigm ensures that 
the continued enhancement of one’s filial line constitutes a core biopolitical stake of one’s 
economic decision-making. As Brown points out, one can look to the uncritically adopted gender 
norms amongst neoliberals to account for their equivocation on whether the basic economic unit 
of society is the individual or the family. (Brown 2015, 100-1) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 His interest in the objectification of sexuality can be traced back at least as far as History of Madness and its 
discussion of the confinement of libertinage in the 17th century. (HM, 82) 
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Or consider language. On the one hand, the concept of homo oeconomicus reduces 
language to the semiotics of the market, where it functions according to the economic rationality 
of neoliberal labor. That is, the question “Who speaks?” receives the answer of the market as a 
site of veridiction. Here once might glimpse something like the self-effacement of the “I speak” 
in discourse, as the neoliberal subject who says “I work” in the market must play a game in 
which none of their capital will possess a final, lasting value. What ultimately works in all work 
is the market, or the generalized apparatus of subjection to economic rationality. On the other 
hand, neoliberalism reserves a special place for language, almost as a sort of compensation. For 
its privileging of human capital tends to value professional knowledge and communicative skills 
(intellectual and emotional forms of labor) as the competitive kinds of human capital.  
This is why I believe that it is important to take a step beyond Foucault’s reading of the 
neoliberals and undertake a brief archaeological analysis of how stands with respect to the 
anthropological a priori. My focus will be on the Chicago School, particularly Becker, since he 
pushes the quadrilateral the furthest. As for the Freiburg School, their Husserlian beginnings 
keep them more clearly within anthropological coordinates that Foucault already detailed in The 
Order of Things, though I will note how they fit in with anthropology along the way.  
First off, as I explained in Chapter One, need is the foundational limit of modernity’s 
homo oeconomicus because it refers to death. It founds the concrete essence of laboring man and 
therefore the possibility of political economy.220 Foucault maintains that the homo oeconomicus 
of classical liberalism is a “partner of exchange, [which] entails…an analysis in terms of utility 
of what he is himself…of his behavior and ways of doing things, which refer…to a problematic 
of needs, since on the basis of these needs it will be possible…to found a utility which leads to 
the process of exchange.” (Ibid., 225) For the economic man of classical liberalism, it was the 
finitude of life, which appeared in the form of death and need that made it possible for the 
anthropology of labor to become a political economy of labor-time. Exchange was ultimately the 
process of quantitatively converting death into value.  
Starting with ordoliberalism, however, the finitude of needs that founded the 
anthropology of laboring man in classical liberalism is replaced by the finitude of time in 
economic rationality. In his phenomenological reduction of the everyday experience of 
commodities, Eucken shows that the measure of their value lies in the allocation of time in the 
present and future toward competing needs. (Eucken 1992, 21-22) The American neoliberal 
redefinition of labor goes further. For the subject of human capital does not measure the utility 
values of goods by the finitude of its needs in the activity of exchange. Rather, beginning from a 
finite amount of human capital, this subject evaluates which affordable ends maximize capital 
returns and invests accordingly. To be sure, Becker maintains, “[the] welfare of people cannot be 
improved in a utopia where everyone’s needs are fully satisfied.”221 (Becker 1996, 139-40) 
However, what fundamentally makes such a utopia impossible is not death as it manifests itself 
in needs and wants. Rather, Becker states, “the most fundamental constraint is limited time…the 
physical flow of time itself.” (Ibid., 140) That time is limited does not primarily mean that our 
lives have an end point, but that the present continually passes. This could be said of an 
artificially intelligent computer, just as it can be said of homo oeconomicus. Time’s constant 
slipping away defines neoliberal subjectivity and makes the time of its existence appear as 
capital to be invested. Certainly, needs must be met to ward off death, but need and death are no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Note: Foucault points out that classical liberalism does without a theory of the economic subject as such, but 
rather presupposes the subject of English empiricism. (BB, 271) 
221 I will discuss below how this assumption is in fact superfluous for Becker.  
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longer a measure of exchange--they determine finitude only secondarily. The finitude of time 
appears in the passing of the present as a resource to be allocated. Time grounds itself as human 
capital in its own finitude—neoliberalism’s first side of the quadrilateral.  
Of course, the finitude of time limits the neoliberal subject in a second fundamental 
respect, namely, the finite knowledge of supply and demand. Earlier, I discussed Hayek’s claim 
that the absence of a universally recognized hierarchy of needs deprives would-be command 
economists of the measure for distributing goods and services from a sovereign position. Thus, 
Hayek also subordinates the finitude to needs to the finitude of knowledge with respect to needs, 
which establishes the supremacy of the price mechanism for meeting human needs.  
 In The Order of Things, the finitude of man’s essential empirical contents allowed them 
to serve as quasi-transcendental conditions of their own intelligibility. Like so many images of 
“man” before it, the neoliberal subject is the result of an empirico-transcendental doubling on the 
basis of his finitude. In the case of neoliberal subjectivity, the content of Homo oeconomicus 
appears on the foundation of the finitude of time-capital and its knowledge of market conditions.  
Just as the finitude of need compelled liberal man to labor, the finitude of time compels 
neoliberal man to economic rationality. In the case of the ordoliberals, it is relatively easy to see 
how economic rationality functions as an empirico-transcendental doublet. Eucken universalizes 
economic rationality when he writes, “Everywhere men try in their economic plans and resulting 
actions to attain a certain end with as small an expenditure of means as possible. They always 
follow the economic principle.” (Eucken 1992, 281)  
Yet when it comes to the Americans, there are moments in The Birth of Biopolitics where 
Foucault appears to suggest that the neoliberal subject constitutes a break from anthropology. 
Dilts picks up on this when he observes that the Chicago School’s theory of human capital “is a 
radically empty theory of subjectivity. In this figure of homo oeconomicus as a grid of 
intelligibility, the anthropological figure who carries a biographical subjectivity is now 
gone…Second, this minimal (or possibly empty) subject is, rather than an anthropological self, 
simply an array of activities.” (Dilts 2011, 136-7) According to Foucault, the American 
redefinition of labor treats all qualitative aspects of the economic subject as “homogenizeable 
elements” of the (human) capital of an enterprise.222 (BB, 233) That is, the economic definition 
of the subject appears to be formal inasmuch as it is simply the operator of a formal rationality 
that allocates its qualitative content so as to maximize its returns. There appears, then, to be a 
break between the transcendental doublet of anthropology and entrepreneurial subjectivity. 
One finds this formalism in Foucault’s remarks on the neoliberal treatment of 
criminality.223 He claims that the Americans do away with an anthropology of criminality (their 
“anthropological erasure of the criminal”), which means they do away with an anthropological 
schema to identify the criminal as a certain type of subjectivity (homo criminalis). (Ibid., 28) The 
neoliberal concept of the criminal is no longer an abnormal type of human being on the margins 
of or specifically different than normal humanity. Neoliberalism would not advise lawmakers to 
seek the criminal behind the crime, as there is no appeal to psychiatric, medical, or sociological 
reasons for criminality. Instead, the neoliberal figure of the criminal is indistinguishable from 
homo oeconomicus in general: “The criminal, any person, is treated only as anyone whomsoever 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 An undelivered portion of the manuscript for March 14th, 1979 reads: “All the problems of [inheritance?]—
transmission—education—training—inequality of level, treated from a single point of view as homogenizable 
elements, themselves in their [turn?] re-focused no longer around an anthropology or an ethics or a politics of labor, 
but around an economics of capital.” (BB, 233) 
223 One might even be tempted to take this as evidence of Foucault’s supposed neoliberalism.  
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who invests in an action, expects a profit from it, and who accepts the risk of a loss.” (Ibid., 253) 
That is, the criminal merely differs in their investment and expenditure strategy by breaking the 
rules of the market game to garner higher returns on their human capital.  
The formalism of human capital analysis is a consequence of its positivist 
epistemological starting point, as Foucault indicates in the lecture from March 21st of The Birth 
of Biopolitics:  
We only move over to the side of the subject himself inasmuch as—and we will come 
back to this, because it is very important…we can approach it through…the network of 
intelligibility of his behavior as economic behavior. The subject is considered only as 
homo oeconomicus, which does not mean that the whole subject is considered as homo 
oeconomicus. In other words, considering the subject as homo oeconomicus does not 
imply an anthropological identification of any behavior whatsoever with economic 
behavior. It simply means that economic behavior is the grid of intelligibility one will 
adopt on the behavior of a new individual. It also means that the individual becomes 
governmentalizable, that power gets a hold on him to the extent, and only to the extent, 
that he is a homo oeconomicus…Homo oeconomicus is the interface of government and 
the individual. But this does not mean that every individual, every subject is an economic 
man.224 (Ibid., 252-3) 
The formalism of economic rationality must first of all be understood as a positivist hypothesis 
for interpreting behavior without ultimately identifying its object with its hypothesis. Economic 
rationality does not first appear to the analyst as the essential content of man—hence the break 
between the empiricist naturalism of Smith and the positivist empiricism of the Chicago School. 
Instead, one begins with the form and applies it to empirical human behavior from without—one 
goes from the former to the latter, not the reverse as in anthropology. As Lawrence Boland points 
out, Becker’s positivism follows Popper in seeking to limit its knowledge to its set of non-
falsified hypotheses. Further, Becker follows Friedman’s instrumentalist positivism, which 
claims that “theories are only useful tools,” where usefulness means the ability to predict 
phenomena. (Boland 1982, 143) From this perspective, empirical contents can always delimit or 
falsify economic rationality as a hypothetical form, supposing that the distinction between fact 
and norm holds steady. 
Yet this distinction does not hold steady—far from it, as I showed in the previous section. 
One of the phrases that I highlighted in the lengthy quotation above was “very important.” Why 
is what Foucault says here “very important”? It is because, as he says, economic rationality 
makes subjectivity governable. Since economic rationality is not directly posited as the essence 
of its object, power’s “hold” on its object is limited to its economic existence. That is, this 
appears to be the very inverse of the classical liberal subject, whose economic rationality was 
what allowed it to function as a limit to sovereignty and raison d’État.225 And yet, what makes 
homo oeconomicus exist? Market conditions.  
In the undelivered notes of the lecture from March 21st, Foucault ends with a question: 
“But does this mean that we are dealing with natural subjects?”226 (BB, 261) He provides the 
answer in the next lecture. Just before explaining how neoliberal subjectivity is inherently 
governable because of its systematic responsiveness to environmental variables, he states: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Italics mine.  
225 Colin Gordon picks up on this in his introduction to The Foucault Effect, where he calls homo oeconomicus 
“manipulable man”: Studies in Governmentality. (Gordon 1991, 43) 
226 My italics. 
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The most important stake [of homo oeconomicus] is no doubt the problem of the 
identification of the object of economic analysis with any conduct whatsoever entailing 
an optimal allocation of scarce resources to alternative ends…And we reach the point at 
which maybe the object of economic analysis should be identified with any purposeful 
conduct which involves…a strategic choice of means…in short, the identification of the 
object of economic analysis with any rational conduct. In the end, is not economics the 
analysis of forms of rational conduct and does not all rational conduct, whatever it may 
be, fall under something like economic analysis? (Ibid., 268-9) 
Therefore, while it is true that the positivism of the Chicago School initially appears to limit the 
hold of governmentality on the subject to its economic side, the marketization of human life by 
the neoliberal state under laissez-faire de facto totalizes—and naturalizes—economic rationality. 
The Americans may commit to an “anthropological erasure of the criminal” and they may 
methodologically isolate economic rationality from the human as such. But to use Foucault to 
claim that they denaturalize economic man and delimit the exercise of power to a limited 
economic domain of action naively assumes that economic rationality is not an effect of 
artificially imposed market conditions. But if economic rationality is an effect of market 
conditions and if neoliberal governmentality seeks to intensify and extend such conditions, then 
economic rationality is more than a form of analysis; it is the induced content of an always 
already objectified subject that is governed by its systematic responsiveness to environmental 
variables.  
 Despite the positivist economists’ apparent modesty in claiming that economics is not so 
much true as it is not-falsified, when economists like Becker test the hypothesis of human capital, 
they do so either in a hypothetical model posits the market as a premise or in an historical, 
empirical reality that has already been subject to the market’s on decision-making. This is akin to 
a theoretical iteration of the circuit of surplus consent established by the ordoliberals. Just as 
ordoliberals legitimized the state on the sheer existence of the market, here that existence serves 
to naturalize the supposedly hypothetical existence of economic rationality. The “systematic 
responsiveness” of homo oeconomicus cannot empirically appear without a market—or market-
like condition—that already informs power relations. Yet this is not difficult under pre-existing 
capitalist conditions. Furthermore, as neoliberalism has succeeded in modeling power relations 
on the market, the reality that would otherwise test hypotheses on human capital has already 
been designed to confirm them. The very existence of the market—and a politics founded upon 
it—destroys the distinction between fact and norm that makes economic non-falsity possible 
according to positivism.227 Therefore, even in the formalism of the American neoliberalism, one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 At the 2011 Carceral Notebooks conference where Becker was invited to respond The Birth of Biopolitics (I deal 
with this response more below), he agrees with Foucault that economic man is a fiction. However, what I am 
claiming in this paragraph is the same thing that Foucault claimed in turning to power relations in the early 1970s, 
namely, that it is not just a matter of affirming that man is an illusion or a fiction, but that it is a matter of 
understanding the power relations that produce that fiction in its singularity as opposed to any other fiction. (PP, 58) 
I quote Becker at length, then to show how his use of positivism allows him to claim that, epistemologically 
speaking, homo oeconomicus is a fiction: “The man produced by human capital is a fiction. Yeah, it is. But all 
theories are fictions…I don’t care if it's physics, biology, economics, you know, any social science, any physical 
science, any biological science—they’re fictions! So you’re taking certain aspects of behavior and your saying, ‘Can 
I take these aspects of behavior, a very simple model of man…and can I take that simple model and understand a lot 
of things about the world and then help to prescribe things for the world?’ Yes, it’s a fiction—I’m proud of that—it 
should be a fiction…If I read more Foucault I’m sure I would find that there are a lot of fictions in Foucault and his 
analysis. But...I wouldn’t call that a criticism…You have to do that to talk in an insightful way about the 
world…Theory is an abstraction, it’s a fiction, and the question is, when analyzing good and bad theories, is which 
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finds the operation of a transcendental doublet: the neoliberals extract economic rationality as a 
form of intelligibility from the empirical effect of subjection to the market. 
The third side of the anthropological quadrilateral, if one recalls, is the opposition 
between thought and the unthought. Inasmuch as man’s conditions of intelligibility are derived 
from objective contents, then anthropological thought always relates itself to something that 
constitutively delimits thought and separates it from its object. This appears to be overturned in 
neoliberalism, with its insistence on the irreducibly subjective character of labor qua economic 
rationality. However, inasmuch as this rationality is due to an objectively given finitude, whether 
as competition over scarce resources or as time scarcity, one finds that the neoliberal cogito is 
still related to a constitutive unthought dimension. On the one hand, there is the question of 
economic irrationality,  in neoliberalism to imbue labor with a subjective form of thought means 
that the split between “the cogito and the unthought” takes two forms: the difference between 
economically rational and irrational behavior on the one hand and, on the other, conscious and 
non-conscious processes of adapting behavior to economic rationality. The relation between 
thought and the unthought elaborates the emergence of the subjective form of knowledge from 
out of an economically defined objectivity. 
In Eucken, there is the problem of accounting for economizing behavior as a universal 
anthropological characteristic when history is replete with economically irrational societies. 
(Eucken 1992, 281) This is not a matter of explaining the difference between non-capitalist and 
capitalist societies in terms of subsistence or acquisitiveness, however. Continuing the 
ordoliberal interpretation of Weber, Eucken locates the cause of apparent economic irrationality 
in society. He argues that while everyone subjectively obeys the economic principle (everyone 
tries to minimize costs), objectively, depending on cultural production practices and the social 
form of organization, history shows us numerous examples of producers who fail to economize. 
(Ibid., 284) Thus, economic irrationality is due to objective social environments that lack a 
mechanism for rewarding economic rationality. That is, most human societies have lacked the 
full power of the price mechanism as a means of guiding producers toward choosing the most 
competitive end. The irrational other of economic rationality is society, which is a necessary 
condition of any economy that has historically eluded and limited its economic principle. (Ibid., 
292-3) 
In the case of Becker, however, the economic cogito can hypothetically be discerned 
everywhere, as the market can make even completely “irrational” behavior conform of economic 
reason through no intention of its own. That is, all behavior involving resource constraints and 
cost signals can be understood economically. However, as a hypothesis, economic rationality 
presupposes economic premises. Becker’s positivism separates him from his German and 
Austrian counterparts by suspending the question of economic irrationality as a theoretical 
concern. That does not mean that it disappears however, for it is the chief problem of economic 
policy. The tribunal of laissez faire has the function of prohibiting and reformatting economic 
irrationality within the state. For the Americans, then, the unthought of the economic cogito is 
simply the historical givenness of its political and social conditions, which needs not be 
explained—merely abolished.  might not find the unthought as the objective ground of economic 
rationality. from needing to explain economic irrationality on the basis of social conditions, That 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
fictions works better for whatever problem you have in mind—whether it’s an analysis or prescribing behavior—
which theory works better? I think human capital has been a great fiction…Nobody would deny that it’s a fiction. 
But you have to say, is it a useful fiction? And maybe, 20 years from now, we will have a different fiction that will 
be better. But at the moment, it is a very useful fiction for a lot of problems.” (Carceral Notebooks 2011) 
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is, thoughtlessness confirms the theory of human capital by unknowingly engendering it.228  
Finally, let us recall that the last side of the anthropological quadrilateral is the repetition 
of the originary as a historical teleology. Work assumes its originary status in neoliberalism in 
the form of economic rationality, which simultaneously functions as a principle of historical 
intelligibility and as a teleological principle of government. This is perhaps most evident in 
Hayek, who continues one step further than the ordoliberals in their understanding of the split 
between the cogito and the unthought along the lines of the economy and society. For Hayek 
explains the economic unintelligibility of society as a historical phenomenon by pointing to the 
non-conscious character of spontaneous organization in human societies. Yet this non-conscious 
spontaneity historically proves to contain the economic principle, as history is but the slow 
evolution of social forms toward the free market as the foundation of the rule of law. This is also 
why Hayek has no need of an ordoliberal Gesellschaftpolitik. For him, rationality is not 
contingent on knowledge, but on acting according to rules that yield favorable results, whether 
knowingly or not:  
The cultural heritage into which man is born consists of a complex of practices or rules of 
conduct which have prevailed because they made a group of men successful but which 
were not adopted because it was known that they would bring about desired effects. Man 
acted before he thought and did not understand before he acted. What we call 
understanding is in the last resort simply his capacity to respond to his environment with 
a pattern of actions that helps him to persist. (Hayek 1982a, 17-8) 
For Hayek, social orders exist because they prescribe rules of action that solve economic 
problems. Such orders are not totalities brought about by design; they come about spontaneously 
through the uncoordinated action of individuals. While Hayek denies the psychoanalytic 
unconscious as nonsense, he affirms that economic rationality historically functions as a non-
conscious principle of social evolution.229 Hayek even maintains that the “error” of 19th century 
“‘Social Darwinism’ was that it concentrated on the selection of individuals rather than on that of 
institutions and practices.” (Ibid., 23) When it comes to Hayek, then, the unthought is not simply 
the abstract other of economic rationality; it is the non-conscious character of economic 
rationality itself as it patiently selects the irrational out of historical existence and objectively 
adapts social life to itself.  
Economic rationality is a historical telos, whether it is the unifying style of all societies, 
the unthought that historically guides society to its final form, or the objective of the tribunal that 
governs the state. I mentioned that the Chicago School neoliberals are far less interested in the 
history of social forms than their European counterparts, since instrumental positivism suspends 
questions of historical development outside of their use for predictive hypothesizing. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 The Order of Things argues that the theme of the cogito and the unthought means that there has only ever been 
one “morality” in modernity, namely, “the apprehension of the unthought.” (OT, 327) To the varying extent that 
neoliberals naturalize economic rationality, they also, paradoxically, maintain that economic rationality is the ideal 
of an entrepreneurial form of life. One both is (or is made) economically rational and must become economically 
rational for oneself.   
229 In Volume I of Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Hayek denounces the psychoanalytic idea of the unconscious as a 
possible misunderstanding of the non-conscious character of the rules that govern human action: “We shall not use, 
and in fact regard as unwarranted and false, the whole conception of an unconscious mind which differs from the 
conscious mind only by being unconscious, but in all other respects operates in the same, rational, goal-seeking 
manner as the conscious mind. Nothing is gained by postulating such a mystical entity, or by ascribing to the various 
propensities or rules which together produce the complex order we call mind any of the properties which the 
resulting order possesses.” (Hayek 1982a, 31) 
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Nonetheless, the historicity of neoliberal man takes over progress narratives that are familiar to 
liberalism: not only economic growth and development, but also the exit from political coercion 
and the expansion of liberty. If there is anything new here, it is that neoliberalism adds the defeat 
of totalitarianism and the permanent strategy of crisis governance as a strategy for dealing with 
breakdowns in economic rationality, whether those arise inside the exercise of economic reason 
itself or outside of the economy in politics or society. Neoliberalism envisions itself as always on 
the cusp of the end of history, as it gives itself an open-ended progress narrative defined by the 
manageability of crisis and the indefinite expansion of the market.  
To repeat what I stated at the beginning of this section, the critique of neoliberalism as an 
anthropological epistemology is not the same as a political critique of its governmentality. As 
Foucault notes, neoliberalism emerged as a response to a crisis of liberal governmentality in the 
first half of the 20th century that had to do with the economic and political costs of producing 
liberty. These included democracy and economic interventionism, social welfare, and the threat 
of totalitarianism. As I discussed in the previous chapter, neoliberalism registers this crisis 
through an “inflationary critique” that dogmatically identifies all non-economic manners of 
conduct as inherently totalitarian insofar as they would pose a threat to economic liberty. And it 
is on the basis of this dogmatism that neoliberalism stakes its claim to save liberal 
governmentality by founding the state upon the market as an apparatus for producing economic 
subjectivity. 
In The Birth of Biopolitics, all of Foucault’s declarations on the stakes of neoliberalism 
point to this. He declares these stakes four times, but they can be boiled down to two (I have 
quoted them already). The first has to do with the apparatus of market competition: “[The] 
problem of neoliberalism is…how the overall exercise of political power can be modeled on the 
principles of the market economy.”230 (BB, 131) The second has to do with entrepreneurial 
subjectivity: “The most important stake [of homo oeconomicus] is no doubt the problem of the 
identification of the object of economic analysis with any conduct whatsoever entailing an 
optimal allocation of scarce resources to alternative ends.”231 (Ibid., 268-9)  
I ended the previous section by showing how neoliberal homo oeconomicus is defined by 
the fact that it accepts its reality and reacts to changes within it. This is what makes homo 
oeconomicus governable and, consequently, rational. In this section, I have shown that the 
acceptance of reality is also what constitutes homo oeconomicus as an empirico-transcendental 
doublet. As such, homo oeconomicus proves to be a doubly-dogmatic form of subjectivity and 
mode of thought: both at the level of its uncritical attitude toward the power relations that have 
been modeled around it and at the level of its epistemological universality.  
Foucault’s aim with the politics of truth was to trace the historical knowledge-effects of 
power so as to intensify struggles of desubjection and contribute to the art of not being governed. 
This involved looking at how power relations that “anthropologize” subjects by tying them to 
essential predicates like labor. In the 18th and 19th centuries, panopticism made it possible for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 My italics. There is another passage on this stake that appears before this one and that specifically addresses the 
market as a foundation of the state and society: “Can the market really have the power of formalization for both the 
state and society? This is the important, crucial problem of present-day liberalism and to that extent it represents an 
absolutely important mutation with regard to traditional liberal projects, those that were born in the eighteenth 
century…It is a question of knowing how far the market economy’s powers of political and social information 
extend. This is the stake.” (BB, 117-8) 
231 This stake is announced in connection to ordoliberalism when Foucault states, “[I]t is…a matter of 
constructing…a social fabric in which precisely the basic units would have the form of the enterprise…this 
multiplication of the ‘enterprise’ form within the social body is what is at stake in neoliberal policy.” (BB, 148) 
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labor to empirically appear and transcendentally function as the “concrete essence” of man by 
producing the field of visibility in which labor could appear as an object of knowledge. In the 
20th century, it is the competitive market that facilitates the appearance economic rationality as 
the hallmark of the worker in the neoliberal re-elaboration of labor. (DE1, 1489-90; EF3, 86)  
Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism allows us to see how the paradoxes of neoliberalism 
point to a twofold dogmatism. On the one hand, the unnatural naturalization of the market 
expresses a dogmatic political rejection of forms of conduct that operate outside of economic 
rationality. On the other, subjection through desubjection expresses the dogmatic form of 
neoliberal subjectivity as a fundamentally reactive subject that is incapable of the critical gesture 
of suspending the universals that condition its existence. At a phenomenological level, this is 
almost understandable. After all, the market constitutes its subjects such that their fundamental 
experience of time is one of scarcity. In a world where time is money and money is scarce, who 
has the time for critique?  
A critique of neoliberalism would not only have to present its historical contingency—
which Foucault has gone a long way in achieving—but also to point toward the possibility of 
counter-conducts that would make good on this contingency by undoing the limits that 
neoliberalism imposes on the present. That is, the critique of neoliberalism must offer some 
tactical pointers to the desire to struggle for desubjection. These would include some weak points, 
obstacles, and strategic resources. So then, what counter-neoliberal strategies are possible for 
becoming ungovernable? What marginal elements in neoliberalism might an ungovernable 
counter-blow take up? What type of subjectivation could break from market veridiction? I would 
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Chapter 7 (Conclusion): Insurrectionary Communism and “Cynicism” 
as Counter-Neoliberal Conducts 
 
Learning to undo things, and to undo oneself, is 
proper to the war machine: the “not-doing” of 
the warrior, the undoing of the subject. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 400) 
 




Neoliberalism may be the extreme form of governmentality today, yet what defines a 
historical moment is not principally its cutting-edge mode of power, but what breaks away from 
it and counter-attacks by inventing new modes of existence. As I mentioned in Chapter Five, one 
of the peculiar things about Foucault’s critique of neoliberalism is that, unlike his critique of 
discipline, it was not directly related to existing struggles (at least not explicitly).232 As such, his 
critique simply points to the possibility of such struggles instead of following in their wake 
(which is not to say that he prophesies them). By way of concluding this dissertation, then, I 
would like to explore the strategic value of Foucault’s notion of critique in the context of 
neoliberalism by asking how he might help us to think about struggling against it. I would like to 
point out two possible directions for the politics of truth in the context of neoliberalism.  
Both require their own set-up. First, I will discuss how neoliberalism shows us that the 
category of society is an anthropological dead-end. Thinking through its reduction to the market 
means grappling with neoliberalism as a governmentality based on war and crisis, which 
fundamentally alters our strategic frameworks. Second, I’ll argue that, on this basis, it is 
necessary to turn to a strategic rationality of ungovernability that is specific to neoliberalism. 
Here I will propose a counter-conduct that re-tools the subject of human capital into a different 
kind of machine—one that uses wealth as a means of de-individualization, that refuses the rules 
of the market game, and that begins from premises that competition disavows, namely, war and 
struggle. The art of not being governed in neoliberalism must affirm war—both as a collective 
mode of existence and as a counter-governmental rationality that turns human capital into a 
communist force. 
The second line of resistance that Foucault opens up comes from his ethical turn, 
particularly his work on the Cynics and parrhēsia. Foucault never ties his work on the Cynics to 
neoliberalism. The third section of this conclusion will offer a reading of Foucault’s 
interpretation of the Cynics before I turn in the fourth section to consider how the Cynics offer 
the rudiments of an ethics of scandalous truth that violates market veridiction and challenges 
others to deviate from neoliberal life.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Foucault was aware of Autonomia, but he never makes reference to it in Security, Territory, Population or The 
Birth of Biopolitics. 
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7.1 The Neoliberal Closure of Civil Society and the Return to the War Hypothesis 
As a first move, I would like to show how resistance to neoliberalism must refuse the 
alternative laid down by neoliberalism between capitalist triumphalism and nostalgia for either 
traditional liberal or Marxist politics. Second, it will be necessary to see how resistance is 
possible by resorting to an aspect of neoliberalism that remained unanalyzed by Foucault, 
namely, war. If one recalls that the first volume of The History of Sexuality argues that power 
relations can never be totally codifed as either politics or war, then it is hypothetically possible to 
analyze neoliberal governmentality in terms of the role played by war. Using Security, Territory, 
Population and The Birth of Biopolitics, I will argue that it is in fact neoliberalism that throws us 
into war in the first place by integrating wars and crises within its governmentality.	  
Whether one takes Deleuze and Guattari’s Marxian insight that capitalism is defined by 
deterritorialization, or the neoliberal insight that the capitalist market is an expanding game of 
catallaxy in which all players and values are in constant movement, one seems to return to the 
following alternative. On the one hand, there is neoliberal triumphalism. This includes what 
Mark Fisher has called “capitalist realism,”233 which is summarily expressed in Margaret 
Thatcher’s statement, “There is no alternative.” There’s also Francis Fukuyama’s thesis on the 
liberal-capitalist end of history and its accelerationist echo in Nick Land, who deliriously affirms 
capitalism as the historically realized form of “temporality itself.”234 Much of what I said in the 
previous chapter shows how Foucault resists the triumphalist thesis of the necessity of 
neoliberalism. On the other hand, there is nostalgic reaction, which includes liberal, socialist, and 
fascist longings.235 However, the difficulty in resisting neoliberalism—particularly for the left—
is the common tendency to regress to political grounds that neoliberalism has already exhausted, 
namely, traditional forms of liberalism and Marxism, with their discourses on political and social 
rights.  
This appears to be a difficulty that Foucault was well aware of. After his discussion of 
neoliberalism in which he claims that homo oeconomicus is “eminently governable,” he spends 
the rest of The Birth of Biopolitics giving an archaeology of civil society. This archaeology 
shows how the concept of civil society emerged as a synthesis of the two liberal subjectivities 
that functioned to critically limit state sovereignty: the juridical subject of rights and the 
economic subject of private interests. The implication, then is that neoliberal governmentality 
will have emerged on the collapse of the tripartite structure of liberal subjectivity: politics, 
economy, and society.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Fisher almost takes the concept of capitalist realism straight from Thatcher: “That slogan captures precisely what 
I mean by ‘capitalist realism’: the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and 
economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative.” (Fisher 2009, 2) 
234 Land: “‘Go for growth’ now means ‘Go (hard) for capitalism’. It is increasingly hard to remember that this 
equation would once seemed controversial…This is the now world Transcendental Miserablism haunts as a 
dyspeptic ghost. Perhaps there will always be a fashionable anti-capitalistm, but each will become unfashionable, 
while capitalism—becoming ever more tightly identified with its own self-surpassing—will always, inevitably, be 
the latest thing.” (Land 2011, 625) 
235 One might also include the theoreticist despair that Land calls “transcendental miserablism,” where one resorts to 
an impotent, resentful critique of capitalism’s ability to endure every crisis and incorporate any outside threat. Fair 
or not (Land lumps the Frankfurt School in here), the miserablist resigns themselves to the impotent, fetishistic 
pleasure of knowing how one is governed or dominated. This is what happens when critique is divorced from 
strategy. Foucault averts this by virtue of the lesson of counter-conducts, which follows from the historical non-
necessity of power-knowledge and the fact that his is not a critique that transcendentally sits above the games of 
power. 
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The rise of the liberal subject’s tripartite structure is as follows. According to Foucault, 
liberalism began with the self-limitation of natural rights as a mechanism for constituting 
political sovereignty and establishing the political subject of contractual rights—homo juridicus. 
(BB, 274-5) With classical liberalism’s homo oeconomicus, political sovereignty underwent a 
further delimitation—this time due to the impossibility of sovereign knowledge of economic 
interests within the marketplace. (Ibid., 281) Liberal subjectivity was thus split into a subject of 
rights and a subject of interests, the former being visible to sovereign knowledge because of the 
recognition implied by the contract, the latter being invisible because it could only be ordered as 
the spontaneous convergence of interests, or the invisible hand of the market. In the end he 
shows how, starting with Adam Ferguson, civil society synthesizes these two discourses and 
their respective subjects. The same thing that brought homo oeconomicus into the fold of 
government was the same thing that provided the common ground for the two sides of liberal 
subjectivity: civil society as a common domain of bonds with their own history and complex 
relations with political and economic life. (Ibid., 296)  
The importance of civil society was not only to unite political and economic liberalism on 
a common, governable ground, but also to limit the dangerous tendency of self-interest to 
dissolve the basis of politics. Ferguson’s concept of civil society posits a network of spontaneous 
communal bonds arising between individuals who differ in their talents, passions, and ability to 
influence others. (Ibid., 304) Such differences produce a division of labor in which individuals 
spontaneously associate with one another, which counter-acts the atomizing forces of self-
interest with the specifically social ideal of common welfare. Historically, a dialectic unfolds as 
the principle of economic interest plays a negative role of dissociation, which dissolves old 
political institutions, while the principle of spontaneous association brings forth new ones, until 
one finally arrives at a society civilized by laws and private property. Civil society is thus the 
milieu in which liberal subjectivity is governed.236 
The legacy of civil society and its economic negation was essential to Marx’s concept of 
class struggle. At one point, Althusser says that, while reading about Hegel’s concept of civil 
society, or the society of need, Marx must have envisioned a sign that read “dig here.” (Althusser 
2006, 110) For beneath the unquestioned presupposition that civil society is composed of 
“relations of individuals,” there lays the simple assumption of the individual: “homo 
oeconomicus and its ethical and legal abstraction, the ‘Man’ of philosophy.” (Ibid.) Marx’s 
advancement was to show how civil society is in fact an ongoing class war without any common 
ground. However, he failed to go far enough, since his concept of society remains within 
anthropology to the extent that need is what simultaneously binds classes together in times of 
false peace and, in times of crisis, drives them apart into open conflict. The anthropological 
image of class war is also responsible for Marx’s prophetic eschatology, which obfuscates the 
meaning of struggle by replacing the common good with the universality of the proletariat. 
Whereas liberalism refuses social war in the name of the common good, the later fails to think it 
post-anthropologically. 
Each of these three “territorialities”—rights, interests, and social bonds—provided 
liberalism and Marxism with an axis of governance and an axis for its critique. The ideal of 
individual political agency on the basis of state-protected social bonds has been fundamental to 
liberal anthropology, just as the idea of collective political agency on the basis of class belonging 
has been essential to the anthropology of Marxism. However, neoliberalism depoliticizes and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Foucault points out in this respect that neoliberal homo oeconomicus was not the first to be governed by its 
milieu, but that the social specificity of this milieu is what American neoliberalism leaves behind.  
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desocializes its liberal inheritance, thereby threatening all rights beyond that of property. Its 
strategy has been to negate any possibility in the liberal tradition (or its Marxist critique) for 
challenging the totalizing tendency of economic rationality.  
One way of using Foucault to frame this problem has come from the work of Wendy 
Brown, who sums up the predicament of liberalism this way: “[N]eoliberalism entails the erosion 
of oppositional political, moral, or subjective claims located outside capitalist rationality yet 
inside liberal democratic society.” (Brown 2005, 45) Hence, neither the citizen, nor society, nor 
the worker as a state-recognized subject can support critical discourses and positions from which 
to critique neoliberalism. And yet, in “Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” Brown 
maintains that liberalism is the ineluctable horizon of politics nonetheless: 
Still, liberalism, as Gayatri Spivak once wrote in a very different context, is also that 
which one “cannot not want” (given the other historical possibilities, given the current 
historical meaning of its deprivation). Even here, though, the desire is framed as 
roundabout and against itself, as Spivak’s artful double negative indicates. It indicates a 
dependency we are not altogether happy about…What are the possible trajectories for a 
melancholic incorporation of that toward which one is openly ambivalent; or perhaps 
even hostile, resentful, rebellious?237 (Brown 2005, 53-4) 
Later, in Undoing the Demos, Brown retains an ambivalent attachment to democracy: “My 
critique of neoliberalization does not resolve into a call to rehabilitate liberal democracy, nor, on 
the other hand, does it specify what kind of democracy might be crafted from neoliberal regimes 
to resist them.” (Brown 2015, 201) Brown reasons that liberalism still contains strategic 
possibilities for democracy, as evinced in her preferred reference-point at the end of the book, 
Occupy Wall Street. She praises the movement for expropriating privatized space to common use, 
refusing the sacrificial logic of neoliberal austerity, justly directing rage against the banks, and 
building solidarities from a political position apart from the abstract, human capitalized identities 
of the market (workers, consumers, students, debtors, and so on). (Ibid., 203; 217; 219) For 
Brown, the democracy of Occupy Wall Street involves these elements along with its assemblies 
that recalled the revolutions of classical liberalism.238  
However, there are two fundamental objections to raise here, which arise from an 
analysis of the downfall of Occupy Wall Street (OWS). The first is that one fundamental 
weakness of OWS was its arbitrary delimitation of the forms of conduct that hostility and 
rebelliousness could take. For the democracy of the assemblies in fact limited rebellion to forms 
of civil disobedience. One could argue that one symptom of neoliberalism is the widespread 
reflex to reach for civil, democratic forms of resistance that we have nostalgically consumed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 My emphasis. 
238 For a more recent contestation of neoliberalism’s sacrificial logic, one could consider riots in Ferguson, Missouri 
as moments of unpoliced black rage. For neoliberalism silences and renders racial inequalities invisible to the extent 
that they (1) do not readily admit of market solutions, (2) engage in massive acts of illegality (or, in legitimate forms 
of protest, made demands for state economic planning), and (3) present a narrative of the market in which its 
ascendency is conditioned by black pain and devaluation. The result of that history is blackness as a negative quality 
that has to be overcome by additional human capital investments or, further, as a mark of social death, as the Afro-
pessimists maintain. To that extent, the black body is unintelligible to human capital as a structural site of 
disinvestment. This constitutive exclusion of blackness would make neoliberal subjectivity the latest historical form 
of whiteness, and perhaps even of white supremacy. Lemke argues in this direction when he states, “These effects 
entail not just the simple reproduction of existing social asymmetries or their ideological obfuscation, but are the 
product of a re-coding of social mechanisms of exploitation and domination on the basis of a new topography of the 
social domain.” (Lemke 2001, 203) Dilts also points this way when he critically asks, “Who or what had to be 
sacrificed in order to posit the conditions of homo œconomicus?” (Dilts 2008, 95) 
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throughout the long duration of its reign. From that perspective, Occupy Wall Street merely 
reproduced the spectacle of democracy. Second, the civil-democratic spirit of OWS gave the 
upper hand to mayors, the FBI, and police departments across the United States, who used a 
hardline strategy of endless evictions, jailings, and violence to drain resources, crush desire, and 
let Occupy fragment and exhaust itself under its own internal pressures. When neoliberal 
governmentality categorically deems civil society both unintelligible and a threat to the market, 
deploying civil strategies of legitimation is to bring a book to a gunfight.  
Yet as Foucault indicates in the closing remark of The Birth of Biopolitics, any politics—
including any novel form of political resistance—will have to situate itself in relation to the 
prevailing forms of governmentality as they’ve developed since the rise of political economy. He 
locates the starting point of politics neither in civil society nor in its material conditions, but 
instead in the “tactical polyvalence” of governmentality, which is distributed into three different 
historical lines: government according to the rationality of the individual sovereign (which 
includes raison d’État), the Marxist art of governing according to the “rationality of history 
progressively manifesting itself as truth,” and the liberal governmentality of governing 
“according to the rationality of the governed themselves.” (BB, 313) He describes the relation 
between these governmentalities thus:  
You can see that in the modern world, in the world we have known since the nineteenth 
century, a series of governmental rationalities overlap, lean on each other, challenge each 
other, and struggle with each other…What is politics, in the end, if not both the interplay 
of these different arts of government with their different reference points and the debate 
to which these different arts of government give rise? It seems to me that it is here that 
politics is born…(Ibid.) 
This is one of Foucault’s final statements on the politics of truth before he turns to the ethics of 
subjectivation. It broadly defines the situation of any possible counter-conduct. Instead of 
imploring his readers to look backward to the movements of the past, it invites us to open up new 
possibilities of conduct by taking up the elements of our present. Instead of a dialectical negation 
of the present that would prophesy a return to Political Society, he offers an open set of 
coordinates in which to think critically, which is to say, to think strategically.   
One strategy—and it is not the only one—would begin from the other side of the market 
and understand resistance in the same terms that neoliberalism itself does, namely, as either a 
criminal violation of the rule of law or as an enemy threat to its order. At this point I would like 
to think about how neoliberalism arose not only through the foundation of the state on the market 
by means of research institutions and policy, but also through practices of war and sacrifice. 
While austerity is a common theme of sacrifice in the continuing fall-out of The Great Recession, 
there is another, more profound theme of sacrifice that returns us to Foucault’s war hypothesis 
anew in order to think about neoliberalism historically. I would like to propose a way of thinking 
about a strategy of counter-conduct on the basis of an analysis of neoliberalism as a strategy of 
war.  
The war hypothesis in Foucault’s mid-1970s work, one will recall, laid down that power 
relations are intelligible only as relations of war. The problem of the biopolitics of populations 
forced Foucault to abandon this hypothesis in favor of exploring how power functions politically 
(in a restricted sense) as governmentality, as can be seen in the connection between the 
medicalization of sexuality and the emergence of things like public health as a concern of the 
state. And yet this abandonment does not mean that power functions only either as war or as 
governmentality. That is, it does not preclude the possibility that governmentality and war at 
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times mutually condition one another historically.  
One prime example of how power can function as war and as governmentality in 
different, mutually reinforcing ways is the role of state violence in neoliberal states and markets. 
In particular, this can be seen in the neoliberal coup d’État.  
Foucault’s genealogy of the coup d’État in Security, Territory, Population shows how, 
starting in the 17th century, state rationality (raison d’État) defined itself through a theory of the 
state of exception thanks to a mutation of the pastoral theme of sacrifice. One of the essential 
problems of the pastoral shepherd was that of omnes et singulatim—the problem of all and each. 
According to Foucault, the shepherd must spiritually prepare himself for exceptional 
circumstances that test his skill. There will be times when he must sacrifice a single sheep for the 
sake of his flock. But there will also be times when he must risk sacrificing his entire flock for 
the sake of a single sheep. And, finally, there might come a time when he will be called upon to 
sacrifice himself for all of his sheep. (STP, 128)  
This problem continues in following the crises of the pastorate that culminate in the 
Reformation and the emergence of raison d’État, or state rationality, following the Treaty of 
Westphalia. Citing Giovanni Botero, Foucault defines state in this discourse as “a firm 
domination over peoples.” (Ibid., 237) For 17th century theorists like B.P. von Chemnitz and 
Gabriel Naudé, there are exceptional circumstances in which the very existence of the state is 
under threat. In such situations, “in the name of the state’s salvation,” it will be necessary to 
suspend all previously established laws. (Ibid., 262) Foucault notes, “Necessity, urgency, the 
need to save the state itself will exclude the game of these natural laws and produce something 
that in a way will only be the establishment of a direct relationship of the state with itself when 
the keynote is necessity and safety” (Ibid.) The coup d’État dissolves the opposition between 
reason and illegality, thus opening the possibility of extra-legal violence. He continues, “We now 
have a raison d’État for which the pastoral will be one of selection and exclusion, of the 
sacrifice of some for the whole, of some for the state.”239 (Ibid., 263) It will be necessary, then, 
to sacrifice “[d]isturbers of the public peace and of the state” for the sake of the state. (Ibid., 264)  
What problem did the coup d’État solve? What threat faced state rationality? Foucault 
notes that the Coup d’État comes up in a text that Chemnitz wrote for the negotiations in 
Westphalia. (Ibid., 240) In particular, the purpose of the Coup d’État is to secure the state of 
peace amongst Catholics and Protestants against political religiosity and the threat of sectarian 
warfare. However, Chemintz’s historical reference here is Charlemagne’s invasion of Saxony in 
772. Once the invasion became an occupation, he planted undercover assassins amongst the 
Saxons as a permanent counter-insurrectionary force. They killed in secret and had total 
discretion, independently of any judiciary authority. (Ibid.) While the coup happens invisibly, its 
effects must be spectacular. The state must show that its existence is inevitable, that it is 
necessary, and hence that its “historical time is indefinite.” (Ibid., 260) The coup d’État is a 
sacrificial act of counter-insurrectionary war by a state against an occupied people that has no 
affiliation to it. It is not the disjunctive, pastoral sacrifice of one and all, but the sacrifice that 
selectively kills for the state’s permanent domination.  
The neoliberal coup d’État acts not in the name of the state so much as that of the market 
that it protects. It combines the pastoral sacrifice of the shepherd with statist counter-insurgency. 
The neoliberal strategy of the sacrificial coup d’État is crisis governmentality: the use of crises to 
produce an exceptional environment of uncertainty that disables the self-conduct of governed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Emphasis added. 
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subjects.240 Since the legitimacy of the neoliberal state is derived from its ability to secure the 
conditions of the market, crises allow the state to manifest not its own necessity, but the necessity 
of the market, the inevitability of the market, along with its indefinite historical time. The 
neoliberal coup d’État declares a state of emergency in the name of economic freedom and 
expands executive powers to install market conditions by any means necessary, including extra-
legal violence and dispossession. Afterwards, when the population exercises its liberty in the 
new marketplace (often out of necessity), the neoliberal state extracts a surplus of tacit consent to 
the coup. As economic rationality totalizes the population’s behavior, their surplus tacit consent 
becomes de facto naturalized. 
The neoliberal coup d’État illustrates that the economic tribunal not only expands the 
market through the privatization of the public good, but also through war. In The Birth of 
Biopolitics, the ordoliberals appear to be the first to use political and economic crisis as an 
opportunity to found the new state on market competition. However, the Chicago School was 
(infamously) the first to manufacture a crisis opportunity, as seen in its role in aiding Augusto 
Pinochet’s 1973 coup d’État in Chile. As described by Naomi Klein, the Chicago School set up 
the economics department at Chile’s Catholic University in order to put neoliberal ideas in 
competition with welfare state economics. (Ibid., 60) This effectively installed the economic 
tribunal that continuously denounced the Allende regime and would later govern Pinochet’s 
dictatorship. On the day after Pinochet carried out his coup, he was given a set of policy 
guidelines called El ladrillo (“The Brick”). Its author was Sergio de Castro, a Chicago trained 
economist. (Ibid., 77)  
Neoliberalism did not reinvent the coup d’État on its own, however. It merged with 
geopolitical considerations relating to the Containment Doctrine of the Truman Administration, 
which sought to stop the expansion of communism. The coup is an anti-communist tactic 
borrowed from the Cold War, which targeted communist or perceived-communist political 
regimes and resistance movements. To name just a few instances, the U.S. led coups against 
heads of state in Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1973, El Salvador in 1979, numerous failed 
attempts on Fidel Castro, and, more recently, there was the failed attempt on Hugo Chavez in 
2002. Where successful, these were generally followed by political purges carried out by 
paramilitary squads, as in the 1980 assassination of the left-wing Archbishop Óscar Romero in 
El Salvador.241  
At first glance, the market appears to neutralize war and sublimate its destructive energies 
into productive forms of competition between entrepreneurial subjects. Yet war and competition 
are neither opposed nor superimposable. Instead, neoliberalism interlaces war and competition 
without identifying the two. They are part of a continuous governmental strategy that includes 
pre-emptive wars, coup d’États, and counter-insurrectionary violence. Thus, laissez-faire is not 
just an economic tribunal of the state; it also deploys the state according to a dual strategy.  
On the one hand, as a principle of the neoliberal state, laissez-faire force in relations of 
war, as neoliberalism conducts high-intensity warfare and extra-legal violence to extend the 
found and extend the market. Such violence is necessarily always extra-legal, whether conducted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 This includes what Naomi Klein calls “disaster capitalism.” (Klein 2007, 6) 
241 Of course, with the War on Terror, the enemy has shifted to Islamist or perceived-Islamist terrorists, as in 2003’s 
“Operation Enduring Freedom” in Iraq, which was organized by former Chicago School students in the Bush 
administration. As Peter Galbraith reported in The Boston Globe August 31st of 2006, the CIA first attempted a coup 
against Saddam Hussein in 1996. 
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by “public” or private military and police forces.242 On the one hand, from this perspective, the 
market is a deintensification and recodification of relations of war in terms of competition under 
the rule of law. Neoliberalism descends toward a baseline of low-intensity conflict in the form of 
economic competition, which includes the mundane policing of criminal entrepreneurs. 
 
7.2 The Communist War Machine as a Counter-Conduct in Neoliberalism  
Since neoliberal governmentality is linked to a strategy of war, any counter-conduct that 
would resist neoliberalism would have to respond to the level of war in which it finds itself. That 
is, the neoliberal exhaustion of liberal democracy challenges those who would resist it to 
abandon liberalism and take up a position in the war that is already being waged. The question 
then is how does one situate oneself? 
After Security, Territory, Population, Foucault indicates the possibility of returning to the 
idea of war, along with liberalism’s historical rival, Marx. He states: 
Up to now, no one has examined or deepened the question of knowing what struggle is. 
What is the struggle when one says “class struggle”? Since one says struggle, it is a 
question of war and conflict. But how does this war develop itself? What is its objective? 
What are its means? What rational qualities is it based on? I would love to discuss how it 
is not from the sociology of classes but the strategic method concerning struggles that 
one must begin with Marx. It is there that my interest in Marx is anchored and it is 
starting from there that I would like to pose problems.243 (DE2, 606).  
If the polyvalence of modern politics includes Marxism, as Foucault remarks at the end of The 
Birth of Biopolitics, and if Marxism can be rethought strategically, then it must meet 
neoliberalism on the terrain of struggle. But it must also go further: it must step past 
neoliberalism by becoming post-anthropological. Just as neoliberalism succeeded liberalism by 
abandoning civil society, communism must abandon the concept of society as a truth that 
historically unfolds throughout history. It must relinquish the state (the object of neoliberal 
paranoia) and the party as a representational body of the universal subject of history. And it must 
relinquish the object of its prophecies, the anthropological eschaton, or communism as the figure 
of humanity that is reconciled with its concrete essence, labor. Rethinking communism and war 
together must involve not a new governmentality, but a counter-neoliberal rationality that frees 
subjective capacities from work qua economic rationality.244  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Some critics of neoliberalism, Maxists in particular, have argued that neoliberal economics is war by other means. 
For instance, Steven Shaviro declaims the neoliberal erosion of civil society as the reduction of social relations to a 
quasi-state of nature, or a social war in which the class-lines have been erased and the parties have been atomized: 
“For neoliberalism, the legitimate role of the State is precisely to destroy civil society, and instead to incite a war of 
all against all, in the form of unfettered economic competition.” (Shaviro 2010, 5) Alternately, David Harvey has 
argued that since capital interests have banded together through a network of associations such as the Chamber of 
Commerce, class war has been decidedly one-sided. (Harvey 2005, 43) 
243 My italics. Later on, he states: ““What attracts me to Marx are his historical works, like his essays on the coup 
d’état of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, on the class struggles in France, or on the Commune…However, these 
analyses, in the historical works, always end with prophetic speeches.” (DE2, 612) 
244 In general, Foucault’s challenge is to invent resistance practices that go beyond negatively tracing themselves 
from their object (à la Marx). He calls for practices that resist apparatuses with new ways of assembling bodies and 
producing signs (as in the case of the G.I.P.). And he calls for new modes of conduct that pervert those that already 
exist. The politics of truth in the context of neoliberalism, like the politics of truth that took the form of the G.I.P., 
would have to act at the level of the historical conditions of conduct. The difficulty in this consists of the fact that 
how one thinks about resistance to neoliberalism depends mainly on how one understands neoliberalism and the 
position from which one considers resistance. Given Foucault’s account, it is one thing to resist neoliberalism from a 
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Starting from counter-conduct as a practice that perverts a regime of power knowledge by 
taking up its marginal elements and integrating them into different procedures of veridiction, 
with different aims, and on the basis of different corporeal relations, one could ask the following: 
how does one “counter-conduct” neoliberal homo oeconomicus as a stock of human capital made 
of subjective capacities and time? How does one “conduct” the flow of its income from self-
investment to something else? What rationality can be used? How can one play a different game? 
In general, what would an ungovernable life look like starting from a life that is eminently 
governed?  
To begin answering these questions, the first line of resistance that I would like to 
propose begins by situating the politics of truth within the intolerable as a limit experience of 
divestment from economic rationality. It then proceeds to outline a counter-conduct in which the 
growth of capacities qua communism is linked to the intensification of struggle for desubjection.  
The notion of the intolerable in Foucault is not the same as moral outrage or indignation, 
rather it is the threshold of desubjection in an apparatus of power-knowledge. As such, it is 
always indexed to the mode of power-knowledge in which it arises. When subjective powers of 
action are governed by their freedom, intolerability often comes in the form of “sad passions” 
that pertain to the vicissitudes of a competitive world. Guilt resulting from debt, the anxiety of 
precarity, depression stemming from abandonment and isolation, and, perhaps above all, 
exhaustion that comes from being run up against the limits of one’s ability to endure the market. 
This is to say nothing of the social death and abandonment of those cut off from the flows of 
human capital or deemed unworthy of investment in the first place. Yet from the point of view of 
human capital, these affects involve a deceleration or blockage of the flow of self-investment 
because they toward a limit of tolerability that involves incapacity, inactivity, and 
disidentification with homo oeconomicus.  
If the death of God was also the death of Man, then it is also important to complete the 
Kantian trio by adding the death of the World. For the world is nothing other than the totality of 
appearances, which is grounded in God as the principle of the sum total of what is possible. 
(Kant 1998, 464-5; 553-4; 558) In his reading of Deleuze, Peter Pál Pelbart characterizes the 
exhausted subject as “he who, having exhausted his purpose, is himself exhausted, such that this 
dissolution of the subjection corresponds to the abolition of the world.” (Pelbart 2015, 122) 
Exhaustion has a special proximity to intolerance because the collapse of the subject of 
possibility necessarily involves the partial collapse of its grounded world—for instance, the 
market as an apparatus that attempts to ground power relations by inducing subjects to 
participate in their own subjection. The inoperativity of the exhausted subject is like a blown 
circuit in the circulation of price signals and human capital. But nonetheless, something is 
affirmed in intolerance; it is not a pure passivity or inoperativity, but an affirmation of one’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
position threatened by or in the midst of formal subsumption, or the raw encounter between the decoded flows of 
labor and capital. But it is totally another to consider resistance in the midst of real subsumption, where capitalism 
takes charge of all subjective potential, the capacity to communicate, to feel, to create, to think, into productive 
powers for capital.”244 (Read 2009, 33) That is to say that there is no general starting point for resisting 
neoliberalism and hence there can be no general program for action. The subject position that one occupies with 
respect to the market will determine one’s degree of investment in subjection. One would expect that the starting 
point would unevenly consist of subject positions involving smaller human capital investments, those whose 
investments have become intolerable to them, and those whose lives have been deemed unworthy of investment. 
Moreover, the starting point for resisting human capital would be complicated by existing struggles along lines that 
are not primarily oriented by neoliberalism. Nevertheless, this is not to say that resistance practices cannot spread or 
resonate across geographies and times. 
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capacity to be affected. Intolerance is an auto-affection that draws a line against an apparatus of 
subjection and opens up power relations to new possibilities. 
There is no guarantee that the experience of exhaustion or the intolerable will engender a 
will to struggle. Most often, existential desubjection is botched along the way and ends in suicide 
or shooting sprees. Even our desubjections have their bad models and clichés. This is because the 
forms of struggle that would allow for powerful forms of life to emerge from these experiences 
are lacking and have to be invented. Making things more difficult still, the neoliberal conditions 
of exhaustion and intolerance are so hyper-individualized and economized that the relations that 
one makes in the marketplace are incentivized against caring for these experiences and help them 
assume a collective form.245 What kind of a collective counter-conduct could begin from this 
exhaustion and fight against its neoliberal conditions?  
Let us recall that the stakes of the politics of truth are the intensification of struggle and 
the detachment of powers of action from the intensification of subjection. Let us also recall 
Foucault’s suggestion that it would be possible to rethink class struggle post-anthropologically in 
the context of the polyvalence of modern politics. The first line of resistance I’d like to propose 
is communization as the rationality of a counter-conduct.246 This amounts to a Foucaultian 
intervention in the recent discourse on communization theory.  
Communization theory can be traced back to the tradition of left-communist theory 
originating out of the French journal, Théorie Communiste, which began in 1977, and has more 
recently been taken up by the Endnotes Journal and writers like Benjamin Noys, Jasper Bernes, 
and Leon de Mattis. However, there is a second origin, namely, the 1970s Italian Autonomia 
movement and its reception in the writings of Tiqqun and The Invisible Committee. Both 
theoretical tendencies maintain that communism is not a transcendent ideal set of social 
conditions, but rather—true to certain passages in Marx—a real movement. That is, 
communization theory generally maintains that communism is immanent to struggle. What 
separates the positions coming out of these two origins, however, is whether or not 
communization is primarily a negative or a positive process. For instance, when de Mattis seeks 
to define communism through the concept of a “communist measure” which is a deed that 
measures the production of the commune in struggle, he writes, “The communist character of a 
measure derives from its capacity to reinforce the struggle against capital while…being the 
expression of its negation.” (de Mattis 2015, 100) This is why de Mattis defines the communist 
measure as an act that generalizes and advances the insurrection against capital. The Invisible 
Committee, following Marx, maintains a certain measure of negativity toward capital as well: 
“Communism is the real movement that destitutes the existing state of things.” (The Invisible 
Committee 2017, 89) However, they take it a step further (here as Tiqqun): “We can win our 
war…provided that the confrontation is always subordinated to our positivity…Each space 
conquered from Empire, from its hostile environment, must correspond to our capacity to fill it, 
to configure it, to inhabit it. Nothing is worse than a victory one doesn’t know what to do with.” 
(Tiqqun 2011, 80) And further (writing as The Invisible Committee), “[destitution] doesn’t 
adjust itself to the movements of the adversary but to what is required for the increase of its own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 The closest thing to collective forms of wealth ownership in neoliberal capitalism are restricted to families, which 
are responsible for maximally investing human capital in their children. As Becker’s analyses show, families are 
always analyzable into individual producers; the human capital machine is always an individual. 
246 Dardot and Laval propose something similar in the last lines of their book on neoliberalism when they write, 
“The practices of communization of knowledge, mutual aid and cooperative work can delineate the features of a 
different world of reason. Such an alternative reason cannot be better designated than by the term reason of the 
commons.”246 (Dardot and Laval 2013, 321) 
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potential.” (The Invisible Committee 2017, 79)  
A Foucaultian intervention into communist struggle would build upon the Deleuzean 
offerings of Tiqqun and the Invisible Committee has already offered, though without so much of 
their Heideggerian baggage. The intervention I’d like to propose is immanent in that it does not 
imply a utopian mode of production, but a set of collective practices for countering the economic 
rationality of the market as a model of power relations and the subject of human capital. 
Communism requires both the positivity of a counter-conduct that is not determined by what it 
negates and a measure of rationality that gives it its own strategic consistency.  
A communist counter-conduct must be able to sustain the experience of the intolerable 
that initiates the desubjection of the entrepreneurial subject by connecting their intolerance to 
others. Whether as a conspiracy amongst friends or as a sudden public gathering, a collective 
assemblage needed in order to fight for one’s escape from the market.247 Since the primary effect 
of market competition vis-à-vis the subject is to individualize wealth in the form of the enterprise, 
it would be a matter, first, of deindividualizing the subject as a stock of capital by finding a new 
collective relation to wealth that resists the norm of competition. Communization first has as its 
object not the expropriation of both traditional forms of capital (flows of money and material 
capital), but our subjective capacities and affects that both empower us and tie us to a market 
identity that makes us docile. What rationality can jam the market’s price signals and divert 
capital flows from homo oeconomicus as an operator of economic rationality? That is, what kind 
of rationality could attack neoliberalism by inventing a positive measure that attests to the 
groundlessness of power relations? 
Following Tiqqun, one potential answer comes from Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
the war machine. Tiqqun write, “By war machines should be understood a certain coincidence 
between living and struggling, a coincidence that is never given without simultaneously 
requiring its construction.” (Tiqqun 2011, 69) In his essay, “To Have Done with Judgment,” 
Deleuze distinguishes combat from war as war is merely the negative antagonism of a “will to 
nothingness” or destruction. In its negative, oppositional form, war begins by “mutilating” what 
it appropriates, determining what it can do in advance, and turning it against an enemy. (Deleuze 
1997, 133) This is the method of every army, which Tiqqun view as the inescapable trap of every 
revolutionary movement that has produced specialized armies.248 Combat, by contrast, is creative. 
Deleuze says that it “is the process through which a force enriches itself by seizing hold of other 
forces and joining itself to them in a new ensemble: a becoming.” (Ibid., 132) Combat for 
Deleuze is a practice of assembling forces in a way that desubjects them. It involves a synthesis 
that mutates what comes together.  
As a rationality, then, combat provides a measure for the strategic consistency of 
communization. This rationality could be defined as the mutual involvement and growth of 
heterogeneous forces in the context of a game of war. It begins from the sharing of affects when 
one finds others on the other side of the threshold of intolerability. It becomes a strategic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Though Foucault’s experiences at Vincennes and his break with the Maoists may have left him cold to the idea of 
communes, in 1971 Foucault remarks, “It is possible that the rough outline of a future society is supplied by the 
recent experiences with drugs, sex, communes, other forms of consciousness, and other forms of individuality. If 
scientific socialism emerged from the Utopias of the nineteenth century, it is possible that a real sociealization will 
emerge, in the twentieth century, from experiences.” (LCP, 231) 
248 As he argues with Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, war is only the contingent result of an encounter with the 
state, which, by contrast, subjects forces to itself by separating them from what they can do. (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 418) Tiqqun use this to problematize the urban guerilla strategy of the Red Brigades in Autonomia. (Tiqqun 
2011, 73-87) 
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measure when sharing gains consistency as a sensibility and a practice that differentiates, grows, 
and multiples through itself. Its object is itself, but its relation to the neoliberal state and market 
is one of war. This is because any practice of communization that goes on long enough usually 
finds itself embattled by its conditions: if the market doesn’t govern communists back into their 
individuality, the state will find some way of coopting or crushing them, as it did with the Black 
Panthers and their free breakfast programs. But more basically, foregoing competitiveness with 
others makes communization something like a pact to care for and strengthen each other. In this 
sense, communism is a politics of friendship. Tiqqun echo this when they write, “I am bound to 
the friend by some experience…that implies that the growth of his power entails the growth of 
my own.” (Tiqqun 2010, 55)   
Communization tacitly recognizes that the reduction of our lives to labor happens through 
a series of subjections that individualize us on the basis of our needs. When one asks people why 
they endure jobs that are joyless and even harm them, the answer is always the same, “You gotta 
work to survive.” The strategic question of communist combat asks, “how do we grow our 
capacities in ways that make us collectively different and abolish the market’s hold on our lives?” 
Or, “How do we approach questions of individual need as collective problems that we can solve 
together?” Desubjection, like subjection, is a strategic affair.  
Communes have their existence in collective and reciprocal growth of subjective 
capacities and shared affects. And, correlatively, the multiplication of communes entails the 
weakening and divestment of markets. Just as the movement of communism desubjects those 
within it from their predicates, so too might it give rise to an anonymous movement of things and 
powers. It involves practices theorized by Peter Kropotkin and other anarchists as mutual aid 
(independent and non-hierarchical cooperation, gifting, and imprecise exchange), but it starts at a 
more fundamentally anarchic level and goes beyond them. Aside from starting with limit affects 
at the extreme of subjection, it also involves the free sharing of skills and capacities outside of 
the selective mechanism of the market. The war-machinic character of the commune arises in 
part from the way the commune itself autonomously determines the value of knowledges and 
skills. Some become worthless, while others retain their value only on the condition that their use 
becomes illicit or conspiratorial. 
A free antifascist martial arts gym, for instance, both communizes and politicizes martial 
arts skills by opening conversations about the political meaning of self-defense, safety, and risk 
while challenging members to reflect on the politics of gender and violence. Even business skills 
like accountancy may help members of a commune maintain an above-ground existence that 
minimally interfaces with the state. Carpentry and design-build architecture allow for the 
materialization of communist spaces when they aren’t expropriated through squatting and can 
build tools and weapons. In general, the de-individualizing circulation of knowledge and the 
critical approach to the market serve to contest the social capital that comes from having human 
capital.  
But at a deeper level, the commune aims at other skills and practices that make up a 
joyous existence that has deserted the market. Living together is something that has to be learned 
if it is not going to result in stabilized power relations. The art of living heterogeneously, of 
living with others without assuming a communitarian point of belonging or a cult of individuality, 
is necessary. How do we share our lives together on the basis of risk in struggle while affirming 
a life we would want to live even in the absence of an enemy? And how do we build the 
commune while attending to the alterity and heterogeneity of the live we put in common? These 
questions lead beyond the scope of this dissertation, but they are necessary for continuing to 
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think the commune anarchically in the groundless openness of power.  
 
7.3 The Other Life: Cynic Parrhēsia as an Ethics of Desubjection 
Admittedly, Foucault stops using the phrase “politics of truth” after The Birth of 
Biopolitics. However, so far what I have presented comes from the view that it is not enough to 
be an ethical homo oeconomicus, or to make entrepreneurialism into an ethically reflected 
lifestyle. Economic rationality as a way of life is precisely what must be put out of operation as 
far as possible. Yet if we have already been subjected to neoliberal governmentality, then we are 
already invested in our own governability, which is to say the truth that the market pronounces 
on our value. Ethical truth is problem of the second line of resistance against neoliberalism. It 
arises out of Foucault’s writings on parrhēsia and the Cynics.   
Of course, Foucault’s ethical turn is supposedly where the politics of truth goes to die. 
Yet, in his book, Foucault and Power: The Influence of Political Engagement on Theories of 
Power, Marceolo Hoffman argues that the relation between political action and philosophical 
writing continued well into Foucault’s writings on ethics and subjectivation.249 For instance, 
there is the often over-looked link between Foucault’s engagement in the Polish Solidarity 
movement and his studies on parrhēsia. Hoffman also argues that the turn to parrhēsia is an 
amplification of the politico-ethical dimension already present in Foucault’s work.250 In other 
words, the turn to subjectivation was not a departure from the politics of truth, but a 
concentration on the ethical component that it already implied (which I detailed in Chapters 
Three and Four). In this light, Foucault’s studies on truth-telling appear as an attempt to 
genealogize his (often over-looked) participation in Solidarity and his public statements against 
the response of Mitterand’s government to General Jaruzelski’s coup d’État.  
The Solidarity movement began as an illegal trade union that spurred a series of wild-cat 
strikes and factory-occupations amidst austerity measures imposed by the Polish government in 
1980. In 1982, Foucault would call the political situation of Europe that led to the conditions in 
Poland “utterly intolerable,” stressing “I do believe in the importance of political affect.” (EF3, 
469, 471) As the movement grew, demands ranged from immediate economic measures to social 
and political demands for improved healthcare, religious freedom, and an end to surveillance and 
censorship.251 When the government’s counter-attacks on Solidarity failed, General Jaruzelski 
led a coup and instated martial law. French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson declared that the 
French government’s position on the coup would be “non-interference.” (Hoffman 2014, 127) 
Along with Pierre Bourdieu, Foucault issued a response statement titled “Missed Appointments.” 
It called for the socialist government to recognize the attacks on the labor movement and the 
necessarily international implications of the coup, given the relations between the French 
Communist Party, the U.S.S.R., and Poland at the time. (Ibid., 130) The statement gathered 
numerous signatures from public figures. And Hoffman describes how it forced the government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 He argues against Eric Paras’ book, Foucaul 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge, that the turn to aesthetics of 
existence did not mark a break from what I have been emphasizing as the politics of truth. Instead, it leads him to 
discuss parrhēsia as a counter-conduct that opens a new game of truth within an already existing rule-bound game 
by contesting those rules and opening up new possibilities of action.   
250 Hoffman states claims that the links between the Polish Solidarity movement, Foucault’s own practices in 
solidarity with it, parrhēsia, and the turn to the Cynics all show that he “move[d] toward power with ever-greater 
intensity and that his accelerated move toward power yielded theoretical reflections on militant political practices.” 
(Hoffman 2014, 125) 
251 Details concerning the rise of Solidarity and Jaryzelski’s coup come from Colin Barker’s article, “The Rise of 
Solidarnosc.” (Barker 2005) 
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into “protesting the coup d’état, providing relief aid to the Poles in the midst of martial law, and 
cancelling a visit to Warsaw by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy.” (Ibid., 131) As for Foucault, he 
continued to work within the Solidarity movement and increase its visibility.252 The act of using 
his name to make public statements on behalf of political causes was nothing new for him. 
However, his efforts on behalf of Solidarity in 1981 and 1982 came to be genealogized as acts of 
militant parrhēsia. And, in turn, the study of parrhēsia broadened the horizon for counter-
conducts in the politics of truth. 
For Foucault, parrhēsia is opposed to a discursive practice that imposes an interpretation 
or conducts the conduct of others. And it is absolutely opposed to what speech-act theorists such 
as J.L. Austin and John Searle call the performative. Foucault states: “With parrhēsia we see the 
appearance of a whole family of completely different facts of discourse which are almost the 
reverse…of what we call the pragmatics of discourse.” (GSO, 68) Performative speech acts are 
illocutionary in that they accomplish what they signify. They also tend to be authorized by the 
codes of a situation that ward off aleatory events and grant a special status to a particular 
speaking subject. (Ibid., 65) “Class dismissed,” “You are guilty,” and “Sale approved” all 
exemplify the performative.  
By contrast, parrhēsia is an “irruptive event” that breaks with the regime of truth that 
governs a situation. Parrhēsia consequently opens itself to an indeterminate danger:” “Parrhēsia 
does not produce a codified effect; it opens up an unspecified risk.” (GSO, 61) This risk consists 
of the unforeseeable consequences of parrhēsia, which establishes a double-pact of the speaker 
with themselves. The subjectivation of the “parrhesiast” consists of the fact that they are both the 
speaking subject in telling the truth and the subject of the enunciation. Hence, they stake either 
some aspect or all of their existence on their truth-telling. This is why, in its extreme cases, 
parrhēsia involves courage and the “risk of death over the life of security.” (FS, 20) What is 
important about parrhēsia is not primarily the content of what is said, which is indexed to the 
situation, but the ethical act or gesture of speaking the truth itself. For Foucault, parrhēsia breaks 
from the rules that organize bodies, distribute subject positions, and distinguish the true from the 
false in a situation: “parrhēsia only exists when there is freedom in the enunciation of the truth, 
freedom of the act by which the speaking subject binds himself to the statement and enunciation 
of the truth.” (GSO, 66) And perhaps most importantly, parrhēsia always implies an other and, 
however tacitly, an appeal to the other to have the courage to form a bond with the truth-teller 
and to risk exploring the consequences of truth together. Evental disruption, indeterminate 
riskiness, a subjectivation that tells the truth, and possibilities of an illicit bond are what make up 
parrhēsia.253 The Nietzschean question “Who speaks?” re-emerges here on the order of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Hoffman sums up Foucault’s direct participation thus: “In addition to his numerous public declarations on the 
situation in Poland, Foucault became heavily involved [in]] the daily activities of the Polish-led Solidarity 
committee in Paris. The head of the committee, Seweryn Blumsztajn, even expressed surprise at the intensity of 
Foucault’s involvement, noting that he ‘devoted hours on end to helping with the most bureaucratic and repetitive 
tasks.’ Second, as in the case of his work in the GIP, Foucault placed a premium on information gathering in 
response to conditions of silencing.” (Ibid., 132) I think it is interesting to note Foucault’s willingness to participate 
in the more tedious kinds of intellectual labor that go well beyond the headline-grabbing work of making 
declarations.  
253 The subject that emerges through subjectivation is neither merely an effect of power, but nor does it pre-exist 
power. Foucault is still committed to a non-constitutive concept of subjectivity and he is still committed to a concept 
of truth that has non-true conditions. In the later works, subjectivation names the gap between power and a set of 
practices that are no longer discursive, but ethical. As Deleuze says, if power is the outside of knowledge, then 
subjectivation is the folding of the outside into the self-relation of a force. (Deleuze 1988, 100) And just as power 
was hypothesized in 1971 to be the condition of truth that cannot itself be true, starting in 1980 with On the 
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subjectivation. 
Of all the examples of parrhēsia that Foucault describes throughout his late lecture 
courses, the most striking one—and the one most connected to his practices around Solidarity—
has to do with the Cynics. When Foucault introduces Cynicism as the subject of The Courage of 
Truth in 1984, he does so by stating, “It seems to me that in Cynicism…the requirement of an 
extremely distinctive form of life…is strongly connected to the principle of truth-
telling…without shame or fear…which pushes its courage and boldness to the point where it 
becomes intolerable insolence.” (CT, 165) The Cynic is the one who pushes parrhēsia to the 
limit by “[risking] one’s life not just by telling the truth and in order to tell it, but by the very 
way in which one lives.” (Ibid., 234)  
This is because the Cynic strategy is transvaluation, as expressed in the Oracle’s 
statement to Diogenes of Sinope, “Change the value of the currency.” (Ibid., 226) The currency 
in question is truth, not as a predicate of propositions, but as it concerns life—the true life 
(alēthēs bios), or the basic theme of philosophy. This involves in an idiosyncratic re-
interpretation of truth as alētheia, or, following Heidegger’s translation, unconcealment. The 
Cynics reinterpret alētheia to mean “stripping bear.” Cynic alētheia is polysemic, as it means to 
reveal oneself, to disrobe, to divest oneself of property, shamelessness, and independence. It also 
means doing away with parts of one’s life that can be used by one’s enemies. Thus “stripping 
bear” involves a number of consequences, of which I will discuss only a few. Taken together, 
they paradoxically characterize Cynic life as “the other life.” As Foucault says, “it is the 
fulfillment of the true life, but as demand for a life which is radically other.” (Ibid., 270) Cynic 
transvaluation could be considered the first reversal of Platonism and its view that true principles 
are a condition of ethical life and thus of the unity of word and deed. Cynic transvaluation means 
that ethics is the condition of truth, not the other way around.  
This is because the general imperative of the Cynic, “Strip bare,” is a condition of 
parrhēsia in that it is both a condition and a test of freedom. Ethical life begins by stripping 
away all investments that bind the self to falsity. Materially, this leads to voluntary poverty. 
Foucault states, “The Cynic is the man…who roams, who is not integrated into society, has no 
household, family, hearth, or country…he is also a beggar.” (Ibid., 170) Beyond stripping 
material comforts to a minimum, the Cynic affirms the “intrinsic value of physical ugliness, 
dirtiness, and destitution,” that forces one to beg, and that hence sullies one’s name and 
reputation. (Ibid., 259) Normatively, relinquishing material attachments frees the Cynic from all 
distracting “private obligations,” “pointless conventions,” and “superfluous opinions.” (CT, 171) 
Stripping bear is not merely negative, however. It is a test of freedom that challenges the Cynic 
to cultivate an affect of shamelessness; as Foucault states, it constitutes “the life in anaideia (the 
brazen life).” (Ibid., 255) The Cynic is nothing without the test of their hardships—“the constant 
test of self on self”—which constitutes the self-relational pact and the exposure to risk 
characteristic of parrhēsia. (Ibid., 280)  
This is also how the Cynics continue the theme of war within the context of counter-
conduct. Foucault states plainly, “The Cynic is a philosopher at war.” (Ibid., 299) This war, like 
Deleuzean combat, first concerns the self in that it involves all of the trials that the Cynic puts to 
themselves, which includes any anger and violence that may be provoked by the scandalous life 
of the Cynic. This theme of war continues in relation to others, as well as Foucault claims that 
the challenge to form a pact around an illicit truth can also be found in the Cynic’s 
pharmacological form of care for others. The Cynic fully extends the ambiguity of the Greek 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Government of the Living, truth has a second extra-veridical condition, namely, ethical practices. (GL, 231-232) 
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word pharmakon, which can signify both cure and poison. Foucault states, “The medications 
offered by the Cynics are harsh…he is…an aggressive benefactor whose main instrument is, of 
course, the famous diatribe…He attacks his enemies, that is to say, he attacks the vices afflicting 
men, affecting those he is speaking to in particular, but also humankind in general.” (Ibid., 279) 
The Cynic attacks others so that they might attack themselves and internalize the war against 
dependency and vice. (FS, 133) However, as Foucault says, their “battle is an explicit, 
intentional, and constant aggression directed at…humanity in its real life, and whose horizon or 
objective is to change its moral attitude (its ēthos) but, at the same time and thereby, its customs, 
conventions, and ways of living.” (CT, 280)  
One way the Cynic critiques others is by affirming opinions that they accept, drawing 
consequences from them, and living out those consequences in ways that go beyond the limit of 
what people tolerate. Put simply, the Cynic turns what people accept into what they reject and 
despise. For instance, the Cynic takes the premise that one ought to live according to nature and 
concludes that all acts that satisfy natural needs ought to be done in public, without shame—
including masturbation and sex. Or there is Diogenes’ famous take on Plato’s definition of man 
as a “featherless biped” in which Diogenes plucked a chicken bare, brought it to Plato’s 
Academy, and announced, “Behold! I’ve brought you a man!” 
Turning to politics, Foucault discusses how the Cynic reverses the currency of ancient 
Greek sovereignty. Sovereignty for the Greeks meant self-possession, which was a condition for 
happiness and being able to conduct others, whether as a teacher, a friend, or as an example of 
virtue in general. (Ibid., 271-3) The Cynic perverts the Greek conception of sovereignty with 
their destitute poverty, their shameless satisfaction, their scandalous freedom, and their bellicose 
pharmacology. Cynicism takes this reversal further by contesting political sovereigns, as in the 
fabled encounter between Alexander the Great and Diogenes of Sinope. The latter claims to be a 
true king—a philosopher-king, which is not a king of human subjects. Diogenes depends on no 
one to exercise power and has already conquered his true enemies (his vices), whereas 
Alexander is still on the march to Persia and depends on countless contingencies in his empire, 
making him more dependent, and thus weaker. (Ibid., 276) Beyond that, Diogenes has modeled 
himself after Zeus, instead of receiving his title from others. And he will never be deposed 
because nothing can be taken from him, whereas all “kings of men” suffer the same fate: the loss 
of their kingdom, either by death or usurpation. (Ibid., 277)  
With total sovereignty, the Cynic conducts others by inciting their desubjection. The 
Cynic is simultaneously the anti-king, or the “king of derision,” the king who hides his monarchy 
in poverty, which is to say, in plain sight. (Ibid., 278) And on that account, simply by virtue of 
their style of existence, the philosopher-king gives themselves the authority to mock and 
denounce the political king. Therefore, Cynic life is also an anti-political ethos inasmuch as 
politics here is understood as the art of ruling the polis. Foucault sees in the Cynics both a style 
of intervening in power relations and an ethics that makes it possible to carry out a critique 
within them.  
The logic of Cynical transvaluation is (self-) conduction by “destitution.” (Ibid., 207) The 
other life that makes the true life possible proceeds by self-destitution and an insolence that goes 
beyond the limits of public tolerability. This is what makes the Cynic sovereign enough to 
conduct others. By destituting the effects of power in oneself the Cynic exercises power through 
gestures of ungovernable aggression that repeat themselves in others through hostility. Cynicism 
is a counter-conduct that spreads. As Lucian wrote of the Cynics, “The city swarms with these 
vermin.” (FS, 116) In this sense, the Cynic goes beyond the G.I.P. questionnaires that sought to 
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heighten the sensitivity of prisoners to the intolerable. The Cynic is intolerable because they 
escape all rule.254 The intolerable here does not name an intensive threshold in an apparatus. 
Instead, the intolerable is the effect of a parrhēsia on an apparatus as it challenges others to 
change their lives.  
Foucault states that the Cynic reversal of the true life into the other life “has laid down 
this otherness of an other life…as the combativeness on the horizon of which is an other world.” 
(Ibid., 287) The Cynic lives the other life as a style of permanent desubjection played out in the 
rules and strategies of knowledge-power. They gesture to the other world, which is not a beyond, 
as it would later be for Christianity when it takes up this theme. Instead, the other world is the 
world that Cynics create as they form bonds with those who accept their challenge and unfold the 
consequences of truth in their lives and in the world they seek to destitute. The other world 
swarms in the world it perverts as the cynic gathers a pack of friends.  
 
7.4 Cynic Life as Counter-Neoliberal Subjectivation 
As Hoffman points out, Foucault refused the idea that one could simply reactivate the 
ethics of antiquity today. (Hoffman 2014, 141) Rather, Foucault asks, who are the modern 
Cynics? And what has happened to them? For this he looks to the history of modern 
revolutionary militancy. He says that the 18th and 19th centuries gave us three types of political 
militancy, which continue to structure our politics today. There is the secret militancy of the 
conspiracy, which invisibly and strategically positions itself within the field of power, waiting 
until the opportune moment to reveal itself and strike. This is the strategy of the 19th century 
revolutionary socialist Louis Auguste Blanqui. Opposed to this there is the visible militancy of 
the political party or organization that appeals to the public though strikes, pickets, 
demonstrations, and rallies. Finally, there is a third type of militancy that repeats the Cynic ethos 
of the scandalous life and thereby cuts a diagonal through the first two alternatives. This form of 
militancy takes up a basis beyond the axes of power and knowledge (the visible and the 
invisible) in subjectivation. Foucault’s characterizes it thus: 
[T]he third important way of being militant is militancy as bearing witness by one’s life 
in the form of a style of existence. This style of existence is specific to revolutionary 
militantism, and ensuring that one’s life bears witness, breaks, and has to break with the 
conventions, habits, and values of society. And it must manifest directly, by its visible 
form, its constant practice, and its immediate existence, the concrete possibility and the 
evident value of an other life, which is the true life. (CT, 184) 
Foucault claims that the legacy of Cynicism is dispersed throughout history, as he places 
Dostoyevsky, Russian Nihilism, and Euro-American anarchism within this line of descent—the 
last especially for its concept of propaganda by the deed.  
Foucault uses the Cynic line of descent to pose a problem to the political malaise of 
France in 1984. Scandalous militancy has been neutralized by the organized left, particularly the 
PCF, which has “banished” any subjectivation that would attest to an illicit political truth. (Ibid., 
186) When revolutionary organizations make conformity to “accepted values” the condition of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 The ungovernability of the Cynics can even be found in their slavery. Accepting absolute poverty also means 
accepting the possibility of slavery, albeit not without at least a gesture of transvaluation. Foucault notes that when 
Diogenes was brought to the market to be sold and was denied the right to sit down, he said “No matter, fish are 
purchased lying on their belly,” and “he lay down like a fish, thus agreeing to play the role of merchandise for sale.” 
(CT, 260) Perhaps he thought it was too obvious, but Foucault fails to mention that Diogenes’s act both thwarted the 
merchant’s attempt to deny him rest and assumed an idler posture than sitting.  
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militancy, they reduce scandalous militancy to deviancy. Leftist political organizations have 
invented a whole typology of deviation for denouncing desubjection, viewing it as adventurism, 
oppositional posturing, bourgeois decadence (individualism), lifestyle-ism, or “leftist madness.” 
(Ibid.) In each case, the tactic is to deintensify anything that would break from the organization’s 
order of the visible and the sayable and its governance over conducts.  
Hoffman argues toward the end of his chapter on Foucault and Solidarity that the Cynic 
poses an alternative to the life of disciplinary societies (despite his caveat above). The Cynic 
opposes the openness of a life stripped bare to the enclosed panoptic gaze, scandalization to 
normalization, animality to the machine, combativeness to docility, and the self-mastery of 
voluntary poverty to the disciplinary investment of forces in the body. (Hoffman 2014, 140-1) 
However, finding an alternative to discipline is not our problem, since neoliberalism has already 
accomplished this to some extent. Does it not present us with the visibility of an unknowing 
price mechanism instead of a knowing gaze, a non-mechanical (semiotic) image of subjectivity, 
a belligerent norm of competitiveness, and free self-investment as opposed to disciplinary 
docility? However, one thing has definitely not changed. The problem of the limit of disciplinary 
power for Foucault was the same as that of ideology in Althusser: how to resist a mode of power 
when one’s powers of action are the immanent effects of its functioning? Disciplinary power 
invests bodies with powers of action only on the condition that they are made docile in the 
process. This is the same problem one faces in neoliberal governmentality, only now it is more 
paradoxical. Neoliberalism turns the very practice of changing oneself through free self-
enhancement into supports of governmentality. How, then, does one invent a mode of life that 
resists neoliberalism when neoliberalism seeks to integrate liberty and desubjection into its 
governmentality? How does one push desubjection beyond mere liberty as the ability to choose 
between competing ends? In neoliberal capitalism, there can be no resistance to neoliberalism by 
desubjection alone. Therefore, it is necessary that resistance to neoliberalism be a subjectivation. 
As an ethics, cynicism not only opposes politics (in the narrow sense of the word), but 
also offers insights for a counter-neoliberal ethics. A contemporary “cynicism” would counter-
neoliberalism’s reduction of truth to the price mechanism, its reduction of disaffected hostility to 
a governed, entrepreneurial competitiveness, and the reduction of freedom to liberty and self-
investment. But most of all, a cynicism that would be worthy of the name today would have to 
counter neoliberalism’s governance of and war against any divergent subjectivation.	  
Today, cynicism could begin by stripping away the attachment to wealth that defines the 
entrepreneur. One could imagine Diogenes asking, “What good are skills and knowledge if they 
only ensure being governed?” At one point Foucault remarks, “The Cynics, of course, would 
have said that someone who is rich, who has a positive relation to wealth, cannot really be wise.” 
(FS, 141) The Cynic neither works nor competes for wealth, but paradoxically begs, antagonizes, 
mocks, and challenges humanity. In fact, one story recounted by Lucian tells of how Diogenes, 
the son of a banker, was known to satirize business.255 (CT, 226) And whereas the neoliberal 
entrepreneur only becomes different under the direction of price signals that subject them, the 
Cynic is the reverse of this, as they make desubjection a condition of truth. The Cynic critically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Lucian, the great satirist of the second century, tells the following story of Diogenes: “A report that Philip II of 
Macedon was marching on the town had thrown all Corinth into a bustle; one was furbishing his arms, another 
wheeling stones, a third patching the wall, a fourth strengthening a battlement, every one making himself useful 
somehow or other. Diogenes having nothing to do—of course no one thought of giving him a job—was moved by 
the sight to gather up his philosopher’s cloak and begin rolling his tub energetically up and down the Craneum; an 
acquaintance asked for, and got, the explanation: ‘I do not want to be thought the only idler in such a busy 
multitude; I am rolling my tub to be like the rest.’” (Lucian 1905, 110) 
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distances themselves from all regimes of veridiction, especially the market. Foucault never 
mentions neoliberalism in The Courage of Truth, but neoliberalism awaits its Cynical rejoinder. 
As Foucault says, “there is often a story of money, banking, and exchange whenever the Cynics 
are involved.” (CT, 241)  
The Cynics contain a number of elements that help to orient resistance to neoliberal life, 
even along the lines of the schematic notion of communism that I described above. First, 
Cynicism is useful for orienting the critique of neoliberal governmentality after one abandons 
traditional left projects like democracy, the welfare state, or social justice. Foucault is right that 
the ever-present danger of formal political organizations is that they convert affects of hostility 
into either sectarianism or hegemony by valorizing the reproduction of the organization and its 
governance over all else. This problem turns up in the context of neoliberalism as wave after 
wave of spontaneous resistance is either crushed by the police state, drained of its resources and 
energy, or channeled into dead-end political forms like the party or the organized left. 
Second, then, there is the question of what to do when neoliberal life becomes intolerable. 
Inevitably, this is a question of how to both replace traditional political forms of organization and 
how to assemble affects and resources in ways that avoid ending up managed or driven into 
despair. In short, how to conduct experiences of intolerability into practices that are intolerable 
to neoliberal governmentality? A Cynical imperative today might be, “Turn your intolerance 
into insolence.” And yet, abandoning one’s governability often appears impossible, particularly 
by oneself, alone. The question then becomes, how can communization begin by communizing 
the affect of intolerance toward market life?  
The answer has to do with truth. Becker mockingly asks at one point, “If governments are 
to expropriate all capital…should they also expropriate human capital?” (Becker 1995, 16) If we 
bracket the subject of this question (this is not a task for government), the answer, of course, is 
yes. As opposed to the formal organizational bond or the market contract, one might put forth 
something on the order of the Cynical pact. This need not mean voluntary poverty as the Cynics 
practiced it, but rather relinquishing the neoliberal relation to wealth that valorizes one’s market 
identity. More importantly, it means attaching oneself to others by challenging them or accepting 
the challenge to destitute oneself and become a scandal: the Cynical “we.” For the Cynical bond 
implies a shared struggle, even if the Greek Cynics practiced their philosophy individually. It 
involves sharing in affects of belligerence and care, which contrast starkly to the neoliberal 
reduction of affectivity to the human capital involved in emotional labor.256 The expropriation of 
human capital would not involve governmental confiscation, but changing its currency and 
assembling it elsewhere, in a different life.   
Third, it is generally expected that the people who “protest” today be intelligible and play 
the game of political recognition. Reading Foucault’s descriptions of the Cynics, I am sometimes 
struck by how tame his own acts of parrhēsia were by comparison. These were generally limited 
to public statements, journalistic reporting, and participation in groups that narrowly addressed 
themselves to contemporary problems. Sometimes this involved direct, material action like his 
work in the G.I.P. or in the French extension of Solidarity. He also planned to give material aid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Cynical care is also distinct from the exercise of care characteristic of the Christian pastorate on at least three 
counts. First, the Christian shepherd exercises a paternal care. Second, the object of care is maintained in a 
hierarchically subordinate position of dependency on the shepherd, whereas the Cynic seeks to further independence 
and mastery in others. Thirdly, the shepherd succeeds in his care only if he successfully leads his sheep to salvation, 
or the transcendent true world, whereas the Cynic aims at an other world that is metaphysically immanent. Finally, 
there is a qualitative ambiguity in the Cynic’s care inasmuch as it often manifests itself in the form of belligerence. 
Christ (appropriately) only manifested such belligerence in lashing out against money-changers. 
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to Vietnamese “boat people” once he finished The History of Sexuality project. (Eribon 1991, 
308) On the one hand, these are all very important examples because they point to a refusal to let 
one’s life be separated from struggle by traditional political forms. Moreover, they show how his 
philosophical problems and concerns largely emerged in and through the way he practiced the 
politics of truth. On the other hand, Foucault’s acts of truth-telling were often directed to 
governing bodies in the form of demands. While Foucault was defiant and valiant in his speeches, 
they nevertheless spoke the same language as those who governed. Often, this was a moral-
juridical language of rights and obligations. And when he appealed to the public for support, I 
wonder whether he saw the tension between himself and the Cynics he studied, who abolished 
the distinction between the private and the public in their conduct.  
Today, however, there are new, more inventive Cynics taking to the streets. Perhaps the 
most courageous risk taken by Occupy Wall Street was the way it refused to make demands that 
would absorb it into a game of recognition while living collectively in public. Black Lives Matter 
protestors have been recalcitrantly blockading or bursting into spaces of consumerism and 
electoral politics. And with increasing consistency and intensity, riots continue to explode with 
the force of the intolerable and challenge others to see whether the other life and the other world 
might live in the destitution of this one by a collective force. If the Cynic is a philosopher at war, 
then perhaps so too is the rioter. And if Cynicism returns us to war by way of governmentality 
and subjectivation, then perhaps one must insist on forcing an encounter with the intolerable.  
One of the most recent insurrections against neoliberalism took place during the Spring 
of 2016, when France was shaken by three months of demonstrations and riots against a 
proposed bill called the “Loi Travail,” or the Labor Law. Fittingly, it was proposed by the 
socialist administration of President François Hollande. The wave of resistance that emerged in 
response eventually called itself Nuit Debout (“Rise Up at Night”) after people began assembling 
at night in order to organize breakaway marches throughout the city.  
People often cited sociological reasons for the rage against the Loi Travail, such as 
France’s 25% youth unemployment rate (10.6% generally). Ironically, the solution proposed by 
the Loi Travail amounted to a familiar series of neoliberal reforms that included reductions in 
redundancy severance payments and overtime pay, along with the easing of restrictions on 
layoffs and minimum work hours–to name but a few. The effect would be the same as what 
we’ve seen in the U.S and elsewhere: a cosmetic reduction of official unemployment figures and 
an increase of precarity and exploitation.  
However, something political emerged in Nuit Debout that was irreducible to its social 
conditions, namely, a general refusal of the alternative between the failed paternalism of the 
social welfare state and the proposed future of heightened neoliberal precarity. Since these are 
both premised on governing the population to identify with work, what emerged was a 
breakaway from government altogether by refusing work as a way of life. Some banners read 
“Become Ungovernable,” “Retire at age 13,” and “Under the paving stones: the cops.” 
On March 24th, two weeks into the movement, the police violently evicted the student 
occupation of Tolbiac High School and, in a separate incident, brutally pummeled a 15 year old 
student demonstrator. At that moment, the predominantly student-led movement clearly saw how 
the neoliberal future on the horizon had its own foot-soldiers on the ground in the here and now. 
To accept order in the streets was already to accept defeat. Two days later, the 26th of March 
saw students go on the offensive by rioting at police stations near the Bergson High School in 
Paris. The social movement against the Loi Travail had become a political war against the police 
apparatus.  
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Fast-forward to June 6. Two and a half months of intense rioting and high-pitched street 
fights against the cops had bent power relations in a new direction and introduced a new way of 
being in the world—or a new way of undoing it—into the situation. Of course, riots are nothing 
new. But when they take on a protracted consistency in space and time, they signify the 
emergence of rioters: neither bodies exploding with rage nor yet another claim-making political 
identity, but battle-forged subjectivities that have learned how to fight and won’t be able to 
return to the daily life from which they’ve broken away.  
One of the blogs maintained by those in the struggle, Lundi.am, put forth an analysis of 
the rioting in a post titled “The Wisdom of Rioters.” Directly citing The Courage of Truth, they 
explain how the rioter is not to be understood sociologically but ethically and politically as a 
sage. The rioter is someone who, like Solon, descends into the city in “only in emergency 
situations” and courageously communicates the truth only through gestural riddles that put them 
at great risk. (Lundi.am 2018, 10; 8) However, rioters are largely mute as they smash the 
symbols of capital and attack the police. When facing off against the cops, they would simply 
chant, “HOO! HOO! HOO!” The rioter is someone whose intolerance has transformed their 
docility into joy as they efface the faceless currency of capital. If the rioters make any appeal, it 
is to somehow join them: “Thus does the smashing of symbols of power communicate itself. It 
lays bare the fragility of power, despite itself, as an act we can and must engage in.” Riots often 
have this quality of making-appear. Usually this happens when those excluded from politics 
storm its regime of visibility, as in the prison riots that inspired Discipline and Punish. Yet, as a 
subjectivation, the rioter wants nothing more than to demonstrate the groundlessness of power 
relations and the inherent breakability of every apparatus that tries to ground them. But perhaps 
even more important than this is that the rioter shows how it is possible to live a different life.  
Foucault’s lectures point beyond Foucault’s own practices to a counter-neoliberal 
conduct that begins with an experience of the intolerable. To assume the intolerable is to will 
what it already accomplishes, namely, desubjection, or the blockage of its flows of self-
investment. This leads to two lines of counter-conduct: one that prioritizes a collective political 
strategy and a second prioritizes ethical subjectivation.  
The ethical gesture in neoliberalism is stripping bare, or destitution in the sense of 
divesting oneself of one’s neoliberal governability. To become a practice, it is necessary to 
preserve the intolerable in an attunement that manifests itself to others as insolence and scandal. 
Insolence smashes the governmentality of market veridiction and the forces of the neoliberal 
state. Scandalous conduct involves challenging others by attesting to the truth that life under the 
market is a life of vice and foolishness, that is, a life that is fundamentally reactive when it need 
not be. The Cynic expressly seeks to polarize those they encounter by presenting them with a 
challenge: become a friendly partisan of truth in desubjection or remain as a mere competitor 
amongst competitors on the market.  
The counter-neoliberal political strategy is communist combat. It starts by connecting the 
intolerable breakdowns in the human capital machine to those lived by others. From there, it is a 
matter of assembling the flows of the human capital machine differently by communizing 
material, financial, and human capital according to a rationality of transindividual empowerment. 
One builds the commune through a rationality of combat, which measures value by the ability to 
become different together through the enlistment of heterogenous forces. Communization 
deindividualizes the subject’s relation to wealth and forces them to become different by exposing 
them to the affects and powers of others. It does not begin by naming external enemies, but it 
does not fail to affirm that there is a war to be waged. In the neoliberal world, communism is 
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illegal, irrational, and untrue, which is why neoliberal states will either govern or attack it as a 
threat. Becoming-communist involves a risk, but it is one that is impossible for neoliberal 
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Appendix: Is Foucault a Neoliberal? 
 
 
Some have claimed The Birth of Biopolitics is not a critique of neoliberalism, starting 
with Gary Becker himself. In 2011, Bernard Harcourt invited Becker to a conference on the 
lecture course that was hosted by Carceral Notebooks at The University of Chicago. Having read 
only the last three lectures of the course, Becker concluded that their analyses were accurate and 
that, in his first impression, he had little with which to disagree. And he was not sure that 
Foucault disagreed with him.257 (Carceral Notebooks 2011) This reflects either carelessness or 
reflects the analytic strategy of The Birth of Biopolitics, which is simply to show how the 
relations of power are modeled on the market and subjectivity is modeled on the enterprise. 
Though I argue for the critical value of The Birth of Biopolitics in Chapter Six and the 
Conclusion, here I would like to address the possibility of a neoliberal turn in Foucault’s work.  
I argued in Chapters Three and Four that Foucault’s critique of subjection operates within 
a circle of struggle and truth. That is, critique is said to have two sources, which both amount to 
limit experiences of the being of language. There are ruptures in the strategies of power that take 
the form of struggles ‘from below’ and there are ruptures in discourse that take the form of 
literature. One of the main tasks of philosophy is to orient its critique of discourses by taking up 
the perspective of struggles. But this presupposes that one knows which struggles to affirm, 
which can only be decided through the critique of discourses.   
Now, nowhere in The Birth of Biopolitics does one find a reference to the pleb or to a 
perspective that would be the counterblow of power. In part, this is because a struggle against 
neoliberalism had yet to be invented.258 Yet, philosophy has another principal task, which is to 
use ruptures in discourse in order to describe their historical a priori. After his Nietzschean turn, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 When this link comes up in the roundtable discussion between Becker, François Ewald, and Harcourt, none of 
them adequately refer to its biopolitical horizon. (Carceral Notebooks 2011) Harcourt addresses Foucault’s claim 
that, in the link between human capital and genetics, biological reproduction will come to be understood as human 
capital enhancement along the lines of eugenics. (BB, 228) He then goes on to cite Foucault, who says: “What, you 
will ask, is the interest of all these analyses? You will be aware of the immediate political connotations and there is 
no need to stress them further. If there were only this lateral political product, we could no doubt brush this kind of 
analysis aside with a gesture, or at any rate purely and simply denounce it. But I think this would be both mistaken 
and dangerous.” (Ibid., 230-1) Harcourt takes this to mean that Foucault thinks that denouncing the connection 
between eugenics and neoliberalism would be mistaken and dangerous. However, it is possible to read Foucault’s 
statement as arguing that that the connection between neoliberalism and racism is not simply a “lateral political 
product” and that to think as much would be mistaken and dangerous. For just a bit earlier, Foucault says that “What 
we might call the racist effects of genetics is certainly something to be feared, and they are far from being eradicated, 
but this does not seem to me to be the major political issue at the moment.” (Ibid., 228-9) Harcourt is right that 
Foucault wants to postpone the question of racism here because it concerns the connection of human capital analysis 
to an external discourse and not a political problem that can already be found within human capital analysis taken by 
itself. The problem Foucault goes on to discuss, which is internal to human capital analysis, is what Harcourt rightly 
characterizes as discriminatory investment in human capital at the level of public policy. This would make racism a 
problem of the intersection of human capital analysis with pre-existing forms of racial discrimination, not a problem 
of human capital analysis itself. However, I would argue if that one analyzes the human capital analysis and the 
science of genetics at an archaeological level, one would find that that scientific racism is not an incidental or 
“lateral” problem, but one that is inextricably linked to the epistemological rules at play in these two sciences. This 
is due to the fact that human capital plays the same role as sexuality in the government of power relations, namely, 
as a relay between individuals and populations, as I discussed above. 
258 It is an open question whether the rise of Autonomia in Italy had any impact on Foucault or whether he saw any 
connection between the situation in Italy and the burgeoning of neoliberalism in France throughout the 1970s.  
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for Foucault this means analyzing the historical a priori as an effect of power and as the target of 
struggles. This, of course, includes anthropology and it means that a historically novel struggle 
would have to take up a basis not within anthropology, but outside of it. Thus, the archaeological 
critique of discourse has an evaluative function when it comes to thinking about struggles. It 
allows one to identify struggles (or tendencies within them) that break from the present. The 
ability to affirm the philosophical and political significance of prison riots in early 1970s France 
was made possible by the critique of anthropology. Or there are Foucault’s positive remarks 
around that time on wildcat strikes as tactics that break with the anthropology and discipline of 
labor unions. (DE1, 1268) I maintain that the critique of neoliberalism in The Birth of Biopolitics 
serves a similar end: it allows one to perceive the stakes of the politics of truth today and it 
points out the limit that one must cross. 
I have argued that three things lead Foucault to turn to an analysis of neoliberalism: most 
proximately, there is the continuation of the critique of governmentality, which was born of the 
emergence of political economy as a discourse on populations. And I have argued that the study 
of neoliberalism is a peculiar anthropology in the way that it objectifies subjects and in order to 
constitute them according to the empirico-transcendental doublet. But, above all, I have also 
suggested that nearly every one of Foucault’s genealogical inquiries seek to analyze modes of 
power in order put forth a challenge, namely, to determine if it is possible to exist otherwise and 
in resistance to the terms of our subjection. The analysis of neoliberalism is no different: the 
paradoxical neoliberal strategy of integrating desubjection into the governmental tactics of 
subjection presents a possible limit or challenge to the Foucaultian concept of critique as a unity 
of the history of the present and desubjection. How Foucault’s thought fares in this test is 
entangled with the question of whether he became a neoliberal.  
Certainly, it is necessary to remind oneself that The Birth of Biopolitics is a lecture, not a 
book. It does not have the status of an “experience book” in that it was not prepared as a 
philosophical-aesthetic object for its audience. That is not to deny that it was transformative for 
Foucault. Even a cursory browsing of Dits et Écrits will find Foucault experimenting beyond the 
book format as he uses interviews and essays to test new hypotheses, concepts, and rhetorical 
styling. Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality series were made possible by the 
experiments conducted at the Collège. And even those things that never made it into the books 
were not necessarily omitted because they are dead ends. The same goes for Foucault’s 
interviews. Deleuze’s insight is helpful in the regard when he points out that they allowed him to 
relate his historical studies both to what is timely and what is untimely in the current events of 
his time. (Deleuze 1995, 106) Even if it varies across written books, lectures, interviews, and 
roundtable discussions, Foucault’s thought was always testing itself.259 Nonetheless, The Birth of 
Biopolitics comes at a critical time in Foucault’s life, in the midst of his eight-year “silence” 
between the first and second volumes of The History of Sexuality. This is also the time in which 
he underwent a methodological crisis that would eventually yield a turn toward ethics and a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 In defending Foucault against Daniel Zamora’s recently edited volume, Critiquer Foucault?, on his Progressive 
Geographies blog, Stuart Elden writes, “[T]here is a risk that we take Foucault’s lectures as they are now presented 
to us, as ‘books’. But they are obviously not of the same status as the books he published himself, over which he 
spent years of work, nor are they are of the same standing as the countless shorter works he published in his lifetime 
– some based on lectures, certainly, but also articles, interviews, petitions, etc. to which he put his name.” Stuart 
Elden, “Foucault and Neoliberalism – a few thoughts in response to the Zamora piece in Jacobin,” Progressive 
Geographies: Thinking about place and power (blog), December 17, 2014, 
http://progressivegeographies.com/2014/12/17/foucault-and-neoliberalism-a-few-thoughts-in-response-to-the-
zamora-piece-in-jacobin/ 
	   165	  
complete reorientation of the project. 
One can begin to measure the impact of neoliberalism on Foucault by looking to the 
semantic field of Foucault’s concepts. The first set of terms pertains to the notion of power 
relations as a game and its resonance with the market as a game of governmentality. These 
include affirmative usage of terms such as “freedom,” “liberty,” “contract,” and the “rule of law.”  
In the 1984 interview, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 
Foucault critically discusses Habermas and the utopian error of seeking to escape power relations, 
opting instead for the use of governmentality and ethics to reduce the effects of domination in 
power relations:  
The idea that there could exist a state of communication that would allow the games of 
truth to circulate freely without any constraints or coercive effects, seems utopian to me. 
This is precisely a failure to see that power relations are not something that is bad in itself, 
that we have to break free of. I do not think that a society can exist without power 
relations, if by that one means the strategies by which individuals try to direct and control 
the conduct of others. The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them in the utopia of 
completely transparent communication, but to acquire the rules of law, the management 
techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the practice of self that will allow us to play 
these games of power with as little domination as possible…I believe that this problem 
must be framed in terms of rules of law, rational techniques of government and ethos, 
practices of the self and of freedom.” (EF1, 298-9) 
Everything here should be familiar to most of Foucault’s readers, except for one thing: the use of 
“rules of law” and “management techniques” to ensure that power relations are not so rigid as to 
become unalterable, but that their inherent fluidity is given a minimal structure that maximizes 
their openness and alterability.  
One finds this already developed earlier in his 1981 interview, “The Social Triumph of 
the Sexual Will,” which hypothesizes that identity is a game in order to elaborate on his 
declaration in the first volume of The History of Sexuality that “The rallying point for the 
counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and 
pleasures.” (HSI, 157) He discusses being gay not as an identity, but as an aesthetic mode of 
collective self-culture based on the creation of new kinds of relationships. As opposed to limiting 
the scope of gay struggles to rights, Foucault (perhaps somewhat jokingly) proposes “[securing] 
recognition for relations of provisional coexistence [and] adoption.” (EF1, 158) Here Foucault 
envisions a counter-conduct of contractual sociability in which individuals use the liberal norm 
of consent to uproot themselves from traditional familial bonds and insert themselves in intimate 
relations conceived as a game governed by the rule of law. And there is also his famous 
discussions of S&M from interviews from around this time, which conceive of it as a game of 
power involving a “mixture of rules and openness” in which there is “the use of a strategic 
relationship as a source of pleasure.”260 (Ibid., 152; 170)  
Beneath such ideas, however, is the effect of governmentality in Foucault’s concept of 
power relations. Governmentality names strategies of power in which the exercise of power 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 When Foucault articulates possibilities for gay struggles through classical liberal concepts, he does so in the 
mode of a counter-conduct that puts them to different uses in order to create new possibilities of existence. The use 
of liberalism to think about queer culture simultaneously queers liberalism. If anything is puzzling, however, it is 
Foucault’s one use of the concept of the rule of law to think about thwarting domination in 1984. However, if 
subjectivation can free up different possibilities for relating to the codes of power-knowledge and pervert these 
codes in the process, then, like Foucault’s discussion of adoption, perhaps one should not be so quick to assume that 
this rule of law is one that Hayek would be able to recognize.  
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between forces is directly related to their self-relation, or how they conduct themselves. That is, 
the relationship of the subject to itself (self-conduct) is already implied where power is no longer 
simply about antagonism, that is, directly acting on another, but agonism, or acting on the 
possibilities of others. In a governmental schema, power relations are understood primarily as 
“strategic games between liberties.” (Ibid., 299) Liberty means the openness of power relations, 
or the open field of possibilities that must already exist in order for one player to govern another. 
And likewise, every move modifies the possibilities available to the players involved. But this 
also means that the liberty inherent to power relations is what makes ethics possible, since the 
way in which one conducts oneself is not solely determined by the actions of other players, but is 
based upon the moves that each player makes for themselves: “Liberty is the ontological 
condition of ethics. But ethics is the deliberate form assumed by liberty. (Ibid., 284)  
Liberty is not unrelated to the notion of resistance already present throughout Foucault’s 
work on power, which one can also find in Foucault’s 1980s interviews: “You see, if there was 
no resistance, there would be no power relations. Because it would simply be a matter of 
obedience…So resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to the forces of the 
process; power relations are obliged to change with resistance. So I think that resistance is…the 
key word, in this dynamic.” (Ibid., 167) This is to say that liberty is a different codification of the 
primacy of resistance over domination in the concept of power relations. Power-knowledge 
would be superfluous in a world where the possibilities of resistance were null.  
That Foucault recognizes the immanence of his thought to the history of governmentality 
is obvious from “What is Critique?” where, in 1978, he states that “governmentalization…cannot 
be dissociated from the question ‘how not to be governed?’” (EFS, 265) It is as a counter-
conduct or a counter-governmentality that critique arises in modernity. And both the emergence 
of a liberal semantic field and the problem of ethical subjectivity in Foucault’s work are due to 
the genealogy of neoliberalism that begins with the study of security mechanisms in Security, 
Territory, Population. This connection appears in a conversation between Foucault and 
Alessandro Fontana, who attended The Birth of Biopolitics lectures:  
A.F.:     Five years ago, in your seminar at the Collège de France, we started to read 
Hayek and von Mises. People then said: Liberalism seemed to be a detour in order to 
rediscover the individual beyond the mechanisms of power. Your opposition to the 
phenomenological subject and to the psychological subject is well known. At that time, 
people began to talk about a subject of practices, and the rereading of liberalism took 
place to some extent with that in view… 
Foucault:     A distinction must be made here. In the first place, I do indeed believe that 
there is no sovereign, founding subject...I believe, on the contrary, that the subject is 
constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through 
practices of liberation, of liberty, as in Antiquity… (PPC, 50) 
For Foucault, freedom and liberty were not invented by the liberal tradition, even if Foucault 
only begins to speak of liberty in 1978. Governmentality is the general strategy of power 
relations in which Foucault thinks the possibility of ethics and critique as an historical practice of 
desubjection and self-formation. As I discuss in the Conclusion regarding cynicism, liberalism 
names but one line of descent in which to think critique as a counter-conduct.  
 There is one final point on the liberal semantics, namely, the rationality of Foucault’s 
critique of governmentality. Within the tendency of Euro-American societies to program power 
relations according to governmentality, Foucault states that the critique is a “general cultural 
form, both a political and moral attitude, a way of thinking...which I would very simply call the 
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art of not being governed or better, the art of not being governed like that and at that cost.”261 
(EFS, 264-5) Does “cost” here imply that the will to not be governed would arise on the basis of 
an economic calculation? Does this mean that the intolerable would be the ratio of costs to 
benefits at which tacit consent to the relations of power would break down?  
If that were the case, then the intolerable would be the limit to power relations only in the 
sense that it would mark the point where governmentality has reduced liberty to zero and has 
become domination. If the intolerable is the reduction of governmentality to domination, then it 
could never enable a critique of governmentality. Instead, it would be a liberal criterion for the 
critique of domination.  
Yet is this not what the neoliberals do when they put forth an inflationary critique of the 
state and totalitarianism? In this case, the intolerable would (a) be intelligible within the 
economic rationality of cost-benefit analysis and (b) be wholly compatible with neoliberal homo 
oeconomicus as an eminently governable subjectivity. And resistance would then be a matter of 
(1) applying a cost benefit analysis of power relations in terms of their denial of liberty, (2) 
applying a risk-benefit ratio for determining the amount of risk involved in optional courses of 
action relative to their expected benefits (the probability that they will enhance liberty and not 
further diminish it).262 Is the economic rationality of liberalism, then, the grid of intelligibility for 
thinking ethics and politics in governmentality? 
 There are three reasons why I do not think that this is the case. (1) There are Foucault’s 
explicit remarks in The Birth of Biopolitics, which critique both the inflationary attitude toward 
the state and the governability of economic rationality. (2) However errant (and stubbornly so) 
Foucault’s enthusiastic assessment of the Iranian situation proved to be, the virtues of 
revolutionary subjectivity that it impressed on him nevertheless yield an important contrast to 
homo oeconomicus’ use of liberty as a criterion of political assessment. And finally, (3) power 
relations do not have to go as far as domination for them to become intolerable.  
Foucault calls the neoliberal critique of the state “inflationary,” prey to “slippages,” 
“fantastical” and “paranoid.” (BB, 187-8) But worst of all, “it does not carry out a criticism or 
analysis of itself,” which is tantamount to saying that it is anti-philosophical. What makes 
critique philosophical is that it is recursive and self-directed. Philosophy’s task is to challenge its 
own assumptions and their relations to power. What would the neoliberals find if they were to 
aim critique not only at their enemies, but at themselves? Foucault does not ask this question, but 
he points out the path to follow when he says that one part of this inflationary critique is to say 
that, in its tendency toward growth, the state “will come to take over entirely that which is at the 
same time its other, its outside, its target, and its object, namely: civil society.” (Ibid., 187)  
What is the effect of the neoliberal critique of the state? It is to oppose the decentralized, 
voluntary coordination of the market to the centralized planning of the state in such a way that all 
instances in which the state posits economic ends for society is inherently totalitarian in tendency. 
One finds this written in Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom: “Fundamentally, there are only 
two ways of coordinating the economic activities of millions. One is central direction involving 
the use of coercion—the technique of the army and of the modern totalitarian state. The other is 
voluntary cooperation of individuals—the technique of the market place.” (Friedman 1982, 13) 
Neoliberalism masks power relations by mapping the distinction between freedom (the 
voluntary) and coercion onto the market and the state respectively. By reducing freedom to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 My emphasis. 
262 Here I have in mind a perceived risk-benefit ratio calculation, which calculates an action’s ratio of risk to 
probable benefits, without knowledge of statistical or historical data on similar actions in similar circumstances.  
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voluntary selection of liberties, neoliberalism excludes the economy from power relations. 
Furthermore, this morally individualizes homo oeconomicus, who must now assume 
responsibility for their economic choices.  
Foucault clearly critiques this distinction between coercion and consent in his emphatic 
characterization of homo oeconomicus as a model of subjectivity that is governable from the 
ground-up. Just as The History of Sexuality says that sex is not on the other side of power, we 
must not think that one says no to governmentality by saying yes to economic choice. (HSI, 157) 
One may use liberty to critique domination, but it contributes to the naturalization of the market 
by conceptually excluding it from the field of power. For this, one must return to the concept of 
counter-conducts in order to conceive of resistance not as a free choice amongst extant 
possibilities, but as the creation of new possibilities that challenge the historical order of the 
possible and the impossible.  
Second, there is the question of insurrection that the intolerable implies. The Birth of 
Biopolitics makes no mention of contemporary struggles. Yet as I argued in Chapter Five, the 
Iranian Revolution was a practical impetus behind Foucault’s concept of counter-conduct. 
Contrasting the subject of this revolution with homo oeconomicus reveals an important 
difference: the subject of the Iranian Revolution is incalculable. One of his first writings on Iran, 
“Useless to Revolt?,” states: “Revolts belong to history. But in a certain way, they escape from 
it…because the man who rebels is finally inexplicable; it takes a wrenching-away that interrupts 
the flow of history, and its long chains of reasons, for a man to be able, ‘really,’ to prefer the risk 
of death to the certainty of having to obey.” (EF3, 449) The historical novelty and inexplicability 
of resistance comes from the absolute risk of death. This signals that ethics is not simply a matter 
of trading off costs (or risks) for benefits. Even in cases where risking one’s life takes the form 
of a sacrifice, one forgoes all certainty of one’s effects. Whether death is certain or risked, dying 
as an act—something that deeply fascinated Foucault—becomes a way of fashioning a life and is 
thus itself a way of conducting oneself in an intolerable situation.263 Thus there is a Nietzschean 
rejoinder to neoliberalism on whether liberty must be one’s reference when thinking about the 
intolerable: great risk involves no recuperation and no playing of probabilities, but a childlike 
cast of dice.  
For Foucault, the incalculable revolutionary is opposed to the calculability of homo 
oeconomicus (and this is to say nothing of the collective mode of existence of insurrections).264 
This incalculability extends to other traits that Foucault used to characterize the politics of truth 
as a counter-conduct starting in 1978. These include words like “insubordination,” “intractability” 
and the “intransitivity of freedom.” (EFS, 266; EF3, 343) One may oppose these to the 
entrepreneurial virtues of adaptability, flexibility, and detachment from bonds with others. 
Neoliberals also heroize the entrepreneur as a risk-taker. But the entrepreneur only takes 
calculated risks. And above all, the entrepreneur’s risk ties them to their subjection in the form 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 James Miller argues that, with AIDS, this element of risk was also a part of the collective practice of Gay men 
and that this added novel dimension to the coupling of bodies and pleasures for Foucault. Miller, citing Foucault: “I 
am a partisan of a true cultural struggle,” Foucault reiterated nearly thirty years later: we must “teach people that 
there is not a piece of conduct more beautiful or, consequently, more worthy of careful thought than suicide. One 
should work on one’s suicide throughout one’s life.” (Miller 1993, 351) 
264 Moreover, in Iran, Foucault found a “politically collective will” that he compared to anti-colonial revolutions. 
Foucault states: “What has given its intensity to the Iranian movement has been a double register. On the one hand, a 
politically collective will that has been rather affirmed, and, on the other hand, the will to a radical change in 
existence. But this double affirmation only has for its support institutions that bring with them chauvinism, 
nationalism, and exclusion, which make up a truly powerful driving force for individuals” (DE2, 754).  
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of moral responsibility, whereas the revolutionary’s risk is a matter of desubjection.  
I have argued that liberty can be used to critique domination, but not governmentality, 
since it artificially limits the critique from extending to the economy and because it refers to a 
calculating subject who is averse to risk and uncertainty. The third reason why the intolerable 
cannot be indexed to liberties is that the stake of the critique of governmentality directly targets 
that of neoliberalism. Regarding critique, Foucault writes, “What is at stake, then, is this: How 
can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?” (EFS, 
55) For neoliberalism, it is the opposite. It is about modeling power relations on the market and 
producing totally governable subjects. In other words, neoliberalism links self-investment in 
human capital—the growth of capacities—to the intensification of power relations. 
Neoliberalism makes desubjection work for subjection. The desubjection of the subject in the 
politics of truth must also be a growth of capabilities, but it must also fight and intensify 
struggle.265 (DE2, 540) 
Foucault’s prescience regarding neoliberalism was not linked to an enthusiasm about its 
historical novelty. Not everything new in history is of the same value. Nor did he see in 
neoliberalism an antidote to the anatamo-politics and biopolitics of the welfare state. For the 
critique of discipline, biopower, and domination does not by default place one on the side of 
neoliberal governmentality. Liberals and socialists set up a false opposition when they conceive 
of politics within the opposition between free market capitalism and the welfare state. If Foucault, 
critiquing Marx, says that he is no different than Ricardo because they both engender the same 
anthropological rules of discourse, then one could say the same of the welfare state and 
neoliberalism insofar as both exist within the same horizon of governmentality. Those who 
critique the state are not for that reason immediately allied with one another.  
Ultimately, however, the question of whether or not Foucault was a neoliberal is 
meaningless. It fetishizes Foucault-the-author and neglects to test his concepts for their strategic 
value within our current conjuncture. Johanna Oksala is absolutely correct when she states on An 
und für sich, “The only relevant question the academic left should be asking regarding 
Foucault’s analyses of neoliberalism is whether they provide us with any useful tools that can be 
successfully deployed against the current neoliberal hegemony.” (Oksala 2015) This is why it is 
important to struggle against neoliberalism—as a matter of challenging both one’s mode of 
existence and one’s concepts.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 The quotes in this paragraph were taken from “What is Critique?,” “What is Enlightenment?,” and “Analytico-
Political Philosophy.” They are all from 1978.  
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Abbreviations Used for the Texts of Michel Foucault 
 
AK Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language 
BC The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception 
BB Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978 – 1979 
DL Death and the Labyrinth 
DP Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
DE1 Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975 
DE2 Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988 
EFS Selections from the Essential Works of Foucault 1954—1984  
EF1 Essential Works of Foucault 1954—1984: Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth 
EF2 Essential Works of Foucault 1954—1984: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology 
EF3 Essential Works of Foucault 1954—1984: Power 
FL Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961 – 1984  
GL On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France 1979 – 1980 
GSO The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981 – 1982 
HM History of Madness  
HS The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981 – 1982 
HS1 The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction 
HS2 The History of Sexuality, Volume II: The Use of Pleasure 
IKA Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology 
LCP Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews 
OT The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences 
PK Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972 – 1977 
PP Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France 1972 – 1973 
PPC Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977 – 1984 
PS The Punitive Society: Lectures at the Collège de France 1972 – 1973 
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SBD Speech Begins After Death 
SMD Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975 – 1976 
STP Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977 – 1978 
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